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ABSTRACT 
This study examines Indonesia's use of informal diplomacy between 1985-1998, 
to further its interests for peace and stability in Southeast Asia. This study argues 
that the adoption of informal diplomacy was in response to the structural 
limitation of ASEAN, the nature of the problems of regional conflicts and 
disputes, and the Indonesian Foreign Ministry's desire to increase its leverage in 
foreign policy making and· implementation within the Indonesian political system 
which promoted inter-elites competition. At the same time, internal dynamics 
within the Ministry from the late-1960s - internal consolidation and the 
development of a new cadre of trained diplomats - made the adoption of informal 
diplomacy possible. 
This study develops an analytical framework derived from the principles 
articulated by various scholars and practitioners of Track Two diplomacy and on 
the conception of bureaucratic politics. The main purpose of this study is to 
outline and analyse the adoption and application of informal diplomacy in 
Indonesia's diplomatic activities from the mid-1980s onward, and also to test a 
number of hypotheses derived from the literature on informal diplomacy. This 
study examines three cases where Indonesia used informal diplomacy as part of 
the overall diplomatic initiatives: in dealing with conflicts in Cambodia and in the 
southempart of the Philippines, and in seeking to prevent armed conflicts 
revolving around territorial disputes in the South China Sea. 
The assessment of research materials and interviews during the fieldwork show 
that in the Indonesian context adherence to informal diplomacy principles was 
subject to the circumstances during the meetings, time pressures, and the 
availability of resources as well as the notion of bureaucratic politics. Overall, the 
interest of President Soeharto in the informal diplomacy process increased the 
status of the diplomatic endeavours, an important feature of conflict resolution 
approaches within the Asian setting. 
This study makes extensive use of documents filed in Indonesia's Ministry of 
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1.1. Scope and impetus for the study 
This study examines the use of informal diplomacy by Indonesia, between 1985-
1998 (the second half of the President Soeharto era), in pursuit of its national 
interests of peace and stability in Southeast Asia. It was during this period that 
informal diplomacy became a 'buzzword' in Indonesia's diplomatic efforts, 
particularly in dealing with three problems in the region, namely: 1) conflict in 
Cambodia, 2) the separatist movement in the southern part of the Philippines, and 
3) territorial claims revolving around the South China Sea disputes. Through three 
case studies, this study identifies the common patterns of the informal diplomacy 
techniques, highlights their unique individual implementations and assesses their 
contribution to resolving the issues. 
Whether the use of informal diplomacy was linked to Indonesia's aspirations to be 
a 'regional leader', as some studies have suggested, 1 is beyond the scope of the 
study. The use of this mode of informal diplomacy between 1985 and 1998 is of 
particular interests in this study because the informal diplomacy at this time 
adopted the principles and some techniques developed by Track Two diplomacy 
scholars to resolve conflicts and disputes. This distinguishing characteristic of 
informal diplomacy as a diplomatic approach is not shared by Indonesia's 
attempts to resolve conflicts before 1985. Prior to 1985, the informal approaches 
tend to be sporadic and rely more on behind the scenes intelligence operations. 
Hence, the informal diplomacy between 1985 and 1998 was a new innovative 
approach to deal with some dated regional problems. 
Indonesia's selection of informal diplomacy is an intriguing topic for analysis 
considering that Indonesia adopted principles of informal diplomacy articulated 
by various scholars and practitioners of Track Two diplomacy. As a convention, 
Track Two diplomacy is regarded as the domain of non-state actors and, therefore, 
state sponsored informal diplomacy as happened in Indonesia's case not only 
challenges the convention, but also raises two questions. The first question is why 
a state adopted the non-conventional approach of diplomacy _ developed by Track 
Two diplomacy scholars and practitioners - and the second question is how useful 
the principles were when implemented by a state actor. These questions involve 
issues relevant to the · adoption of informal diplomacy and the aspect of 
implementation of informal diplomacy to deal with regional problems are the 
main focus of this study. 
1.2. Justification for the study 
This study is important because although much has been written on Indonesian 
foreign policy, there is no major study on the characteristics of Indonesia's 
informal diplomacy between 1985 and 1998. The majority of studies on 
Indonesian foreign policy and diplomacy tend to concentrate their discussion on 
the formal aspect of the diplomacy and discussion of Soeharto's informal 
approach in diplomacy, such as it is, is treated more as illustrative than 
descriptive. Some analysts of Indonesian foreign policy do explore the aspect of 
informality in Indonesian diplomacy, but their discussions revolve mostly around 
the role of the military. Fore example, Leo Suryadinata discusses the way 
Soeharto use informal approach in dealing with some foreign policy issues, 
particularly by assigning military intelligence as points of contact.2 Rizal Sukma 
also observes the way Soeharto used the military and Indonesian business 
communities to explore the possibility of renewing Indonesia's diplomatic 
relations with China.3 
Likewise, no major study explores the dynamics of foreign policy making and 
implementation in the Indonesian political system, by examining closely the 
processes within the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Ministry) from 
the perspective of bureaucratic politics. 
Furthermore, there are no major studies which (1) analyse the way in which 
Indonesia adopted and implemented principles of Track Two diplomacy in its 
diplomacy, or (2) assess the implications of state sponsored informal diplomacy 
for the study of Track Two diplomacy. This study aims to fill this gap. At the 
2 
same time, this study of informal diplomacy will provide new perspectives on 
Indonesian foreign policy in the Southeast Asian Region within and beyond the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Lastly, this study provides an 
opportunity to examine a number of propositions/hypotheses derived from the 
Track Two diplomacy literature. 
1.3. Framework of the study 
From the very outset, it is necessary to mention that although the adoption of 
informal diplomacy to resolve regional conflict took place in the mid-1980s, this 
does not mean that Indonesia's interest in regional order started in that period. In 
fact, regional order was an ideal of Indonesian leaders from the early years of 
Indonesia's independence in 1945. 
President Soeharto was deeply committed to the ideal and asserted that peace and 
stability was a prerequisite condition for Indonesia's economic development 
program and nation-building. To achieve this aim, Indonesia embarked on policies 
of developing good neighbourhood relations and promoting regional co-operation 
through ASEAN. These policies were designed to restore confidence among the 
neighbouring countries of Indonesia's good intentions in the region. The 
restoration was essential because, under Soekarno, Indonesia had embarked on 
'high profile' diplomacy of confrontation (konfrontasi) against Malaysia which 
had imperiled the region. The Soeharto government adopted 'low profile' 
diplomacy in the late 1960s and the 1970s and, as a consequence, the 
neighbouring countries were gradually convinced that Indonesia was not wishing 
to play a 'big brother' role within ASEAN, nor did it have hegemonic interests. 
Indonesia treated ASEAN as the primary vehicle to build trust and confidence 
among the members and, at the same time, to transmit Indonesia's concerns for 
issues affecting peace and stability in Southeast Asia. In their various statements, 
Indonesia's leaders had all expressed their confidence in the efficacy of ASEAN 
and its framework, and given the impression that ASEAN was at the centre of 
Indonesian foreign policy.4 Indonesia promoted the need for stability among the 
ASEAN members as a means to achieve regional stability, that is, national 
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resilience for regional resilience. Essentially, each ASEAN member was 
responsible for developing its resilience by concent t· ·1 · ra mg on 1 s own nation-
building program. At the domestic level ASEAN membe t d 1 "th th · , rs were o ea w1 eir 
own politico-security, economic, and social issues. The end result of national 
stability would be regional stability. 
However, Vietnam's inva~ion of Cambodia in the late 1970s challenged regional 
peace and stability, provoking a new cycle of protracted armed conflict in 
Cambodia which imperilled the region because, in sustaining their war efforts the 
parties to the conflict brought the two super powers, the United States (the US) 
and the Soviet Union, into the equation. Although the US did not employ its 
military power directly, it aligned its position with China, the regional power in 
Asia, and put diplomatic pressure on Vietnam to withdraw. The conflict strained 
ASEAN's relations with Vietnam while, at the same time, ASEAN's relations 
with China - Vietnam's nemesis - soared, due to ASEAN solidarity with Thailand. 
As a 'front line state,' Thailand relied on China's support to deter the potential 
threat posed by Vietnam's military forces along the Thai border. However, 
ASEAN's de facto alignment with China did not serve Indonesia's interest in 
having regional order and a strong Vietnam as a buffer against a potential threat 
from China. 
The Cambodian conflict contradicted Indonesia's security perspective and 
interests with the interests of some members of ASEAN and also with the position 
of ASEAN as a group. Indonesia had no other option than to follow ASEAN's 
position. To balance its interests, Indonesia insisted that ASEAN maintain contact 
with Vietnam. Indonesia's persistence forced ASEAN to accredit Indonesia with 
status as ASEAN interlocutor with Vietnam, a status which provided Indonesia 
with a mandate to look for an alternative solution to the conflict within and 
beyond the ASEAN framework. Indonesia translated ASEAN's mandate and its 
interest for peace into a series of informal meetings in the late 1980s, known as 
the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIMs). The precursor of the informal diplomacy 
conception was Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja's proposal for hosting 
a 'cocktail party' to effect a breakthrough in the stalemate by bringing all parties 
to the Cambodian conflict to Jakarta to meet in an informal setting. 
4 
The JIM gave Indonesia a first lesson on how to facilitate informal meetings 
aimed at resolving conflict comprehensively. Having confidence in the merit of 
the informal diplomacy approach, Indonesia used a similar approach in dealing 
with two regional problems. First, from 1993 to 1996, Indonesia facilitated 
informal exploratory talks and a series of meetings between the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. 
Second, from 1990 to 19~8, Indonesia organised informal workshops to discuss 
possible co-operation in the South China Sea, downplaying the unresolved status 
of territorial claims.5 
Although known by a variety of names (cocktail party, informal meetings, 
informal exploratory talks, and informal workshop) the common thread of 
Indonesia's diplomatic initiatives between 1985-1998 was informal diplomacy. 
Informal diplomacy adopted principles closely associated with approaches for 
conflict management and conflict resolution, referred to as Track Two 
diplomacy.6 This Track Two diplomacy approach differed from the traditional 
approach of official diplomacy or 'track one,' which Edward Azar7 argues, lacks 
the necessary orientation to generate conflict resolution breakthroughs because it 
puts more emphasis on "official contacts between the representatives of sovereign 
entities, governments and other parties to a dispute within a bargaining 
framework."8 In contrast, an informal forum could facilitate a meeting between 
adversaries where no formal mechanism suitable for the differing parties exists. 
Hence, informal diplomacy was derived from the principles grounded in Track 
Two diplomacy. 
The adoption of principles from Track Two diplomacy by a state actor raises 
doubts about the validity of the convention that Track Two diplomacy is the sole 
domain of non-state actors. The principles of Track Two diplomacy were 
developed and discerned by scholars who were dissatisfied with the failures of 
'track one' diplomacy and mediation to resolve conflicts and disputes 
comprehensively. The involvement of non-state actors in Track Two diplomacy 
has its own merit because they are usually perceived as more neutral than 
governments and because they address the underlying issues of conflict and 
disputes which state actors often ignore. 
5 
The use by Indonesia of informal diplomacy was not an alternative to or a 
substitute for formal diplomacy, but a way to complement the diplomatic efforts at 
the more formal level. Hence, informal diplomacy was used within the bigger 
picture of Indonesian diplomacy and, therefore, in the three case studies, there was 
a linkage or synergy between informal and formal diplomatic processes. Indonesia 
employed principles of Track Two diplomacy, adopted a number of the 
techniques and underst~ndings, but adjusted these principles when the 
circumstances required such actions. The Indonesian action raises questions about 
whether the Indonesians were fully aware of the Track Two diplomacy principles 
and techniques, and whether there were factors impeding complete adoption of 
these principles. 
This study argues that Indonesia's informal diplomacy proved very helpful in 
paving the way for the resolution of the Cambodian conflict and the subsequent 
signing of the peace agreement in 1991. Informal diplomacy was also very useful, 
and was used in tandem with formal negotiations, to deal with conflict in the 
southern-part of the Philippines and led to the signing of a peace agreement 
between the Philippines Government and the MNLF in 1996. Nevertheless, 
similar approaches in the South China Sea disputes had yet to achieve positive 
results. After nine years sponsoring Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts 
in the South China Sea, Indonesia had to admit that the progress of the informal 
process had been very modest. Indonesia had not been able to formalise the 
informal process of the meetings, or even gain support from the participants to 
persuade their authorities to implement some of the agreements reached in the 
workshops. 
Indonesia's diplomatic initiatives to deal with the three regional problems came 
under the scrutiny of domestic constituents. In particular, the commitment to 
hosting the series of informal workshop was questioned domestically by 
bureaucrats from departments outside the Foreign Ministry, who wished to see 
some more tangible outcomes from the informal undertaking and criticised the 
workshops as being nothing more than a talk shop. 
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This study argues that it would be premature to judge the effectiveness of informal 
diplomacy on the grounds of the lack of apparent positive outcomes. Adequate 
attention needs to be given to the philosophy and reasons behind the approaches, 
as well as to the objectives of the informal diplomacy set by their proponents from 
the Ministry. Overall, the choice of informal diplomacy raises a number of 
questions about why Indonesia took the initiative in the first place, and why in the 
form of informal diplomacy? Had Indonesia exhausted all available formal 
channels (the bilateral and the ASEAN framework) to deal with the problems? 
What were the limitations of the formal process? As an approach, did informality 
represent an ASEAN tradition for dealing with problems quietly behind closed 
doors or was it a reflection of innovation on the part of Indonesia? If it was an 
innovation, who were the main proponents of the approach within the Ministry? 
Considering that all of the diplomatic initiatives were introduced during 
Soeharto's presidency clearly Soeharto's governing style had some influence on 
the choice of the informal format. Furthermore, Soeharto was known for 
encouraging competition among the bureaucracies and the military establishment 
to fulfil his domestic and foreign policy goals. With this in mind, a question arises 
as to whether the informal diplomacy was a result of bureaucratic politics in 
foreign policy making where elites were competing at all times for the President's 
favour. Furthermore, in the first two decades of his rule, Soeharto did not have 
confidence in the Ministry because of the allegiance of some high-ranking 
officials in the Ministry to Soekamo's cause. Sensing Soeharto's antipathy toward 
the Ministry, the new leaders in the Ministry took steps to improve their position 
inside the Indonesian political system. One of these steps was to develop a new 
cadre of professional diplomats who were trained and educated overseas and, 
therefore, were equipped with various perspectives on diplomacy. The informal 
format was the outcome of soul searching among Ministry personnel or a 
reflection of the Ministry's efforts to gain Soeharto's confidence. 
Informal diplomacy suggests a revival of the career diplomats' position in foreign 
policy matters. With limited resources to compete with other resource rich 
bureaucracies and the military establishment, the Ministry was left with no other 
means but to be creative in trying to gain the confidence of the President. As 
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discussed in Chapter 3, foreign policy making in Indonesia was subject to rivalry 
among the bureaucrats (bureaucratic politics), as different ministries and sections 
of the military establishment tried to ensure that their interests were 
accommodated in foreign policy outputs. In one way or another, bureaucratic 
politics influenced not only the foreign policy making process, but also the way in 
which the Ministry designed and implemented informal diplomacy. It is therefore 
necessary to comprehend !he nature of inter-ministry rivalry in Indonesia in order 
to assess the making and the implementation of informal diplomacy. 
However, rather than focusing on these questions and considerations, some 
analysts perceived the plethora of Indonesia's initiatives within and beyond the 
ASEAN framework as a revival of an assertiveness in Indonesian foreign policy.9 
For them, the initiatives represented a return to a 'high profile' stance as it was 
before under Soekarno. This study argues that informal diplomacy was prompted 
by limitations within ASEAN's framework which made it difficult for Indonesia 
to further its interests in regional order. This study considers that these limitations 
include the prevalence of the non-interference doctrine in the internal affairs of 
members, and ASEAN's reluctance to discuss disputes involving some member 
countries. 10 Indeed, ASEAN's reluctance to find solutions to the problems 
involving some of its members and also members' internal problems not only 
prolonged the status quo but also created uncertainty that had the potential to 
destabilise the region. 
In the process of considering all the issues involved in the three case studies this 
study argues that in order to deal with political security issues at the regional level 
and noting some limitations in the ASEAN framework, Indonesia intentionally 
pursued informal diplomacy, to complement its formal diplomatic efforts at a 
regional level in ASEAN and at a bilateral level. The technique had been carefully 
designed to avoid neighbouring countries, many of whom were still feeling the 
. . h t 11 d negative effects of Indonesia's high profile diplomacy m t e pas , an were 
apprehensive about Indonesia's intentions. 
It will be argued that Indonesia adopted some Track Two diplomacy principles, 
assumptions and techniques because the nature of the conflicts and the disputes 
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required a different diplomatic approach. It will also be argued that the adoption 
of informal diplomacy was a result of bureaucratic politics within the Indonesian 
political system and the internal dynamics within the Ministry. Moreover, it will 
be argued that in the Indonesian context, informal diplomacy's contribution to the 
resolution of regional conflicts and disputes was dependent on the nature of the 
problems, the parties' commitment to the informal diplomacy process and the 
support from the Preside_nt, the bureaucracies and the military establishment. 
Lastly, it will be argued that although state sponsored informal diplomacy 
benefited from propositions derived from Track Two diplomacy, in some cases 
the full adoption of the propositions was not desirable. Participants' lack of 
interest and motivation as well as efforts by some of them to derail the informal 
diplomacy processes illustrate why it was imperative for the third party to adapt 
the propositions according to the dynamics during the informal diplomacy 
process. 
1.4. The objectives of the study 
The primary objective of this study is to outline and analyse the adoption and 
application of informal diplomacy in Indonesia's diplomatic activities from the 
mid-1980s onward in dealing with conflicts and disputes in the Southeast Asian 
region. This study will also test a number of hypotheses derived from the 
literature on informal diplomacy. The specific objectives of this study are: 
(1) To examine the background behind the selection of in/annal diplomacy as a 
diplomatic technique, including the reasons behind the adoption of the 
technique. At issue here is why Indonesia selected the informal format. 
(2) To explore the objectives of Indonesia's informal diplomacy. At issue is the 
main intention in pursuing informal diplomacy in the three case studies. 
(3) To analyse the achievements of informal diplomacy. At issue is what factors 
helped or did not help Indonesia in achieving the objectives of informal 
diplomacy. 
(4) To assess the implementation of informal diplomacy from the perspective of 
Track Two diplomacy. At issue is whether or not informal diplomacy was 
guided by principles grounded in Track Two diplomacy and what aspects of 
Track Two diplomacy Indonesia followed. 
9 
(5) To assess the relevance of principles derivedfirom T, k T d" l · rac wo ip omacy m 
the context of Indonesia's informal diplomacy. At issue is under what 
circumstances can the principles associated with Track Two diplomacy 
contribute to the resolution of conflicts or disputes. 
1.5. The organisation of the thesis 
This study consists of eight chapters. The first chapter provides the background to 
the problem and outlines the objectives and the relevance of the study. Chapter 2 
provides the framework of the thesis, including the theoretical foundation, and 
also proposes hypotheses derived from Track Two diplomacy and bureaucratic 
politics in order to test aspects of Indonesia's informal diplomacy. This chapter 
will also explain the research method of the study. 
Chapter 3 provides an historical outline and analysis of Indonesia's responses to 
issues affecting peace and stability in the Southeast Asian region. In particular, 
this chapter describes five issues: 1) Indonesia's perspective on order; 2) the 
regional context of Indonesian foreign policy, by looking at ASEAN and its 
policy of accommodation, and the notion of Indonesia's national interest; 3) 
President Soeharto's growing interest in foreign affairs and in sustaining 
Indonesia's economic growth; 4) foreign policy making in Indonesia, including 
the structure and process of foreign policy initiation in the Ministry and in the 
Indonesian political system in general; and 5) the strategic motives behind the 
adoption of informal diplomacy. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 outline and analyse the three case studies at the regional level 
which Indonesia had tried to resolve or manage through informal diplomacy. Each 
chapter outlines the historical background of the problems and assesses how 
regional configurations and the deep-seated distrust among the parties affected the 
prolongation of the unsettled issues. The implementation of the informal 
diplomacy on each issue is also analysed and observations made on the objective 
of informal diplomacy, the intention of the technique, the strategy developed to 
pursue it and the outcome of the informal diplomacy. In this chapter, the issues of 
context are analysed to see the extent to which the context variable influenced the 
course of Indonesian diplomatic initiatives. However, as the focus of this study is 
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on informal diplomacy, the issues of context are discussed as a background in 
analysing the informal diplomacy. 
Chapter 7 assesses the common threads of Indonesian informal diplomacy in the 
three case studies. This chapter provides a summary analysis of how Indonesia 
pursued informal diplomacy and examines the way the Indonesian team exercised 
informal diplomacy in the_ three case studies. This chapter focuses on three major 
themes. The first theme is the organisational aspects of co-ordination, building the 
team and bureaucratic politics. The second theme examines processes that took 
place during the informal diplomacy, particularly the meeting dynamics. The 
analysis of the process during the meetings considers the interplay between the 
core-participants, that is, representatives from the parties involved in conflicts and 
disputes, and the facilitators: the Indonesians and others, such as the Canadians in 
the South China Sea workshops and French in Cambodia. The third theme is to do 
with the objectives of informal diplomacy. From the discussion of the objectives, 
this chapter assesses factors that helped or did not help Indonesia to achieve the 
objectives of informal diplomacy. 
Chapter 8 summarises the findings of this research in the light of theoretical 
arguments about Track Two diplomacy and bureaucratic politics, and assesses 
their usefulness in understanding and assessing Indonesia's informal diplomacy 
between 1985-1998. This chapter summarises the analysis of the hypotheses 
identified in Chapter 2. 
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Informal Diplomacy, Track Two and Bureaucratic Politics 
11.1. Introduction 
How a state responds to developments in its immediate region that are detrimental 
to its interest in having a stable and peaceful environment is central to this study. 
In its efforts to resolve the regional problems, Indonesia employed informal 
diplomacy during the second half of President Soeharto's administration (1985-
1998) - a period known for competition among ministries and the military 
establishment on some foreign policies issues. 
This study develops an analytical framework based on international relations 
theories and concepts relating to international order, security perception, foreign 
policy making and bureaucratic politics and, in particular, on concepts derived 
from the study of Track Two diplomacy. In a number of contexts Indonesian 
diplomats adopted several of the approaches and techniques developed by 
scholars of Track Two diplomacy. A number of hypotheses are derived from the 
literature on Track Two diplomacy, and from bureaucratic politics for testing in 
the case studies. 
11.2. Literature review 
2.1. The primacy of order: foreign policy in a regional context 
Foreign policy is a widely discussed topic in international relations. In their study, 
Theodore Couloumbis and James Wolfe adopt Cecil Crabb's definition of foreign 
policy as follows: 
Foreign policy consists of two elements: national objectives to be achieved 
and means for achieving them. The interaction between national goals and 
the resources for attaining them is the perennial subject of statecraft. 1 
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What constitutes national objectives is, at times, difficult to assess. If, as argued 
by Hedley Bull,2 national interest is the main reason for a state's existence then it 
is logical that the main purpose of foreign policy is to secure that interest.3 
However vague it may appear, to the proponents of a realist approach national 
interest is the single concept that can help a realistic understanding of 
international politics.4 Realists assume that because of the anarchic international 
system a state has to rel_y on itself in order to survive usually by increasing 
national power, including military capability. Unfortunately, armaments are not 
always a viable option, especially if their acquisition is perceived as a threat by 
neighbouring countries, which then respond by acquiring or adding to their own 
armaments. This is the classic action-reaction process associated with arms races 
and emanates from the so-called security dilemma.5 For a developing country, 
buying a large quantity of armaments can be economically unsound. According to 
Indonesia's former Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, such an act diverts resources 
away from national development efforts without resulting in greater security.6 
Considering the negative impacts of arms acquisition, a state has to be creative 
and search for other options to enhance its sense of security and, at the same time, 
stay focused on its national development program. 
The so-called English School of International Relations, although concurring with 
the realists on the potential for disorder arising from the anarchy in international 
relations, prefers states to cultivate their common interests. They see this achieved 
through co-operation in the working of institutions such as international law and 
the machinery of diplomacy.7 However, there are limitations in the ability of 
international law and diplomacy to secure an orderly, peaceful and stable world. 
International law does not appear to be very effective without an enforcement 
capacity: for instance, the capacity to implement sanctions or embargoes 
eff ecti vel y. 8 According to Jost Delbruck, another element that limits the 
enforcement capacity of international law is state consent. He states that 
international law, as a normative binding legal framework, "is functional only if 
its normativity is not made dependent on the consent of a particular state or actor 
at a particular time."9 This statement implies that a sovereign state might easily 
reject any international ruling which contradicts its interests. In addition, as 
indicated by James Hsiung, international law does not require states to resolve 
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their disputes by peaceful means. 10 As a consequence, states sometimes resort to 
war as a final arbiter of their disputes and that implies that international law still 
has some shortcomings in securing international order. 
In the case of diplomacy, limiting it to a mere dialogue between independent 
states within the state system, as suggested by Adam Watson, would reduce its 
capacity to maintain order: 11 In this case, there is a limitation to formal diplomacy 
in the absence of recognition of non-state entities in international relations or 
' ' 
where the status of entities as autonomous states is disputed. In the same light, 
Watson's suggestion that the central task of diplomacy is not mainly the 
management of order, but more the maintenance of order in the midst of change 
can be seriously questioned, especially if the way diplomats conduct diplomacy 
remains conventional and emphasises state-to-state relations. 12 The effectiveness 
of diplomacy as a tool in statecraft is also questioned by John Spanier and Robert 
Wendzel who argue that diplomacy alone would not be effective without the 
support of military and economic instruments. 13 This sentiment is shared by 
Henry Kissinger who asserted the importance of non-diplomatic pressure in 
diplomacy and argued that in the absence of any penalty for non-compliance, 
there is no incentive to reach agreement from diplomatic negotiation. 14 Some 
analysts even criticise diplomats for being too conservative and "concerned more 
with procedure than the substance of talks, with taking part rather than doing."15 
This discussion suggests that diplomacy can not perform its functions well if the 
approach remains conventional and the players or the diplomats themselves 
remain conservative. Moreover, a state that uses diplomacy as a foreign policy 
instrument might not achieve its objectives if the state has limited resources to 
support its diplomatic efforts. 
Given their limited resources to back their diplomatic efforts, some developing 
countries have considered regionalism as a building block to achieve an orderly 
environment. The concept of regionalism, based on a functionalist point of view, 
has added political weight to the diplomatic efforts of the member states -- not to 
mention other benefits they can gain from joining such organisations. In the case 
of ASEAN, its concerted diplomatic initiatives in the wake of Vietnam's invasion 
of Cambodia in 1978, enabled the group to garner international support for its 
Of WA.\KATO 
U"'.''ER!:il1'< 
Ill" , ··uei:-JiJW 
15 
position in the United Nations (UN) forum. 16 However, as observed by Sheldon 
Simon, ASEAN responds to regional security issues usually in a reactive way.11 
This view is also shared by Michael Leifer, who considered ASEAN more as a 
diplomatic community, which is often reluctant to deal with problems of regional 
peace and stability. 18 This attitude is perhaps a reflection of each member's 
preoccupation with domestic priorities to maintain national security and to 
develop their economies._ ASEAN also operates under the presumption that 
members' adherence to the codes of conduct within the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) will contribute to peace and stability. 19 The 
strategy to give priority to internal stability is in line with ASEAN's doctrine of 
national resilience contributing to regional resilience. 
Arguably, the inward looking nature of the doctrine represents the focus on 
internal security by Third World countries in general. According to Mohammed 
Ayoob, in contrast to the western conception of an external threat, many Third 
World countries are more concerned with security problems from within.20 
Indonesia's military capability is aimed "more to maintaining internal stability 
and security and to warding off local threats than to meeting the requirements of 
external defence against a major power."21 Here, local threats imply various 
threats, not just military threats. In this sense threats can originate from economic, 
social, political and environmental problems. Furthermore, some Asian countries 
have been reluctant to follow the European tradition of forging military alliances 
and seeking external assistance during a conflict. Since gaining independence in 
1945, Indonesia has championed a strategy whereby regional countries first try to 
settle their problems within the region. However, Indonesia's motives for 
preventing non-regional countries meddling in regional problems were often 
questioned on the basis of Indonesia's confrontation policy against Malaysia in 
the late 1960s. Some regional countries suspected Indonesia of wishing to play a 
'big-brother' role in ASEAN and the region by limiting the role of major powers. 
To put the issue in perspective, Soedjatmoko, a leading Indonesian thinker, 
provides reasons for not involving non-regional actors in regional problems: 
[It] is in the interests of the developing countries to wean 
themselves from external military support and involvement, for 
two compelling reasons. One is that external involvement almost 
always increases the scale and destructiveness of violent conflicts 
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... The second compelling reason to forego external assistance is 
that such assistance undermines the autonomy of the recipient. 22 . 
In any case, regionalism through ASEAN has, to a certain extent, contributed to 
regional order. In this ~ase, order refers to a more predictable and peaceful 
relationship among the members and the absence of domination and imposition by 
any single country. According to Adam Curle, a condition of peaceful 
relationships exists when there is mutual assistance, understanding, concern, and 
collaboration founded on this mutuality.23 Indeed, harmonious relations among 
ASEAN's member countries have given each of them an opportunity to 
concentrate on national economic development programs and have also made the 
Association appear more cohesive. At one extreme and for the sake of harmony, 
ASEAN countries are willing to shelve discussion on sensitive issues, such as 
border disputes, until they feel comfortable to engage in such discussions. 
It may be the case that ASEAN cohesiveness is also influenced by culture specific 
factors that puts faith in networks of communication and consultation to reach 
consensus. The habit of consultation inhibits member-states from using the 
military option in settling their disputes. This mutual-trust and confidence have 
guaranteed the survival of ASEAN despite the fact that members are hesitant to 
use legal mechanisms to settle their disputes. Discussions to settle disputes or to 
manage conflicts were usually held in secret and involved only small numbers of 
high level officials.24 ASEAN's ways of operating do not favour a legalistic 
governing relationship, since trust and confidence are seen as far more important 
than a rigid arrangement and hasty negotiation. On the whole, ASEAN's tradition 
can be seen as both an asset and a liability (bearing in mind the potential friction 
from shelving sensitive problems for indefinite, future consideration). These 
ASEAN traditions that have cemented the organisation since its inception in 1967 
might not operate smoothly in the future, especially if the new generation of 
ASEAN leaders consider the traditions obsolete.25 
Regionalism, however, could pose a dilemma for the integrity of the individual 
member-states: for example, where a member perceives its interests as being 
subordinated to the group's interests. Still, for the sake of unanimity and cohesion, 
this member state has to follow the group's decision. As an organisation, ASEAN 
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faces many limitations as member states are still reluctant to provide it with the 
two most important functional characteristics of any international organisation, 
that is, centralisation and independence. According to Kenneth Abbott and 
Duncan Snidal, centralisation and independence are the most important features of 
a formal organisation that enable it to achieve its objectives and values, because 
the members have granted the organisation a sufficient mandate to function on 
their behalf. 26 Indeed, ASEAN members' reluctance to provide the organisation 
with the two functions of centralisation and independence stemmed from their 
concern about the state sovereignty issue. Furthermore, despite closer co-
operation and interdependence among association members, geographical 
proximity also increases the potential for disorder at both regional and domestic 
levels as a result of the spillover effects of instability in neighbouring countries. 
The ASEAN tradition of non-interference in the internal problems of member 
countries limits the ability of the group, as well as the members, to assist in the 
early settlement of problems. 
It is a challenge for any country, especially a developing one, to seek the means 
and policy options for coping with potential anarchy in its strategic environment, 
particularly when conflicts of interest, limitation of resources, and stigma from 
past political adventures become prominent. This thesis argues that despite its 
limitations, diplomacy remains a viable option and a flexible state instrument, 
especially if that state can introduce soundly developed innovations in its 
diplomatic practices. 27 In this regard, "[the Soeharto government] has, for most 
part, tried to neutralize possible threats from outside through regional cooperation 
and diplomacy."28 Diplomacy, including informal diplomacy, was Indonesia's 
means of responding to destabilising problems in the region between 1985 and 
1998. 
2.2. Informal diplomacy and Track Two diplomacy conceptions 
Informal diplomacy is not a well-defined concept and is not widely used in the 
diplomatic field. There are a number of concepts used in combination with the 
word informal, such as informal sectors in the economic field and informal 
politics. Informal politics connotes the kind of politics which are not governed by 
rules and institutions, but evolves as 'conventions and codes of behaviour.' 29 
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Because informal politics are not based on rules, "the workings of such politics 
tend to be sporadic, erratic, and invisible, making them much harder than formal 
politics for the outsider to observe in detail, describe accurately, and explain 
coherently."30 In the economic field, informal economic sectors are closely 
identified with a society based economy where small and medium scale 
enterprises flourish. The following discussion looks at the use of the word 
'informal' in the contex~ of diplomacy and examines the ways Indonesians 
comprehend the concept. 
Two main interpretations of the term informal diplomacy are evident in the 
literature. First, the concept is used to explain the activities of an entity that are 
not formally recognised by most countries as an independent state. For instance, 
the 'diplomatic' activities of Taiwan are usually called informal diplomacy.31 
Indeed, diplomacy is used mainly to refer to a foreign policy instrument of an 
independent state, and as a state centred concept diplomacy is concerned with 
politics between state actors.32 Secondly, informal diplomacy is concerned with 
innovation in diplomacy to deal with some conflicts and disputes where the 
traditional form of state to state diplomacy was no longer considered suitable. The 
informal diplomacy of Indonesia, as further discussed, belongs to the latter 
interpretation. 
The traditional form of diplomacy has the following characteristic. It has an 
element of national power33 (from a realist perspective) and also signifies "a 
regulated process of communication between at least two subjects, conducted by 
their representative agents over a particular object."34 According to Der Derian, 
diplomacy is not only a communication process, but it is specifically linked with 
"mediation of estranged peoples organized in states which interact in a system."35 
This interpretation of Derian revolves around the centrality of mediation and the 
state system. In reality, however, mediation is not an easy task. Some of the 
difficulties are caused by the complexities of the issues themselves, while in other 
cases the negotiators have to face divergent values,36 which make their efforts to 
bridge the differences difficult. According to Jay Rothman, this issue of value is 
the very reason why new approaches in dealing with conflict become necessary. 
He states that "[d]iplomats and policymakers often pay little attention to the host 
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of other factors that also underlie international conflict, such as values, history, 
and culture of opponent communities."37 
Similarly, the traditional form of diplomacy is closely associated with the 
interrelationship between· official representatives in a state system and the notion 
of diplomatic representation. The reality of contemporary international relations, 
especially in the economi~ sphere, suggests an increase in the role and power of 
non-state actors and, therefore, confining diplomacy exclusively to states no 
longer holds ground. This reality has left the state with no other option but to 
engage itself in direct negotiation and bargaining with private firms, in addition to 
their traditional intergovernmental forms. The triangular diplomatic system of 
negotiation and bargaining, that is, between state and other states, states and 
private firms and between private firms themselves is known as new diplomacy.38 
Moreover, the growing role of private citizens, Non Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) and society at large in international relations create new dynamics that 
diplomats need to take into consideration. Co-operation between the state and the 
private sector became more obvious and, at times, state actors can benefit from the 
resources of the non-state actors. 39 Hence, the new linkage between state and 
society has also forced the state to negotiate and deal directly with non-state 
actors. 
Given the conventional concept of diplomacy and the notion of new diplomacy, a 
question arises as to how to understand Indonesian informal diplomacy. For 
Indonesia, informal diplomacy was state-based with the element of 
communication,40 although the executing agency, the Foreign Ministry, asserted 
that the efforts were not aimed at mediating the conflicting or disputing parties. 
Some prominent Indonesian diplomats stated that informal diplomacy was not a 
substitute for formal diplomacy, but it was a prerequisite due to the nature of some 
conflicts and disputes that they had to deal with.41 However, the limitation of 
resources left Indonesia with no alternative but to look for support from potential 
third country or non-state actors in implementing parts of the informal 
diplomacy.42 
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This interpretation of informal diplomacy has two main components. First, 
informal diplomacy was part of formal diplomacy and designed to reinforce it. 
Second, the nature of the conflicts and disputes that Indonesia tried to resolve 
required different diplomatic approaches because the conventional mode of 
diplomacy was considered inadequate. Indonesia saw informal diplomacy as a 
method of conducting diplomacy in a non-conventional way whereby the rules of 
recognition and protocol were flexible, the atmosphere at the meetings was 
informal, parties to the conflicts and disputes met without preconditions, and 
innovative ways to seek breakthroughs in the problems were encouraged during 
the meetings.43 Various participants saw the role of the Indonesians in the 
informal diplomacy process as mainly facilitative, ranging from selecting venues 
for meetings to chairing meetings. They also saw informal diplomacy as a means 
of building confidence, of searching for possible co-operation among the parties, 
and of facilitating consultation to promote consensus.44 
2.2.1. Track Two diplomacy: some variants of Track Two diplomacy 
methods and factors supportive of conflict resolution 
Indonesia's method of conducting informal diplomacy bears a close resemblance 
to the Second Track, or Track Two diplomacy, defined by Joe Montville as 
"unofficial non-structured interaction. It is always open-minded, often altruistic 
and strategically optimistic, based on best case analysis."45 He further defined the 
field as follows: "[it is] unofficial, informal interaction between members of 
adversial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing 
public opinion, and organising human and material resources in ways that might 
help resolve the conflict."46 Christopher Dupont and Guy-Oliver Faure consider 
Track Two as normal practice in "international encounters, especially in the 
diplomatic arenas" which function as "preliminary contacts, either unof~icial or 
informal".47 They further state that "[t]rack II talks start before the formal opening 
of the negotiations and take on special importance during the course of 
negotiation; in fact, recesses and social events are especially designed to 
. . ,,4g 
encourage the dual development of contacts and negotiation. 
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However, as a new approach Track Two diplomacy is not necessarily a mundane 
process revolving around recesses between a conference and a meeting because 
''Track Two is designed to establish a pre-negotiation stage in which analytical 
'breakthroughs' by the disputants themselves are encouraged."49 Loraleigh 
Keashly and Ronald Fisher define pre-negotiation as a "process that begins when 
one or more parties considers negotiations as an option and communicates this 
. t· th art· "50 Th h " mten 10n to o er p 1es. _ ey note t at pre-negotiation ends when one party 
abandons negotiation as a policy option or when the parties agree to formal 
negotiation."51 Hence, pre-negotiation in Track Two diplomacy is concerned with 
conditioning; that is, preparing the parties before they move on to formal 
negotiation. At the same time, the third party also focuses the forum's attention in 
the pre-negotiation stage on "building relationships that can be sustained over the 
long term."52 The key issue that confronts the third party in this stage is to find the 
best moment to move the parties to a negotiation stage.53 
Harold Saunders considers that the pre-negotiation stage is an integral part of the 
overall peace process (including formal negotiation) because in this stage the 
conflicting parties can deal with three important issues. First, finding a common 
definition of the problem. Secondly, producing a commitment that a negotiated 
solution is better than continuing the conflict. Thirdly, preparing the negotiation, 
that is, deciding how to negotiate.54 Hence, Track Two diplomacy is not only 
concerned with establishing contacts, but also in finding breakthroughs indicated 
by careful analysis of the problem and the processes applied to it. 
In order to provide the conflicting parties with the processes to discuss, analyse 
and find a possible solution to their problems, scholars and practitioners 
introduced various approaches or techniques known as 'problem-solving 
workshops', 'interactive problem solving' ,55 'interactive conflict resolution'56 and 
'third party consultation. ' 57 Although the various techniques essentially evolved 
from the problem-solving workshop engineered by John Burton and others, the 
proponents of each approach introduce a different technique on how to make a 
contribution to the resolution of the conflict. Concerning the problem-solving 
workshop, Burton explains, "[p]roblem solving implies exploration and not 
merely the simple process of bargaining. 'Workshop' is similarly useful because it 
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suggests that all the parties concerned have to get down to the analytical job of 
problem solving."58 Hence, the essence of problem solving activities within the 
workshop setting is to explore possible solutions to the problem through careful 
analysis. 
Alarmed with the broad definition of Track Two diplomacy provided by 
Montville and also with _the proliferation of techniques under the Track Two 
diplomacy, Nadim Rouhana proposed to use the term 'unofficial third party 
intervention' instead. This term suggests an intervention made by non-official 
agents to help resolve a conflict. Montville's generic concept of Track Two 
diplomacy is more concerned with using different approaches to deal with 
conflict. Consequently, official agents representing a government can use ideas 
derived from the concept in their diplomatic activities. 
To distinguish between what he calls 'unofficial third party intervention' and 
'unofficial activities,' Rouhana makes the following statement: 
For an effort to be termed "unofficial third party intervention," 
some specifications are required: first, that the effort is expressly 
designed and carried out by a third party to contribute to the 
resolution of an ethnic or international conflict; second, that none 
of the parties participate in the effort as official representatives of 
governments or parties to the conflict; and third, that the theoretical 
relationship between the intervention and the potential contribution 
to the resolution of the conflict is clearly delineated.59 
The proliferation of techniques under the Track Two diplomacy umbrella suggests 
that scholars and practitioners of the approach have yet to reach consensus, 
particularly on the best approach to implement Track Two diplomacy. Rouhana 
admitted that in the case of problem solving workshops, scholars and practitioners 
of workshops themselves are not unanimous with regard to the terminology, the 
method and goals of their approach or the techniques to be used. 60 In his opinion, 
"[t]he absence of a demonstrated and acceptable set of methodologies opens the 
door for practitioners to use whatever techniques they judge to be useful, often 
relying on their own instincts and goodwill."61 
Although he agreed with Rouhana's assessment on the non-unanimity in the 
present state of unofficial problem solving approach, Saunders considers that each 
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technique can make a contribution to the overall peace process. Saunders argues 
as follows: 
No one program will achieve peace by itself. The impact will lie in 
combining complementary approaches. To build strategy around 
such a combination requires starting from the broadest possible 
·choice among instruments and then knowing what each instrument 
can do and how instruments might reinforce each other.62 
Based on his long experiences in peace efforts,63 Saunders argues that 
"[p]ractitioners must also know when to use each instrument. That will be helped 
by thinking of a peace process as moving through stages."64 Hence, following 
Saunders' argument, each technique - under problem solving workshop or Track 
Two diplomacy in general - can contribute to the peace process, as long as the 
practitioners know what technique to use at each stage. 
The opinions of Rouhana and Saunders confirm that the problem solving 
workshop and its variants are still evolving and the element of experimentation 
remains observable. For instance, some scholars support the validity of the 
'contact hypothesis', where adversaries coming together will reduce stereotypes 
and change their perceptions of the enemy65 whereas some others use methods of 
psychoanalytical frames of analysis to guide their intervention in interethnic and 
international conflict. Those who champion psychoanalytical frames of analysis 
are confident in the efficacy of the "healing function of mourning, grieving, and 
apology in political conflict resolution".66 According to Christopher Mitchell and 
Michael Banks, the first stage of most workshops is characterised with an 
outpouring of emotions which the third party should not "try to cut it short."67 
However, Rouhana doubted the effectiveness of psychoanalytical frames of 
analysis in a conflict such as the former Yugoslavia.68 In contrast, Saunders 
appears more optimistic and is confident that insights from psychiatrists, social 
psychologists or cultural anthropologists are important elements in helping the 
conflicting parties break their impasse.69 Paul Salem also criticised the 
psychoanalytical technique as being less applicable, particularly, in the third 
world context: 
[l]n many non-Western negotiation situations, it might be wiser to 
increase the level of formality and social role-playing in order to 
get the negotiations going, rather than to increase the level of 
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personalization and individual self-revelation or to engage in 
game-playing. 70 
Indeed, being open and frank as part of the healing process might not fit well in a 
culture or society not ~ccustomed to revealing emotions openly, such as in 
Indonesia's Javanese traditions.71 At issue here is the timing of intervention, 
because when volatility is high, the efforts to reduce the animosity by 
psychoanalytical techniques might not be acceptable to the participants who 
believe that they are being victimised by the conflicts.72 Thus, the timing of 
intervention and the techniques employed should also take into consideration the 
stages of the conflict. 
According to Jacob Bercovicth, conflict has a life cycle: "conflict formation, goes 
through maturation and escalation, and terminates with stagnation, resolution or 
renewal."73 Analysts give special attention to the stage or cycle of the conflict 
because in their analysis intervention at particular stages of the conflict tends to 
yield a positive result.74 For instance, Hugh Miall argues that there are two phases 
in conflict when resolution appears more promising. ''The first is at an early stage, 
before attitudes become too fixed and behaviour too hostile. The second is at a 
latter stage when the conflict has become a costly stalemate and the parties are 
exhausted."75 In a mediation context, Bercovitch notes that "the longer a dispute 
lasts, the less amenable it is to mediation."76 Other scholars give lesser 
consideration to the notion of stage and instead assume that an intervention by a 
third party to help resolve the problem will be more effective whenever a conflict 
has reached its ripeness.77 
Ripeness in this case means that a conflict has reached a plateau or a level of 
'hurting stalemate' where the parties "no longer feel they can use force to gain a 
unilateral advantage and, therefore, become willing to consider other options."78 
However, at times, a condition of hurting stalemate is more a perception than 
objective reality.79 This notion of ripeness is also related to political changes 
which take place within the parties or countries, such as leadership change.80 
Michael Watkins and Kirsten Lundberg describe this aspect of change as 'channel 
factors' (that is, critical facilitators of change). There are "people or processes that 
act as catalysts for new behaviour. They 'tunnel through' residual barriers to 
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change, initiating chain reactions that progressively build, leading to seemingly 
disproportionate results."81 They also mention that the Oslo peace process was 
facilitated by a neutral facilitator (Norway) of which a Norwegian national, Terje 
Larsen, played a critical role in the early stage of the process through Track Two 
diplomacy. 82 Nevertheless, there are cases when the notion of asymmetry hinders 
the resolution of the process and, at times, prevents the conflicting parties from 
meeting face to face. ~symmetry in this case includes the issue of legal 
asymmetry (the issue of legitimacy) and structural asymmetry refers to "key 
differences in the internal structure, conditions and processes of the 
adversaries."83 Two examples of structural asymmetry are the 'salience of goals' 
where the issue of the conflict is not high on the agenda of the parties, and the 
notion of 'survivability' in which the parties prefer the status quo in order to 
survive.84 
From the above discussion of dynamics surrounding a conflict and the parties 
involved in it, a question arises on the efficacy of Track Two diplomacy. Rouhana 
suggests that proponents of each single approach in conflict resolution: 
. . . define their goals, propose how to achieve them, and present 
systematic evidence that these goals are achievable. This will 
require the empirical demonstration of such interventions, 
beginning with what takes place in the initial meetings between 
adversaries and moving on to the impact on the conflictual 
1 . h' b h . 85 re atlons 1p etween t e parties. 
Rouhana further states that to assess these approaches it is necessary to answer the 
following questions: is a new learning process taking place among the 
participants?; is there a new discourse after participants return to their home 
environment?; and are there new interactions among the participants?.86 
However, Burton, a leading figure of Track Two diplomacy, claims that the 
analytical framework of the Track Two approach itself always guarantees a 
positive outcome and states: 
[e]xperience has shown that when parties to disputes come into an 
analytical and exploratory framework they discover that their 
definitions of the conflict are false, that they are pursuing what are 
essentially common goals by adversary tactics, and that once their 
fundamental goals are defined accurately, options can be deduced 
by which they can be achieved in cooperation.87 
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Herbert Kelman also demonstrates a similar optimism when he states: 
[b]y helping to establish communications between parties at the 
sub-elite level and typically at the prenegotiation stage, these 
workshops undermine the 'we-they' image of conflict, begin a 
discussion of framework solutions, identify steps that will break 
the impasse, and .create some understanding of the processes that 
will lead the parties out of the conflict. 88 
However, the meetings' ~onvenor needs to ascertain that the new learning took 
place between the participants would have an impact on the relationship between 
the parties at the macro level. There were cases where the issue of a gap between 
the micro level of interaction between parties to a conflict and the macro level of 
conflict at societal level tempered Kelman optimism. 89 Success of addressing 
conflict situation in the 'micro' level of workshop does not guarantee that the 
achievement will affect the conflict at the 'macro' level if the participants fail to 
channel their new perceptions to the decision making elites. 
Success or failure in any peace initiative is a concern of international relations' 
scholars who evaluate the role of the third party in helping the conflicting parties 
and the disputants resolve their problems.90 The very notion of success itself is an 
ideal that according to John Kaufmann, "[e]ven the best of diplomatic techniques, 
whether in a multilateral, a bilateral, or a 'mixed up' set up, cannot ensure." 91 He 
also argued that "[s]uccess requires the finding of mutually acceptable solutions to 
what may at the start of a negotiation appear to be intractable problems and 
disagreements."92 Although Kaufmann developed the argument from his long 
experiences as diplomat and negotiator, his concern about 'a mutually acceptable 
solution' as an indicator of success is also shared by conflict resolution scholars. 
From informal diplomacy's perspective an acceptable solution takes place when 
the parties emerge from the meeting with "an outcome that satisfies their 
underlying interests and their goals."93 However, as discussed earlier, some 
conflict resolution scholars and practitioners do not favour negotiation because 
they disapprove of the use of power and bargaining techniques in the negotiation 
process. Instead, they prefer problem solving techniques because "[w]ith problem 
solving, both sides may achieve favourable results, may prevent future conflict, 
and may maintain their relationship. Thus problem solving actually resolves 
conflict. "94 
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However, there are many instances where the desired outcomes of a lasting peace 
generated from problem solving exercises failed to materialise. One example is 
the breakdown of the Israel and Palestine peace agreement from the Oslo' process 
signed in 1993.95 The question arises whether the breakdown in the peace 
agreement from the Oslo' process invalidated the earlier success? This example 
illustrates the difficulty in assessing success from peace initiatives to deal with 
conflicts and disputes. C~uld the third party's goals, objectives and motives in 
assisting the peace process be used as a basis for evaluation? According to Tamra 
Pearson d'Estree, et al, "if we evaluate processes based upon their goals, then the 
concepts of success will be one that is easier to define and a less fearful or 
contested claim for practitioners to make".96 However, an assessment of success 
would not be easy if the goals, objectives or even motives of the peace initiatives 
were not clearly spelled out. Thus, there are many issues that should be addressed 
in assessing the outcomes of any peace initiative, including the process stemming 
from informal diplomacy. 
2.2.2. The third party role in and their expectation of Track Two diplomacy 
In terms of third party roles in the problem solving process, almost all of the 
scholars agree that the third party should function mainly as a facilitator.97 
According to Ronald Fisher, the third party in the problem solving process should 
not be passive, but should implement strategies of inducing and maintaining 
mutually positive motivation, improving the openness and accuracy of 
communication, diagnosing the conflict, and regulating the interaction.98 Herbert 
Kelman, however, postulated that the third party, especially in the workshop 
process, might engage themselves in one of the three forms as follows: 
(1) theoretical inputs, which help participants distance themselves 
from their own conflict, provide them conceptual tools for analysis 
of their conflict, and offer them relevant illustrations from previous 
research; 
(2) content observations, which suggest interpretations and 
implications of what is being said and point to convergences and 
divergences between the parties, to blind spots, to possible signals, 
and to issues for clarification; and 
(3) process observations, at the intergroup level, which suggest 
possible ways in which interactions between the parties 'here and 
now' may reflect the dynamics of the conflict between their 
communities.99 
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Kelman provides further clarification on the nature of the facilitator function of 
the third party and remains adamant that, as facilitator, the third party could 
intervene in the discussion process as long as the intervention was still within the 
rules of engagement he established earlier (the three forms above). Kelman 
defined the role of the third party as follows: 
The third party in our model does not take part in the substantive 
discussion; it does not give advice or offers its own proposals, nor 
does it take sides, evaluate the ideas presented, or arbitrate between 
different interpretations of historical facts or international law. The 
task of the third party is to create the conditions that allow ideas for 
resolving the conflict to emerge out of the interaction between the 
parties themselves. The facilitation of the third party, however, is 
an important part of the process. The third party sets the ground 
rules and monitors adherence to them; it helps to keep the 
discussion moving in constructive directions, tries to stimulate 
movement, and intervenes as relevant with questions, observations, 
and even challenges. 100 
Scholars and practitioners see the advantages of Track Two diplomacy from 
different angles. Track Two diplomacy and the problem solving workshop 
technique in particular could help scholars enrich their knowledge of international 
conflict, its dynamics and the potential for resolution. 101 In a larger spectrum the 
process could also be used as a 'laboratory' to study ethnic particularities, such as 
their behaviour, strength and weaknesses that might be used as an assumption of 
the negotiation or diplomatic style of the particular ethnic group. Practitioners find 
the approach supportive to the objective of developing proposals and de-
escalating a conflict, in away not associated with formal channels. Indeed, the 
informal character of Track Two diplomacy has made discussion on some 
sensitive issues possible due to the non-binding character of the approach. Kelman 
is confident that the non-binding character of workshops "is their special strength 
and their unique contribution to the larger process: they provide an opportunity for 
exploratory interaction, which is essential to negotiation at all of its stages, but 
which is usually difficult to arrange in an official context, especially around the 
negotiating table." 102 He also added "[the] workshop can deal with issues that are 
not yet on the table, providing an opportunity for the parties to pre-negotiate some 
of these issues so that, by the time they get to the table, they can be framed in 
ways that are conducive to successful negotiation."103 The advantage of the 
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process is that it is not confined to only changing the perceptions of the 
participants at the inter-personal level. 
According to John McDonald, a former American diplomat, Track Two 
diplomacy "is designed fo identify the policy differences and the nonnegotiable 
issues that divide the parties in conflict and then try to impact their solution."104 
He also stated that "[p]~rsons involved in Track Two efforts have as their 
objective the reduction or de-escalation, of conflict within a country or between 
countries by lowering the anger, tension, or fear that exists, by facilitating 
improved communication, and by helping to bring about a better understanding of 
each party's point of view."105 He valued creativity as an essential qualification 
for those practising Track Two diplomacy and indicated that "[o]ne of the 
strengths of the Track Two diplomacy is that it encourages an innovative and 
unconventional approach to old problems."106 Arguably, creativity and innovation 
are significant for Track Two practitioners, and also qualities important for any 
person engaged in diplomatic or mediation efforts. 107 
According to Burton, third party members should have the following 
qualifications: "well informed on all available insights into patterns of behaviour, 
theories of behaviour, human motivations and goals, the political values attached 
to status and role and just about everything available in experience and in 
theory."108 Burton also argues "it is preferable that those comprising the third 
party do not have a specialized knowledge of the area and of parties involved in 
the disputes .... They are required to be, and to be seen to be, supportive of all 
parties."109 The very nature of the informality of the method and the relatively 
limited role of the third party, mainly as facilitator, is disputed by Salem on the 
grounds that participants might have different values about the concept of 
seniority and leadership. He states that "the attempt of anonymous 
moderator/facilitator to establish leadership and authority over a negotiation 
process may cause resentment and may become part of the problem in the form of 
a struggle for power between the moderator/facilitator and various 
participants."110 In his opinion, in some societies the position of the traditional 
authority figure as moderator/facilitator is more acceptable and in the same token, 
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the traditionally accepted rules of conflict resolution, that is, mediation, is more 
applicable. 111 
Scholars of Track Two diplomacy share several assumptions on how to conduct 
such diplomacy, but they are not unanimous with regard to the best method of 
conducting their peace initiatives or of the intentions of the Track Two approach. 
Interestingly, Edward Az~ (a Track Two diplomacy advocate) considers the 
approach suitable for both the management and the resolution of conflict , 
although the majority of the scholars remain adamant on the exclusiveness of the 
approach for conflict resolution (see more discussion on this matter in the next 
section). Azar's broader expectation of the approach is reflected in the following: 
The applied conflict management approach works well if one holds 
to certain premises, namely, that politics and diplomacy are about 
building consensus between contending parties and that this 
process involves a long and complicated series of tasks. In almost 
all cases of protracted social conflict, the use of Track Two 
diplomacy is a crucial first step. Track Two is designed to 
establish a pre-negotiation stage in which analytical 
'breakthroughs' by the disputants themselves are encouraged . 
.. . Track Two and other forms of alternative diplomacy have 
become increasingly visible and popular during the last twenty 
years and have made contributions to the concepts and vocabulary 
of conflict analysis and management. 112 
The conventional wisdom suggests that as long as the intention of the approach, to 
analyse the needs, values and interests of the parties is fulfilled, then the method 
to achieve the intention is open to the practitioners' own judgement. As discussed 
earlier, there is a tendency among the practitioners of Track Two diplomacy to 
embark on trial and error (experimentation) based on instinct and goodwill.113 
Consequently, former diplomats who became Track Two practitioners also bring 
with them the skill and knowledge obtained during their careers in government. 
Bearing in mind that the intervention of non-regional actors or 'complete 
strangers' in some conflicts might bring unrealistic expectations from the 
conflicting parties 114 or create distrust on the sincerity of the intention, 115 scholars 
like Salem argue that the conventional model of state based intervention in some 
third world societies remains appropriate. Although Salem's point of view merits 
consideration, in some cases a breakthrough in a conflict or a dispute can only be 
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stimulated with an informal process sponsored by non-state actors, especially if 
the warring factions do not feel prepared to embark on formal interactions. In this 
case, the familiarity with the regional setting, such as culture and influential 
individuals in society, could be added as a required qualification of the Track Two 
practitioners. To illustrate, in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Track 
Two diplomacy set a platform toward the signing of the peace accord in 
Washington (1993), mainl_y because the process was initiated by Terje Larsen (a 
Norwegian) who was knowledgeable about local dynamics and who knew 
individuals who had access to decision makers. 116 
In summary, Track Two diplomacy remains an evolving approach to deal with 
deep-rooted conflict situations. To fulfil the intention of analysing the problems 
and finding their solution, scholars and practitioners brought with them their 
expertise, educational background (and method based on this) and skill. The 
motivation to intervene is not always based on a desire to find a solution to 
international conflict. Some of the efforts are motivated by a wish to test theories, 
approaches and techniques in real situations of international conflict. 
The main themes of Track Two diplomacy, then, concern the uniqueness of the 
approach (referred to as originator), the objectives and the process of the Track 
Two diplomacy, and the skills of the practitioners. The following sections look at 
these themes more closely. 
2.2.3. Track Two diplomacy - originator 
Track Two diplomacy was introduced as an alternative to the traditional approach 
of official diplomacy, which was power based and often rigid. 117 Azar notes that 
official diplomacy "lacks the necessary orientation to generate conflict resolution 
breakthroughs," 118 because Track One diplomacy gives emphasis to official 
contacts between the representatives of sovereign entities, governments and other 
parties to a dispute within a bargaining framework. Originally, the new track was 
designed to fill the gap left by official state agents, concerning the many 
protracted social conflicts in which the issue of state sovereignty usually limited 
the possible intervention by a state actor. Even if the official representatives did 
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interfere in the conflicts, their intention was mainly to stop the conflicts or to stop 
the escalation of the conflicts in an effort to promote settlement, and not to find a 
lasting solution to the problems. The settlement processes invariably involved 
selected members of parties to the conflicts, and the role of the third party was 
perceived as being based ·on the state interest. 
Burton argues that the roots of international conflicts are similar to those of social 
conflicts at other levels, that is, a "situation in which ontological needs of identity 
and recognition, and associated human development needs, are frustrated. These 
conflicts cannot long be contained, controlled, or suppressed, but can be resolved 
and prevented by the satisfaction of such needs."119 Track Two diplomacy was 
designed to assist the conflicting parties to address their problems and work 
together toward relationship improvement and problem solving. 
The new track was also introduced, primarily, to deal with conflicts and not 
disputes. According to Miall, although there is a tendency to use the word conflict 
and dispute interchangeably, the two wprds involve a different set of issues. In 
this case, dispute is concerned with interests, which are prone to compromise, 
whereas conflict is concerned with more deep-seated issues, such as needs and 
values, and is therefore more difficult to reconcile. 120 As a consequence, Burton 
argues, conflicts and disputes should be approached differently, that is through 
dispute settlement and conflict resolution. 121 These scholars believe that 
awareness of the contrast will avoid a potential third party making the mistakes of 
traditional third parties, in failing to address the root of a problem. Hence, Burton, 
Miall and some other scholars agree that the existing mechanisms, such as 
diplomatic bargaining, judicial settlement and arbitration cannot settle problems 
satisfactorily. 122 They argue that existing mechanisms are not suitable, because: 
(1) the third party does not appear neutral to the conflicting parties; (2) the process 
tends to be power-based or dependent on the capacity of the mediator to put 
pressure on the parties; and (3) the mechanisms, sometimes, have to face the issue 
of legitimacy, and consequently the rulings are always at stake. 123 
Hugo Van der Merwe, however, questions such rigid separation between disputes 
and conflicts. He considers the needs as one aspect of a conflict, rather than the 
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defining characteristic of conflict, and therefore considers that both the analytical 
and bargaining approaches could be used in tandem. 124 Joseph Scimecca also 
questions the dichotomy, especially of non-power approaches to resolve dispute. 
For Scimecca, since power - following Weberian thinking - is omnipresent, any 
attempt to compromise interests and dissociate the efforts with power would not 
be effective. 125 
The broader interpretation of Track Two diplomacy given by Dennis Sandole can 
accommodate the differing perspectives mentioned above: Track Two diplomacy 
is an "attempt to achieve peace through cooperative processes, either by means of 
training, problem solving workshops, facilitation, conciliation, or mediation."126 
What really matters to Sandole is the ability of the third party " ... to create the 
'magic' by which Realpolitik-driven competitive processes can be replaced (or 
supplemented) by ldealpolitik-based cooperative processes of conflict 
resolution."127 
2.2.4. Track Two diplomacy - objectives 
As mentioned by Montville, Track Two diplomacy is often altruistic and includes 
the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organising 
human and material resources in such a way to help the resolution of the conflict. 
With such broad goals or objectives, the scholars and practitioners of Track Two 
must have some priorities on what they would like to achieve with their particular 
interventions. They also have to take into consideration whether or not they can 
guarantee the sustainability of the Track Two diplomacy process from the 
standpoint of availability of funding and expertise. These two factors determine 
the third party commitment to the Track Two process and, therefore, determine 
the objectives of the diplomacy. 
The third party needs to assess the constraints set by their budget and whether the 
informal meeting they organise is able to generate interest among the 
participants. 128 Due to participants' lack of enthusiasm, some unofficial 
interventions only last for a few series, or are even only a one-time exercise. 129 
Consequently, scholars and practitioners could not expect that they would be able 
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to improve a relationship among the participants from an 'ad hoc meeting.• 
However, even from limited interactions among the conflicting parties, the 
meeting's convenor could increase their knowledge and scholarship on 
international conflict. Although the scholastic interest seems rather 'parochial•, 
the objective of testing theory in the field is still a legitimate exercise. 
Nevertheless, an 'ad hoc' and 'parochial' exercise has the potential for creating 
difficulties for the participants and being counter-productive to future efforts with 
a long cycle program that attempts to interlock the informal and the formal 
processes. 130 
In the same way, state sponsored informal diplomacy could also have a range of 
objectives from settling the problem, to more parochial objectives, such as 
increasing the country's international standing or even raising the stature of those 
organising the peace initiatives. However, in any case and similar to the private 
sponsored Track Two diplomacy, state sponsored Track Two diplomacy also has 
to define the objectives of the exercise according to the capacity of the sponsor, 
and whether there are sufficient resources, in terms of funds and human resources, 
to facilitate the informal diplomacy process. 
2.2.5. Track Two diplomacy - process/skill 
The Track Two diplomacy process refers to three aspects: procedures, dynamics 
and strategy. Procedures refer to the standard principles of a problem solving 
exercise or other modes of intervention in general. 131 In this case, Rouhana 
mentions three important aspects. First, participants and third parties are unofficial 
representatives of their societies and not designated by their governments. The 
third party recruits the participants on the assumption that the participants 
"represent their society interests and should be legitimate within their own 
community."132 
Secondly, the workshop consists of a small group and the participants are 
involved in group-dynamics. They interact in the following order: "parties first 
analyse the needs that have to be fulfilled and concerns that have to be addressed 
for a solution to be acceptable in each society, and only later examine possible 
solutions that respond to both sides' needs and the constraints that have to be 
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overcome."133 However, the third party should be able to balance the agenda and 
the dynamic emanating from the interaction. Thirdly, the third party establishes 
ground rules as a requirement for the workshop to take place, that is, the meetings 
are private and confidential, the third party acts only as a facilitator not a 
mediator, and there are some expectations about what the meeting will achieve, 
such as thinking of new ideas, reaching agreement on one issue, or formulating a 
joint concept paper. 134 In particular, a meeting setting is regarded as critical for the 
overall Track Two diplomacy exercises and the ideal format would be a neutral 
and isolated setting: a meeting setting where the participants feel comfortable 
during and between the meetings. 135 According to Lynne C. D' Amico and Robert 
A. Rubinstein, the meeting setting at the pre-negotiation stage also has to pay 
special attention to cultural aspects of those in conflict, such as language and 
social identity. 136 The second aspect of process is concerned with the dynamics 
during the Track Two diplomacy exercise, 137 since the established procedures 
have a significant impact on the problem solving exercise. 
The third party should give careful attention to the dynamics taking place during 
the Track Two exercises, and play its role according to the principles of Track 
Two diplomacy as discussed earlier, that is, mainly as a facilitator who observes 
the dynamics and only intervenes to provide theoretical inputs. Hence, the 
emphasis of the Track two diplomacy is to let the conflicting parties themselves 
find a resolution to their conflicts and, therefore, the third party should refrain 
from intervening in the exercise, 138 or even from fixing meeting's agenda. 139 As 
argued by John Burton, "problem solving means leaving decision making in the 
hands of the parties until an agreement is reached which satisfies the needs of all 
concerned." 140 
In the Track Two diplomacy context, the notion of strategy revolves around 
'controlled communication.' 141 Controlled communication provides the facilitator 
with an opportunity to steer the discussion by way of directing the participants to 
discuss and analyse their problems issue by issue. In the process, the facilitator 
should discourage any effort by the participant to table any proposal for resolving 
. l 142 St t . their problem before the completion of the analyt1ca process. ra eg1es are 
also concerned with how to achieve objectives. However, the Track Two scholars 
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prefer the third party as facilitator which limits their role during the overall 
process to operating largely as a channel of communication. Therefor~, the third 
party has very little control over the interactions between the parties.143 
Bercovitch states that "[scholars and Track Two practitioners] approach an 
international dispute as private citizens only, not as official representatives, and 
their efforts are designed to utilize their competence, credibility and experience to 
create contexts and occasi_ons in which communication may be facilitated, and a 
better understanding of a conflict may be gained."144 
Bercovitch makes clear that the skills of the practitioners are derived from their 
competence, which stems from their scholarship. However, as discussed earlier, 
the skills of the practitioners should also include creativity and innovation. 
Furthermore, as recently introduced and acknowledged, Track Two practitioners 
should also be aware of the dynamics of the conflict, so their efforts could 
contribute positively to the work at the formal level of the first track. 145 At the 
same time, the third party also has to couple their skill with "extensive knowledge 
and sensitivity regarding the social processes of human interaction,"146 Ideally, 
each of the two tracks should be able to fill the gaps left by_ the other. Hence the 
two tracks reinforce one another and build peace cumulatively. 
2.3. Foreign policy making and bureaucratic politics 
The consideration of bureaucratic politics in foreign policy formulation is aimed 
at ascertaining the nature and extent of the involvement of bureaucrats in the 
formulation process. At issue is whether bureaucratic politics is a factor in 
Indonesian informal diplomacy. If bureaucratic politics is a factor, it is important 
to determine to what extent it influenced the informal diplomacy process, 
especially the attainment of the objectives set by the professional diplomats. The 
following discussion examines, in brief, the theoretical perspective of foreign 
policy making and bureaucratic politics. 
Foreign policy making is a fluid and context bound subject, and is subject to the 
form of government (whether democratic or authoritarian, presidential or 
parliamentarian), to the domestic system (whether open or closed), to tradition and 
37 
culture, and to level of economic development. 147 The realist tradition assumes 
that, as a unitary actor, the state responds "rationally to the imperati~es of the 
international system."148 Lu Ning outlines the realist assumption of a state as a 
rational actor as follows: 
The classical schools [the realist] assumes that decisionmakers 
strive to be consistent, to make optimal choices in narrowly 
constrained, neatly defined situations, and to rank and maximise 
values by choosing the most efficient alternatives. It assumes that 
decisionmakers discern clearly their objectives, the options 
available, and the likely consequences of each alternative choice 
before making their decision. 149 
The rationality in the decision making process is enhanced by the roles of the 
bureaucrats within the political system. Therefore, foreign policy making is 
always predictable and follows a common pattern. First, the various layers of the 
bureaucracy process data gathered, but not all the layers process similar data 
because bureaucrats at the lowest level in the strata usually have no access to 
classified information. Then, the bureaucrats at the higher levels are able to 
propose foreign policy options to their superiors by combining the classified 
information they can access with the information gathered by their subordinates. 
Next, when the foreign policy options reach the desk of the highest level 
bureaucrat, that is, the Minister150 his responsibility is to refine, reformulate or to 
approve the proposed policy. The Minister also receives foreign policy inputs 
from the 'attentive public' who are informed and show interest in foreign policy 
problems. 151 However, there are cases where the foreign policy estabiishment 
could "with no special efforts develop and maintain consistent international 
policies for many years."152 This happens when the role of the attentive public is 
minimal. 
Overall, the Minister is responsible for bringing the matter - after considering the 
various inputs from the various sources - to the attention of his superior, the Chief 
Diplomat (either the President or Prime Minister). Hence, the process flows up 
from the lower layers of the bureaucratic structures to the top-level bureaucrats, 
because the top echelons in the bureaucratic structures usually have little time to 
follow specific issues closely. Henry Kissinger stated to this effect as follows: 
The purpose of bureaucracy is to devise a standard operating 
procedure which can cope effectively with most problems. A 
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bure~ucracy is efficient if the matters which it handles routinely 
are, m fact, the most frequent and if its procedures are relevant to 
their sol_ution. If those criteria are met, the energies of the top 
leadership are freed to deal creatively with the unexpected 
occurrence or with the need for innovation. 153 
Kissinger suggests that the top leadership deal more with broad conceptual or 
hypothetical policy, requiring less knowledge of the details. At the same time, the 
top leadership also relies on the bureaucracy to implement the foreign policy 
outputs efficiently. Hence, at times, the flow can reverse when top officials give 
direction to sub-ordinates on issues requiring close attention. However, in any 
case, the nature of the process of data analysis is also subject to the management 
style of the leaders in the bureaucracy. 
Overall, the rational actor model suggests that those responsible for foreign policy 
have ample opportunity to discuss the problems, based on the extensive 
information they have, and to make a decision from a range of alternative policy 
options to deal with or to respond to the problems. It is also acknowledged, 
however, that such luxury of time to discuss and contemplate options in the most 
rational manner is not always possible, because in some cases a decision has to be 
taken in a very short time, in a narrow interval such as during an international 
crisis. The most frequently cited case is the Cuban missile crisis. Graham Allison 
pioneered a work to reconstruct the decision making process during the crisis. In 
his seminal book 'The essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,' 
Allison proposed several models to understand foreign policy making; the rational 
actor model, the organisational process model and the governmental 
(bureaucratic) politics modeI. 154 
Clearly the aim behind proposing such models is not limited to reconstructing 
what takes place during a decision making process, but it also signifies an effort to 
analyse the process for the sake of greater understanding. Scholars of foreign 
policy making, at times, have no valid data to sustain their argument on how 
exactly a certain policy was formulated. Therefore, model and abstraction are an 
invaluable means for understanding the decision making process. The overall 
effort proves that foreign policy making is a complex process, and to deal with 
such a dilemma as not knowing the process has meant that the policy making 
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process itself is treated as a 'black box.' In this case, the scholars can only make 
assumptions about the process by analysing the policy outputs and the people 
whom they have determined were involved in the decision making process. 155 
However, according to Edward Morse, the major contribution of Allison's models 
(especially of bureaucratic politics) to the study of foreign policy making is for 
being critical to the very_ notion of rationality in the policy making process. 156 
Morse notes that bureaucratic politics is a logical consequence of policy making 
in modem bureaucracies which "involves both lateral bargaining among the 
members of various administrative units and vertical or hierarchical bargaining 
among members of various strata in a single organization."157 Lincoln Bloomfield 
shares this opinion and states that the bureaucratic politics model "illuminate[s] 
the nonrational influences that bear on steps in the policy process, and 
acknowledge the compromises real-world people make when they work through 
the policy machinery to a point of decision."158 
Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf highlight the notion of parochialism in 
bureaucratic politics from Graham Allison's study as follows: "many participants 
in the deliberations that lead to policy choices often defined issues and favor 
policy alternatives that reflect their organizational affiliations."159 Theodore 
Couloumbis and James Wolfe share the sentiment and state that: 
. . . most policies reflect the conflicting interest of various 
government bureaus, military services, and subdivision thereof, 
which constantly compete to maintain their narrow bureaucratic 
survival and growth and to maximize their involvement and 
. fl . h 1· ki 160 m uence m t e po icy ma ng process. 
In the efforts to secure their parochial interest, various bureaucratic elements often 
attempt to develop access to the Chief Diplomat (the President or the Head of 
Government). This is the reason behind the interests of some foreign policy 
analysts to assess the correlation between the degree of proximity/closeness or 
trustfulness between the Chief Diplomat and his confidant in foreign policy circles 
to certain policy outcomes. 161 
Clearly that as with all policy consideration, foreign policy is a contested matter, 
as evidenced by the ongoing competition among bureaucrats and the Chief 
40 
Diplomat's foreign policy aides for his/her favour or policy preferences. 
Following the bureaucratic politics' scenario, the policy making process involves 
a bargaining process among the foreign policy elites of which the outcomes from 
the deliberation is then presented to the Chief Diplomat. Bloomfield describes the 
complexity of the process as follows: 
The process of bargaining involves forming coalitions among 
players, and it is a familiar game for all bureaucrats down the line. 
Those coalitions cut across formal organizational lines and boxes. 
The process happens not at formal meetings but on the phone, by 
the water-cooler, or at lunch. Someone at one level may join up 
with someone at a different level, outside the chain of command, in 
different agencies, in order to create a coalition that can work 
things out to mutual benefit, then confront both bosses with an 
attractive policy. 162 
In some other cases the Chief Diplomat may request inputs separately from 
foreign policy elites on the kind of policy to be pursued, but the final decision 
rests on his judgement. 163 This notion of 'consultation' suggests a constant 
competition among the elites for their Chief Diplomat's favour, because being 
able to be heard and trusted will guarantee a positive reward. 
Although bureaucratic politics is a useful framework for analysing the 
development and implementation of policy, 164 consideration should also be given 
to the state's ideology, as well as to traditions and practices developed in the 
individual political system. 165 For instance, Barton Bernstein expressed his 
concern about Allison's method of explaining the substance of policy by way of 
an abstraction of process mainly on the organisational and bureaucratic aspects, 
with little attention to the ideological aspects of the country. 166 It may be the case 
that in an open political system (democratic system) where public scrutiny of 
policy is high, the decision-maker must take into account the reactions of 
constituents, members of parliaments or interest groups, before initiating a policy. 
By way of contrast, in a more closed political system, such as an authoritarian 
system, the foreign policy elites have less obligation to consult other institutions 
during the decision making process. As a consequence, they have relative 
autonomy to propose a course of action. 
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However, the dichotomy of open and closed political systems does not always 
mean that foreign policy making is the product of the politicai system's 
particularities. There are cases when the leaders of the authoritarian system have 
little interest in foreign policy matters. In other cases, the leader or the elites in 
one political system have a great interest in foreign policy decision. The final 
decisions are, therefore, subject to the motivation of the elites, whether or not the 
decision serves designat~d national interests or serves mainly the parochial 
interests of the elites, such as for prestige or regime survival. The case of serving 
the parochial interests of elites is not limited to a closed political system because 
this attitude is also observable within an open one. For example, the U.S. State 
Department frequently competes with the White House National Security adviser 
for securing their position on foreign policy matters. 167 Similarly, the authoritarian 
system is not always characterised with leaders' domination in foreign policy 
making; General Franco of Spain left much of the foreign policy making to his 
foreign and economics ministers. 168 Hence, the aspect of leader or elite interest is 
a factor in foreign policy making whether the political system is open or closed. 
The various models discussed above provide a framework to explain foreign 
policy making, but the researcher also needs to consider other factors which 
influence the process. In particular, Christopher Hill argues that applying the 
foreign policy making models developed in the Western tradition to the third 
world context requires open-mindedness. 169 He notes that in Indonesia's case, the 
analysis of foreign policy should go "beyond the rational actor approach"170 and, 
following Franklin Weinstein's argument, that Indonesian foreign policy should 
be understood according to "the functions that foreign policy performs, whether 
internationally or at home, for the nation as a whole, and for sectional 
interests."171 In fact, Weinstein's contribution to the study of Indonesian foreign 
policy is grounded on his consistency in showing that Indonesia's foreign policy 
was determined by the Indonesian foreign policy elites' view of the world. He 
also shows that the elites compete to influence the direction of foreign policy 
based on their particular view of the world. 172 
However, it is important to note that Weinstein conducted his study in the early 
years of the Soeharto presidency when the majority of Indonesian foreign policy 
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elites perceived the international environment as hostile to Indonesia's national 
interests. Their attitude stemmed from a combination of factors, including their 
revolutionary experiences of gaining independence, their struggle to win West 
Papua, and the abortive communist coup, allegedly linked to Communist China. 
Hence, by then, Indonesian foreign policy was clouded by the aspect of 
subjectivity of the elites stemming from their perceptions or misperceptions of 
their regional environment. 
At the same time, these elites faced a dilemma concerning the course of foreign 
policy that they had to follow. On the one hand, their distrust of the external 
environment prevented them from 'bending' Indonesia's foreign policy to one of 
the two poles, the communist or the Western pole. On the other hand, the post-
1966 government under Soeharto had to deal with an economic development 
program whose implementation depended on international economic assistance 
from the West. In fact, by then, economic assistance from the West was readily 
available. Hence, in the late 1960s and in the 1970s, the shape of Indonesian 
foreign policy was determined by: (1) the elites distrust of the international 
environment; (2) pragmatism and the need for economic assistance; and (3) a 
desire not to depend on foreign assistance, knowing Indonesian society's 
sensitivity about such dependency. 
Those involved in inter-elite rivalry on foreign policy matters were mainly the 
military, technocrats and professional bureaucrats, and President Soeharto sat at 
the apex. The main characteristic of the bureaucratic politics of the late 1960s and 
throughout the 1970s is that the various elites were competing for the President's 
favour and maximised any opportunity to participate in the policy making process 
and implementation. However, of all the elites the military, especially the army, 
dominated the Indonesian political scene. From late 1960s to late 1980s, the 
military was considered as primus inter pares because they penetrated all state 
institutions, including the Foreign Ministry. The army had a strong presence in the 
Ministry partly because they distrusted the professional diplomats who, prior to 
. M. . S b d. 173 the 1965 coup, were led by a pro-Soekamo Foreign 1mster, oe an no. 
Obviously, after the first few years of the army's purge against professional 
diplomats - allegedly sympathetic toward Soekamo and the communists (leftists) -
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the Ministry was paralysed because some of their most qualified diplomats were 
detained or asked to take early retirement. 174 As a consequence, the new Foreign 
Minister, Adam Malik, had to cultivate a new cadre of professional diplomats and, 
at the same time, work in a context where the majority of the professional 
diplomats in the Ministry were reluctant to challenge the army in foreign policy 
matters. 
Foreign Minister Malik, a senior politician, led the Ministry from 1967 to 1977. 
Clearly, the Ministry benefited from Minister Malik because he was well 
respected and, importantly, President Soeharto was not very interested in foreign 
policy matters and allowed the professional bureaucrats under Minister Malik to 
deal with foreign policy matters. However, the President did not let the 
professional bureaucrats (diplomats) gain autonomy in the foreign policy making 
and implementation. The President used his trusted aides to keep the professionals 
in check, including giving the differing groups overlapping assignments. 175 For 
instance, he assigned the intelligence apparatus and the professional diplomats to 
end the 'confrontation' with Malaysia. 
This inter-elite competition on foreign policy - especially concerning economic 
policy - was prone to conflict. The most frequently cited case was the January 
Disaster (known by Indonesians as Malapetaka Januari or Malari) when students 
took to the streets in 1974 to protest against Indonesia's dependency on Japanese 
economic assistance and condemned President Soeharto's trusted aides who 
masterminded the policy. The riots in Jakarta following the student protest were 
allegedly organised by military and technocrat groups who were dissatisfied with 
the policy of close alignment with Japan. 176 Indeed, the lack of transparency of 
the decision-making process left the general public with no knowledge 
whatsoever of the decision making process and who was accountable for the 
policy outputs. As a consequence, the general public was easily used as a pawn 
when inter-elite competition surfaced. 
At issue here is whether the characteristics of decision making in the 1970s can 
be applied to the decision making process in the 1980s and 1990s. In many 
ways, there were no significant changes within the domestic configuration in the 
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1980s and 1990s because of two central characteristics of the Indonesian 
political system. First, President Soeharto operated a closed political system in 
which he theoretically had maximum control of the domestic environment 
surrounding foreign policy making. Secondly, the President was a dominant 
figure in deciding the direction of Indonesia's politics, in terms of domestic and 
foreign policies. At the same time, he maintained his strategy of dispersing the 
process of policy framing ~nd foreign policy implementation among a number of 
trusted aides, mostly from the military circle, and bureaucrats from several 
ministries. Hence, Soeharto maintained the pattern of inter-elite competition in 
order to keep his aides and subordinates in check and, at the same time, 
maintained his supremacy in the decision making process and as the chief policy 
maker. 177 Harold Crouch states that: "[b]y weakening the internal coherence of 
his regime, Soeharto was able to protect his own personal power."178 
Competition among groups in policy framing and making was a central feature of 
Indonesian bureaucracy in the Soeharto era. However, in general, bureaucratic 
institutions in any political system experience similar kinds of competition and 
have to tackle problems of co-ordination and fragmentation. 179 These problems 
are observable in Western political systems and also in those of the Asian 
tradition, for instance in Japan. In Japan's case, C. S. Ahn notes that the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) tends to control incoming information from its 
overseas posts and only shares limited information with other ministries. With this 
strategy the MoF A is able to surpass the other ministries on foreign policy 
issues. 180 The element of bureaucratic politics is a common feature in modem 
organisations. Paul 't Hart and Uriel Rosenthal explain the phenomena as follows: 
"the BP [bureaucratic politics] perspective depicts a country's foreign policy 
making system as a pluralistic arena where policy is a resultant of political 
interaction between multiple stakeholders within the government bureaucracy."181 
Political interaction in this case can have positive or negative results. At one level, 
competition opens the possibility for innovation and creative thinking among the 
elites involved because they want recognition from their superiors. At another 
level, the negative side of competition comes as some bureaucrats are tempted to 
undermine their rivals, for instance, by not sharing data or even trying to derail the 
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implementation stage. Arguably, bureaucratic politics is a factor in Indonesian 
foreign policy both in terms of policy framing and policy implementation.1s2 The 
President promoted bureaucratic politics and benefited from the process, 
especially when his personal interest in foreign policy matters increased. 
Clearly an ability to deliver result as demanded by President Soeharto was the 
Ministry's only alternative for improving its position within the political system 
governed by inter-elites competition which was instigated by the President 
himself. For informal diplomacy to evolve during the 30 years of the New Order's 
regime, especially from the mid-1980s onward, the Ministry went through a 'soul 
searching' process to define their role and position in the Indonesian political 
system. They noted that the President always used a number of channels to 
achieve his foreign policy objectives, and that the Ministry was only one of these. 
Moreover, the Ministry had limited resources to compete with resource rich 
institutions such as the military and the State Secretariat. The only means for the 
Ministry to gain the President's confidence was through creativity, 
professionalism and, most importantly, by fulfilling the President's assignments. 
The limitation of the Ministry resources is more or less equivalent with their 
limitation of 'power' within the political system. 
In order to overcome this resource gap, the Ministry could only compete by 
proposing ideas or alternative policy choices. 183 Ideas, including innovation in 
diplomacy, was the only relative 'power' that the Ministry had in its competition 
with other institutions. However, in order to fulfil the President's task, the 
Ministry had to maintain a good working relationship with other foreign policy 
elites, especially the military and the State Secretariat. Another way to secure 
support was by making the other institutions aware that the President himself was 
behind the diplomatic initiatives or to make it clear that the Ministry had gained 
'the confidence' of the President.' 184 A good working relationship and 'the 
confidence of the President' was a means to increase the Ministry's flexibility to 
pursue diplomatic initiatives, particularly informal diplomacy. 185 Failure to obtain 
this confidence would have meant that support from other institutions would be 
minimal and the Ministry would have been left alone to pursue diplomatic 
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initiatives and, that the diplomatic initiatives themselves would have been prone 
to interference by other elites. 
In summary, to a certain extent, Indonesia's experiences in foreign policy 
making and implementation reflected the dynamics of bureaucratic politics and 
the normal process of a rational organisational process, where inputs flow from 
the lower layers to the top layer. President Soeharto was a factor in Indonesian 
foreign policy because he intentionally let his subordinates compete with one 
another. Although the President was clearly a dominant figure in Indonesian 
foreign policy, the extent to which his personality was a dominant feature of 
Indonesian foreign policy would be hard to ascertain taking into account that, 
according to former Minister Ali Alatas, the former President would listen to the 
suggestions of his minister. 186 Thus, the personality factor in this thesis is treated 
as an intervening variable that would have influenced Indonesian diplomacy 
from 1985 onward, particularly in relation to the informal diplomacy conception. 
The President himself took a greater personal interest in foreign policy matters 
from the mid- l 980s onward when he had achieved some success in establishing 
strong domestic foundations, that is, political stability and economic 
development. The Ministry took into account Soeharto's concerns, preferences 
and interests for the sake of gaining his support in pursing foreign policy 
objectives, including informal diplomacy. 
2.4. Working definitions of informal diplomacy and bureaucratic politics 
The following working definitions of informal diplomacy and bureaucratic 
politics have been derived from the discussion above. 
2.4.1. Informal diplomacy 
Informal diplomacy is both an approach to the conduct of diplomacy and a 
process whereby the diplomacy is conducted. 
Informal diplomacy is free from the regulated and highly prescribed processes of 
formal diplomacy and is, therefore, non-conventional; it is an approach which 
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seeks to explore more freely the range of possible outcomes available than is 
envisaged under formal and conventional approaches to diplomacy; it is a process 
whereby the understandings of parties and the exploration of options are pursued 
through facilitating communication between parties; the facilitated 
communication is usually· non-binding and often non-attributable; it is a process to 
encourage informal communication between parties; it is comprehensive in its 
approach and is designed. to assist parties in conflict or serious disagreement to 
mutually agreed, supported and sustainable outcomes. 
The parties may be found within one or more states; the parties may also include 
non-state actors. 
These defining characteristics serve to identify informal diplomacy from formal 
diplomacy. Informal diplomacy does overlap with related notions, such as 
unofficial diplomacy or flexible diplomacy, but is more specific in the attributes 
of informal diplomacy. 
In the case of Indonesia, informal diplomacy incorporates each of the attributes 
above, but specifically became part of the endeavours of the Ministry to support 
the President in efforts to ensure Indonesia could make a significant contribution 
to peace and stability in South East Asia. 
2.4.2. Bureaucratic politics 
Bureaucratic politics is the identification and analysis of the different bureaucratic 
elements, together with their interactions, in the development and implementation 
of policy. 
Bureaucratic politics considers the policy making process to be characterised by 
many elements, including parochialism, conflicting interests and competition to 
secure particular organisational interests and needs, bargaining, and involves 
interaction across formal organisational lines and outside formal organisational 
structures. 
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As a concept bureaucratic politics connotes the elements of both positive and 
negative interactions. Positive interactions refer to the condition whereby those 
who participated in the foreign policy making process were concerned with 
attaining the most agreeable outcomes to be presented to the Chief Diplomat, the 
President or the Head of State. Negative interactions refer to a condition where 
some foreign policy making elites intentionally share only limited information and 
build cross-cutting coalitions with particular sections within other bureaucracies to 
achieve their preferred goals, to the exclusion of other goals. 
In the case of Indonesia, the development and implementation of foreign policy 
reflect the main notions of bureaucratic politics. Specifically, it was part of the 
Ministry's endeavours to enhance its profile within the political system so 
strongly shaped by inter-elite competition. The primacy of domestic politics, and 
particularly the primacy of President Soeharto, were key elements in 
understanding the bureaucratic politics from which informal diplomacy emerged 
as a preferred approach when seeking to promote peace and stability in South East 
Asia. There can be no doubt that the President's views played a leading role in 
shaping the general direction; but it came after the Ministry had been successful in 
presenting him with a policy approach which he then supported. 
It was evident that President Soeharto had considerable influence in foreign policy 
making and its outcomes. In order to maintain his control over the Indonesian 
foreign policy making elites, the President intentionally instigated inter-elite 
competition and this was indeed a feature of President Soeharto's governing style. 
This reality did not make the use of bureaucratic politics conception in this thesis 
obsolete. On the one hand inter-elite or inter-bureaucracy interaction to produce 
foreign policy implies co-operative efforts to achieve the most agreeable policy. 
On the other hand, the policy making process itself is not free from the rivalry of 
those involved and who, at times, have conflicting interests. 
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2.5. Summary of analytical framework and assumptions 
To achieve regional order a state can select a number of means, including 
regional co-operation and diplomacy. However, there are cases when regional 
co-operation has lacked· a capacity to deal with issues affecting peace and 
stability because of the principles and norms that the organisation had adopted. 
At the same time, the trad_itional format of diplomacy and mediation can be less 
effective in dealing with deep-rooted conflicts or issues involving non-state 
actors. Track Two diplomacy was introduced as an alternative to the traditional 
form of diplomacy and mediation which was often based on power politics. As a 
new approach, the aim of Track Two diplomacy was to resolve conflicts and 
disputes comprehensively through co-operative efforts involving the main 
parties with resolution of the problems following from the interactions between 
the conflicting parties or the disputants facilitated by the third party in a setting 
of informal meetings. Track Two diplomacy scholars and practitioners usually 
favour an informal workshop as an ideal setting to analyse problems and to 
effect a breakthrough. The meeting setting and the skills of the third party 
facilitating the informal process are two important components of Track Two 
diplomacy. 
In contrast to the above consideration of Track Two diplomacy, bureaucratic 
politics provides a different explanation as to why a state innovates an 
alternative form of diplomacy. Bureaucratic politics suggests that the dynamics 
within the domestic context influence foreign policy making. In the bureaucratic 
politics model, the head of the state (the President) instigates inter-elite 
competition in order to have the best policy options and, at the same time, to 
sustain his or her supremacy within the political system. Inter-elite competition 
is a norm of bureaucratic politics and, therefore, to survive the foreign policy 
elite or bureaucratic institution has to compete with the single objective of 
winning the favour or confidence of the President. To secure this confidence, the 
foreign policy elites must show that they are able to fulfil his/her task or to excel 
over other institutions. One way of surpassing other institutions is through 
proposing policy initiatives where special skills are required and no other 
institutions are equipped with such skills. Moreover, it is also important to look 
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for avenues where the initiatives upheld the priority of the President and, in 
Soeharto's case, his priority was to achieve order for the sake of national 
development. The support of the President for diplomatic initiatives left other 
institutions with no other options but to support them because they wanted to be 
part of activities which had the President's favour. 
This summary of the !heoretical framework provides two scenarios for 
Indonesia's proposal of informal diplomacy to deal with regional conflicts and 
disputes during the last two decades of Soeharto era. On the one hand, the 
adoption of Track Two diplomacy principles, assumptions and techniques was 
essential due to the nature of the regional conflicts and the disputes. On the other 
hand, bureaucratic politics put pressure on the Ministry to excel over other 
institutions and to gain the confidence of the President. Informal diplomacy was 
the Ministry's means to achieve these objectives. 
Based on this analysis, the following assumptions about the Indonesian informal 
diplomacy can be made. 
1. Informal diplomacy was selected given the nature of the conflicts and the 
disputes and the structural limits of ASEAN, as well as being an outcome of 
inter-elite competition within the bureaucratic politics model. The adoption 
of informal diplomacy signified that the Ministry wished to surpass other 
institutions in an effort to gain the President's trust and confidence. 
2. The Ministry had confidence in the informal diplomacy approach because 
they were knowledgeable about the principles, assumptions and techniques 
of Track Two diplomacy. Moreover, the Ministry had the human resources 
with which to pursue objectives of informal diplomacy. 
3. The element of bureaucratic politics could support or constrain the 
implementation of informal diplomacy due to the notion of inter-elite 
competition. Informal diplomacy receives more support from other 
institutions, both bureaucratic and military, if they know that the President 
has given it his full support. In contrast, such support would be less 
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forthcoming if the President only gave tacit approval to the informal 
diplomacy initiatives. These variations in the degree of support are a logical 
consequence of bureaucratic politics. 
4. To maintain the support of the President, those who pursued diplomatic 
initiatives were very concerned with attaining tangible results from the 
informal diplomacy process. The pressure emanating from bureaucratic 
politics, and the Ministry's own wish for results, increased the likelihood that 
those who lead the informal diplomacy process were not thinking primarily 
of fully implementing the principles of Track Two diplomacy. They adjusted 
the Track Two approaches based on the dynamics during the informal 
diplomacy process. 
2.6. Hypotheses to be tested 
The followings hypotheses derived from the propositions about Track Two 
diplomacy and bureaucratic politics will be tested in the three case studies of this 
research. 
1. A third party's adherence to principles, assumptions and techniques derived 
from Track Two diplomacy will ensure positive results (this hypotheses is 
derived from John Burton's and Herbert Kelman's propositions, see footnotes 
87 and 88). 
2. The non-binding character of informal diplomacy and a third party's discipline 
in upholding its facilitation function are positively correlated with the 
participants' willingness to explore options (this hypotheses is derived from 
John Burton's, Herbert Kelman's and Barbara Hill's propositions [see 
footnote 97], and also Herbert Kelman's propositions [see footnotes 99 and 
102]). 
3. The participants' commitment to the informal diplomacy process is positively 
correlated with their preparedness for, and interests in, change (this 
hypotheses is derived from Fen Osler Hampson's proposition [see footnote 
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78], Daniel Lieberfeld's proposition [see footnote 80], and c. R. Mitchell's 
proposition [see footnote 84]). 
4. A third party's creativity and innovation is derived from their scholarship and 
stature as private citizens, not from their official status or authority (this 
hypotheses is derived from John McDonald's proposition [see footnote 106], 
and Jacob Bercovitch' proposition [see footnote 144]). 
5. Those practising informal diplomacy should set altruistic objectives and strive 
for the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and 
organising human and material resources, as well as their interests (this 
hypotheses is derived from Joe Montville's propositions [see footnotes 45] 
and Franklin Weinstein's proposition [see footnote 171]). 
6. The level of support from bureaucratic and military institutions for informal 
diplomacy depends on the interest of the President in informal diplomatic 
initiatives. The more these institutions are aware of the President's support, 
the more forthcoming is their support for informal diplomacy (this hypotheses 
is derived from Thomas Preston and Paul 't Hart's proposition [see footnote 
161], I. M. Destler's proposition on bureaucrats source of power [see footnote 
184], and Johannes Botes and Christopher Mitchell's proposition on flexibility 
of a 'third party' [see footnote 185]). 
II.3. Methodology 
This research adopts an eclectic approach and employs standard research methods 
such as historical and geopolitical-strategic analyses, and other methods 
developed in the social sciences. Specifically, this study follows the qualitative 
method through case study analysis of Indonesia's informal diplomacy in dealing 
with the three regional problems between 1985-1998. Quantitative methods were 
not appropriate for this study because, as mentioned by Stephen Krasner, 
"quantification forces explicit rules for defining variables and explicit 
assumptions about the way variables relate." 187 This study is not seeking to affirm 
the relationship among all the variables because of the uniqueness of the issues 
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involved, that is, of the conflicts and the disputes. Political science scholars 
themselves also have not reached consensus on "how these rules were 'chosen or 
how the relationship should be tested, [that is, of quantitative methods]."1ss 
Hence, the qualitative method is undertaken in this study rather than the 
quantitative one because lhe qualitative method can provide a "holistic overview 
of the context under study: its logic, its arrangements and its explicit and implicit 
rules." 189 
This study develops a conceptual framework together with a range of arguments, 
and identifies main elements from propositions on Track Two diplomacy and 
bureaucratic politics. The main elements from propositions on Track Two 
diplomacy and bureaucratic politics function as suppositions of causal relationship 
among variables that led Indonesia to initiate and implement informal diplomacy. 
According to Robert Jervis, "fleshing out our theories and thinking of as many of 
the links in the causal chains as possible is a good way to make our theories more 
satisfying, more testable, and more productive."190 In this connection, 
documentary research and interviews are the two major components of the 
qualitative research of this study, especially for collecting and interpreting data. 
Most importantly, from the two instruments (documentary research and 
interviews) this study is able to understand the issues in a more comprehensive 
way. 
3.1. Written information 
The major part of the data was gathered from primary sources: official documents 
published by the relevant agencies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
research centre of the Ministry of Defence (Lemhanas), and official news releases. 
The published materials from the respective ministers are treated as official policy 
lines concerning the diplomatic initiatives, which are part of the public record. 
Logically, the releases contained the kind of information that the Indonesian 
Government wished to project, such as why they conducted the diplomatic 
initiatives, what had been achieved during the activities and other general 
information about the issues themselves. The releases, including information 
provided to the public during press conferences (usually being conducted prior to 
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and after the events), mostly involved the kind of information that had been 
carefully scrutinised and the Ministry felt comfortable with sharing ope~ly. 
The official documents or the published documents also include the results of all 
the joint studies between ·the Ministry and some Indonesian universities and think 
tanks on some of the regional problems of this study. In many cases, the Ministry 
shared some information on the issues with their counterparts. In most cases, the 
studies were also held under the terms of reference prepared by the Ministry and 
therefore the project was designed to meet certain interests of the Ministry. These 
interests ranged from gaining their support for the government's policies (official 
lines) or seeking policy advice from the universities and think tanks. 
As an official from the Ministry, the writer had been given access to study the 
unpublished records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hence, this research was 
also enriched by information gathered from unpublished internal documents, such 
as diplomatic reports, verbatim records and internal notes. The unpublished 
information gives a broader picture of the initiatives and the processes which were 
not clearly spelled out in the published official documents and press releases. 
However, due to the nature of the documents, which were mainly to serve the 
interests of government or organisations, the writer had taken care to observe the 
requirements of confidentiality to the documents' content and, therefore, the 
information obtained is paraphrased, taking the essence of the substance. 
It is also important to mention that this study gives close attention to the 
documents and information from officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
because the Ministry was responsible for the implementation of the informal 
diplomacy in each of the three case studies. 191 Considering the sensitivity of some 
data from primary sources, in particular some government documentation, the 
recorded information has been verified by those involved in the informal 
diplomacy, both governmental and non-governmental actors. 
In order to have a balanced perspective, particularly in reviewing the 
objectiveness of the intentions and the interests of the participants in informal 
diplomacy, the views of a range of analysts and experts on Indonesian foreign 
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policy have also been sought. These experts provided their independent 
assessments of Indonesia's diplomatic initiatives in the three case studies 
discussed. In addition, data from secondary resources were also studied from 
major newspapers and magazines both in Indonesian and English, as well as from 
international journals. 
The main parts of the pri~ary data (documentary research) were gathered during 
fieldwork from 24 September 2001 to 14 January 2002 in Jakarta. The 
documentary researches were held mainly in the documentation holding of the 
Ministry and for each case study the average time allotted to the data gathering 
was between two and three weeks. This study obtained data concerning Cambodia 
from the documentation holding of the Directorate for Asia and Pacific Affairs 
(Dit. ASPAS). Data concerning Moro (the Philippines) was gathered from the 
documentation holding of the Directorate for International Organisation (Dit. 01) 
and Dit. ASPAS, both under the Directorate General for Political Affairs. Data 
concerning the South China Sea workshops was gathered from the documentation 
holding of the Research and Development Agency of the Ministry (BALITBANG 
Deplu). 
Noting the limitation of old data on Cambodia in the documentation holding of 
the Directorate for Asia and Pacific Affairs, 192 the last two weeks of the field work 
were devoted to acquiring more data from the archive section of the 
Communication Office of the Ministry. In that particular office, the writer was 
given access to the classified cables and diplomatic communications between 
1985 and 1991, involving four of Indonesia's diplomatic posts: Bangkok, Hanoi, 
Paris and the Indonesian Permanent Representative in the UN (New York). 
3.2. The interviews 
Interviews were an essential part of this study for three main reasons. First, this 
research aims to understand issues such as the reasons behind the selection of 
informal diplomacy, the objectives of the diplomatic initiatives and assessment of 
the processes taking place during the diplomatic exercise, from those who took 
part in or were involved in the undertaking. In this case, it is important to mention 
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that Indonesians are generally not fond of writing memoirs; in most cases they 
would rather give a lecture and share their life experiences.193 Secondly, the 
elements such as bureaucratic politics and individual motivations of the initiators 
of informal diplomacy were not clearly spelt out in the written documents. 
Thirdly, this study cons.iders that to gain a better perspective of Indonesia's 
foreign policy, particular attention should be given to culture specific dimensions 
(especially of Java), bec~use the culture has undeniably influenced the way 
governmental officials (especially during the Presidency of Soeharto) expressed 
their opinions, in both verbal and written forms. Careful interpretation, to 
understand the nuances behind statements, was therefore essential, and interviews 
were a means to verify the meaning of ambiguous statements. Thus, the interview 
was a means of reconstructing the events and scrutinising information which is 
not expressed in the written records. 
This study observed the unstructured interview technique and followed the open-
ended (in-depth) interview in order to understand the issues in context "without 
imposing any apriori categorization that may limit the field of inquiry."194 The 
intention was to let the interviewees (particularly those who took part in the 
diplomatic initiatives) provide their personal accounts of the informal diplomacy 
with regard to the process, including the preparation stage and the post-diplomatic 
exercises (evaluation stage). Basically, the intention was to let the interviewees 
recount issues that they felt were important. To have a more productive 
discussion, before every interview, extra times were devoted to familiarise the 
interviewee with the research objectives and issue areas that the study would like 
the interviewees to comment on. 195 In order to have a frank and open discussion, 
the interviews were not recorded. In addition to direct interviews, this study also 
conducted written or correspondence interviews, in which the interviewees were 
given a set of questions for comment. The latter were mainly aimed at the 
potential interviewees who did not reside in Jakarta during the field-research. 
During the fieldwork, the writer interviewed 42 people. The composition of the 
interviewees were government officials, including those in active duty as well as 
those already retired; and Indonesian experts or specialists on Indonesian foreign 
policy and strategic issues in Southeast Asia. The majority of interviewees were 
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from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, including the main players who took part 
in the diplomatic undertakings and those who had some knowledge of the 
informal diplomacy process due to their participation in the Ministry's team. In 
order to have a variation of opinion, the range of interviewees were spread from 
those who, during the conduct of informal diplomacy, were the most senior to 
those who, at the time, were junior officials. Their names were obtained from the 
written documents and from recommendations made by some of the interviewees. 
Prior to any interview, the writer sent each potential interviewee a letter 
requesting an appointment, including an attachment which explained the intention 
of the interview and the issues or information sought. Almost all of the interviews 
were conducted in Indonesian Language (Bahasa Indonesia), except one retired 
diplomat who preferred to speak in English. However, in many instances some 
interviewees preferred to use English words or sentences to emphasise certain 
points. In general, the atmosphere during the interviews was very open and the 
interviewees spoke frankly on various issues raised. 
The exact composition of the interviewees was as follows: (1) still active officials 
included Foreign Minister, 2 senior officials at the level of Directorate General, 5 
senior officials at the level of Director, 5 officials at the level of Deputy Director; 
5 desk officials; 1 staff (2) already retired officials included former Foreign 
Minister (1988-1999), 12 former Ambassadors (five of them once holding a 
position of Director General of the Ministry and the rest at the level of Director), 1 
former Directorate General and 1 former Director; (3) 7 experts on Indonesian 
foreign policy and security issues; and (4) 1 senior journalist. The list of 
interviewees' names and date of interview is attached in Appendix No. 1. 
3.3. Research notes 
In view of the limited time available to conduct the field-research, the compilation 
of data was guided by the research objectives; the conceptual framework, and 
some questions organised based on the propositions. This strategy helped in 
placing the information under separate headings relevant to conceptual 
frameworks or propositions. However, this study was careful not to let the 
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research become totally imprisoned by the conceptual framework. New insights 
gathered during the field-research were used to improve the concepts selected in 
this study. 
The main part of the data for this study was gathered from the Soeharto era, taking 
into account that the informal diplomacy was initiated during his presidency. It is 
important to mention that the main feature of the Soeharto era was the element of 
secrecy and, as a consequence, government officials were by then very reluctant 
to talk openly to the media. Although they made some statements, the wording 
was usually vague and subject to interpretation. Indonesian journalists were 
known for their talent in making inferences from government statements, as well 
as in publicising information along the 'unwritten norms', that is, following the 
preferences of Soeharto's government. The writer consulted one senior journalist 
to seek his opinion or interpretation concerning some 'between the line' 
statements made by some government officials of the Soeharto era. 
Lastly, to understand a state's behaviour and the policy options within a regional 
context, this thesis combined both the governmental and regional levels of 
analysis. The governmental level of analysis focused on the assessments of 
policies made by different segments within the Indonesian Government, to 
identify and examine the prevalence of competition in the country's bureaucracy, 
which led to the conduct of Indonesia's informal diplomacy in the selected case 
studies. The regional level of analysis involved a critical assessment of the 
strategic environment surrounding Indonesia, which was affected by the 
prolongation of unsettled issues and which also influenced Indonesia's way of 
designing informal diplomacy. 
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Indonesian Foreign Policy 
in the Second-Half of Soeharto Era (1985-1998): 
In search of regional order through new diplomatic initiatives 
111.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes and examines Indonesian foreign policy in the second half 
of the Soeharto era (1985-1998). It focuses on the new diplomatic initiatives 
pursued by the Soeharto Government within this time frame to achieve 
Indonesia's core foreign policy objective of regional order. 
This chapter is divided into five main sections. The first provides background 
information on Indonesia's interests for order at domestic, regional and 
international levels. The second describes the regional context of Indonesian 
foreign policy by looking at ASEAN and especially at the notion of Indonesia's 
national interest and the policy of accommodation. The third looks at the Soeharto 
era and examines more closely the aspect of the President's growing interest in 
foreign affairs and his concern with sustaining economic growth. The fourth 
section examines the Indonesian Foreign Ministry (the Ministry) in the context of 
growing confidence among the professional diplomats in the 1980s and 1990s. 
This section also outlines the structure and process of foreign policy initiation 
inside the Ministry. The fifth outlines the strategic motives behind Indonesia's 
adoption of informal diplomacy. 
111.2. Indonesia's interest in order 
The early years of independence helped Indonesian leaders to shape their outlook 
of order, in particular the inter-linkages between the interest of order at national, 
regional and international levels. Although most of the founding fathers realised 
that order at all levels was necessary to build the nation, their concern during the 
early years of independence was mostly with domestic disorder. The issue of 
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separatism required their immediate attention. However, they were also concerned 
that order at regional and international levels had been dictated by the strategic 
interests of the two superpowers under the bipolar structure. The antagonistic 
atmosphere at regional and international levels posed a serious challenge to 
Indonesia's efforts to build the nation and fulfil an ideal of a just and prosperous 
Indonesia as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution.1 Mohammad Hatta stated that 
"only in a peaceful atm~sphere can [Indonesia] rehabilitate its war-damaged 
economy and lift its citizens out of poverty."2 
Seeing the risks of aligning Indonesia to one of the superpowers, Hatta 
pronounced that Indonesia should pursue 'an independent and active foreign 
policy' (bebas-aktif). Independent meant that the new republic would not bend 
itself to any of the opposing blocs, while active suggests efforts to help achieve a 
peaceful world and to help relax international tension emanating from the 
polarisation of world politics.3 As a concept, an independent and active foreign 
policy invites a number of interpretations, such as a policy of "equidistance 
between the superpowers,"4 and a foreign policy "based on the principles of 
peaceful coexistence and noninterference."5 In essence, an independent and active 
foreign policy was a reflection of Indonesia's desire to act independently in 
international politics and not to simply follow the preferences of the major 
powers. 
However, maintaining an independent posture did not free Indonesia from major 
powers meddling in Indonesia's domestic affairs. An example of this was the US 
support for the 1958 rebellion: PRRI (Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik 
Indonesia - Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic) in Sumatra, 
and Permesta (Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam - Universal Struggle Charter) in 
Sulawesi. The US channelled weaponry for the rebel forces in Sumatra from 
Taiwan, and smuggled the weapons to the island from Singapore and Malaysia.6 
The evidence of external support to the rebel forces which including providing 
rebels with sanctuary raised Indonesians suspicions about the US, as well as 
concern about Malaysia and Singapore who had, in Indonesia's view, acted as 
foreign stooges. The Indonesian leaders also had similar suspicions of Britain who 
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"made [its] airfield facilities in Singapore and North Borneo available to the rebels 
[of 1958]."7 The suspicions, fuelled with internal struggle for power in Indonesia, 
led to the adoption of a confrontation policy toward the British plan to form a 
Malaysian Federation in early 1960s. 
Soekamo had taken power in the late 1950s and dissolved the parliamentarian 
system which he consid~red as a factor responsible for the weakening of the 
central government. Soekamo's perspective of order was shaped by his assessment 
of development at regional level and, in particular, by his scepticism toward the 
intentions of the Western powers in Southeast Asia. His scepticism toward the 
West and the efficacy of the United Nations to win the liberation of West Irian8 
from the Netherlands underpinned the adoption of the 'confrontation' policy 
toward the Netherlands. By choosing confrontation Indonesia was clearly 
subscribing to the view that the international system operating at the time was a 
revolutionary system in which the UN as an international organisation was 
ineffectual. Stanley Hoffmann describes this state of a revolutionary system as 
follows: 
A revolutionary system wracked by inexpiable power rivalries and 
ideological conflicts is one in which international organisation is 
reduced to impotence as a force of its own and to the condition of a 
helpless stake in the competitions of states.9 
Having adopted such a perspective, Soekamo returned Indonesia to the 'rails of 
revolution' (jalan revolusi). By committing the nation to a revolutionary path, 
Soekamo deliberately radicalised Indonesia's posture, both domestically and 
internationally. 10 Soekamo's perspective of order was also shaped by his 
revolutionary point of view and his suspicions of the external powers' intentions 
regarding Indonesia. 11 For instance, when speaking before the UN General 
Assembly in 1960, Soekarno referred to the West Irian as a "colonial sword poised 
over Indonesia. It point at our heart, but it also threatens world peace."12 
The conclusion of West Irian's chapter in 1962 did not pacify Soekamo. He 
challenged the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia on the grounds that 
Indonesia was not consulted when the decision to establish the Federation was 
made. 13 Soekarno, again, adopted a policy of 'confrontation' to challenge the 
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Federation of Malaysia and as a consequence, more resources were diverted from 
economic development and welfare to armaments. On December 1963, Foreign 
Minister Subandrio claimed that the government was deliberately neglecting the 
economy for the sake of regaining Indonesia's national identity and reviving. the 
'iron spirit of the people.' 14 Soekamo's confrontation policy and his attempt to 
restructure order at the international level through the New Emerging Forces's 
proposal (NEFOS), 15 cafI?.e to an end after the abortive coup in October 1965. 
After 1965, Soeharto took the leadership of the nation. 
Soeharto dedicated his administration to order at all costs. Internally, he gave the 
military responsibility for maintaining order so that the development programs 
were not disturbed. The military and the intelligence apparatus were also 
responsible for monitoring the society from any efforts to destabilise the 
government, from both the extreme left (communist) and the extreme right 
(radical Muslim). 16 The military establishment considered the Indonesian political 
system was weak because the Indonesian society had yet to achieve cohesiveness 
and the nations faced an acute issue of national integration horizontally. 17 
The success of the military in maintaining stability18 and the success of his 
economic development program (until 1997) gave Soeharto the opportunity to 
concentrate power in his hand. According to Jamie Mackie, this success gave 
Soeharto what he called "performance l_egitimacy."19 From 1965 to the late 1990s, 
Soeharto's power was so decisive because there were no groups or individuals 
capable of effectively challenging his governing system. His system was 
authoritarian with strong emphasis for an orderly, harmonious and tolerant 
relationship within the pluralistic society of Indonesia.20 As mentioned by Donald 
Emmerson, Soeharto "has not only built a government but around it a regime, 
whose structures are more solid than a purely personalistic or Javanese-cultural 
conception of power in the New order would allow."21 
Order at the regional level was also essential in creating a more predictable 
environment in the area surrounding Indonesia's territorial border. To secure 
regional order, Soeharto adopted two strategies: he ended confrontation with 
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Malaysia and supported the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. In fact, Soeharto as 
a commander of the Army Strategic Command (KOSTRAD - Komando Strategis 
Angkatan Darat) had established contact with the authorities in Malaysia to end 
Confrontation, even when Soekarno was still hammering his Crush Malaysia's 
Campaign (Kampanye Ganyang Malaysia). 22 The use of an informal channel and 
trusted confidant to further Soeharto's objective, as in the case in Malaysia, 
became a common featur~ of Soeharto's style of administration, at both domestic 
and international levels. 
Indonesia did achieve the two most significant issues in the context of its strategic 
interest within the ASEAN framework: first on the stipulation that all foreign 
bases were temporary in the Bangkok Declaration of 1967,23 and second, the 
adjustment of the final concept of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality 
(ZOPFAN) declared in Kuala Lumpur in 1971. On the latter, the neutrality 
conception of ZOPFAN was closer to Indonesia's strategic thinking of denying 
external powers influence in the region. In the earlier version, Malaysia proposed 
neutrality with the proviso that the major powers would guarantee not to compete 
in the region. 24 
However, the nature of Indonesia's preoccupation with domestic problems led it 
to promote the national and regional resilience conception as a prescription for 
maintaining regional order. With national resilience, each member is responsible 
for strengthening its domestic capacity, in all aspects: economic, political, social 
and cultural, as well as security and defence. Conceptually, the totality of national 
resilience of all ASEAN members would form a regional resilience. President 
Soeharto was involved in introducing the concept to other ASEAN members and 
systematically, the National Defence Institute of Indonesia (LEMHANAS -
Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional) conducted a series of workshops, involving 
military and civilian leaders of ASEAN countries, to disseminate the ideas.25 At 
the end, ASEAN member countries accepted the ideas. 
ASEAN did increase Indonesia's sense of security at the regional level. To 
enhance regional trust and confidence and Indonesia's sense of security, the 
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Soeharto government embarked on boundary delimitation programs with its 
neighbours and supported regional economic co-operation. 
III.3. Indonesian foreign policy in regional context: pursuing national 
interests beyond ·ASEAN 
As discussed in the first section, Indonesia under Soeharto gave priority to 
pursuing the establishment of an orderly system, at both domestic and regional 
levels. At the regional level, Soeharto considered ASEAN as Indonesia's main 
instrument to achieve regional order and, therefore, ASEAN was designated as the 
cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy. However, Indonesia's interest in having 
a peaceful and stable regional environment clashed at times with the ASEAN 
group position on some issues. One case in point was the Cambodian conflict 
between 1979-1991. Here ASEAN had to accommodate Thailand's stand on the 
conflict because Thailand felt threatened by the presence of Vietnamese troops 
along Thai and Cambodian borders. As a loyal member, Indonesia had to 
accommodate Thailand's interests and follow the collective position set by 
ASEAN. Former Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja expressed 
Indonesia's feeling at this time by stating "ASEAN and especially Indonesia had 
no choice other than to stand firmly against the armed intervention of Vietnam in 
Kampuchea."26 His statement stressed ASEAN's interest in maintaining its 
credibility, but it also emphasised that Indonesia was left with no option other than 
to follow ASEAN's position. 
The ASEAN tradition of accommodation was considered as the backbone of the 
association. Michael Antolik regarded accommodation as a factor that contributed 
to the successful outcomes of ASEAN co-operation and stated that "[t]he 
continued success of the ASEAN process depends on member governments' 
ability and willingness to continue accommodation."27 Hence, on the issues of 
accommodation, Indonesia faced a dilemma between observing the ASEAN 
tradition of accommodation and, at the same time, looking for ways to further 
Indonesia's interests. 
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ASEAN also subscribed to the non-interference principle and was not willing to 
intervene in the domestic problems of the member states or with issues of bilateral 
concerns, such as territorial disputes. However, non-interference did not 
necessarily mean that the ASEAN countries prevented other members from 
responding to requests for help from member countries. In some cases, ASEAN 
countries did help each other with internal problems, but mostly where there were 
mutual interests and cons~nt for such assistance or co-operation. An example of 
this was the joint border co-operation between Indonesia and Malaysia to eradicate 
the remnants of the communist groups in Borneo. 28 Furthermore, ASEAN and 
their members had developed a tradition of postponing discussion on sensitive 
issues involving the member states to the indefinite future, to a time when the 
member states would feel comfortable about discussing the issues, either 
bilaterally or as a group within the ASEAN forum. 
On the one hand, both the traditions of accommodation and non-interference 
served Indonesia's interests. For instance, Indonesia had been able to rely on 
support from individual ASEAN members and from ASEAN as a group on the 
East Timar issue at the UN and other international forums. The non-interference 
principle on the domestic problems of other members had given the Soeharto 
government a free hand to deal with any domestic problem, including those in 
East Timor, as well as separatism in West Irian and Aceh. In fact, Indonesia's 
dispute with Portugal on East Timar had jeopardised the external co-operation 
between ASEAN and the EU in the 1990s. This meant that ASEAN members had 
no other option but to follow Indonesia's position on East Timor in the 1990s.29 
On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, Indonesia was also concerned about some 
problems at the regional level that had the potential to jeopardise Indonesia's 
interest in having a stable regional environment to support its economic 
development program. For instance, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea 
had the potential to upset the exploration of liquid natural gas in Indonesia's 
Natuna Island, but ASEAN was not in a position to address these disputes within 
its framework. Nana Sutresna, former Director General for Political Affairs of the 
Ministry, provided his assessment to that effect as follows: 
Indonesia is aware that any development in Southeast Asia, 
whether positively or negatively, will have a direct bearing on its 
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natural development. Prospects of political stability and economic 
progress within each individual country cannot be separated from 
the prospects of peace and stability in the surrounding region. 30 
Hence, Indonesia was left with the option of letting some regional problems run 
their own course or pursuing diplomatic initiatives of its own. Indonesia was able 
to address some issues of regional concern beyond the ASEAN framework. In the 
case of Cambodia, with a _mandate from ASEAN to act as ASEAN's interlocutor, 
Indonesia organised Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM). Later on, as a Co-Chair of 
the Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC) with France, the two 
countries elevated the discussion of the problem to the international level. PICC as 
a framework to discuss the Cambodian problem is an example of Indonesia moved 
beyond ASEAN in its diplomatic efforts. Similar to JIM, all ASEAN countries 
took part in PICC as individual countries and, therefore, each of them had no 
obligation to uphold ASEAN' s positions. 
As will be explained in Chapter 4, some ASEAN countries took a rigid position 
during JIM and PICC and this attitude had a negative impact on the dynamics 
during the meetings. These realities further convinced Indonesia that the ASEAN 
tradition of accommodation was incompatible with Indonesia's interest of having 
a speedy resolution to the Cambodian conflict. One retired senior diplomat from 
Indonesia mentioned that, at one time, he had criticised his counterpart from 
Singapore for being very hostile toward Vietnam and the Hun Sen led-
government. He stressed that such hostility contributed to the deterioration of the 
meetings' atmosphere.31 The parochial attitude of some ASEAN participants had 
convinced Indonesia that their colleagues were only concerned with their own 
interests. As a consequence, Indonesia considered it acceptable to strive for its 
own interests by initiating new diplomatic initiatives. 
As PICC had set a precedent of Indonesia pursuing new diplomatic initiatives at 
the regional level, Indonesia proposed two further diplomatic initiatives at this 
level. Indonesia received a mandate from the Organisation of Islamic Conference 
(OIC) to help resolve the Moro problem, and engaged ASEAN countries in 
informal diplomacy processes through informal workshop on the South China Sea 
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disputes. These three cases demonstrated that in the desire for regional order, 
Indonesia was willing to use ASEAN as a vehicle and, if necessary, move beyond 
ASEAN. Informal diplomacy was Indonesia's means to effect a breakthrough on 
these problems. 
111.4. President Soeharto and Indonesian foreign policy in the 1980s and 
1990s: growing p~rsonal interest 
When he assumed leadership of Indonesia in the 1960s, Soeharto displayed a low 
profile posture on foreign policy and even let Thailand gain the credit for the 
establishment of ASEAN, despite the fact that the association was Indonesia's 
brainchild.32 ASEAN was closely associated with Thailand because the ASEAN 
Declaration of 1967, signed in Bangkok, was also named the Bangkok 
Declaration. Soeharto did not wish to take personal credit for ASEAN's 
establishment, even though he had assigned his lieutenant, Foreign Minister Adam 
Malik, and a small team to develop a concept paper of ASEAN as a regional 
framework for co-operation and later on persuaded neighbours to accept its ideas. 
This low profile posture of Soeharto can be explained in two ways. First, the 
President wished to establish a new posture for Indonesia post-Soekamo. He 
wished to portray an image of a co-operative Indonesia which did not wish to play 
a 'big brother' role in the region. Second, at that stage the President was 
preoccupied with the domestic problems and had had little exposure to 
international affairs. Soeharto saw the merits of the idea of regional co-operation 
and let Minister Malik work intensively to gain support for the idea from the 
neighbouring countries. Hence what really mattered to Soeharto was the 
acceptance of the concept of regional co-operation and agreement for the 
establishment of ASEAN. 
Soeharto let Minister Malik and his small team of professional diplomats from the 
Ministry develop the concept paper of ASEAN. Soeharto also assigned a number 
of army officials closely associated with him to work with the team.33 On the one 
hand, the assignment of military officials could be interpreted as a means to 
increase the efficiency of the diplomatic efforts because the military had networks 
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among their military counterparts in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, Soeharto 
could have been also indicating to Minister Malik and his team that they should 
not claim credit for their diplomatic efforts because the army officials were 
assisting them in their work. Overall, Soeharto's actions signify his strong control 
of the process around the establishment of ASEAN, and both the Ministry and the 
anned forces were simply executing his orders. However, at the same time, 
Soeharto maintained his lqw profile during the process. 
Soeharto kept this low profile on foreign affairs throughout the 1970s, mainly 
because his government was busy concentrating its energy on the national 
development program. The improvement in the economic situation in the 1970s 
helped the regime gain broader acceptance, even among groups initially opposing 
it.34 However, the stabilisation and development programs were implemented at 
the price of a harsh policy at the national level. As noted before, during the early 
years of the Soeharto government, the military gained more leverage in domestic 
politics because it acted as Soeharto's main instrument to achieve national 
stability.35 
The 1980s marked a new chapter of Soeharto's Indonesia, especially in the fields 
of domestic politics and the economy. Some developments had profound impacts 
on Indonesia's politics in the 1990s and, therefore, will be examined closely in 
this chapter. Overall, Soeharto was able to manage these developments and, as a 
consequence, his pre-eminence in Indonesia between 1980s to the first half of 
1990s was not challenged. In the 1980s, Soeharto was very confident about his 
supremacy in the domestic political system. Mackie summarised Soeharto's 
profile in the 1980s onward as follows: 
... Soeharto found himself in a position of unprecedented personal 
preeminence in the early 1980s, completely dominating the 
political system and imposing his own personal style on it 
increasingly from then on. Decision-making authority came to be 
concentrated more than ever in and around the palace circle of the 
president and his immediate associates. 36 
In the political field, the most significant developments in the late 1980s 
concerned Soeharto's relationship with the military and the Islamic interest 
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groups. In the early 1980s, Soeharto had legitimised the military's dominant 
position of the Indonesian political system through legislation No. 20, 1982. Some 
Indonesian analysts, such as Riefqi Muna, argue that the new bill entitled 'Basic 
Provisions for the Defence and Security of the Republic Indonesia' had legalised 
the 'dual function' of the military, and, at the same time, increased the role of the 
military into a 'multi-function' one.37 The bill gave the military the licence to 
penetrate all aspects of I~donesian life, not only in security and socio-political 
affairs, but also in economic, cultural and other affairs. Micheal Vatikiotis ~gues 
that the bill was Soeharto's means of "distributing patronage to his supporters and 
silencing his critics."38 With the military gaining a dignified grip on the political 
system, many in Indonesian society regarded the military as a tool of the Soeharto 
regime.39 The sense of antipathy toward the military became deeply embedded 
within the society. 
Sensing the growing resentment toward the military, in the mid-1980s Soeharto 
appeared gradually to distance himself from it. He did not prevent some civilian 
leaders from questioning the military's perspective of stability and also their 
domination in domestic politics. While the military continued with their focus on 
maintaining stability through vigilance toward the 'communist threat' and of 
maintaining 'national discipline,' civilian intellectuals were promoting the 
necessity of pursuing a democratisation program.40 This episode signified a period 
when civilians began to assert their position in the Indonesian political system. 
Although the civilians were not always successful in their efforts - because the 
military was always adamant about their prime position - what was impressive 
was that civilians had the courage to challenge the military's rigid security 
outlook. 
At the same time and also not to the military's liking, Islamic leaders and 
intellectuals began to look for a greater role in domestic politics. By the late 
1980s, Soeharto was looking for an alternative power base among the Indonesian 
Moslems to balance the army's power.41 One of Soeharto's sources of support was 
lkatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI or Association of Indonesian 
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Muslim Intellectuals) which was established in December 1990, and led by 
Soeharto's protege, B.J. Habibie. Douglas Ramage argues that: 
It is well known that because Soeharto' s support from the armed 
forces has somewhat diminished since the late 1980s, he has 
actively sought to co-opt the Indonesian Islamic movement to 
bolster his legitirriacy.42 
For their part, the military in the late 1980s were made aware that the President 
was prepared to be bold in his dealings with some domestic affairs, even if that 
meant contradicting the position of the military. The most obvious case was 
Soeharto's appointment of a former army lawyer, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Sudharmono, as 
Vice President in 1988, despite the strong objections from the military.43 In the 
early 1990s, Soeharto made a statement asking the military to limit their 
involvement in the internal affairs of other institutions: governmental and non-
governmental organisations.44 In 1993 Soeharto did not endorse the appointment 
of military candidates for the position of general chairman of GOLK.AR 
(Golongan Karya - Functional Group).45 Harmoko, a civilian, was elected to this 
position and as a result the rivalry between the civilians and the military 
intensified and became public knowledge.46 Clearly, controlling the power of the 
military was a calculated move by Soeharto of and was followed by the gradual 
decline in the military's role in Indonesia's politics. 
In the mid-1980s, Soeharto had adopted politik keterbukaan (political openness) 
which had helped loosen some of the tension within the political system. Under 
the 'political openness' policy, new Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
flourished and those organisations provided Indonesia's younger generation with 
alternative political outlets.47 In the political openness era, journalists also found 
new freedom to express their opinions, although they had to express their opinions 
carefully so that they did not offend the government.48 Economic growth during 
the Soeharto years also stimulated the emergence of Indonesia's middle class.49 
The new middle class was a product of government protective measures and easy 
access to government funds and therefore, they gave their support to the Soeharto 
government.50 Bob Lowry provides his assessment of these economic elites as 
follows: 
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Many of the ~urre~t ind_igenous capital holders have family or 
patronage relat1onsh1ps with the bureaucracy which provide access 
to government contracts and protection from Chinese and foreign 
business.51 
Starting in the 1980s, Indonesia embarked on an export led growth strategy and, to 
stimulate the strategy, the government gave the private sectors and foreign 
investors more incentives, such as tax holidays. Hence, from 1980s onward, the 
Soeharto government's outlook in the economic field was more open as Indonesia 
hoped to integrate its economy to the Asia and Pacific markets. 
This study argues that having the domestic sphere in control and having economic 
progress in hand, Soeharto began to give more personal interest to foreign affairs. 
President Soeharto became actively involved in deciding foreign policy direction. 
He had showed interest and gave moral support to JIM (in the 1980s) and the 
Moro peace process (in the 1990s). Moreover, he was directly involved in another 
two of the most high profile international events in Indonesia, the NAM Summit 
in 1992 and the APEC Leaders Meeting in 1994.52 
In dealing with the NAM and APEC issues, Soeharto also adopted a policy of 
dispersing assignments. He relied on the professionals from the Foreign Ministry 
and, at the same time, appointed some trusted aides as Soeharto's alternative 
channel to deal with particular issues. For instance, in the case of APEC he 
appointed Prof. Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, a technocrat, as his liaison with APEC 
members.53 The appointment of trusted aides duplicated the work of the Ministry, 
the formal institution responsible for dealing with day to day operations related to 
the issues. 
Although Soeharto maintained his habit of using a number of channels to pursue 
foreign policy objectives, the role of professional diplomats did gradually 
increase. Soeharto needed the professional diplomats to deal with the delicate 
negotiations surrounding the NAM and APEC processes, a role that his personal 
aides were unable to fulfil. Arguably, Soeharto's confidence in the diplomats' 
ability had increased because of their success in various international assignments, 
such as during the negotiations of UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on Law 
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of the Sea) where the conception of archipelagic states was acknowledged by the 
international community. 
Soeharto's growing interest in foreign affairs gave the Ministry an opportunity to 
increase its profile through professionalism. Clearly, the President needed the help 
of the professionals to achieve his interest of playing some roles internationally. 
The skills of the Ministry's personnel in negotiation, organising international 
meetings and conferences, and in dealing with intricacies surrounding protocols, 
cannot easily be replaced by other civilian bureaucracies or the military 
establishment. At the same time, the moderation of the military's role 
domestically meant that the President had tempered his favouritism and was 
willing to rely on the civilians for pursuing his interests at the domestic and 
international levels. Hence, the timing between the mid-1980s to the late 1990s 
was ripe for the Ministry to gain the confidence of the President through ideas and 
performance. 
111.5. Soeharto's Indonesia: foreign policy making and the role of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Indonesian foreign policy in the second half of the Soeharto era (1985-1998) was 
marked by a number of diplomatic initiatives. This study is concerned with some 
initiatives at the regional context, that is, Indonesia's preparedness to move 
beyond the ASEAN framework, if necessary, to secure its interest of regional 
order. As indicated earlier, Indonesia pursued new initiatives as a result of a 
number of factors, including the limitation of ASEAN and the growing personal 
interest of President Soeharto in foreign affairs. This study argues that the 
dynamic at the Ministry also influenced the profile of Indonesia's diplomacy from 
the mid-1980s onward. 
This section discusses and outlines the following issues. The first one relates to 
the Ministry's position within the bureaucratic structures overall, the foreign 
policy making process and those involved in it (especially in the 1980s). The 
second issue concerns the structure of the Ministry and some developments within 
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the structure that were supportive of the adoption of infonnal diplomacy. The third 
one concerns the process of policy initiation within the Ministry and the aspect of 
policy co-ordination with other bureaucracies, including the· military 
establishment. 
5.1. Foreign policy making: between process and the personality of President 
Soeharto 
During the Soeharto era, foreign policy making in the Indonesian context was 
undoubtedly elitist and characterised by bureaucratic politics. The President 
allowed the foreign policy making elite to compete for his favour and, in the end, 
he decided which course of action would be taken. The domination of the 
President was a result of the pyramidal shape of Indonesia's political structure in 
which Soeharto sat at the apex making him very influential in the policy making 
process. William Liddle describes the political structure of the Soeharto 
government as follows: 
The political structure of the New Order can be described as a 
steeply-ascending pyramid in which the heights are thoroughly 
dominated by a single office, the presidency. The president 
commands the military which is primus inter pares within the 
bureaucracy, which in tum holds sway over the society.54 
The elitist nature of the policy making process under Soeharto had some 
resemblance to that of the Soekamo era. In contrast, in the early years of 
independence from 1945 to 1958 foreign policy outputs were subject to 
parliament's scrutiny and, therefore, the process of formulating the policy was 
more transparent.55 In Soekamo's case, he defined Indonesia's foreign policy and 
then the Foreign Ministry and the military implemented the policy.56 In his early 
years in power, Soeharto gave the military and the Ministry's officials 
responsibility for shaping and implementing foreign policy. By assigning these 
two institutions with such responsibility, Soeharto maintained a check and balance 
mechanism, thereby retaining his control of foreign policy matters. 
Although, the elitist nature and exclusiveness of foreign policy making would 
seem to make any assessment of the foreign policy making's process seem easy to 
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follow, in reality the process itself was difficult to understand. The lack of clarity 
of the process was aptly put by Robert Tilman: "the forces shaping Indonesian 
policy making, including the making of foreign policy, are subtle, deeply 
imbedded in a very complex and sophisticated Indonesian/Javanese culture, and 
rarely what they appear to be on the surface."57 The elitist nature of the process 
made foreign policy making distant from the society at large. To deal with the 
difficulty in assessing th~ foreign policy making process, some analysts have 
tended to consider the process took place in a 'black box.' They have made 
assumptions about the process within the box by first identifying those whom they 
considered were involved in the process and later on they observed the foreign 
policy outputs. In their opinion, the outputs would have had some correlation with 
the power of the actors who took part in the process, that is, the more powerful the 
actor the more their interests would be reflected in the policy. However, they 
mostly agree that Soeharto had the position as the Hegemon and he had the 
ultimate power in deciding the final outputs from the foreign policy making . 
process.58 
At times, the President made decisions merely to appease the various interest 
groups or the competing elites. Tilman argues that decisions on foreign policy 
were not necessarily taken for the sake of national or societal interests, but to 
accommodate or balance the competing interests among factions, usually among 
government bureaucrats.59 In this case, President Soeharto made the final decision 
to satisfy the competing elites, so that the substance of the policy was not too 
important. Hence, what was important was the symbolism that the President was 
wise and could make a decision to satisfy all parties in domestic politics. 
This domestic balance came at the price of confusion on the part of the foreign 
counterparts. An example of this was Soeharto's commitment to let Indonesia join 
in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFT A) process in 1992, but only on condition 
that the liberalisation process was done gradually to allow those involved in the 
domestic economy to adjust. Indonesia was adamant that AFT A be held according 
to the CEPT scheme (Common Effective Preferential Tariffs) which clustered 
manufactured products into tariff groups. Each participant of AFT A had to decide 
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which of their products they considered eligible for tariff reduction and included 
into the scheme, the inclusion and exclusion lists.60 The decision to join AFT A 
satisfied the ASEAN circle in the foreign and trade ministries who felt it was 
necessary to support regional initiatives. Likewise, the CEPT scheme satisfied the 
business community and state enterprises, which were heavily protected during the 
Soeharto years. By making such a condition, Indonesia had, in fact, restricted the 
progression of AFT A, d_isappointing some members of ASEAN, particularly 
Singapore and Thailand. 
This ambiguity of the decision making process gave analysts no other option but 
to concentrate on the structure of elites and their interests on particular 
international relations issues. For instance, for politics and defence issues, they 
would look at the elite from the Foreign Ministry (the Ministry), the military 
establishment (Ministry of Defence and Intelligence Agency), State Secretariat 
(Sekneg) and research institution such as CSIS (Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies).61 For economic issues, they would single out the Ministry 
of Trade, business community (KADIN - Kamar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia 
or Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry), Sekneg and to a lesser extent 
the Ministry and CSIS. The role of think tanks such as the CSIS depended on their 
patron and the particular elite or power group in the government at the time. The 
CSIS was considered very influential during the peak of the late-Ali Moertopo, a 
member of Soeharto's inner circle who at the time was responsible for intelligence 
and security.62 However, CSIS was instrumental in producing policy papers on 
political, security and economic issues on a regular basis.63 Similarly, the concerns 
of interest groups like the business community were also reflected in policy 
outputs according to their closeness with elites in the economic portfolio, and 
more importantly with the President's family. 
Generally, interest groups in Indonesia only expressed interest in foreign related 
affairs if the issues involved their specific concerns. For instance, as noted earlier, 
the economic groups lobbied for foreign policy if their trade and market access 
were at stake. Some NGOs concerned with workers' rights, at times, pressed for 
government intervention when there were consular problems involving 
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Indonesia's workers overseas. The Moslem clerics asserted pressure on issues 
sensitive to their ummah (followers), such as the atrocities against the Moslem 
community in Bosnia. Hence, the interests of the non-governmental entities were 
sporadic and not well structured. None of the interest groups took part in the 
policy making process and therefore the only available instruments to direct their 
concerns to were the media, parliament or developing a relationship with those in 
the foreign policy making elite. Teuku Rezasyah argues that the role of those 
outside the policy making process, such as KADIN, CSIS, the ruling party 
(GOLKAR), the media, members of parliament and the society at large ranged 
from mainly passive or supportive to raising concern or commenting on foreign 
related issues. 64 In Soeharto' s Indonesia, at least until the mid-1990s, the interest 
groups did not dare to press their concerns by holding demonstrations because the 
government was very sensitive about maintaining stability and order.65 
Overall, domestic stability created an environment wherein the government 
apparatus was able to structure, formulate and pursue their ministries' programs. 
In a sense, the bureaucrats were able to pursue a policy relatively free from 
interference from other centres of power, such as from members of parliament and 
opinion makers, because the political environment favoured the continuation of 
policy from year to year. Moeljarto Tjokrowinoto noted that the various references 
to Indonesian bureaucracy during the New Order, such as bureaucratic polity and 
bureaucratic authoritarian regime, were all basically referring to a bureaucracy 
which dominated the decision making mechanism and insulated the mechanism 
from popular participation.66 However, bureaucratic politics also signified 
constant competition among the foreign policy making elite within the 
government bureaucracy in attaining some policies. Although foreign policy 
making went through a complicated process, the final say of the outputs always 
rested with President Soeharto, based on his prerogative right. Logically, in the 
cases where the initiative taken by the bureaucrats would have enhanced the 
President's profile internationally and domestically, the President would have 
given it his full support. 
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Although most analysts concurred on the pre-eminence of the President, neither 
the foreign policy elite nor analysts were able to identify which one of the many 
actors the President favoured. As noted earlier, Mackie argued that the decision 
making authority was concentrated around the palace circle.67 Similarly Liddle 
pointed out that in the ·pyramidal structure of the New Order, the presidency 
dominated the whole structure.68 However, the President and his close aides 
around the palace did not_ always have full cognisance of foreign related matters 
and, therefore, had to rely on inputs from the bureaucracy. In fact, the capacity of a 
bureaucratic institution to propose foreign policy options is a logical consequence 
from the general nature of bureaucracy. Robert Wendzel provides the following 
rationale: 
Every chief policymaker in every country operates within a 
bureaucratic political context. Because there are simply too many 
decisions for any person to make and because such a wide variety 
of expertise is required, an organization exists, the purported 
purpose of which is to help the chief policymaker rationally 
formulate and efficiently implement his optimum foreign policy.69 
At issue is which one of the many institutions involved in foreign related affairs -
bureaucratic institutions, military establishment or interest groups - the President 
listened to the most. The difficulties in determining this stem from two factors; the 
personality factors of Soeharto, and his management style. First the President 
received inputs from different sources at different times70 and, at times, he only 
listened to the inputs and did not make his opinion explicit. This noncommittal 
attitude left the elite confused as to whether or not the President had given his 
consent to their proposed policy options.71 Second, as indicated earlier, the 
President always assigned different institutions to deal with the many foreign 
policy matters. This management style can be interpreted in two ways. On the one 
hand, the President did not fully trust his aides and, therefore, he intentionally let 
his aides compete in fulfilling his tasks. In the end, none of the actors would have 
been able to claim credit from the success of their diplomatic missions because of 
the many actors involved in the process.72 On the other hand, Soeharto might have 
wished to gain the most from the expertise or skills of the different actors. Hence, 
he encouraged co-operation because he knew that any successful outcome from 
the diplomatic missions would have enhanced his status. The second explanation 
87 
can be applied to the JIM on Cambodia and the peace process to deal with the 
Moro problem because the Ministry received substantial support from other 
bureaucracies and the military establishment. However, from a different 
perspective, such support for the Ministry was a logical consequence of their 
realisation that Soeharto· had put his weight behind the diplomatic initiatives 
proposed by the Ministry. 73 
Such realisation of the President's support implied that the Ministry had been 
successful in gaining the confidence of the President from the mid-1980s onward. 
The sign of Soeharto growing trust to the Ministry was the appointment of Ali 
Alatas (a professional diplomat) in 1988 as a Foreign Minister. Although this did 
not mean Soeharto trusted the Ministry as an institution, the appointment sent a 
symbolic signal to the Ministry's bureaucracies (and to other bureaucratic 
institutions) that he had given the Ministry an opportunity to function under the 
leadership of its own people. 
The implications of Ali Alatas appointment to the Ministry were twofold. First, it 
increased the Ministry's confidence on their capacity to act as a lynchpin within 
the Indonesian bureaucratic politic setting, in terms of proposing foreign policy 
options and implementing them. Second, he imprinted idealism into the Ministry's 
mainstream. Ali Alatas introduced the concept of 'just peace', which he was 
exposed to in the United Nations, into the thinking within the Ministry. The notion 
of 'just peace' or resolving problems comprehensively which balance between 
freedom and responsibility had a lot to do with the personality of Minister Alatas, 
Indonesia's Ambassador to the United Nations for several years before being 
appointed as Minister for Foreign Affairs for eleven years. He described the term 
as follows: 
Only peace based on justice, on a recognition of the equal worth of 
all human lives, the equal validity of all human aspirations, can 
become true peace. And because it is based on justice, true peace is 
durable. In a regime of peace founded on justice there is a 
harmonious balance between freedom and responsibility and in that 
balance the human potential and human creativity can soar. 
Cooperation among individuals and among nations becomes the 
1 f h . , 74 natura course o uman act1v1ty. 
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5.2. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry: the structure, process and the 
diplomatic machinery 
As noted in Chapter 2, when Soeharto came to power, he showed a lack of trust 
toward professional diplomats from the Ministry. In order to 'cleanse' the 
Ministry of those whom he perceived as leftist or Soekamo followers, Soeharto 
installed military personn_el in the Ministry. The military were placed in some 
strategic positions in the Ministry: as Secretary General and Inspector General. 
Similarly, some important overseas posts were given to the military, among 
others, ambassadorships in ASEAN capitals, Tokyo and Washington.75 The 
domination of the military in the Ministry suggests that in his early years Soeharto 
was more concerned with the stabilisation program and securing various 
bureaucracies, military establishment, political parties and social organisations 
from the remnants of the PKI. However, it is clear that Soeharto also realised the 
importance of foreign policy to secure his development program and to renew 
regional and international confidence in Indonesia post-Soekamo. 
To secure his foreign policy objectives, Soeharto assigned Adam Malik, a senior 
politician, as Indonesian Foreign Minister. Minister Malik, who led the Ministry 
from 1967 to 1977, nurtured a new cadre of professional diplomats after the 
military had purged a number of senior diplomats from the Ministry.76 Minister 
Malik was successful in achieving Soeharto's objective of creating a new image of 
Indonesia in the region, particularly through the establishment of ASEAN. 
The success of Minister Malik with the help of professional diplomats did not 
necessarily raise the Ministry's profile in Soeharto's eyes. Up to the mid-1970s, 
the military establishment had Soeharto's favour and retained its favoured 
position. An example of this was the Ministry's position vis-a-vis the 
incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia in 1976. To the Ministry's 
embarrassment, they were left out of the loop of the operasi Komodo (Komodo 
operation), that is, when the 'Indonesian volunteers' infiltrated East Timor in 
1976.77 Even by then, Minister Malik and some diplomats were in the process of 
dialogue with Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) and 
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the Portuguese government. Because they had not been appraised of the operation, 
the Indonesian diplomats in the UN were dumbfounded when the Portuguese 
diplomats presented the case before the UN General Assembly and showed the 
Assembly with photographic evidence of the military incursion.78 Although 
withholding information about the invasion from the Ministry could be seen as 
part of the military or intelligence strategy of clandestine operation, the Ministry's 
ignorance of the operation.spoilt Indonesia's image in the UN in the early years of 
the East Timor fiasco. 
The case of the invasion of East Timar haunted Indonesia's profile internationally 
and, at the same time, damaged the reputation of the Ministry domestically. The 
parliamentarians, media and the military establishments often accused the 
Ministry of failing to defend Indonesia's position on East Timar at the 
international level. However, according to Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, East Timar 
presented Indonesian diplomats with an indefensible case because they did not 
know what happened in East Timar between 1976 to the late 1980s. Between 
these years, the area was insulated from the rest of Indonesia and became the 
military's fiefdom.79 Minister Alatas aptly called East Timar as a 'pebble in the 
shoe'80 that brought pain to the diplomats wherever they went. With the Ministry's 
limited capacity to solve the East Timar problem and their desire to renew 
Indonesia's profile internationally as well as the Ministry's stature at domestic 
level, the Ministry came up with a number of diplomatic initiatives to deal with 
regional issues. This observation is confirmed to a certain extent by former 
Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, who spoke about the success of Indonesia's 
diplomacy in dealing with some regional issues. From this he concluded that the 
East Timar problem had not undermined Indonesia's profile internationally.81 The 
success of the Indonesian diplomats in dealing with some international issues and 
regional conflicts did increase the profile of the Ministry at the national level and 
in particular, in the eyes of President Soeharto. 
At the same time, the notion of success has a lot to do with the skills of those who 
pursued the diplomatic initiatives. As mentioned earlier, Minister Malik inherited 
a bureaucratic system where their personnel had gone through security clearance, 
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and, therefore, were somewhat dispirited. Clearly, the Ministry did regress after 
some of its professionals had been purged and, at the same time, for~ign policy 
was not high on the agenda of the New Order government which gave priority to 
stabilisation of the domestic front. In dealing with this apathy among the 
personnel, Minister Malik nurtured a new cadre of professional diplomats among 
those who remained in the Ministry and embarked on a policy of recruitment. 
Those who were recruite~ had undergone intensive training and were encouraged 
to pursue post-graduate studies overseas.82 All ministers, after Minister Malik, 
continued the Ministry's policy on training and education. 
For instance, Minister Kusumaatmadja, a former Dean from a State University in 
Bandung, gave special attention to the education of the diplomats.83 Minister 
Kusumaatmadja gave further academic flavour into the Ministry when in early 
1980s, he recruited Prof. Fuad Hassan, a lecturer and trained psychologist, as a 
Head of the Research and Development Agency of the Ministry. 84 During Minister 
Alatas' tenure more diplomats were sent overseas to undergo post-graduate 
studies. Clearly, training and education became essential components of the 
Ministry's human resources development programs. The importance of training 
and education was also reflected in the fact that those who led the Training Centre 
in the Ministry were mostly senior diplomats with ambassadorial rank. 
Theoretically, by the time the Ministry engaged in informal diplomacy in the mid-
1980s, they had sufficient cadres who were skilful diplomats and, at the same 
time, some of them were exposed to various perspectives on diplomacy and 
conflict resolution from their overseas studies. With the pooling of trained human 
resources and skills personnel in the Ministry, the adoption of informal diplomacy 
became susceptible. Former Indonesian Ambassador to Beijing, Juwana, 
confirmed this assessment and stated that Indonesia was able to organise JIM 
because by then Indonesia had skilful diplomats and understood the issues 
comprehensively, which also meant they were equipped with a theoretical 
perspective.85 In contrast, former Indonesian Ambassador to Ottawa, Budiman 
Darmosutanto, argued that in some cases there were tendencies to recruit member 
of a team to deal with some issues, mainly based on his or her portfolio in the 
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Ministry.86 Therefore, at times, skills were not a determining factor in the 
recruitment of members of a team. It is to be seen in the three case studies 
chapters (Chapter 4, 5 and 6) which of the two opinions confirmed with reality 
within the Indonesia teams to deal with the three regional problems. 
The following discussion outlines the organisational structure of the Indonesian 
Foreign Ministry and th~ decision-making processes in the Ministry. Special 
attention is also given to the dynamics of information flows within the Ministry 
and how the process of assessing information and policy initiation influenced 
foreign policy options and the diplomatic designs to deal with international issues. 
Hence, organisational aspects also influenced foreign policy making in Indonesia 
and more importantly to the adoption of informal diplomacy. 
5.2.1. The organisational structure of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry 
Within the period of this study (between 1985 and 1998), the formal structure of 
the Ministry consisted of eight main offices each of which supervised several 
directorates or bureau. Those main offices were a Secretary General, an Inspector 
General, a Directorate General for Political Affairs, a Directorate General for 
External Economic Relations Affairs, a Directorate General for Social and 
Cultural Affairs, a Directorate General for Protocol and Consular Affairs, the 
Indonesian-ASEAN Affairs and the Research and Development Agency.87 
Internally, the office of the Secretary General was considered to be the most 
'influential' office in the Ministry, because it oversees not only the personnel 
matters, but also all communication flows from the Ministry to the overseas posts 
and vice-versa, including the confidential communication. The Secretary General 
was also responsible for the Foreign Minister's special administration (office) 
with the main function involving correspondence, scheduling of meetings, and 
preparing for daily and weekly briefings. By custom, the office was led by one of 
the most senior diplomats in the Ministry who was a trusted aide of the Foreign 
Minister.88 The office of the Inspector General was also internally powerful, but 
its concern was mainly with personnel and the rules of compliance. 89 
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The Directorate General for Political Affairs was responsible for all political 
issues at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. The regional and bilateral 
matters fell under the responsibility of four directors with the following portfolios: 
Asia and Pacific, America, Europe, and Africa and the Middle East. All 
multilateral affairs were under the jurisdiction of the Director for International 
Organisation. It is inte~esting to note that the office responsible for the 
Cambodia's diplomatic initiative was the Asia and Pacific Directorate, whereas 
the International Organisation Directorate supervised the diplomacy concerning 
the southern-part of the Philippines.90 
The non-political issues were dealt by the Directorate General for External 
Economic Relations Affairs, the Directorate General for Social and Cultural 
Affairs, the Directorate General for ASEAN Affairs and the Directorate General 
for Protocol and Consular Affairs. However, one Directorate under the Directorate 
General for ASEAN Affairs was responsible for ASEAN political co-operation 
and, to a certain extent, their area of jurisdiction overlapped with those in the Asia 
and Pacific Directorate under the Directorate General for Political Affairs. The 
Director for Information, under the Directorate General for Social and Cultural 
Affairs, was responsible for providing information to journalists and issuing news 
releases. At times, the director acted as the Ministry's spoke-person, but the role 
was optional and subject to the Minister's approval. 
The Research and Development Agency (the Research Agency) was in charge of 
the long term strategic policies of the Ministry and also responsible for developing 
links between the Ministry and the government or private universities, think-tanks 
and various research centres of international relations in Indonesia and overseas. 
This link helped the Ministry understand the concerns of various interest groups in 
Indonesia about foreign related matters and the Ministry also benefited from their 
perspectives. The Ministry, through the Research Agency, also used these interest 
groups to sound out policy options. For instance, in the mid-1980s CSIS proposed 
a number of policy options on how to deal with the Cambodian problem whereas, 
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in the late 1980s,91 the Research Agency used CSIS as a spring board to gain 
domestic support for informal workshop on South China Sea disputes.92 
The implication from the Research Agency's interest in strategic issues was that 
their work, at times, overlapped with the work of other Directorate Generals. An 
example of this was the South China Sea issues. Besides the Research Agency, the 
Asia Pacific Directorate a_!ld the Directorate responsible for ASEAN political co-
operation also showed their interest in the South China Sea issues. The roles and 
the interests of the Head of the Research Agency were very instrumental in 
deciding the strategic issue under research.93 It was Dr. Hasjim Djalal's interest in 
the issue and his role in initiating the informal workshop in the early 1990s that 
made the Foreign Minister give the Research Agency custody of the workshops 
series on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea. 94 
Hence, the designation of diplomatic tasks to particular directorates and agencies 
suggests that foreign policy assignments did not always necessarily correspond 
with the 'area of jurisdiction' of particular directorates. To a certain extent, such 
assignment was influenced by factors, such as the cognisance of the directorates or 
certain individuals with certain issues, and this had a lot to do with the aspect of 
information gathering and assessment. Policy initiation was also a factor that the 
Foreign Minister took into consideration when he gave certain individuals 
responsibility. 
Overall, the organisational structure of the Ministry between the mid-1980s and 
the late 1990s distributed responsibility based on issue areas: whether political, 
economic or social issues. At the same time, there were cases where unclear 
demarcation in areas of jurisdiction made a number of offices or directorates dealt 
with similar issues. On the one hand, this created dissension, but this is a normal 
feature of any organisation. As long as the Minister and the first echelons in the 
Ministry were able to manage the problems stemming from dissension and co-
ordinate the work, the problem did not disrupt the Ministry's program too greatly. 
However, there were cases where such animosity prompted some officials to give 
only minimal support to the diplomatic initiatives. On the other hand, any 
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overlapping of interest opened a window of opportunity for creativity among the 
Ministry personnel: some of the offices and individuals wished to excel over 
others. In this case, some individuals skills, overseas training, networking and 
wide exposure to diplomatic activities were their asset in proposing policy 
initiatives and in winning the support of the Minister. Hence, albeit imperfect and 
not by design, the organisational structure of the Ministry was receptive for new 
ideas on how to deal wit~ regional problems: including the ideas to use informal 
diplomacy. 
5.2.2. Information flows and processing 
Information flows and processing were closely related with the aspect of policy 
initiation and formulation within the Ministry. By gaining advance information, 
some offices were able to formulate and suggest well structure policy 
recommendations for the Minister. The office could propose the recommendations 
in written form through internal memorandum or share them with other offices 
during regular policy discussion meetings. Advance information gave some 
offices more opportunity to surpass the other and, consequently, they would be 
able to play a leading role in dealing with some problems. 
In general, the regular sources of information in the Ministry were from cable 
communication from the overseas posts, which mostly contained information 
about political, economic and social issues concerned with bilateral or multilateral 
relations. The incoming cables also highlighted some issues in the host country 
that Indonesia should be aware of, that is, their implication for Indonesia's 
national interest. In addition, the Directorate for Information was responsible for 
collecting information from the international wire services and local news agency. 
The Communication Centre, under the aegis of the Secretary General's office, 
distributed all the incoming information to the designated directorates and bureau. 
Although the Ministry adopted the one-door policy concerning the sending and 
receiving of cables, that is, through the Communication Centre, this did not 
preclude some offices in Indonesia's overseas posts, such as the defence and trade 
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offices, from maintaining their own channels of communication.95 With this 
distinctive information flow inter-bureaucracy co-ordination function became 
essential. 
Not all information received by the Ministry was processed. Some information 
required their immediate response, while other information was treated as news 
for general information. I~ particular, the designated offices, where the cable was 
addressed, processed the information. In some cases, upon receiving the cables, 
some directorates took the initiative to arrange internal co-ordination and 
meetings. The aim for such meetings was to clarify the kind of responsibility of 
each the directorate with regard to the issues they discussed. The internal meeting 
was also aimed at assigning a particular directorate with responsibility to deal with 
some issue. However, at times the final say for such assignment rested in the hand 
of the Minister. He had the authority to assign particular directorate to deal with 
certain issues. At times, the assignment of particular office based on this 
prerogative right of the Minister was not well taken by the competing office. They 
resented the decision and, as a consequence, their support would be less 
forthcoming during the implementation of the diplomatic initiatives.96 
In general, there were two mechanisms within the Ministry for delegating such 
responsibility. The first mechanism was a weekly meeting involving the secretary 
of each Directorate General (second echelon in rank) under the supervision of the 
Head of Foreign Minister's office, a co-ordination meeting involving all the 
Directorate Generals (first echelon in rank) under the supervision of the Secretary 
General. The second mechanism was 'leaders meeting' involving all the Director 
Generals, the Secretary General and the Foreign Minister. 
The 'leaders meeting' was also a forum for the Minister to brief all the first 
echelons with information and any assignment that the Ministry had received 
during a full Cabinet meeting under the President or a co-ordination meeting, 
supervised by the Co-ordinator Minister for Political and Security Affairs. The co-
ordination meeting chaired by the Co-ordinator Minister for Political and Security 
Affairs involved ministers responsible for security and defence issues. In a case 
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where the Minister was not able to take part in a co-ordination meeting, he 
assigned official at the level of first echelon to represent him. The representative 
then reported to the Minister about the outcomes of the meeting and in such a case 
where the Minister was not available, he or she consulted the matter with other 
first echelons or the director responsible for the subject maters, directly.97 
However, in some cases t~e opportunity to hold a 'leaders meeting' depended on 
the availability of the Minister, and, therefore, the most frequent meetings in the 
Ministry were the weekly meetings. The co-ordination meeting was held at least 
once a month. Due to the closeness of the Head of Foreign Minister's office and 
the Foreign Minister, the outputs of the weekly meeting become important, 
because the results usually reached the Foreign Minister's ear.98 
Within the period of this study (1985 to 1998), it was not known whether a daily 
briefing mechanism took place in the Ministry. There was a precedent of daily 
briefing during Adam Malik's term as a Foreign Minister (1966-1978). In this 
case, it was the Director for Information/the Ministry's spokesperson who updated 
the Minister on issues of the day that required his attention and vice-versa, the 
Minister informed the Director of some information that the spokesperson should 
be aware of.99 It is quite plausible that the Head of the Foreign Minister's office 
also played a role of updating all the Foreign Ministers after Minister Malik, in the 
absence of a special mechanism of daily briefing. The head of the office relayed 
the Minister's decision to the designated officials. 
From the above discussion, two kinds of information are evident: one gathered by 
the Ministry's mechanism and the other, information shared by the Minister. In 
addition to this, it is also known that during the co-ordination meeting and the 
'leaders meeting,' those who took part in the meetings, at times, shared 
information gathered from non-formal sources, such as from think tanks, non-
governmental organisations and the media. In any case, during information sharing 
those who shared the information had to be prepared not only to explain the 
information in detail, but also to recommended policy options. 100 
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5.2.3. Policy initiation and co-ordination (internal and external) 
Foreign policy initiation was a delicate subject in the Ministry. The policy 
initiation process could take two forms, that is, top down and bottom up. 
However, the centralised mechanism that places the Minister and the first 
echelons in the apex of the pyramid made the bureaucrats from lower echelons 
very cautious in proposing initiatives. In the bottom up process, proposals reached 
the top only after the lower echelons were confident of the significance of the 
issues and the policy recommendations they made. Overall, the initiative was 
shaped and went through several stages. First, an internal discussion took place 
within the directorate. Second, the Director followed up the results of the internal 
discussion with the Director General. Third, the Director General raised the 
matters through an internal memorandum, incorporating the background of the 
issues or problems and suggesting the policy recommendations. Another avenue to 
address the matters was the 'leaders meeting.' By sending a memorandum or 
raising the issue during the leaders meeting, the Director General wished to 
receive comment and approval from other first echelons and the Foreign Minister. 
In some cases, some officials having close relation with the Foreign Minister 
broke the rigidity of the bureaucratic system by channelling their initiatives 
directly to the Minister. The problem with this strategy was that the initiatives 
might not receive adequate support from other structures within the Ministry who 
would have felt by-passed. 
The top down process was more straightforward, that is, the Minister assigned the 
Director General or Director or even trusted officials to carry out a special 
mission. Such an assignment meant that the Foreign Minister generated the policy 
initiative and the bureaucratic system carried out the mission. In this case, the 
bureaucratic system had to provide their full support, because such assignments 
usually involved a decree from the Minister. Clearly, both the top down and the 
bottom up flows of initiatives needed internal co-ordination, as well as co-
ordination with external ministries, in order to maximise the capabilities in 
achieving the foreign policy objectives. 
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Internal co-ordination was an essential part of policy initiatives. In some cases, 
several directorates or bureaus responded separately to some issues based on the 
incoming cables. They tended to respond to the issues and provided policy options 
from their point of view (portfolios), and, therefore, the approach was far from 
comprehensive and integrative. Hence, without co-ordination, there was a risk of 
redundancy in policy initiation between some directorates. Moreover, internal co-
ordination helped reduce <;:ompetition within the Ministry in taking the leadership 
on some issues where the potential for overlapping in 'area of jurisdiction' was 
feasible. For instance, the Directorate for Asia and Pacific and the Directorate 
responsible for ASEAN political co-operation might have proposed, at the same 
time, initiatives to deal with issues affecting an ASEAN country or ASEAN 
relations. 
External co-ordination was required when the issues were connected with the 
interests of other ministries and the military establishment, such as on trade related 
and security issues. In the mid-level of inter-ministries, co-ordination took place 
regularly in such forums as 'the intelligence community.' In some cases, the 
designated Directorate within the Ministry organised a meeting involving other 
ministries to discuss issues of mutual concern and to obtain inputs or support in a 
case where the Ministry led some activities. As mentioned before, at the top level, 
co-ordination took place under the supervision of the Co-ordinating Minister and 
involved several ministers. These ministers discussed issues affecting national 
security at large. Some ministers also used this co-ordination forum to inform 
other ministers about any assignment that they had received from the President. 
External co-ordination did not necessarily take place within the setting of a formal 
meeting. The most routine form of co-ordination was through formal 
correspondence between the Foreign Minister and other ministries. 
Correspondences with the President were channelled through Sekneg which 
functioned as the office of the President. In any case, the Ministry's staffs 
developed networks or contacts with their counterparts in different ministries and 
Sekneg, to make sure that the correspondence received proper attention. 
Maintaining open communication, especially with Sekneg was essential 
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'd . th . d S h IOI cons1 enng e1r power un er oe arto. According to Liddle, Sekneg was "the 
office through which the President controls the civilian bureaucracy."102 Robinson 
Pangaribuan shares Liddle's opinion and argues that Sekneg was very powerful, 
especially under Sudharmono who presided over the office from 1972 to 1988. He 
states further that: 
Sekneg not only provided administrative services the President 
required, but also examined all plans and recommendations that 
were offered to the President. Thus, Sekneg was often characterised 
as being the eyes, ears and hands of the President. The more the 
President relied on the administrative functions of Sekneg, the 
greater Sekneg's power became. 103 
Overall, the only means for the Ministry to perform their role effectively - with 
relatively limited interference from other bureaucracies and the military 
establishment - was by gaining the confidence of the President. The Ministry used 
two different channels to gain this confidence. The first channel was through the 
Minister's personal visit to the Palace, to report to the President about the 
diplomatic initiatives that the Ministry wished to undertake. In this case, as further 
discussed in Chapter 4, Minister Alatas visited President Soeharto in the Palace 
and sought for his support in organising JIM. 104 The second channel was by way 
of formal correspondence through Sekneg. As shown in Chapter 5, the diplomatic 
initiative to deal with the Moro problem was sought through this channel. 
Although, there was no evidence that the proposal for the informal workshop on 
the South China Sea also went through either of these channels, the Minister must 
have informed the President about the workshop, especially taking into 
consideration the high profile nature of the territorial disputes in the South China 
Sea and also of the extensive media coverage of the informal workshops during 
their first years. 105 
Some sources familiar with Soeharto's style stated that the President always read 
correspondence from the Ministry and also the accompanying briefing paper, 
which was attached to the letter. 106 In particular, Mr. Kusnadi, former Director for 
Asia and the Pacific of the Ministry, stated that when using either one of the two 
channels the Ministry always provided the President with a briefing paper, 
detailing the issues and the policy recommendations. Mr. Kusnadi also stated that 
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the President always read the briefing papers provided by the Ministry and, at 
times, gave his personal opinions when he met with the Minister.107 As already 
stated, all the insights suggest that from the mid-1980s onward, President 
Soeharto showed more interest in foreign related affairs and, at times, he even 
gave his personal opinions on the policy recommendations of the Ministry. The 
President, therefore, took a more active role and did not simply rely on policy 
options derived from bur~aucratic politics. Moreover, his willingness to present a 
personal opinion indicated his growing confidence of the Ministry. 
111.6. The strategic motives behind the adoption of informal diplomacy 
The strategic motives behind the adoption of informal diplomacy stemmed from 
the regional and domestic perspectives. 
6.1. The regional perspective 
Indonesia was concerned on the limitations of ASEAN as a regional framework to 
deal with regional problems of conflicts and disputes. ASEAN was not able to 
provide leadership to deal with the three regional issues under study, primarily 
because ASEAN not neutral image in the eyes of some parties in the Cambodian 
conflict. In the other two problems, separatism problem in the Philippines and 
territorial disputes in the South China Sea, ASEAN appeared reluctance to offer 
alternative solution because the problems involved its members. 
In the 1980s, the prolongation of the Cambodian problem posed difficulty to the 
region, not least because of the way in which major powers had became associated 
with particular factions. The continued involvement of major powers in the 
Cambodian conflict would not serve Indonesia's interest for promoting regional 
solution to regional problems. Informal diplomacy was Indonesia's means to 
promote peace dialogue at the regional level. 
In the case of separatism problem in the Southern part of the Philippines, the 
problem remained volatile and had not shown any improvement. Indonesia was 
seeking through informal diplomacy to move the problems toward possible 
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solution. Being a fellow ASEAN member who always supported the Philippines 
concerns of the Moro's problem in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) 
discussion, and being a country with a large Moslem population, Indonesia had the 
advantage of being perceived as more acceptable to the conflicting parties. 
The South China Sea disputes pose ASEAN with the potential of divisiveness and 
regional instability. There{ore, Indonesia was seeking whether strategically the use 
of informal diplomacy could assist in the settlement process with positive 
outcomes. 
6.2. The domestic perspective 
Having led the nations for almost two decades, President Soeharto wished to 
increase his international stature, being part of his performance legitimacy, and 
Indonesia's international profile. Therefore, he was searching for possible avenues 
to attain his desire. 
In responding to the President's desire, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry which 
was desperate for assuming prominence on foreign policy issues at the domestic 
level, proposed informal diplomacy as a diplomatic means and was endorsed by 
the President. 
As a diplomatic instrument, Track Two diplomacy promised a possible 
breakthrough and a prospect for resolving the problems comprehensively. Upon 
the endorsement by the President, the approach was applied in the three cases. 
111.7. Conclusion 
With his pre-eminence within the Indonesian political system coupled with the 
positive economic growth in hand, President Soeharto in the 1980s began to give 
considerable attention to foreign policy matters. He had shown interest in and 
gave moral support to JIM and the Moro peace process. Indonesia's interests to 
achieve its foreign policy objectives at the regional level also stemmed from the 
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limitations of ASEAN as the regional framework. Hence, Soeharto's confidence 
of his pre-eminence at the domestic politics and the limitations of ASEAN were 
the basis of Indonesia's new diplomatic initiatives from the 1980s onward. The 
new initiatives were necessary to effect a breakthrough on some regional problems 
that inhibited Indonesia from having a regional order, a prerequisite condition for 
Indonesia's development program. 
Although factors responsible for the initiatives can be identified, the process 
leading to the formulation of the foreign policy options were difficult to trace. The 
difficulty was caused by the lack of clarity of the foreign policy making process in 
Indonesia's political system. President Soeharto was a dominant figure in the 
policy making process and he operated through bureaucratic politics in which he 
let his bureaucracies competed one another for his favour. He also liked to give 
similar foreign policy tasks to a number foreign policy actors and, as a 
consequence, the Ministry had to work hard to gain the President confidence. 
In the early years of Soeharto's Presidency, the Ministry was battered because of 
the alleged support some personnel gave to the left cause and of the Ministry's 
support for Soekarno's policy. When he led the Ministry, Minister Malik nurtured 
a new cadre of professional diplomats through recruitment, training and education. 
Internal consolidation helped increase the Ministry's confidence and, at the same 
time, the Ministry was able to produce skilled diplomats who were also had a 
wider perspective of diplomacy and conflict resolution. These human resources 
were the Ministry's assets in pursuing informal diplomacy. 
The policy initiation intern of the Ministry followed the organisational process (as 
discussed in Chapter 2), but in some cases the interests of a number of directorates 
overlapped. Internal co-ordination was essential to clarify each directorate's 
responsibility in dealing with particular issues or diplomatic initiatives. External 
co-ordination with other bureaucracies and the military establishment were also 
important in order to gain their support in the implementation of the diplomatic 
initiatives. Some elements of the bureaucracy, such as Sekneg, were very powerful 
~nd therefore the Ministry had to develop good rapport and networks. However, 
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the Ministry attempted to gain the confidence of the President to avoid the 
problem arising from inter elite competition. From the mid-1980s onward the 
President's confidence in the Ministry did increase to a certain extent and this took 
place when the President himself showed greater interest in foreign related affairs. 
Such confidence gave the Ministry the ability to initiate and implement informal 
diplomacy within the context of bureaucratic politics in Indonesian political 
system. 
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Chapter IV 
In Search of Peace in Cambodia: from Jakarta Informal Meeting to Paris 
International Conference on Cambodia in 1991 
IV.I. Introduction 
Historical analysis suggests that efforts to find a solution to the Cambodian 
conflict were not confined to a particular country or organisation. Each of the 
players in the peace process made some contribution to the settlement of the 
problem. 1 The intention of this chapter is to analyse the informal diplomatic 
approaches of Indonesia with rega;d to the Cambodian conflict. This chapter will 
describe and analyse the aspects of informal diplomacy in the context of the 
Cambodian conflict, why informal diplomacy was required, and how Indonesia 
exercised informal diplomacy. The main argument of the chapter is that Indonesia 
was able to play a critical role in the peace process because, first, ASEAN 
provided Indonesia with a mandate to act on its behalf and, secondly, the majority 
of the protagonists in the conflict considered Indonesia more neutral than other 
ASEAN countries. 
Indonesia designed informal diplomacy to facilitate a breakthrough in the 
Cambodian conflict. Thus, informal diplomacy was an important aspect of the 
overall peace processes because it complemented the initiatives sponsored by 
individuals, states, and regional as well as international organisations. Informal 
diplomacy took the form of informal meetings functioning at intervals to discuss 
points of contention prior to formal negotiations. Moreover, informal diplomacy 
had substantial support from bureaucrats within and outside the Ministry. The 
informal diplomacy was concerned with the processes of establishing contact, 
building personal rapport, and networking behind the formal and informal setting 
of interactions and negotiations. In this case, such processes took place among the 
conflicting parties, and also between the conflicting parties and the third parties, 
within the Indonesian ranks, within ASEAN, and between Indonesia and the 
French Government. 
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The chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section provides a 
background to the Cambodian conflict and identifies the parties directly involved, 
and also those countries with a stake in the prolongation or settlement of the 
problem. As the conflict took place during the Cold War era, the stakeholders in 
this problem were not limited to the regional countries and China (the major 
power in the region), but also included the superpowers, the Soviet Union and the 
United States. Southeast ~sia was one of the arenas where the two superpowers 
were competing for their respective spheres of influence. The second section 
analyses the Indonesian peace initiative to understand the internal dynamics 
behind the initiative, the implementation of the informal diplomacy, the 
techniques adopted, the strategy developed, and the outcome of the peace 
initiative. 
IV.2. The background to the Cambodian conflict 
2.1. The root of the conflict and the reaction of the regional countries and 
China 
The focus here is the Cambodian conflict that occurred after Vietnam, one of the 
regional powers, occupied its neighbour in 1979. However, to gain a fuller picture 
of the problem, the conflict needs to be examined in terms of a domestic struggle 
for power or an internal feud that took place almost ten years before Vietnam 
moved into Cambodia in the late 1970s. The internal feud arose from the differing 
perceptions of Prince Sihanouk Norodom Sihanouk and his armed forces in 
coping with the impact of the Vietnam war on their country in the 1960s. The 
Second Indochina war, from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, was between North 
and South Vietnam involving the US, China and the Soviet Union. 
It is clear that Cambodia was a victim of an ideological contest during the 
Indochina war in the 1960s and thus was forced to side with one of the two 
blocks, although the government in power under Prince Norodom Sihanouk 
wished to maintain Cambodia's neutrality.2 The diplomatic skills of Prince 
Sihanouk that balanced the interests of the major powers came to an end when he 
was ousted from power in March 1970 during an overseas visit to the Soviet 
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Union. The coup was masterminded by Cambodians from among the armed forces 
who opposed the policy of allowing Vietnamese communists (the Vietcong) to 
operate from within Cambodia's interior to infiltrate South Vietnam. The armed 
forces did not accept the Prince's argument that the aim of his policy was to keep 
Cambodia out of the war.3 The new government under General Lon Nol sided 
with the US and adopted a hostile policy towards the communists of North 
Vietnam and Cambodia. 
From 1970, Cambodia was plunged into civil war. The armed conflict and cycle 
of violence in Cambodia were made worse through the involvement of the major 
powers who used the factions in Cambodia as their proxies. The Lon Nol 
government (1970-1975) faced insurgencies from the coalition forces of the 
National Liberation Front under Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge.4 The 
coalition forces received military training and assistance, and were given 
sanctuary by China and North Vietnam. The US backed the Lon Nol government 
by providing military assistance including launching a massive bombing 
campaign in Cambodia to destroy the resistance forces, in particular the Khmer 
Rouge. The Khmer Rouge blamed Vietnam for Cambodia's devastation from the 
US bombing raids in 1973 on the grounds that the bombing took place after 
Vietnam and the US had agreed on a partial cease-fire in South Vietnam and a 
permanent one in Laos.5 Although this alleged 'sell-out' to the US was regarded 
as a factor that triggered hatred among the Khmer Rouge leaders towards Hanoi,6 
the fact was that the Khmer Rouge leaders since mid-1972 had treated their 
Vietnamese compatriots with hostility. According to Stephen Morris, by then the 
North Vietnamese did not react strongly because their immediate goal was to 
conquer South Vietnam.7 
In 1975, the Khmer Rouge successfully overthrew Lon Nol and established a 
communist government led by Pol Pot. During the period from 1975 to 1979, the 
Khmer Rouge government of 'Democratic Kampuchea' established closer 
bilateral co-operation with China and adopted China's model of communism, 
including copying Mao Zedong's ideal of self-sufficiency.8 In their remodelling of 
Cambodian society, the Khmer Rouge forced the cities' inhabitants to move to the 
rural areas. The social reform experiment resulted in an unprecedented 
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humanitarian tragedy and 1.7 million Cambodians died within a four-year period.9 
At the same time, while the bilateral relationship between the Khmer Rouge led 
government and China had increased, the Khmer Rouge's relationship with 
Vietnam deteriorated. This relationship was made worse by the Khmer Rouge's 
attempt to 'purify their ranks' through 're-educating' those who had been closely 
associated with Vietnam. To escape re-education some factions closely affiliated 
with Vietnam, including !{eng Samrin and Hun Sen, fled to Vietnam and took 
sanctuary there. 
An increased number of border disputes between Cambodia and Vietnam in late 
1977,10 including the Khmer Rouge's notorious attack on Vietnam's border in 
September 1977 and the killing of civilian farmers, 11 coupled with the expulsions 
of around 50.000 Vietnamese settlers from Cambodia12 provided a pretext for 
Vietnam to invade Cambodia in 1979 and install the Heng Samrin-led 
government. The Khmer Rouges' belligerence toward Vietnam seemingly 
prompted the invasion, but concerning Vietnam's motives for the invasion some 
scholars, the ASEAN members and China interpreted the motives differently. The 
following discussion looks at some scholars' interpretations of the Cambodian 
imbroglio following the invasion and identifies the reactions of the regional 
countries and major powers, especially by observing their threat perception. 
Some scholars interpreted the invasion, followed by China's punitive military 
action against Vietnam between February and March 1979, as a repetition of a 
historical antagonism between the three countries. They referred to the triangular 
relationships between the three kingdoms in the past, that is, the Chinese emperor 
had treated the Kingdom of Vietnam as its vassal and likewise, Vietnam had also 
treated its weaker neighbours, the Kingdoms of Champa and Cambodia, as its 
own vassals. Both the Kingdoms of Champa and Cambodia had sought protection 
from the Chinese emperor. 13 Hence, Vietnam's motive for the invasion was 
simply to subjugate the Cambodians under its sphere of influence, a repetition of 
ancient history. The invasion and the appointment of Heng Samrin to lead 
'Vietnam's puppet government' in Cambodia were taken as evidence of this aims. 
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Stephen Morris contradicts historical antagonism as the main factor behind the 
conflict. He considers the antagonism stemmed from the three countries• 
ideological orientations and the intrinsic political culture of the Cambodians and 
Vietnamese. The polarisation of ideological orientation, that is, Vietnam 
following the Soviet Union and the Khmer Rouge following China, fuelled their 
antagonism. In having a similar ideological orientation with China, the Khmer 
Rouge believed that China would help them in their conflict with Vietnam. 
Vietnam also had similar expectation of support from the Soviet Union. In fact, 
since the late 1960s, the Vietnamese communists no longer trusted China and 
accused China of betraying the communist world, especially by China's strategic 
realignment toward the United States to counter what China's communist leaders 
perceived as the Soviet Union's threat. Hence, while Vietnam suspected that the 
Khmer Rouge were China's tool to destabilise Vietnam, China also believed that 
Vietnam was a pawn of the Soviet Union and part of the Soviet's grand design to 
encircle China. In terms of political culture, the Khmer Rouge believed that the 
Cambodians were superior to the Vietnamese. By treating the Vietnamese of 
ethnic Chinese origin as second class citizens and forcing them to flee the country, 
Vietnam showed little consideration for China's sensitivity about such 
treatment. 14 Therefore, the invasion stemmed from Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge 
paranoia, coupled with Vietnam's motive to secure its frontier from a hostile 
neighbour. The Heng Samrin government - assisted by Vietnam's military and 
bureaucrats -functioned as Vietnam's security guarantor. 
In general, the regional countries and China condemned Vietnam's intervention, 
but their strategies on how best to deal with the problem did not always converge. 
These countries shaped their individual policies and positions based on their 
assessments of Vietnam's motives, the history of their past interaction with 
Vietnam, and the way their country perceived their national and regional security 
from the perspective of threat perception. China, Thailand and Singapore reacted 
strongly to the invasion for differing reasons. Although China and Thailand 
believed that Vietnam's intention was to dominate Indochina and put Cambodia 
and Laos under Vietnam's influence, they developed their threat perception from 
a different angle. China was afraid of being encircled by hostile Asian neighbours 
who had a close association with the Soviet Union, and were willing to follow the 
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Soviet's strategy of isolating and containing China, especially by accepting Soviet 
military assistance to reinforce their military strength. 15 In the case of Vietnam , 
China did not want to risk a potential military threat from its Southern neighbour 
and a strong Soviet foothold in its backyard: Vietnam being analogous to Cuba for 
the US. 16 Therefore, China's determination to resist Vietnam's presence in 
Cambodia was framed within this strategic perspective. Juwono Sudarsono, an 
Indonesian political scien~ist, further argued that China's support for the Khmer 
Rouge was also a reflection of China's hostility toward Soviet involvement in 
matters involving the Indochina countries. 17 
Similar to China, Thailand was also very concerned about Vietnam's invasion. 
With the fall of Cambodia, Thailand felt more vulnerable because there was no 
longer a buffer country separating it and Vietnam. As stated by Khien Theeravit, 
"[a]n independent Kampuchea and Laos means, for Thailand, buffer states 
between Thailand and Vietnam and beyond. These two weak states by themselves 
pose no threat to Thailand. Without Vietnamese troops in their countries, there 
would be no border clashes with the Vietnamese."18 What made the matter 
complicated was that first, the two countries considered Cambodia and Laos as 
their traditional sphere of influence and, secondly, Thailand and Vietnam lacked a 
history of co-operation (which Thailand had also supported the US during the 
Second Indochina war). Hence, Thailand had reason to worry about Vietnam's 
hostility. This concern intensified during Vietnam's military incursions into Thai 
territory under the pretext of ambushing the Cambodian resistance's forces hiding 
along the border and within the Thai interior. The earliest incursion took place in 
June 1980.19 Thailand was also concerned about the possibility of Vietnam using 
the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) to destabilise Thailand. 20 
To counter the threat posed by Vietnam's military presence in Cambodia, 
Thailand allied itself with China and sought diplomatic support from the ASEAN 
countries through the regional association. The mutual interest between Thailand 
and China facilitated this co-operation. China pledged to assist Bangkok in the 
event of external aggression and stopped providing the CPT with material support, 
even instructing them to confront Vietnam.21 For its part, Thailand let the Beijing-
supported Khmer Rouge and other anti-Phnom Penh resistance forces use "Thai 
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territory along the common border as an active sanctuary and as a source of 
material resupply." 22 Moreover, "Beijing also utilized Thai territory, including the 
waters, to sustain the forces opposed to the Heng Samrin regime with military 
assistance.',23 By giving access to the Cambodian resistance forces in its interior, 
Thailand became a party'to the conflict and, on number of occasions, Thai armed 
forces engaged in military clashes with Vietnam's troops. 
Concerned about the security of Thailand as a 'front-line state', ASEAN provided 
Thailand with diplomatic support. However, at times there were disagreements 
among the ASEAN members about the strategy to deal with the Cambodian 
problem. Indonesia and Malaysia, in particular, were reluctant to follow China's 
strategy aimed at weakening Vietnam by "perpetuating a conflict situation and 
preventing the Heng Samrin government from stabilising."24 The main factor that 
led to the disagreements was the differing perception of threat among the ASEAN 
countries. Clearly, ASEAN was divided between countries who considered 
Vietnam as a potential threat for their national and regional securities and 
countries who were more sceptical about China's intentions toward their country 
and the region. The following discussion looks briefly at the threat perceptions of 
the rest of the ASEAN members: Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the 
Philippines. 
Singapore was another member of ASEAN which had openly and consistently 
condemned Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. As a small island state, Singapore 
was very sensitive about any country breaching the principle of national 
sovereignty through military intervention and occupation.25 Singapore had always 
considered itself vulnerable to its neighbours (Indonesia and Malaysia) who were 
bigger and shared a similar Malay culture. Singapore was indeed afraid of being 
bullied by its bigger neighbours. Therefore, Singapore considered the national 
integrity of a country as vital. At the same time, Singapore considered instability 
in its immediate environment as a threat to its national security and, indeed, a 
threat to its survival as a nation because instability creates unpredictability.26 With 
limited national resources, Singapore depended on international trade and services 
and, therefore, instability and unpredictability were an anathema to Singapore's 
national economic development. 
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In the 1980s, Singapore's leaders stated that the principal external threat to the 
country's national security emanated from Vietnam. They believed that the Soviet 
Union's support for Vietnam made the presence of the US and other Western 
powers in the region imperative.27 Singapore also supported Thailand's position 
on the importance of ASEAN' s closer co-operation with China to contain 
Vietnam and the potential for Soviet's assertiveness in the region. Although 
Singapore believed that t~is co-operation was the best response to the immediate 
threat, Singapore remained cautious about China's long term interests in the 
region and looked upon China as "a long-standing source of external threat to 
Singapore's national security."28 
Although ASEAN members expressed sympathy over Thailand's difficulties and 
regret on the invasion of Cambodia, two ASEAN countries (Indonesia and 
Malaysia) did not feel comfortable with Thailand's strategy of closer alignment 
between ASEAN and China. Both Malaysia and Indonesia were concerned about 
Thailand's growing dependence on China and at the same time, they were also 
suspicious about China's strategy of bleeding Vietnam into submission. They 
were afraid that the strategy was China's first step to put the Southeast Asian 
region into its sphere of interest and they believed that Vietnam was the only 
country in the region capable of halting China's ambition.29 However, Malaysia 
and Indonesia were concerned about the potential for regional destabilisation from 
the prolongation of the Cambodian conflict, including the flow of Vietnamese 
refugees of ethnic Chinese origin into their countries. Therefore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia tried to find a solution to the problem and resisted a rigid anti-Vietnam 
posture. At times, their position, especially Indonesia's, seemed accommodative 
toward Vietnam's strategic interest in Indochina. 
Clearly, Malaysia and Indonesia's approach to the problem reflected their 
perception that it was China and not Vietnam that posed a threat to their national 
and regional securities. China was seen as a threat because China had supported 
communist insurgency in their respective countries. They were also worried about 
the prospect of China manipulating the Malaysians and Indonesians of ethnic 
Chinese origin to further China's interest.30 They questioned the allegiance of 
their ethnic Chinese citizens. Moreover, both Malaysia and Indonesia were 
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alanned by China's determination to punish Vietnam for the invasion and 
especially by China's military onslaught against Vietnam in 1979.31 In contrast, 
Thailand was grateful for the military attack because it meant Vietnam had to 
concentrate on two different fronts and had moved some of its regular troops from 
Thailand's border and stationed them along its border with China in the North.32 
The concern of another ASEAN member, the Philippines, with the overall 
Cambodian conflict was linked with the presence of US military bases in the 
Philippines. Any conflict involving China and Soviet Union over Indochina would 
have involved the US because of the entente cordiale between the US, China and 
Japan.33 The Philippines would have been brought into the conflict by the mere 
presence of the US bases on its soil and the two countries' security agreement. 
However, the Philippines' attitude toward Vietnam was relatively relaxed because 
it did not consider Vietnam posed a direct military threat against the Philippines.34 
The Philippines did share Indonesia and Malaysia's concern about China's 
potential to create instability in the Southeast Asian region based on China's close 
association with communist inspired insurgency in the Philippines.35 Hence, of the 
five ASEAN countries, three of them (Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines) 
were more concerned about the potential threat from China than from Vietnam. 
2.2. The conflicting parties and the stakeholders from 1979 onwards 
Broadly defined, the parties and stakeholders to the Cambodian conflict were 
those who fought for victory in the battle and the diplomatic fields. If on the 
battlefield, the warring factions were relatively easy to identify; on the diplomatic 
front the stakeholders of the conflict were more diverse and fluid. On the 
battlefield, the resistance groups consisted of the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot; the 
Khmer People's National Liberation Forces (KPNLF) under Son Sann; and the 
United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia 
(FUNCINPEC) under Prince Sihanouk. These resistance groups fought against the 
People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) with the backing of the Vietnamese 
occupation forces. 36 China provided Khmer Rouge forces with more military 
assistance compared to its assistance to FUNCINPEC. The KPNLF faction, whose 
military officers were members of the defeated Lon Nol regime before 1975, 
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received only token military assistance from some ASEAN and Western 
• 37 countnes. 
The stakeholders in the Cambodian conflict as well as its settlement can be 
divided into two broad dassifications, the inner and outer circles. The inner circle 
consisted of above three three resistance factions and the People's Republic of 
Kampuchea as well as countries engaged directly in the conflict, that is, Vietnam, 
Thailand and China. The outer circle involved those regional countries concerned 
with the prospect of conflict escalation and its potential to endanger regional 
stability. ASEAN also had a stake because the conflict threatened the principles of 
ASEAN, especially those of non-interference and the inviolability of national 
sovereignty.38 Clearly, the invasion and the instalment of a puppet government in 
Cambodia challenged ASEAN's credibility as a regional grouping that promoted a 
regional code of conduct. Michael Leifer portrays ASEAN feelings by stating: 
"ASEAN could not ignore Vietnam having conveyed a government into 
Kampuchea virtually in the saddle bags of its invading army without a serious loss 
of international credibility."39 Hence, ASEAN had to respond to the conflict post-
invasion. The urgency of finding a solution to the Cambodian conflict increased 
over time because the conflict created strains in the relations of some ASEAN 
members. The latter aspect is further outlined during the discussion of Indonesian 
diplomatic initiatives to deal with the Cambodian conflict. 
The outer circle included the superpowers which had strategic interests in the 
Southeast and East Asian regions; France, the former colonial power, which had a 
moral obligation to put the country back in order; Australia, and Japan. The 
United Nations, under the UN Charter, had the responsibility to uphold world 
peace, while organisations such as the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) could also 
be included in this circle. Out of these actors in the outer circle, the position of the 
two superpowers on the Cambodian conflict influenced the dynamics of the 
Cambodian conflict, for at least two reasons. First, the conflict took place in the 
context of the Cold War, during which the two superpowers had competed for 
spheres of influence in various regions in the word. Therefore, each superpower 
did not want to let the region fall under its opponent's influence. Secondly, the 
two superpowers gave their support, either directly or indirectly, to one or other of 
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the parties in the conflict. The continuation or scaling down of diplomatic and 
material support to their proxy in the Cambodian conflict influenced the attitudes 
of the conflicting parties, either in the battlefield or during peace discussions. 
The Soviet Union backed Vietnam's supremacy in Indochina, including 
Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, for a number of reasons. As suggested by 
Vladimir Rakhmanin, both countries had developed long relations; they had 
mutual interests to contain China; and moreover, they shared ideological 
proximity.40 To enhance their relationship, on 3 November 1978 the two countries 
signed a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in which the Soviet Union gave 
implicit guarantees to support Vietnam against military aggression. However, the 
Soviet Union appeared cautious in implementing the Treaty because it did not 
engage militarily when China attacked Vietnam in early 1979. Arguably, China 
had been able to keep the Soviet Union out of military conflict by making it clear 
that China's objective in the border attack was limited, that is, to punish Vietnam 
for its hostility toward China. Hence, China successfully prevented the Soviet 
Union and Vietnam from invoking their Treaty. 
The above episode in early 1979 showed a case when the Soviet Union 
maintained a cautious position within the triangular relations between itself, China 
and Vietnam. In fact, historically, the Soviet Union's positions had not always 
been in favour of Vietnam and the fluctuation in Soviet relations with China 
shaped that position - a factor that Vietnam was well aware of. Indeed, the 
Soviet's commitment to Vietnam increased in the mid-1960s during the US 
bombing raids over Vietnam.41 The deterioration in Vietnam's relations with 
China in late 1970s provided further impetus for both the Soviet Union and 
Vietnam to strengthen their relationship. The Soviet Union was able to optimise 
the relationship for its strategic interest in the region, particularly by gaining 
access "to the air naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, Danang and to the Tan Son 
Nhut air base [allowing them to establish] a permanent naval presence in the 
South China Sea."42 Thus, the Soviet Union provided Vietnam with economic and 
military assistance to sustain Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia in return for 
access to military facilities in Vietnam. Needless to say, the presence of Soviet 
military forces in Southeast Asia had the potential to aggravate peace and stability 
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in the region because the other superpower, the US, had military bases in the 
Philippines. 
The strategic alignment between the Soviet Union and Vietnam which was 
enhanced after the invasfon of Cambodia, and the fact that the Soviet Union had 
obtained a military foothold in Vietnam caused great concern in the US. In 
response to the looming threat to its interests in the region, the United States 
decided to align its position with China and ASEAN. At the same time, the US 
also strengthened its security co-operation with its allies in Southeast Asia , 
particularly Thailand, and provided this country with military assistance. 
Similarly, the US also provided the Cambodian resistance forces, especially the 
KPNLF, with armed assistance. Hence, the US was involved in the armed conflict 
in Cambodia indirectly, through its military supply to some parties to the conflict 
who engaged in armed confrontation on the battlefield. 
The alignment with China posed some dilemmas for the US because the US was 
forced to follow the hard-line position set by China. On the one hand, the US had 
no difficulty in follow the strategy because some influential sections within the 
US, especially the parliamentarians and military personnel, by then resented 
Vietnam for the trauma the Americans experienced during the Vietnam War. On 
the other hand, the US felt awkward upholding China's strategy of weakening 
Vietnam and the Heng Samrin Government by assisting the Khmer Rouge, at all 
cost.43 In aligning its position closely with China and ASEAN, the US also 
supported the strategy of isolating Vietnam and its 'puppet government' in 
Cambodia internationally. However, this strategy created another dilemma for the 
US because due to the isolation Vietnam became more dependent on the Soviet 
Union's military and economic aid.44 
Overall, the power play and manoeuvring between stakeholders in the inner and 
outer circles, as well as among the stakeholders in the outer circle had some 
impacts - good and bad - on the settlement processes of the conflict. The efforts to 
find peace in Cambodia were like erecting a building, at first establishing a peace 
map (the architect's plan), then as the dialogue progressed, the builder gradually 
put more bricks into the foundation, until the building's shape came into 
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existence. Unfortunately, in the case of the Cambodian conflict, the conflicting 
parties and the stakeholders often insisted that they had the best 'peace map' for 
the basis of the peace plan. Thus, the Indonesian peace initiative was concerned 
with identifying the many peace maps, consulting the parties and the stakeholders 
on the nature of each map, and presenting the consolidated map to the conflicting 
parties within the setting of informal meetings. The peace process moved back 
and forth from informal t~ formal, during which the stakeholders exchanged and 
negotiated positions for the sake of putting substance into the peace map, as if 
putting bricks in one at a time into an edifice of peace. 
IV.3. The Indonesian Peace Initiatives 
3.1. Indonesia as ASEAN Interlocutor 
From the very outset it is important to mention that the Cambodian conflict put 
Indonesian and ASEAN interests in collision. To a certain extent, as outlined 
earlier, the differing threat perceptions among the ASEAN members also 
influenced how individual states reacted to the Cambodian conflict. ASEAN 
subscribed to the inviolability of national sovereignty and, therefore, regarded 
Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia as having to be challenged unconditionally. 
Such aggression made ASEAN's ideal of having a peaceful and stable region look 
unattainable.45 As a member of ASEAN, Indonesia had to support ASEAN's 
strategy of isolating Vietnam, at all costs, and use all diplomatic means to achieve 
this strategy. At the same time, Thailand provided an arms supply from China to 
the resistance forces in Cambodia in order to put an extra burden on Vietnam and 
its occupational forces. The objective of this strategy was to 'bleed Vietnam 
white' in order to force Vietnam to back down and meet ASEAN's demand to 
retreat from Cambodia. However, Indonesia did not consider that a weak Vietnam 
would serve Indonesia's interest for having a strong country acting as a buffer 
against potential threats from China.46 Indonesia also did not consider the strategy 
of isolation was effective and observed that instead of backing down, Vietnam had 
instead hardened its stand. In 1982, for instance the Vietnamese Foreign Minister 
Nguyen Co Thach had stated that ASEAN hostility towards Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia would make the Vietnam government "resort to its right to self-
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defense."47 Indonesia considered that the other ASEAN policy of limited 
interaction with Vietnam, that is, by assigning certain ASEAN countries to engage 
Vietnam in a dialogue, would yield better results in the long run, rather than the 
policy of isolation. In fact, since the early 1980s ASEAN had assigned Malaysia, 
and later on Indonesia, as a point of contact between itself and Vietnam. 
In the belief that isolation would not guarantee a reversal in Vietnam's attitude . , 
Indonesia tried to maintain a good rapport with Vietnam, for instance by making a 
moderate statement during the yearly debate in the General Assembly session of 
the UN.48 However, as a member of ASEAN, Indonesia had no other option other 
than to stand united with the ASEAN's position during the UN General Assembly 
which condemned Vietnam for its invasion and demanded that Vietnam pull out 
its military forces from Cambodia. ASEAN also used the UN to negate the 
existence of Vietnam's puppet government in Cambodia by blocking its 
credentials in the UN. Simultaneously, ASEAN used the UN to maintain 
international recognition of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) and later on the CGDK 
as the legitimate representative of the Cambodians, at least in the UN. However, 
in the case of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), ASEAN members in the NAM 
(Indonesia, Malaysian and Singapore) were unable to change the NAM's policy to 
leave the seat for the representative of Cambodia in that organisation vacant. 
To deal with the dilemma it faced from the Cambodian conflict, the Indonesian 
Government maintained an open-minded attitude and was willing to listen to 
policy options or inputs suggested by Indonesian scholars. In 1983, during a 
seminar organised by the Research and Development Agency of the Indonesian 
Foreign Ministry, the Ministry requested several leading Indonesian political 
experts and military strategists to analyse several possible modalities to deal with 
the Cambodian problem. One of the ideas suggested was to ask the Ministry and 
the ASEAN countries to embark on a limited regional conference to complement 
the efforts at the UN forum. The seminar also suggested the Ministry persuade 
ASEAN countries to not further isolate Vietnam and gradually distance 
themselves from the Khmer Rouge.49 Although it was not too clear what the 
impact of the seminar on Indonesian policy on Cambodia was, the 
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recommendation convinced Indonesia of the merit of maintaining dialogue with 
the Vietnamese. 
However, Indonesia's efforts to lend assistance in finding a solution to the 
Cambodian conflict were far from smooth. Indonesia had to balance its own 
position with the interests of other ASEAN members, and therefore was expected 
to show at all times tha~ Indonesia supported ASEAN policies on Cambodia. 
Initial efforts to maintain Indonesia's integrity, that is, by issuing a joint statement 
outlining a common understanding with Malaysia of the strategic interest of 
Vietnam in Indochina, were strongly criticised by other ASEAN members, 
particularly Thailand and Singapore. The joint statement was the result of a 
meeting between the former President Soeharto and the late Prime Minister Datuk 
Hussein Onn in Kuantan in March 1980 and pronounced that the solution to the 
Cambodian conflict should take into consideration: 
a) that Vietnam shall be free from dependence on foreign powers, 
either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China; 
b) that in the framework of finding a solution to the power 
struggle for influence in Kampuchea, a political solution should 
be employed, instead of military one, especially by recognizing 
the security interests of Vietnam and reducing the influence of the 
People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union in the region.50 
Thailand and Singapore's criticism of Indonesia and Malaysia for breaking 
ASEAN ranks was softened when in June 1980 Indonesia and Malaysia joined 
their compatriots to stand behind Thailand's security concerns after Vietnam's 
military incursion into Thailand's territory. On June 23, 1980, Vietnamese forces 
crossed the Thai border and engaged the Thai forces in a military clash. However, 
it is important to note that Indonesia kept the Kuantan principles in mind as basic 
principles that should govern efforts toward a 'comprehensive political solution to 
the Cambodian problem.' 
Moreover, although Indonesia yielded to the pressure from its ASEAN colleagues, 
Indonesia did maintain some contact with Vietnam, especially through the 
Indonesian armed forces. In February 1984, General Benny Murdani, Commander 
of the Indonesian Armed Forces, shocked the regional countries by his visit to 
Hanoi from 14 to 17 February 1984, and by his statement that Vietnam was not a 
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threat to the region. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was left with the task of 
qualifying General Murdani's statement and convincing other ASEAN members 
that Indonesia did not deviate from ASEAN's stand.51 Consi_dering the cordial 
relationship between Indonesia and Vietnam, ASEAN in May 1984 designated 
Indonesia as ASEAN's interlocutor to promote dialogue with Vietnam. Dr. Dewi 
Anwar suggested that ASEAN's decision was also aimed of keeping Indonesia in 
check52and reinstating confidence that ASEAN remained unified.53 Dr. Anwar's 
views have some merit in respect of some difficulties that Indonesia faced from 
some ASEAN countries in fulfilling its responsibility as interlocutor. 
3.2. Preparing the ground work for the informal diplomacy process 
Upon assuming responsibility as ASEAN interlocutor, the Indonesian Foreign 
Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja intensified efforts to find ways to settle the 
Cambodian conflict that would be acceptable to the conflicting parties and the 
stakeholders. He made a number of trips to Hanoi to confer about ASEAN's 
positions and in between consulted his ASEAN colleagues, particularly Thailand, 
on any developments from the discussions. Noting that some of ASEAN's and 
Vietnam's positions were irreconcilable, Minister Kusumaatmadja decided to 
consolidate all the positions into a 12-point proposal. 
The proposal incorporated the various peace proposals suggested by the various 
parties. Indonesia regarded the proposal as an integral part for achieving peace 
and stability in the region and in particular for resolving the Cambodian conflict. 
The overall Indonesian strategy to solve the Cambodian conflict, including the 
informal diplomacy, revolved around this proposal. However, in the course of the 
process to solve the conflict, some elements of the proposal were overtaken by 
events, while some other elements were adjusted based on the contexts 
surrounding the peace process, at the regional and international levels. 
On October 1985, Minister Kusumaatmadja proposed the 12-point proposal as 
Indonesia's framework to solve the Cambodian problem. The framework was 
comprehensive - albeit with some contradictions - because it addressed all issues 
essential for the solution of Cambodian conflict. In particular, the proposal 
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suggested stages on how bring peace in Cambodia and postulated 
ASEAN/Indonesia's ideal of the region post-Cambodian conflict.54 The first 
element was a concern with strategic framework. In this case, the US had to be 
brought into the strategic equation to balance the role played by the Soviet Union 
and China. In this respect, Indonesia hoped that the US would take steps to 
normalise its bilateral relations, such as discussing with Vietnam the issue of 
American troops Missing ~n Action (MIA). The rationale behind the proposal was 
to reduce Vietnam's dependence on the Soviet Union. The second element 
outlined the strategic objective from the resolution of the Cambodian problem, 
that is, to have an independent, free, and non-aligned Cambodia. By having a non-
aligned Cambodia, Vietnam in particular would not feel threatened by a neighbour 
who, before the invasion, had adopted a policy hostile towards Vietnam and 
established an alignment with China. 
The third element emphasises the importance of the withdrawal of Vietnam forces 
from Cambodia. In this case a clear time frame for the withdrawal of Vietnamese 
forces from Cambodia was seen as essential and, therefore, international pressure 
for such withdrawal had to be maintained. The fourth element highlights the 
importance of an international conference to discuss a solution to the Cambodian 
problem. The format being suggested was a limited conference involving ASEAN 
countries, Vietnam, Laos, members of the Security Council (the US, Soviet 
Union, PRC, the United Kingdom and France), Australia, India and Sweden. The 
fifth element of the proposal involved arranging direct talks between the 
protagonists, the CGDK and Vietnam. However, direct talks between the CGDK 
and the Heng Samrin led-Government was not encouraged because this would 
imply recognition of a 'puppet government'. The sixth proposal highlights the 
importance of national reconciliation, inclusively including all factions in the 
conflict. However, this proposal contradicted the previous proposal which, in 
principle, opposed direct talks between the CGDK and the Heng Samrin faction. 
The seventh of the twelve elements are concerned with the stages from Vietnam's 
military pull out to the establishment of a national reconciliation government in 
Cambodia. Specifically, the seventh element highlights the aspect of withdrawing 
Vietnamese troops. One issue was how to pull the forces out, whether in stages or 
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in total. The eighth element concerned the creation of a safety zone. whether it 
would apply to all of Cambodia or limited to the border of Cambodia and 
Thailand. This issue was contentious for Thailand and Vietnam. The ninth 
element concerned the creation of an international force. The role of the forces 
would be subject to the role that the parties expected from such forces, such as to 
act as peace keeping forces. The tenth element was the creation of an international 
control commission. The eleventh was to hold an election/referendum under 
international supervision. The last of the twelve was concerned with the 
establishment of a government of national reconciliation led by Prince Sihanouk 
which included the Heng Samrin faction. 
Preferring to have a regional approach at the first phase as a way of settling the 
Cambodian conflict,55 Minister Kusumaatmadja conferred with his colleagues in 
the Ministry on the kind of meeting format that could bring all the conflicting 
parties and the regional stakeholders together. Among those consulted by Minister 
Kusumaatmadja was Prof. Fuad Hassan, a trained psychologist who had served 
the Ministry in the Research and Development Agency in the mid-1980s.56 The 
colleagues supported Minister Kusumaatmadja's idea that the most feasible 
format was to convene an informal meeting, held on the basis of 'equal footing, 
without preconditions and with no political label' .57 The informal meeting would 
consist of two stages: first, a meeting between the CGDK and the Heng Samrin 
Government, and second, a meeting between the Kampuchean factions involving 
ASEAN, Vietnam and Laos. 
On 29 July 1987, Minister Kusumaatmadja visited Vietnam and discussed the 
meeting format and the 12-point proposal with Vietnam's foreign minister, Mr. 
Nguyen Co Thach. Minister Co Thach expressed support for the format and 
agreed to consider some of the elements in the 12-point proposal. This 
convergence of views was recorded in the 'Ho Chi Minh City Understanding' of 
1987 between Indonesia and Vietnam. Vietnam's agreement to the proposed 
meeting format was a breakthrough in the sense that Vietnam had previously 
refused to participate in any meeting in which the Khmer Rouge participated and 
in any meeting which implicated Vietnam as a party to the conflict.58 However, 
Vietnam's agreement was hardly surprising because Vietnam was worried that the 
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Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev might abandon Vietnam for the sake of 
nonnalising its relations with China. In fact, in 1986, the Soviet Union did attempt 
to resolve the Cambodian conflict directly with the Phnom Penh Government 
knowing that the resolution of the conflict was one of the preconditions set by 
China before nonnalisati"on could take place. Hence, by accepting the proposed 
meeting format, Vietnam hoped that it would maintain its influence in Cambodia. 
Unfortunately, the agreement reached in Ho Chi Minh City was not received 
favourably in some ASEAN countries. It is curious that Thailand's Foreign 
Minister, Mr. Siddhi Savetsila, who was aware of Minister Kusumaatmadja's 
intention, stated that he was not fully consulted on the matter. During his press 
briefing in August 3, 1987, Minister Savetsila, praised Minister Kusumaatmadja 
for his successful visit, but made a remark that implied that ASEAN countries 
should not become too involved in Cambodian affairs.59 
Baffled by this reaction, Minister Kusumaatmadja wrote to Minister Savetsila, 
dated 10 August 1987, stating that Vietnam's agreement to take part in the 
'cocktail party' 60 was the maximum result of his visit.61 He also mentioned in his 
letter that "the Vietnamese have also agreed that any subject can be raised and 
discussed in that infonnal meeting."62 He concluded his letter by stating that "[a] 
consensus among us at this juncture is of crucial importance so as to enable us to 
consider and chart the steps that should be taken in the days ahead." He added, 
"for this purpose, ideally an infonnal meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers could 
be convened. If this idea of an informal meeting is agreeable, the appropriate time 
could be between now and the date of your departure for Beijing."63 Indonesia's 
proposal to call an infonnal ASEAN meeting could be interpreted as an attempt 
not only to clarify the misunderstanding,64 but also as an effort to find a concerted 
ASEAN position in anticipation of China's opposition. However, during the 
special ASEAN ministerial meeting in Bangkok on 16 August 1987, both 
Singapore and Thailand opposed the decision to hold meetings in two stages 
because ASEAN acceded to Vietnam's position that the Cambodian conflict was 
mainly an internal conflict among Cambodians. Both countries also insisted that 
ASEAN use the 8-point proposal of the CGDK as a basis for the discussi_on during 
the informal meeting. However, this condition was not acceptable to Vietnam, and 
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Thailand was well aware of Vietnam's rejection of the CGDK proposal, which 
asked Vietnam to negotiate directly with CGDK.65 
Indonesia was clearly disappointed with Thailand and Singapore's reactions, and 
for a while the agreed ·basis and format for discussion was shelved.66 Jn an 
apparent display of displeasure, during a meeting of ASEAN Senior Officials 
(ASEAN SOM) in Bangkok from September 8-10, 1987, Indonesia's delegation 
mentioned that the ASEAN countries should always remember that the 
Cambodian conflict was the problem of the Cambodians and ASEAN was only 
there to help find a solution. Therefore, any action by ASEAN countries should 
always be guided by the principle of 'only to help'. The delegation invited 
ASEAN countries to look for ways of settling the conflict from the point of view 
of the victims of the conflict, that is, the Cambodians, and not from the interest of 
. l 67 any reg1ona country. 
At the same time, Vietnam also expressed its disappointment at the result of the 
ASEAN ministerial meeting and questioned ASEAN's appointment of Indonesia 
as its representative to consult Vietnam, who was acting on behalf of the 
Indochinese countries. 68 The question revealed that as ASEAN interlocutor, 
Indonesia was not given full power to speak on ASEAN's behalf. In its editorial, 
Merdeka - a Jakarta based newspaper, sympathetic to Moscow - expressed 
concern that Indonesia was being manipulated and forced to give up its 
independence and active foreign policy.69 However, it could be argued that as 
long as the so-called 'front line-state', Thailand, considered the interlocutor 
function of Indonesia was not jeopardising its interests, Thailand would give 
Indonesia permission to take diplomatic initiatives. The kind of ambivalence in 
Thailand's attitudes toward Indonesia's diplomatic initiatives was observable 
during the overall peace efforts leading to the Paris agreement in 1991. This 
ambivalence is evident in the following discussion. 
3.3. Paving the way for the Jakarta Informal Meetings 
It is important to note that although the reaction to the 'Ho Chi Minh City 
understanding' was rather tepid, the 'cocktail party' proposal remained alive and 
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was discussed on several occasions. For instance, during an ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers meeting in New York, 28 September 1987 - on the fringe of the 
General Assembly's meeting - Minister Kusumaatmadja informed his 
counterparts that Vietnam had expressed interest in pursuing the Ho Chi Minh 
City agreement, that is, organising an informal meeting among the Cambodians. 
Minister Kusumaatmadja also informed the meeting that Vietnam had agreed to 
meet Prince Sihanouk, but only in his personal capacity. However, Minister 
Kusumaatmadja stated that he would not follow up the request unless ASEAN 
gave him their fullest support. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers gave their approval, 
as long as Indonesia could guarantee Vietnam's participation.70 Due to the 
sensitivity of the issue, the ASEAN ministers also agreed to play down the 
planned meeting, and requested Indonesia make the necessary arrangements with 
the Vietnamese government, and consult Prince Sihanouk on the matter.71 
Prince Sihanouk was undoubtedly a lynchpin in Cambodian affairs. His consent 
and endorsement of any diplomatic initiative to settle the Cambodian problem was 
essential. Prince Sihanouk appeared supportive of the idea when Minister 
Kusumaatmadja discussed Vietnam's request with him in private before the rest of 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers joined in for a bilateral meeting with Prince Sihanouk. 
Interestingly, during the bilateral meeting, which was described as 'sincere and 
open', Prince Sihanouk maintained that ASEAN should take a realistic approach 
and consider Vietnam's security interests as well as the Cambodians half-hearted 
support of CGDK warfare, because the Cambodians were still traumatised by Pol 
Pot's regime. In his opinion, Vietnam would not accept any settlement which 
forced Vietnam to acknowledge itself as a culprit in the Cambodian conflict. The 
Prince also mentioned that Vietnam considered it was in a strong position because 
of the support from the Soviet Union and some non-aligned countries such as 
India.72 
Prince Sihanouk then elaborated three possible options for peace talks: (1) 
dialogue between Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen in Paris; (2) dialogue between 
Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen, immediately followed by Prince Sihanouk meeting 
with a high level Vietnamese leader, preferably Vietnam's President or Prime 
Minister (both meetings in Jakarta); and (3) dialogue within the framework of 
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'cocktail party' in Jakarta. He, however, was not too optimistic of the 'cocktail 
party' option because in his opinion the Khmer Rouge, with the backing of China, 
would be unwilling to participate·.73 ASEAN Foreign Ministers expressed their 
support for the Prince's plan. In the meantime Indonesia decided to follow up the 
planned meeting with Vietnam, despite the 'lukewarm' response from the 
Prince.74 
The decision to continue pursuing the 'cocktail party' proposal stemmed from 
Indonesia's experience that Prince Sihanouk sometimes made conflicting 
statements. For instance, on 25 August 1987, Prince Sisowath, FUNCINPEC 
representative in CGDK's office in the UN, informed the Indonesian mission that 
he was asked to relay Prince Sihanouk's appreciation of Indonesia's effort in 
settling the Cambodian conflict. Prince Sihanouk considered the 'Ho Chi Minh 
City understanding' important, because the agreement recognised Vietnam as a 
significant factor in conflict settlement. The Prince regretted the outcome of the 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok and described the communique of the 
meeting as 'pure sabotage' of Indonesian efforts as the communique confirmed 
the positions of the hard-liners, that is, China, Thailand and the Khmer Rouge. 
Interestingly, on the following day, the same envoy again approached the 
Indonesian mission and conveyed a different message; Prince Sihanouk denied the 
legality of Vietnam's claim that the agreement in Ho Chi Minh City was between 
ASEAN and the Indochina states. However, Prince Sihanouk did not omit the 
possibility of his participation in a kind of meeting, because his envoy stated that 
Prince Sihanouk was agreeable to the 'cocktail party' between the Cambodian 
factions, as long as the Heng Samrin dropped the claim as the legitimate 
government in Cambodia.75 The conflicting statements explained that the Prince's 
action was influenced by his attempt to act independently and, at the same time, to 
court China to maintain its support. 
In order to have a clearer picture of Prince Sihanouk's intentions, Minister 
Kusumaatmadja in October 1987 sent the Director General for Political Affairs of 
the Ministry, Mr. Nana Sutresna to Paris, to confer with the Prince. During the 
discussion, the Prince annulled his earlier scenario of peace talks, that is, the two 
stage meetings in Jakarta and instead suggested a triangular meeting between 
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himself, Hun Sen and the Vietnamese. He argued the modification was prompted 
from his conviction that the Cambodian people would object to a notion that he 
met on an equal footing with Hun Sen. He mentioned that if such a meeting with 
Hun Sen was to take place, the appropriate venue would be France. He also 
mentioned that the French Government had offered assistance to solve the 
Cambodian conflict, but without detailing the nature of the offer. In response to 
the latest position of the Prince, Mr. Sutresna stated that he would bring the matter 
to the attention of his superior.76 Although Indonesia was aware of Vietnam's 
hesitation about the idea of a direct meeting with the Prince, even in a triangular 
format, Indonesia did consult Vietnam on the matter during the bilateral Working 
Group meeting in Bali, 23 November 1987. Indonesia reasoned that the planned 
meeting between Sihanouk and Hun Sen on December 1987 in Paris could be 
regarded as the first stage of the 'cocktail party'. Vietnam's reaction to the 
suggestion was "interesting and worth considering.''77 
In his letter to Prince Sihanouk, Minister Kusumaatmadja also indicated 
Vietnam's preference for a "substantive negotiation for reaching a comprehensive 
solution to the Kampuchean problem"78 held in Jakarta and not during Prince 
Sihanouk's meeting with Hun Sen in Paris. It is understandable that Vietnam 
would hope to gain better results from negotiation in a regional setting. There 
were grounds for optimism for the informal meeting in Jakarta because, in 20 
December 1987, FUNCINPEC's conference in Paris declared their support for 
Indonesia's diplomatic efforts to find a comprehensive solution to the Cambodian 
problem. They also agreed with the principles governing the 'Ho Chi Minh City 
Understanding' of 29 July 1987.79 It is also important to mention that Minister 
Kusumaatmadja in his visit to Bangkok in 2 February 1988 also received 
assurance from the Thai government of their support for the planned meeting in 
Jakarta. In his letter to President Soeharto, Minister Kusumaatmadja expressed his 
delight that Thailand had finally given its full support to Indonesia's diplomatic 
initiative, that is, to an informal meeting. 80 
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3.4. The Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) 
3.4.1. The First JIM in Bogor: 26-28 July 1988 
Minister Kusumaatmadja's successor, Minister Ali Alatas, renewed Indonesian 
efforts to facilitate the peace process upon his election as Indonesian Foreign 
Minister in March 1988. He even considered the Cambodian conflict as his 
priority.81 During his to~rs to ASEAN capitals during the first months of his 
appointment, he invited his ASEAN counterparts to reconsider the 'cocktail party' 
proposal. He reiterated that ASEAN had not accomplished much from their past 
policies of limited engagement with Vietnam, and suggested that perhaps an 
informal meeting could renew interests among the conflicting parties and the 
stakeholders for dialogue.82 The necessity for the new minister to gain ASEAN 
support was also based on the consideration of the possible negative implications 
of his appointment for the fate of the informal meeting, the brainchild of the 
former Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja.83 
The success of Minister Alatas in convincing his ASEAN's counterparts could be 
attributed to his persuasive skills. However, the ASEAN countries' support was 
also prompted by some factors, such as the two meetings in France between Hun 
Sen and Prince Sihanouk (2-4 December 1987 in Fere-en-Tardenois and 20-21 
January 1988 in St-Germain-en-Laye) which did not prove to be successful.84 On 
the one hand, the non-participation of the Khmer Rouge and KPNLF in the two 
meetings in France was not acceptable to China. Thus, without China's blessing, 
any agreement reached between Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk would be difficult 
to implement and, therefore, would not guarantee a comprehensive solution to the 
Cambodian problem. 
However, on the other hand, according to Vietnam's Ambassador in Jakarta, the 
deadlock, particularly during the second meeting between Prince Sihanouk and 
Hun Sen was caused by their disagreement on the issues of the time frame for a 
military pull out and the establishment of an interim government. The 
Ambassador explained that Hun Sen had offered a military pull out within two 
years and that a quadripartite government should be formed after elections. In 
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contrast, the Prince insisted that Vietnam's military pull out should be held in 
1989 and the quadripartite government would be formed before elections and at 
the same time the PRK government should be dismantled. The Ambassador also 
mentioned that the Prince, in his effort to persuade Hun Sen to accept his offer, 
had stated that he was prepared to leave out Khieu Samphan and Son Sann if they 
did not want to accept the agreement. Although this information should be 
considered with qualification, there are grounds for believing that the Prince 
might have made some offers, knowing his diplomatic canniness and constant 
manoeuvring. 85 
The ASEAN countries were also concerned with the potential for increased armed 
conflict in Cambodia after Vietnam announced its intention on 21 January 1988 to 
withdraw their 'army volunteers' from Cambodia by 1990.86 Their concern with a 
potential civil war in Cambodia after Vietnam's statement of intent made JIM 
more relevant. Similarly, the failures of the two meetings in France had renewed 
Prince Sihanouk's interest in JIM. In fact, his son Prince Ranariddh approached 
the Indonesian Ambassador in Bangkok on 27 January 1988 to state that his father 
requested Indonesia to continue its diplomatic initiatives.87 
Upon receiving these assurances of support, Minister Alatas established an 
organising committee and assembled a team to prepare substantive matters for 
JIM, scheduled for the 26-28 July 1988. Mr. Alatas mentioned that he personally 
requested permission from Mr. Kusumaatmadja to call the planned meeting the 
'Jakarta Informal Meeting', considering the term 'cocktail party' would not be 
appropriate for the predominantly Muslim community in Indonesia. Mr. 
Kusumaatmadja did not object to the renaming providing there was no alteration 
to the agreed format and objectives.88 He also invited some seasoned diplomats 
from the Ministry who were knowledgeable about the distinctive elements of both 
the Vietnamese and the Cambodians' ethnic particularities to advise him on 
suitable protocols. 89 
The chief diplomat taking care of the substantive aspects of the informal meeting 
as Director General for Political Affairs, was Mr. Louhanapessy, a French-
speaking diplomat who once served as Indonesia's Ambassador in Hanoi. 
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Unfortunately, the Indonesian team for JIM did not seem to have definite ideas on 
how to proceed with the substantive discussion of JIM. During the third ASEAN 
Senior Officials Meeting (ASEAN SOM) in Bangkok, from 2-3 June 1988, the 
Indonesian delegation, headed by Mr. Louhanapessy, was still not prepared to 
provide participants to the meeting with any clearer idea on the substantive aspect 
of JIM.90 Some possible explanations of this situation were: (1) the Indonesian 
delegation had not considered the agenda conclusive, considering some 
consultations were still taking place (in that period, Minister Alatas was shuttling 
from Jakarta to Bangkok and New York to consult with the protagonists of the 
Cambodian conflict); (2) the Indonesian delegation did not want to openly discuss 
.the tentative agenda, worrying that possible leaks to the media might endanger the 
prospects of the meeting; and (3) the Indonesian delegation, by then, simply had 
no idea as to what would be the scenario of the JIM meeting.91 What seemed most 
important was to have the JIM meeting taking place, as if to say 'let the 
protagonists get together and we will see how things develop'. In a way, this 
message was spelled out in the invitation letter to the conflicting parties and 
concerned countries. In his letter, Minister Alatas stated "I should like to propose 
the date of the 251h July 1988 as the start of the meeting and to keep its duration 
'open-ended', to be determined in the light of developments during the 
meeting. "92 Thus, the letter indicated an element of speculation about the possible 
outcomes from the process on the part of Indonesia as the meeting convenor. 
The expectation might have been prompted by a degree of uncertainty 
surrounding the planned meeting, such as the likely participation of Khmer Rouge 
and Prince Sihanouk and whether it was appropriate for ASEAN to circulate a 
working paper during JIM. The following discussion looks at how undecided the 
parties to the conflict were about their participation in JIM and highlights some 
efforts made by Indonesia to convince them to participate in the informal meeting. 
In his effort to convince the Cambodian factions to take part, Minister Alatas, in 
May 1988, asked the Indonesian Ambassador in Bangkok to meet in person with 
Khieu Samphan and Son Sann. During the meeting, the Ambassador was asked to 
let both Khieu Samphan and Son Sann know that their non-participation in JIM 
was to be used in Vietnam's propaganda campaigns. Vietnam would be able to 
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argue that (1) there was no need for an inclusive dialogue including the concerned 
countries, because a bilateral dialogue had taken place involving Hun Sen and 
Prince Sihanouk; and (2) CGDK was not as flexible as Vietnam and PRK, who 
were willing to come to Jakarta to find a solution to Cambodian conflict. The 
Ambassador was also asked to convince both Khieu Samphan and Son Sann that 
the success of Vietnam's propaganda could result in a decline in international 
support for the ASEAN p~sition on Cambodia during the UN General Assembly 
debate.93 
For his part, Prince Sihanouk made a confusing statement when he stated that if 
Vietnam took part in JIM, the meeting would be bound to fail. The Prince stated 
further that JIM would not take place because the Khmer Rouge had declined to 
participate.94 Arguably, the Prince's statement was in contrast to the conventional 
wisdom that Vietnam's preparedness to meet the CGDK should be welcome 
because Vietnam should be accountable for its actions in Cambodia. Furthermore, 
the participation of the Prince himself in JIM was in doubt. On 11 July 1988, the 
Secretary General of Thai Foreign Ministry, Mr. Kasem S. Kasemsri briefed 
ASEAN Ambassadors in Bangkok about Prince Sihanouk's withdrawal as 
President of CGDK, and stated that the Prince had decided not to attend JIM. 
However, the Indonesian Ambassador in Bangkok suggested that the Ministry 
should not just accept the Thai statement and asked the Ministry to confirm the 
matter directly with the Prince in Paris.95 The Foreign Minister followed the 
suggestion and assigned Mr. Nana Sutresna (the Indonesian Ambassador to the 
UN) to Paris to personally delivered a letter from President Soeharto, inviting the 
Prince to come to Jakarta as the President's personal guest during the JIM.96 
Clearly, this personal approach at the highest level proved effective because the 
Prince accepted the invitation and came to Jakarta during JIM - not as a 
participant but as an able statesman and personal guest of President Soeharto. 
The appropriateness of a working paper during JIM was not the only issue that 
troubled the Indonesians; they also had to deal with another pressing issue 
concerning which countries should attend and send participants. There was a 
general understanding among the ASEAN members that a working paper was not 
in line with the ideal of an informal meeting, that is, a free flow and undirected 
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discussion. However, on the issue of which countries should be invited to JIM, the 
ASEAN countries went through a lengthy debate. During an ASEAN Working 
Group meeting on the Cambodian Problem in Bangkok, from 31 Mayto 1 June 
1988, Thailand objected to Laos's participation in JIM. Thailand, supported by 
Singapore, argued that: (1) Laos's participation would create an impression that 
JIM was a meeting between two groups of regional countries: ASEAN and 
Indochina; (2) the Camb~dian problem had become a regional problem; and (3) 
Laos had nothing to do with the Cambodian problem. Although Indonesia was 
aware of Thailand's concern that JIM would address bilateral problem between 
Thailand and Laos, Indonesia also had to consider Vietnam's concern. Vietnam 
maintained that if Indonesia invited Thailand, Vietnam would invite Laos. 
Vietnam wished to have Laos, its trusted ally, there during JIM to balance the 
ASEAN countries. Indonesia was finally able to persuade Thailand to soften its 
stand and suggested that Vietnam would use the conditionality as a pretext to not 
attend JIM. 97 
By then, the Indonesian diplomats had no direct access to Hun Sen. Although the 
Indonesian Ambassador and the PRK Ambassador in Hanoi had established 
communication, Indonesia also had to rely on the good faith of the Vietnamese 
Govemment.98 Thus, the success of Indonesia's effort to bring all the parties to 
Jakarta depended on its ability to persuade the protagonists of the usefulness of an 
informal meeting, and to a certain extent it had to rely on the good will of 
Thailand and Vietnam who had leverage over some factions.99 
The notion of leverage was an interesting aspect of the overall peace process 
involving Indonesia. On the one hand, by not having leverage over the factions 
and concerned countries, Indonesia had the benefit of appearing as a neutral third 
party, who mainly acted as facilitator only able to offer facilities, expertise and 
presided over the meeting. On the other hand, with limited leverage, Indonesia's 
diplomatic efforts were subject to Thailand, Vietnam and China's co-operation. 
As long as these countries - the inner circle - considered their interests and 
positions were not being served by any peace discussion, they would not give 
their utmost support to any peace initiative by a third party. However, it is also 
important to mention that although Indonesia was relatively more neutral 
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compared to other ASEAN countries in the eyes of the protagonists and concerned 
countries, some members of the CGDK and ASEAN sometimes suspected 
Indonesia of being too close to Vietnam. This suspicion was unavoidable because, 
as already noted in this chapter, some Indonesians considered Vietnam as 
Indonesia's buffer against China's penetration in Southeast Asia. For its part, 
Vietnam treated Indonesia more sympathetically than the other ASEAN countries 
because Indonesia had no_ formal security and military affiliation with the West, 
and never engaged in hostility toward Vietnam during the Vietnam War. 100 
Preparation for JIM itself was not limited to substantive and organisational 
aspects. In preparing for JIM, Minister Alatas designated several seasoned 
diplomats to act as his liaison for each head of delegation and to accompany them 
during their stay in Jakarta. From a protocol point of view the approach was 
'smart' as it resulted in each delegation being treated equally; from the point of 
view of strategy the seasoned diplomats could help the minister understand the 
delegation's concerns on both substantive and non-substantive matters. Between 
meetings and on several occasions these diplomats, the so-called 'old-timers' 
conferred and held private meetings with the Minister to discuss strategy and 
receive or transmit information.101 
JIM took place as scheduled from 26-28 July 1988 and was held in two stages 
following the 'Ho Chi Minh Understanding.' 102 During the first stage (morning 
session) the four factions met together after Minister Alatas made his opening 
remarks. It was hoped that the participants would make the most of this meeting 
because the Cambodians were the only parties who could settle their own 
problem. 103 He stated that the first stage of the informal meeting was significant 
because it provided "representatives of all Kampuchean factions with a first 
opportunity to discuss, in an atmosphere of informality and unstructured, those 
aspects of the problem that should appropriately be taken up by the Kampuchean 
people themselves."104 Not appearing to be directing the factions on what should 
be discussed, Minister Alatas suggested, en passant, that "[the aspects to be taken 
for consideration included] national reconciliation, self-determination, the 
provisional government to arrange for general elections and the building of a new, 
h " 105 Th . . f peaceful, independent, Non-aligned and neutral Kampuc ea. e mtention o 
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the suggestion was to give the participants encouragement to discuss issues of 
mutual concern. The scenario was to encourage participants in the morning 
session to decide among themselves an agreed agenda for the afternoon session's 
discussion. 106 By giving the Cambodian participants the opportunity to decide on 
the agenda, Indonesia was hopeful that the participants would reach a consensus 
on a modality to end their conflict. The approach also reflected an effort to make 
the participants felt that J!hl process was their own because they were given the 
responsibility to steer the course of the subsequent meeting involving the 
concerned countries. 
The meeting among the four factions was indeed one of the breakthroughs of JIM, 
because after fighting for more than 10 years they had never met face to face. The 
informal meeting format provided them with the opportunity to sit together in one 
room (minus Prince Sihanouk). To maintain their privacy, no Indonesian officials 
(including the liaison) were present, and, therefore, no one in Indonesia could 
explain what was taking place during their private meeting. The conversation was 
held in the Cambodian language. Unfortunately, the 'conditioning' process was 
not too successful. During the second stage of the informal meeting, 
representatives of the factions and other concerned countries debated strongly on 
their positions. Deadlocks appeared on the issues of dismantling the two 
organisations that claimed sovereign's right of Cambodia (CGDK and PRK), and 
the proposal to establish a 'national reconciliation council' as a temporary 
government. In the afternoon session of JIM, the role and function of the third 
party was even more difficult due to the presence of the so-called concerned 
countries, who insisted on having their views heard and, at times, using the 
factions as their pawns. According to some Indonesian diplomats who attended 
this session, each of the participants acted unilaterally to counter others' opinion 
and in the same way, they could air the position of their compatriots. 107 This 
pattern was observable during the subsequent JIM series and in the interval 
meetings prior to the Paris Peace Conference of October 1991. 
The second session of IlM also showed Indonesia that the concerned countries 
were willing to derail the meeting discussion or to subvert the role of Indonesia as 
a third party if their concerns were not met. For instance, Indonesia was later 
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informed that during JIM, Thailand lobbied the Khieu Samphan's camp to veto 
Indonesia's effort to release 'a joint statement' (communique). 108 In the end, JIM 
only produced a Chairman's statement which was less authoritative than a joint 
statement by JIM's participants would have been. 
The informal setting of the meeting, which was not binding and supposedly 
exploratory in nature, di~ not induce the participants to engage in constructive 
discussion and instead they debated from positions, as if they were in a formal 
negotiation. These realities suggested that the enmity among the Cambodians after 
years of fighting was difficult to reconcile. However, the psychological boundary 
that prevented them meeting one another was no longer sustainable after JIM. The 
JIM form:n was also marked by another breakthrough because for the first time, 
the three factions of CGDK were seated at the same table, face to face, with their 
common enemy, the Vietnamese. To intensify interactions among JIM 
participants, Indonesia as a host also arranged a number of social events and, 
according to Mr. Louhanapessy, the participants did interact during them. 109 
In his concluding statement before JIM's participants, Minister Alatas stated that 
he felt it was appropriate to issue a Chairman's Statement outlining what had been 
agreed upon. 110 He reasoned that the intention of his decision was to "show the 
outside world that we have started not only to discuss with one another the various 
aspects and dimensions of the problem, but that we also wish to move 
forward." 111 In the end, the first JIM reached an agreement "on the need to solve 
the Kampuchean problem through political means, and thereby contribute to the 
establishment of peace and stability in Southeast Asia."112 The participants also 
reached an understanding on the need for national reconciliation and for an act of 
self-determination.113 Moreover, the participants also shared similar views on two 
inter-linked key issues: 
... the withdrawal of Vietnam forces from Kampuchea, to be 
carried out within the context of an overall political solution and 
the prevention of the recurrence of genocidal policies and 
practices of the Pol Pot regime and to ensure the cessation of.all 
foreign interference and external arms supplies to the opposmg 
Kampuchean forces. 114 
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This formulation had entangled the external and internal aspects of the Cambodian 
conflict, something that Vietnam had attempted to avoid. Indonesia and the 
ASEAN countries did not want Cambodia to fall victim to Vietnam's unilateral 
action of pulling out their so-called army of volunteers, which could instigate civil 
war. However, to accommodate Vietnam's interest, the Chairman's statement also 
emphasised two issues of Vietnam's concern, that is, the Pol Pot regime and 
external arms supplies to the Cambodian resistance forces. From a different 
perspective, according to Khatharya Um, these parts of the agreement were 
considered by many observers as a "boon for Hanoi and its Phnom Penh ally."115 
ASEAN, for the first time, committed itself "to a position that attributes equal 
importance to a Vietnamese withdrawal and to safeguards against a Khmer Rouge 
restoration."116 In fact, it was China who always insisted that the retreat of 
Vietnam from Cambodia be made without putting any condition. Therefore, there 
was a possibility that the statement reflected a convergence in interest between 
Indonesia and Vietnam, for not letting a pro-China communist regime dominate 
the new Cambodia. 
The JIM forum also highlighted the fact that Prince Sihanouk remained an 
influential figure. Although he had no formal position in CGDK - he resigned 
from the presidency of CGDK on 10 July 1988 and had delegated his position in 
FUNCINPEC to Prince Ranarridh - representatives of the four factions (including 
Hun Sen) visited him in the course of JIM meeting. 117 Interestingly, during JIM, 
members of Hun Sen' s delegation mingled at ease with members of the other 
factions' delegations, particularly the FUNCINPEC and KPNLF. 118 This 
occurrence could be explained in two ways. Firstly, the PRK wished to act 
independently and not as a surrogate of Vietnam. Secondly, it was mainly a 
tactical move to impress other factions, especially the FUNCINPEC faction of 
Prince Sihanouk, and to isolate the Khmer Rouge. 
The First JIM also agreed to establish a Working Group to elaborate some aspects 
of the problem identified by JIM. The format of the Working Group meeting was 
also informal and its task was "to examine specific aspects of a political 
solution."119 Thus, if JIM was to provide a framework on several substantive 
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issues of the Cambodian conflict, the Working Group had the responsibility for 
putting substance into the framework. 
3.4.2. The Working Group Meetings and the Second JIM in Jakarta 
During the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting at the UN in October 1988 
' 
Minister Alatas urged his. counterparts to maintain the momentum by persuading 
the protagonists and Vietnam to implement some of the agreed principles reached 
during the first JIM. He also requested ASEAN countries to maintain unity and 
contribute more input in order to put substance into JIM's framework. 120 There are 
grounds to believe that the appeal was prompted by his concern that in the first 
JIM there had been no unanimity among the ASEAN countries. 
It is also important to note that after the first JIM, there was an increase in 
international interest to help settle the Cambodian conflict. Some indications of 
this growing interest are as follows. First, the Indonesian diplomats in Bangkok 
were informed by their host that on 13 September 1988 Mr. Rafeeuddin Ahmed 
(UN Secretary General's Special Representative) had conveyed to the Thai 
Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsilla, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's 
suggestion to involve members of the Permanent Five (P-5) in the Cambodia 
peace process. 121 Then Prince Sihanouk, in a meeting with ASEAN Ambassadors 
at the UN in New York on 19 October 1988, indicated to them his firm support of 
France's proposal to hold an international conference on Cambodia. 122 
In some ways, the JIM process did not benefit from the plethora of international 
interest. For instance, France's proposal to hold an international conference on 
Cambodia shifted the concentration of the participants from the planned meetings 
in Jakarta to the peace process that took place in France. In this case, Indonesia 
was not able to persuade France to wait until the informal process had run its 
course. Indonesia had hoped that as regional efforts, JIM and the Working Group 
would be able to prepare the substance, the modalities and other detailed aspects 
for a comprehensive political solution to the Cambodian conflict. 123 The 
achievements of the regional efforts, at a latter stage, could be taken up in any 
international conference on Cambodia. However, Indonesia was not successful in 
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convincing France that without this degree of preparation a formal international 
conference would run aground. 124 Indonesia was successful in restraining the Non 
Aligned Movement (NAM) from creating redundancy in peace efforts, and 
suggested that it concentrate instead on the international aspect of the Cambodian 
conflict. Thus, the NAM Committee on Cambodia was agreeable to Indonesia's 
suggestion to let the JIM Working Group work out the detailed aspects of a 
comprehensive political s~ttlement. 125 
The First Working Group took place from 17-19 October 1988, with the objective 
of examining "the specific aspects of a political solution to the Kampuchean 
problem." 126 The Working Group failed to achieve its objective and the discussion 
was hampered by the non-participation of the Khmer Rouge. Although the 
meeting was informal and non-binding, the absence of the Khmer Rouge created a 
complex situation in which any agreements reached during Working Group 
meeting had to be discussed with the Khmer Rouge first before they were 
considered worthy for consideration during the formal negotiation. The Khmer 
Rouge failed to show up because they were displeased by the clear references to 
genocide directed against Pol Pot in the Chairman's statement of the first JIM. 
However, the Khmer Rouge argued that the timing for the Working Group was 
not suitable. When consulted prior to the Working Group by Indonesian diplomats 
in Bangkok, Khieu Samphan mentioned that the suggested date for the meeting 
(17 October 1988) would constrain Democratic Cambodia's efforts to win 
international support during the annual voting on Cambodia's problem in the 
UNGA. Thailand shared the Khmer Rouge's concern on the timing of the 
Working Group, despite it being known that the debate on Cambodia in the 
UNGA would not take place until the third week of October. 127 In the end, 
Indonesia was not able to convince the Khmer Rouge to send some 
representatives, even after it hinted that the non-participation would further isolate 
them. 128 
The working group meeting was also conducted in an informal setting, with 
limited protocol intricacy, but all the participants were able to take part on an 
equal footing. At the meeting, chaired by Mr. Louhanapessy, participants were 
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asked to discuss the specific aspects of a political solution to the Kampuchean 
problem and also to make recommendations on the convening of another meeting. 
Unfortunately, as in the first JIM, the informal setting failed to stimulate 
constructive discussion. Minister Alatas's effort to motivate the participants by 
urging them to "show the outside world that they were able to solve their own 
problem in their own way, in accordance with their traditions and cultural 
I " 129 f ·1 d f. d A · va ues ai e to m resonance. ccordmg to Mr. Louhanapessy, his efforts to 
reconcile the concerns of the Cambodian participants during the meting were 
dashed by Thailand and Singapore. He considered their action as a 'stab in the 
back' by the fellow ASEAN countries. 130 Interestingly, according to some 
diplomats who helped in the conference room, Mr. Louhanapessy was, in fact, 
yielding too much to participants' demands. 131 
This impression can be explained by the different expectation between those who 
supported the meeting (supporting unit) and those charged to chair the meeting. 
The diplomats who supported the meeting - who were generally very young and 
newly recruited - wished to see achievements, whereas Mr. Louhanapessy was 
more concerned with process. He preferred to involve the participants in lengthy 
discussion, to let their concerns be heard and better understood. Acting on behalf 
of a neutral third party, he also had to avoid the impression of appearing too 
authoritative and, therefore, was hopeful that his 
ASEAN counterparts would give their fullest co-operation by ways of stimulating 
discussions with constructive ideas during the informal meeting. However, this 
did not happen. The participants remained firm to their own positions and 
concerns and instead of listening to other points of view, they insisted that others 
respect their concerns. Worrying that the meeting would result in no conclusive 
agreement, Minister Alatas asked Dr. Hasjim Djalal, a tough negotiator and 
accomplished international lawyer, to substitute for Mr. Louhanapessy at some of 
the sessions. 132 Minister Alatas wished to see two outcomes accomplished: an 
improvement in relationships among the participants and, at the same time, an 
indication of progress. As the helmsman in Indonesia's peace initiative, he knew 
that any indication of failure from the informal approach would lessen the interest 
of protagonists and concerned countries in taking part in the subsequent meeting 
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cycle. Thus, he saw a need to balance between idealism and pragmatism. More 
importantly, he was also aware that other interested parties, such as France and 
Australia, were waiting on the sidelines ready to offer their own conflict 
resolution mechanisms. 
The First Working Group did not make substantial progress. In the end, the 
meeting outcome only reiJerated the aspects of the Cambodian conflict identified 
during the first JIM. However they did agree with the necessity to reconvene an 
informal meeting, in order "to achieve more concrete results and to sustain the 
momentum of the joint efforts of all the participants."133 The failure of the First 
Working Group meeting to achieve the meeting's objective was used by members 
of some factions as an excuse for not attending the Second Working Group and 
JIM. During the ASEAN SOM meeting in Bangkok, on the 20-22 December 
1988, Mr. Thep Devakula, Director General of Thai Foreign Ministry, informed 
participants of his conversation with Khieu Samphan of the Khmer Rouge about 
the planned meetings in Jakarta. He mentioned that Khieu Samphan was not 
pleased with the result of the first JIM and he would be prepared to participate if 
the planned meetings had a clear agenda, and if China and the Soviet Union were 
present. 
The reaction of individual ASEAN countries to the conditions set by the Khmer 
Rouge, especially on the participation of China and the Soviet Union, reflected 
their position on the Cambodian conflict. For instance, Singapore and Brunei 
Darussalam's delegations expressed no reservation about the idea. In fact, 
Singapore stated that Vietnam would have to accept any agreement reached 
between China and the Soviet Union. Malaysia responded by saying that it would 
be difficult to convince some participants on the merit of involving non-regional 
countries in JIM. However, Indonesia categorically rejected the request and 
argued that non-regional countries should not be allowed to decide how to end the 
conflict on their own terms because they were only concerned with their priorities. 
Indonesia asked Thailand to convince Mr. Samphan on the importance of 
attending the planned meetings, and to explain that non-regional countries could 
be involved after JIM had made some achievements. 134 In the end, ASEAN 
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Foreign Ministers held a position that the idea to include non-regional countries 
was difficult for JIIM 
After their internal meeting, ASEAN representatives also conferred with 
representatives of CGDK. During the consultations, the CGDK aired a number of 
concerns and put certain conditions on their participation in the planned meetings 
in Jakarta. For instance, l_(hieu Samphan considered the planned meeting would 
not be effective because Vietnam was not being honest. He asserted that 
Vietnam's recent statement of military pull out was groundless because around 
one million Vietnamese settlers had not yet left Cambodia's soil. In the 
subsequent meeting, Prince Ranariddh read a letter from his father to Mr. 
Samphan which said "it would be more beneficial to postpone the convocation of 
JIIM II because of the Cambodian internal affairs and unacceptable attitude of 
Vietnam."135 Interestingly, Prince Ranariddh did not completely dismiss the 
prospect of his father's participation in JIIM because he also mentioned that Prince 
Sihanouk might reconsider his position if there were positive developments before 
the planned meetings took place. Nevertheless, Prince Ranariddh pointed out that 
his father appeared more interested in France's proposal for holding an 
international conference in Paris (some motives behind Prince Sihanouk's interest 
is discussed under 3.5.). 
During the luncheon, and in a defence of the planned Jakarta meetings, Mr. 
Louhanapessy stated that a solution to the conflict should not be confined to one 
forum. In his opinion, if the Paris conference failed to meet its objectives, the 
peace efforts on Cambodia would "return to zero."136 He suggested, therefore, that 
the Cambodians reconsider their reservations and proceed with the planned 
meetings as scheduled. In response, Khieu Samphan stated that he was willing to 
reconsider his position, as long as there were new elements that guaranteed 
• 137 Kh" progress in the peace process, and if there were adequate preparations. 1eu 
Samphan' s reaction could be interpreted in two ways. First, he wished to make a 
conciliatory statement, so as not to offend Indonesia. Secondly, he wished to keep 
the channels open, just in case the Khmer Rouge failed to achieve its interest in 
different forums. 
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As in the first JIM, the prospect of CGDK's participation in the second JIM was 
still clouded with uncertainty until a few days before. Indonesia made use of all 
available channels to persuade leaders of the CGDK to come to Jakarta. In 
particular, Indonesia requested Thailand to persuade the factions to come to 
Jakarta and also asked America to alert China to the importance of the Khmer 
Rouge's participation in the planned meetings. The uncertainty surrounding 
Prince Sihanouk's positio~ about his participation has a lot to do with his political 
cunning and mercurial personality. The following illustration shows the 
complexity surrounding the Prince's commitment to attend the second JIM. When 
briefing several Ambassadors based in Paris about the result of his recent meeting 
with Hun Sen on 7-8 November 1988, Prince Sihanouk stated that if the Working 
Group meeting in Paris involving the four factions was not successful, he hoped 
that the Working Group JIM could make some achievements.138 However, 
Indonesian diplomats in New York were informed by Mr. Rafeeuddin Ahmed, the 
special representative of the UN Secretary General, that Prince Sihanouk was 
rather upset about not being well informed on the preparations leading to the 
second JIM. Based on this input, the Indonesian representative in New York 
suggested the Foreign Minister approach and inform the Prince on the detailed 
aspects of the planned meetings. 139 In following up the suggestion, Minister 
Alatas wrote a letter to President Soeharto requesting the President invite Prince 
Sihanouk to Jakarta as his personal guest as in the first JIM. In his letter Minister 
Alatas considered the Prince as the only person acceptable to all of the conflicting 
parties. 140 
Although the participation of leaders of the CGDK was still doubtful, Minister 
Alatas maintained an optimistic stance and asserted that the CGDK, including 
Prince Sihanouk, would attend the planned meetings. His optimism was to a 
certain extent caused by the Prince's positive reaction to President Soeharto's 
invitation letter, which Minister Alatas conveyed in person to Paris on 10 January 
1989. During their conversation, Minister Alatas emphasised the importance of 
proceeding with the planned meetings so that the peace efforts would not lose 
momentum. For his part, the Prince stated that he would come to JIM as a 
personal guest of the President and restated that the intention of his presence was 
to show his support of the Indonesian led initiative. 141 As in the previous JIM, the 
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Prince's acceptance of the invitation could be used as a means to entice the other 
factions to attend the informal meetings. 
On 22 January 1989, one day before his departure for Beijing, Prince Sihanouk 
invited and briefed ASEAN ambassadors in Paris. He again reiterated that he 
would come to Jakarta, although he believed the planned Working Group and JIM 
meetings would not be su~cessful because Vietnam and Hun Sen had rejected his 
five-point proposal. As a consequence, the CGDK would also reject their counter 
proposal. During the meeting, the Prince also expressed his regret that Mr. Sabam 
Siagian, editor of an Indonesian Newspaper (the Jakarta Post) had written an 
article suggesting the Prince should adjust himself to the reality and recognise 
Hun Sen's de facto control of Cambodia. Based on the article, which seemed 
supportive of Hun Sen and Vietnam, the Prince questioned the extent of 
Indonesia's neutrality as a third party in the Cambodian conflict. 142 Knowing that 
the Prince had a tendency to make spontaneous reference to matters that he . 
disagreed with, Indonesia was hoping that despite his scepticism about 
Indonesia's objectivity, he would still come to Jakarta. 
Unfortunately, the Prince finally cancelled his trip. The cancellation, announced in 
Beijing on 26 January 1989, was not linked to his earlier query of Indonesia's 
impartiality, but was prompted by Thailand's decision to invite Hun Sen to 
Bangkok. 143 The reversal of Thailand's policy toward Hun Sen, from non-
recognition to active engagement surprised not only the Prince but also the 
ASEAN countries, including Indonesia. Former Foreign Minister, Dr. Mochtar 
Kusumaatmadja, speaking before foreign diplomats and businessman in Jakarta, 
on 1 February 1989, stated that Indonesia was stunned by the invitation. He also 
indicated that ASEAN countries had no prior knowledge of the planned visit, even 
though they recently had met the Thai Foreign Minister, Mr. Savetsila, in Brunei, 
on 21 January 1989, for a special discussion to prepare for the Second JIM.144 
Interestingly, Mr. Kusumaatmadja gave the statement not long after he had a 
discussion with Minister Alatas in the Minister's office. On the one hand, Mr. 
Kusumaatmadja's statement was not 'politically incorrect' because he no longer 
held an official position in the Indonesian government. However, on the other 
hand, his long association with Indonesia's peace initiative to resolve the 
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Cambodian conflict made his remark significant. His statement could be 
considered as an expression of Indonesian displeasure. 
Indeed, Thailand's policy of rapprochement with Vietnam and Laos and a 
statement of intent 'to tum Indochina from a battle field into a trading market' had 
stimulated misgivings about Thailand's good faith among Indonesians. They were 
worried that the new polic_y might have some negative impacts on Indonesia's role 
as peace broker in the Cambodian conflict. 145 Indonesia's concern was well 
grounded considering some Cambodians had also expressed their concern that 
Thailand might work on its own in trying to settle the Cambodian conflict, 
especially by making separate agreements with China and Vietnam.146 Moreover, 
Indonesia was also upset when Son Sann of the KPNLF made a statement on 28 
January 1989 that questioned the relevancy of JIM and mentioned that there was 
no need for leaders of the three factions to come to Jakarta if Hun Sen's position 
was still rigid. Although Sann' s son, Son Soubert, later on argued that the. 
statement was mainly 'a tactical move,' 147 Indonesia was disturbed and considered 
the statement inappropriate and unnecessary. 
Contrary to the CGDK, Hun Sen had indicated his preparedness to come to JIM. 
In his letter to Minister Alatas, Hun Sen accused the CGDK of being too rigid 
because during their last meeting in Paris, the CGDK had demanded that the PRK 
accept, in total, Prince Sihanouk's five-point proposal. In the letter, he also stated 
that rather than yielding to the CGDK's demand, he preferred to maintain the 
status quo. He further stated that JIM should not be held hostage by the non-
willingness of the CGDK to come to Jakarta, and suggested, in the absence of the 
CGDK, the meeting could discuss the international aspects of the Cambodian 
problem. 148 Thus, prior to the Jakarta meeting, the parties to the Cambodian 
conflict had already engaged in debates over positions. In the meantime, Vietnam, 
the PRK's ally, had requested that the second JIM be held as scheduled. Arguably, 
Vietnam's interest to reconvening JIM stemmed from its desire to release the 
burden of sustaining its military presence in Cambodia without losing face. 
Vietnam's persistent questioning of Indonesia about the planned Working Group 
and JIM meetings, and statement suggesting Indonesia had lost interest on JIM, 
had irritated the Indonesian diplomats. 149 Prior to confirming the meetings, 
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Indonesia wished to receive assurances from each faction of their participation 
and co-operation during the meetings. 
Meanwhile, to appease the CGDK, Prime Minister Chatichai on 30 January 1989 
hosted a dinner in Bangkok for representatives of the three factions. 150 The 
intention of the meeting, according to Ambassador Sarasin Viraphol, the 
Ambassador at large for ~outheast Asian Affairs of Thailand's Foreign Ministry, 
was also to ensure the CGDK's participation in the Working Group and JIM 
meetings. 151 Indeed, after his meeting with the CGDK, Prime Minister Chatichai 
wrote a letter to President Soeharto, dated 30 January 1989, and said "after my 
meeting with the three factions of the CGDK this evening, I can convince them to 
attend JIM II."152 He further stated that "[the three factions] have now given their 
assurances of coming to Jakarta to participate in JIM II as scheduled. This step 
will now help make JIM II a real possibility."153 Although some Indonesian 
diplomats were not happy that Thailand was taking credit for the CGDK's 
participation, 154 they had no other option except acknowledge the Thai 
government's role in the success. In his letter, President Soeharto clearly stated 
his appreciation to Thailand and mentioned: 
... with the reconfirmation of the participations of the CGDK 
factions at the forthcoming Second Jakarta Informal Meeting as a 
result of Your Excellency's meeting with them, it would appear 
that the last hurdle in the path towards Jakarta Informal Meeting 
II has now been overcome. Preparations for the convening of the 
Jakarta Informal Meeting II, therefore, can now proceed with 
despatch. 155 
It is also important to mention that in an effort to avoid the planned meetings 
receiving further criticism from the CGDK, President Soeharto on 30 January 
1989 wrote Prince Sihanouk a letter indicating that he respected his decision to 
cancel his trip to Jakarta. In his letter the President also mentioned that, despite 
the cancellation, he was prepared to welcome the Prince at any time in Jakarta. At 
the same time, the President expected the Prince would share his view on the 
relevancy of JIM, and therefore would help in encouraging the CGDK to 
participate in JIM. 156 President Soeharto stated in his letter that: 
... the convening of the Second Jakarta Informal Meeting under 
the present circumstances constitutes a timely opportunity for our 
common endeavours to finding a just and comprehensive political 
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solution to the Kampuchean problem and therefore remains of 
relevance. 157 
Unfortunately, the appeal failed to stop the Prince from issuing discouraging 
statements about JIM, even a few days before the planned meetings, stating that 
JIM would be bound to fail. 158 
The second JIM took place as scheduled, from 19 to 21 February 1989, and was 
held subsequently after the meeting of the Second Working Group of JIM (16 to 
18 January 1989). The Working Group was designed as the first stage of the 
meeting involving only the Cambodians. It is important to note that Minister 
Alatas took the unusual step of chairing the Working Group meeting. This would 
not be expected because the four factions as well as the concerned countries only 
assigned officials at the level of Director or Director General during the Working 
Group meeting. However, he rejected the speculation that he was not satisfied 
with Mr. Louhanapessy's performance during the October 1988 Working Group 
meeting, by explaining that his decision to chair the working group was mainly 
based on practicality because he would chair the subsequent leaders meeting. 
However, it is certain that he would not want to risk an unsuccessful Working 
Group because the JIM meeting was designed to follow up on undecided issues, 
and to endorse aspects that had been agreed upon during the Working Group. 
The formats of the Working Group and JIM meetings were similar to the past 
practices, but during those meetings Indonesia organised more consultations 
among the participants or separately between the Chair and representatives of the 
factions. The Chair also consulted the participants from the concerned countries a 
number of times. The Chair intentionally limited the frequencies of plenary 
meetings considering that the participants in a plenary session tended to engage in 
non-constructive debate rather than making conciliatory statements. In particular, 
he noted that during the Working Group meeting, the Cambodians were mainly 
reiterating their already known positions and did not engage in substantive 
discussion. 159 Thus, the Chair considered it more appropriate if during the JIM 
meeting he acted as a 'middle man' who conveyed messages from one party to 
another. Apparently, Minister Alatas relied on his diplomatic skills160 and also 
expected that he could benefit from the networking between the seasoned 
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Indonesian diplomats and the heads of the delegations. In the second JIM, as in 
the first JIM, Minister Alatas assigned some seasoned diplomats, with an in depth 
knowledge of ethnic particularities of the Cambodian and the concerned countries , 
to accompany each head of the delegation during the social events. 
In contrast to previous practice, Indonesia circulated an unofficial working paper 
to function as a reference tor the participants. The paper itself had been discussed 
among the ASEAN countries but to make the paper acceptable to Vietnam and 
PRK, Indonesia called it 'a non-paper'. The discussion of the paper was not very 
productive because of the difference of opinion among the participants and also 
because parts of the paper, which were still being discussed, were leaked to the 
media. The efforts of some journalists to give their own interpretation of the 
documents, as well as their separate interviews with some member delegations, 
proved counter-productive to JIM. The relaxed atmosphere during the plenary and 
the consultations, which Indonesia wished to maintain, was hampered by 
participants' harsh statements directed toward one another during the media 
interviews. The second JIM provided Indonesia with a lesson that when 
convening a meeting, even an informal one, the presence of journalists could be 
detrimental to the peace process. 
The leakage also had some impacts on the domestic affairs of the Indonesian 
team. One issue was who should bear responsibility for the affair because of the 
difficulty of identifying the person who had leaked the content of the paper to the 
media, whether it was the work of a member of the Indonesian team or the 
organising committee. In fact, it was also possible that the media had learned 
about the paper from JIM's participants. In the wake of such uncertainty, the 
organising committee became stricter in the issuance of releases and 
information. 161 They were careful not to let a similar mistake reoccur. As a 
consequence, the media became more aggressive in searching for news and relied 
more on information shared by JIM's participants. Thus, the whole affair was like 
a 'vicious circle' with any action taken by Indonesia posing its own dilemmas. 
In the end, the second JIM was unsuccessful in narrowing the gap between the 
protagonists. The obvious disagreements on some issues led to the Chair 
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postponing the closing of the meeting. During the four month postponement, the 
conflicting parties were to conduct their own internal discussions on the issue of 
the establishment of an Interim Quadripartite Authority of national reconciliation. 
They were to inform the Chair of the result of their consultation, and then he 
would decide whether · or not to hold another JIM meeting. 162 The most 
contentious issues revolved around the following. First, the CGDK and the PRK 
had diametrical views o~ the format of the interim government. The PRK, in 
particular, rejected the CGDK's demand to dismantle their government. Secondly, 
the CGDK objected to Vietnam and the PRK's insistence on linking Vietnam's 
military pull out with: (a) the non-recurrence of the Pol Pot's regime, and (b) the 
cessation of all foreign interference as well as external arms supplies assistance. 
Thirdly, the participants were not able to agree on who should supervise the 
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, whether the UN or selected 
countries. 
The decision to defer the closing of JIM was a shrewd diplomatic tactic. The 
reasons for the postponement could be explained as follows. First, the decision 
was a face saving formula for Indonesia as facilitator, that is, by not giving the 
impression of an unsuccessful meeting. Secondly, by delaying the closing of the 
meeting, Indonesia had sustained itself as a third party in any future meetings to 
resolve Cambodian conflict. Thirdly, Indonesia did not wish to damage the 
positive relationships among some participants that had been nurtured during 
informal meeting$. An abrupt closing of the meeting, in a tense atmosphere, could 
create a negative impression in all the participants that the peace efforts were no 
longer on the right track. After the second JIM, Minister Alatas wrote the four 
Cambodian factions a letter stating that although "divergences of view still exist 
on many issues of vital concern,"163 he hoped "in the months to come the talks 
among the four Kampuchean parties will yield success."164 Minister Alatas's letter 
to Minister Co Thach of Vietnam, somewhat, conveyed a more positive tone as 
follows: 
It is my sincere hope, which I know is also shared by you, that 
now that at least the parameters for an overall political solutions 
to the Kampuchean question has been set through the consensus 
statement of the Chairman of the JIM, our efforts to find such a 
solution will be further facilitated. 165 
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The non-conclusive results of the second JIM also stemmed from at least three 
factors. First, the factions expected that they would gain better results from the 
planned summit meeting between Deng Xiaoping of China and Mikhail 
Gorbachev of the Soviet Union in Beijing, in May 1989. Second, the CGDK was 
hoping to delay substantive discussions until the planned international conference 
under French supervision took place. Indonesia was informed earlier by China's 
Permanent Representativ~ at the UN about France's intention to organise an 
international conference, following the JIM pattern. Later on, France planned to 
expand the participants of the meeting to include the Permanent Five members of 
the Security Council. 166 Thirdly, the non-participation of Prince Sihanouk was 
another important factor that impeded the free flow of discussions among the 
participants. For example, participants representing the CGDK objected to the 
release of a 'joint statement,' on the basis that they had not received prior 
agreement from the Prince. In the end, Indonesia only released a 'Consensus 
Statement of the Chairman' at the end of second JIM. 167 Although the non-
participation of the Prince was perhaps used by the CGDK as an excuse for not 
making any decision, their attitude could also be seen confirming the status of the 
Prince as the most influential figure in Cambodia who should always be reckoned 
with. 
Another important feature of the second JIM was that a courtesy visit of all 
participants to President Soeharto was arranged. This event was important because 
Indonesia had not arranged a similar visit during the first JIM. During the courtesy 
visit, the President expressed his opinion that the Cambodians could settle their 
problems only with mutual efforts. He suggested that each of the factions should 
set aside their differences and contradictory positions for a while and look for 
common interests. He made an interesting illustration by saying that each of the 
factions could have their own car, but they were asked to leave their cars in the 
parking lot and to seat themselves together in one car and head for their 
intermediate objective, a national reconciliation government. 168 
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3.5. Post JIM: concerted international efforts for peace in Cambodia 
After the series of informal meetings m Indonesia, France had elevated the 
informal and exploratory nature of the informal diplomacy into formal 
negotiations. However, between the two international conferences on Cambodia in 
Paris, the first one from July to August 1989 and the last one in October 1991 that 
concluded the peace negotiation, peace efforts were pursued within the formal 
framework of negotiations and the informal setting of consultations. Since Paris 
1989, participants to the peace process had multiplied and included members of 
the P-5, the six ASEAN countries, the Indochina countries (Vietnam and Laos), 
regional countries (Australia, Japan, India), Canada, representatives of the Non-
Aligned Movement and the UN Secretary General, and the four Cambodian 
factions. Furthermore, within this period, the peace processes were also marked 
by concerted efforts by these countries and the UN to put substance and ideas into 
the peace framework. 
Parts of the framework itself emanated from the elements identified during the 
JIM processes. JIM had identified certain elements which became an integral part 
of the overall resolution of the Cambodian conflict and were embodied in the 
peace framework of the "Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of 
the Cambodian Conflict", signed in Paris on 23 October 1991. This linkage 
between JIM and the Paris peace process was noted in the proceedings of the 
Working Group Meeting under the Paris International Conference on Cambodia 
(PICC) when the working group discussed and refined the peace framework. 
Paragraph 104 of the document reads as follows: 
Since J.I.M. I it was agreed that there were certain elements that 
needed to be drawn together such as ceasefire, cessation of arms 
supplies, withdrawal, general elections, how to prevent the 
recurrence of past policies and practices which was now under the 
rubric of human rights, repatriation of refugees, and the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia. 169 
In a nutshell, JIM was successful in specifying the internal and external aspects of 
the conflict. M. Nagendra Prasad states that "as a result of the JIM I and II talks, 
the internal and external aspects of the Cambodian problem came to be 
distinguished from each other." 170 The concerted international efforts post-JIMs 
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dealt with the two issues in tandem, but in the end, all those acting as a third party 
noted that the single most difficult issue to resolve was the internal aspect of the 
conflict. 
As mentioned previously: at the time of second JIM in February 1989 some of the 
factions already had set their eyes on Paris as their next meeting place. The 
following discussion look~ at how the parties to the Cambodian conflict perceived 
the role of French Government in the peace process. Prince Sihanouk, in 
particular, was very enthusiastic about the planned meeting in Paris because of the 
participation of representatives from the major powers. He considered other 
forums, including JIM, not representative enough because of the non-participation 
of the major powers. 171 Besides, the Prince considered France his second home 
and, therefore, he was more comfortable with a meeting in France than in other 
places. Son Sann of the KPNLF had a good rapport with the Western countries 
and was favourable toward the planned international conference in Paris. 
However, the Khmer Rouge was not eager to come to Paris, because the French 
government was critical of their human rights violations. In Paris, the Khmer 
Rouge relied on China's support. 
Vietnam had no strong objections to Paris as a venue for a meeting because the 
French government had always maintained open communication with Hanoi. 
However, Vietnam preferred limited scope meetings, such as JIM, because 
Vietnam was able to maintain its influence. Vietnam was concerned that the major 
powers would put pressure on Vietnam in an international conference sponsored 
by France. Similarly, Hun Sen was not very enthusiastic about coming to an 
international conference sponsored by France. In fact, Hun Sen questioned 
France's impartiality because during several of his meetings with Prince Sihanouk 
in France, he considered the French government had treated him differently 
compared to the Prince. Hun Sen made a number of complaints about the 
inequality of treatment he received when he met the Prince in France in November 
1988 and questioned France's motive for such treatment. Hun Sen's displeasure 
was reflected in the following statements he made after returning from Paris. 
They [the Prince and France] proposed that we meet at the former 
Cambodian Ambassador Residence, which France illegally 
handed over to the Samdech [Prince Sihanouk]. We did not agree 
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to this because it was a maneuver by France and Samdech 
Sihanouk, who wanted to push us into legitimizing the Samdech 
has right over this residence. 172 
By pressuring Hun Sen .to meet with the Prince in the Embassy - of which the 
status of the legitimate trustee of the Prince was disputed by Hun Sen led-
government - France ignored Hun Sen's sensitivity. Feeling insulted by the affair, 
Hun Sen stated that he would no longer meet the Prince in France and instead, he 
would meet him in Jakarta. Despite the problems arising from the meeting, Prince 
Sihanouk, Son Sann and Hun Sen did discuss a number of issues, and reached a 
consensus that after the withdrawal of Vietnam's troops had been verified, all 
Cambodian parties should stop receiving foreign military aid. They also agreed to 
ask the Indonesian Foreign Minister and the UN Secretary General to organize an 
International Conference on Cambodia. 173 Although the meeting appeared able to 
reach important agreements, in the absence of the Khmer Rouge any agreement 
reached was meaningless. Moreover, during the second JIM the Khmer Rouge 
strongly opposed any effort to link the military pull out with the cessation of 
military aid. Similarly, agreement about the involvement of the UN Secretary 
General also raised a question because Vietnam and PRK did not trust the UN, 
due to its non-recognition of the PRK. 
In the end, at the special request of Prince Sihanouk to President Soeharto, the 
fourth bilateral meeting between the Prince and Hun Sen was held in Jakarta on 2 
May 1989. It may be the case that the Prince's request was aimed at maintaining 
President Soeharto's support for the Cambodian cause, knowing that Indonesia 
was not very happy with the Prince's cancellation of his trip to Jakarta during the 
second JIM. Apparently, the Prince's letter impressed the President. In his memo 
to Minister Alatas, President Soeharto asked the Minister to convey to the Prince 
that "Indonesia accepted the request with utmost pleasure and would provide 
whatever assistance required for the meeting."174 However, the process leading to 
that meeting was rather awkward for Indonesia as the host. An example of this 
was that although the Prince had asked Indonesia to host the meeting he criticized 
Indonesia when it sent Hun Sen an invitation letter. Clearly the Indonesians were 
puzzled by the criticism because they wondered how Hun Sen could come to 
Jakarta without an invitation. However, the affair also shows that any third party 
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who was willing to help solve the Cambodian conflict needed to consider the 
idiosyncrasies of the Prince. 
All the activity and meetings described above show that by mid-1989 the parties 
to the Cambodian confli"ct all had a chance to meet informally in an informal 
setting, either in Indonesia or in France. The main contrast between the informal 
processes sponsored by I~donesia and France was in terms of participants, the 
facilitation function and the notion of 'equality in treatment.' The Indonesian 
sponsored informal process involved, inclusively, all parties to the Cambodian 
conflict and the regional countries who were concerned with the problems, the 
ASEAN countries and Laos. In the case of the informal process sponsored by 
France, the meetings were mainly bilateral, between Prince Sihanouk and Hun 
Sen, although the third meeting on November 1988 involved Son Sann of the 
KPNLF. With regard to the facilitation function, Indonesian diplomats were 
involved in the informal process to assist the participants in their discussion. In 
contrast, France mainly provided facilities for the meeting to take place. Both 
Indonesia and France gave special attention to informality as one means to avoid 
complicity surrounding the non-willingness of the participants to recognise 
participants representing other factions. In emphasising this aspect, Indonesia 
considered it essential that all participants should be treated equally and Indonesia 
assumed that a setting would make a positive contribution to the informal 
diplomacy activities and the participants trusted the host for being non-
discriminative by treating them equally. However, France appeared less concerned 
about this matter with Hun Sen claiming that he was not treated equally in Paris. 
3.5.1. Paris International Conference on Cambodia 
Although not too enthusiastic at first about France's proposal to hold an 
international conference in Paris, Indonesia finally supported the proposal after it 
successfully convinced the French government of the JJ1.erit of chairing the 
meeting together. Indonesia argued that a Co-chair system would give the regional 
efforts adequate recognition and therefore the Paris conference could make use of 
some of JIM's achievements. 175 However, with regard to the function of the 
conference, Indonesia was not too taken with France's intention to make the 
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planned conference a 'multilateral negotiating forum'. Indonesia considered the 
idea too risky and preferred instead, a kind of 'ratification conference' for sorting 
out all the differences. 176 Therefore, Indonesia favoured the model of JIM 
meetings or working groups with limited participants. France had a different 
opinion and considered its approach appropriate. There was hope that during the 
conference the major powers could put pressure on the parties to the conflict and 
their supporters in order t~ become more accommodative. France's optimism was 
justifiable noting that the Permanent Five, during their meeting in New York on 8 
May 1989, had declared their intent to provide assistance if requested to help 
settle the Cambodian conflict. 177 
The Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC) was held from 30 July to 
30 August 1989. The conference was not preceded by any preparatory meeting 
involving senior officials, but began with a short meeting among foreign ministers 
who adopted the rule of procedures and reviewed the meeting's agenda. 178 The 
foreign ministers agreed to the establishment of four committees with the 
following responsibilities: 179 
1) the first committee was responsible for defining the modalities of a cease fire; 
2) the second committee was in charge of defining the aspect of international 
guarantee to the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and neutrality 
of Cambodia; to ensure cessation of external arms supplies and to prevent 
foreign interference; and to prevent the recurrence of genocidal policies; 
3) the third committee was responsible for discussing the terms and references 
for repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, and to prepare the post-war 
reconstruction of Cambodia; and 
4) the fourth committee, named the Ad Hoc Committee was to examine 
questions regarding the implementation of national reconciliation and the 
establishment of a quadripartite interim authority under the leadership of 
Prince Sihanouk. 
Based on the foreign ministers' guidance, the committee conducted their 
individual meetings and also observed the Co-chair system. Unfortunately, the 
committee meetings failed to proceed as planned for at least two reasons. First, the 
involvement of a larger number of participants had, in fact, complicated the 
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discussions because of conflicting interests. For instance, on the issue of the 
international guarantee of Cambodia's neutrality, the US, supported by the UK, 
expressed reservation, worrying that this policy would have some impact on their 
global interests. In contrast, Indonesia and some ASEAN countries considered the 
issue as one important component of the ASEAN's ideal of a Zone of Peace, 
Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia. Secondly, the rule of 
procedure of the Paris Co~ference on Article 16 stated that questions of substance 
had to be adopted unanimously. The implication of this procedure was that any 
participant or country could veto any decision, which was not favourable to its 
interests. 180 Moreover, although the Co-chair system (including in the 
committees) was able to give indication of efforts to balance the interests of the 
CGDK and the PRK, the Co-chairs were sometimes not in harmony and this 
affected the meeting discussions. 
In the end, the Paris conference did not achieve its main objective, that is, to reach 
an agreement on a comprehensive solution to the Cambodian conflict. Similar to 
the second JIM, the Paris conference decided to postpone the conclusion of the 
meeting and asked the conflicting and interested parties to continue their efforts to 
narrow their differences. In his report to President Soeharto, Minister Alatas 
identified five main points of contention as follows: 181 
1) Interim Authority in Cambodia prior election. CGDK maintained the 
importance of establishing a quadripartite interim authority, whereas Hun Sen 
rejected Khmer Rouge participation in the interim government, in order to 
prevent the recurrence of a genocide policy. Hun Sen proposed the 
establishment of a 'supreme council' but insisted the existing government 
being maintained. 
2) International Control Mechanism (ICM). Hun Sen preferred the ICM to be 
instituted under the Paris conference (PICC), whereas the CGDK wanted the 
body under the supervision of the UN. 
3) Genocide. Hun Sen considered the genocide issue as the key to settling the 
Cambodian problem. CGDK rejected the term and demanded the formulation 
adopted in the UN be used, that is, 'the non-return of the universally 
condemned policies and practices of a recent past.' 
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4) Vietnam's settlers in Cambodia. This was a new issue tabled by the CGDK. In 
response, Hun Sen asked the PICC to send an independent fact finding 
mission, but their dispatch could only take place after the genocide's issue was 
settled. However, CGDK demanded that the dispatch of such a mission be 
held after the establishment of an interim authority. 
5) Armistice. Hun Sen maintained that the armistice should be declared prior to 
Vietnam's military pull out from Cambodia, whereas the CGDK demanded 
the opposite. 
In his assessment of the failure of PICC, Minister Alatas pointed to two 
developments in Southeast Asia. 182 First, the success of the resistance forces to 
fighting the PRK who had been able to penetrate deeper, close to Phnom Penh. 
Clearly, the success had hardened their position in Paris and had boosted their 
confidence in their fighting capability. Having the upper hand in the battlefield, 
the resistance forces wished to gain the most during the PICC. Secondly, the 
moderates in the PRK had to concede more to the hardliners within the ranks and 
to balance, Hun Sen had to maintain a firm posture during the Paris negotiation. 
Hence, Hun Sen did not want to jeopardise his position in Cambodia and appear 
to be yielding to external pressure. 
3.5.2. Post-PICC: the concerted diplomatic initiatives that led to the signing 
of the Peace Agreement in Paris, 23 October 1991 
Following the failure of the first PICC to end the Cambodian conflict and the 
unilateral military pull out of Vietnam, military clashes between the CGDK and 
the PRK had intensified. This situation triggered alarm in Bangkok about the 
potential proliferation of the conflict followed by flows of refugees into 
Thailand.183 In response, Prime Minister Chatichai suggested holding another 
informal meeting, but proposed that the venue of such meeting be Jakarta or Paris, 
not Bangkok. During his conversation with the Thai Foreign Minister, Siddhi 
Savetsila Minister Alatas stated that Indonesia was unenthusiastic about hosting , 
another informal meeting in Jakarta, but was prepared to offer assistance if there 
were grounds to believe that the parties were willing to co-operate. He reiterated 
that such a meeting should not just aim to reach a 'cease fire' but should be 
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organised under the framework of a comprehensive political solutions based on 
the PICC. 184 Minister Alatas did not want to rush to accede to Thailand's request 
if there was not enough preparation and no clear agenda. 
In particular, Minister Alatas infonned the Thai Foreign Minister that he was 
cautious about holding another JIM because at the domestic level some members 
of parliament and media. had questioned the merit of Indonesia continuing its 
diplomatic initiatives to deal with the Cambodian conflict. They suggested 
Indonesia should limit its role only to the two JIMs. 185 Clearly, by making a 
reference to constraints at the domestic level, Minister Alatas implicitly wanted to 
make his counterpart aware that some Indonesians remained annoyed by 
Thailand's sudden reversal of policy toward the Hun Sen led-Government prior to 
the second JIM. The Indonesians did not consider it to be a matter of urgency for 
them to take an active role in the wake of military clashes along the Thai border 
and in Cambodia's interior. Hence, the message from Minister Alatas was that 
Indonesia was prepared to organise an infonnal meeting as long as the Thai 
Government gave it their full support. 
At the same time, some countries brought a new impetus into the discussion of the 
Cambodian conflict. First, the Soviet Union, supported by the US, proposed the 
implementation of a moratorium on arms supply to the conflicting parties. 
Secondly, Australia proposed that the UN function as an interim government in 
Cambodia. The Australian proposal dealt with one of the five main points of 
contention during the PICC, that is, the Interim Authority in Cambodia prior 
election. To gain support for its proposal, Australia sent Mr. Michael Costello, 
Deputy Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, on overseas tours. 
Responses to the proposal were varied but in general were rather sceptical. For 
example, France did not believe that the idea was practical, knowing the factions' 
insistence on maintaining their position. 186 However, hoping to find a 
breakthrough in the stalemate on the question of interim government, Indonesia 
considered the Australian proposal could be used as a basis for discussion during 
the informal meeting. In this connection, Minister Alatas travelled extensively to 
consult with leaders of the factions and some concerned countries about the 
prospect of holding an informal meeting, under the aegis of PICC.187 From his 
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consultations, he sensed that the parties were willing to meet and prepared to 
k . "f t88 G . ma e concessions, 1 necessary. augmg that there were adequate reasons to 
hold a meeting, Indonesia arranged another informal meeting in Jakarta. 
The aims of the informal meeting (Informal Meeting on Cambodia - IMC) were 
to discuss some outstanding issues not resolved in Paris and also to ponder on the 
Australian proposal. The IMC took place from 26 to 28 February 1990 in Jakarta 
and was jointly chaired by Indonesia and France. Australia took part in the 
meeting as a resource delegation. The IMC was designed as an interim meeting 
prior to the international conference in Paris. Unfortunately, the IMC failed to 
move the parties to the conflict and concerned countries forward. By adopting 
unanimity ruling, the meeting was not successful in producing any agreement 
because the Khmer Rouge rejected the inclusion of the word 'genocide' in the 
document entitled 'possible points of common understanding' which was 
designed as a basis of discussion during IMC. 189 Some other issues of contention 
included: the question of Vietnamese withdrawal because it was held without 
international supervision, the establishment of a Supreme National Council and an 
enhanced role for the United Nations in a peace settlement. The meeting did not 
accept either the Australian proposal nor Prince Sihanouk's proposal which was 
reintroduced by the CGDK. 
The failure of the IMC brought a new feature in the overall peace process, that is, 
an enhanced Permanent Five (P-5) role in determining the framework for a peace 
agreement. Ironically, this was the very notion that Minister Alatas had 
anticipated during the IMC. When chairing the IMC, Minister Alatas had stated 
that by accepting the content of the document prepared by the Co-chairs, the 
participants would send a signal to the world that they were determined to 
contribute to solving a problem in their own region. The agreement also meant 
that they were not simply just waiting until outside powers found, or helped to 
find, a solution.190 
After the IMC, further diplomatic efforts were initiated to resolve the Cambodian 
conflict, both at regional and international levels. The diplomatic initiatives at the 
two levels reinforced one another, with each filling the gaps left at the other level. 
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On one level, the P-5 were determined to develop the framework for a peace 
agreement. They developed the framework from a number of sources, including 
the Australian proposal. 191 However, Indonesia and the ASEAN countries did not 
want the P-5 to commit a similar error to that which had happened in Afghanistan, 
when the Soviet Union reached a decision with the concerned countries on the 
peace terms for Afghanistan without consulting the conflicting parties among the 
Afghans. The end result of the Soviet Union's approach was civil war, which 
Indonesia and the ASEAN countries did not wish to happen in Cambodia. In this 
regard, ASEAN through Indonesia and France as the Co-chair of the PICC held a 
meeting to consult with the factions and the concerned countries about the content 
of the peace framework agreed upon by the P-5, during their Sixth Meeting in 
New York on 28 August 1990. The consultation meeting took place in Jakarta 
from 9-10 September 1990. At the end of the informal meeting, the participants 
representing the four Cambodian factions asserted their acceptance of the peace 
framework formulated by the P-5 in its entirety. 192 Moreover, the Cambodian 
participants also agreed in principle to form the SNC, consisting of 12 
Cambodians, and to accept Prince Sihanouk as the 13th member to chair the SNC. 
The Cambodians' agreement to the peace framework proposed by the P-5 and the 
formation of the SNC did not mean a completion of the peace process because the 
Cambodians then disputed what they had agreed upon. The Co-Chair of the PICC 
had to arrange a special informal Working Group meeting (informal expanded 
bureau meeting), from 9 to IO November 1990, to refine the peace framework 
developed by the P-5. The other issue that required attention was a new dispute 
among the Cambodians about the composition of the SNC. 
The composition of the SNC was one issue that the Cambodians disputed fiercely. 
Their deep-seated distrust, after long years of conflict, made them afraid that their 
faction would be disadvantaged in the event of a vote among the SNC to decide 
on some issues. This problem concerning the SNC was discussed mostly at the 
regional level. This task proved more complex because those who were acting as a 
third party at the regional level had to deal with a number of delicate internal 
Cambodian issues. From September 1990 to June 1991 a number of meetings took 
place in several ASEAN cities: in Bangkok (17 September 1990), in Jakarta (2-4 
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June 1991) and in Pattaya, Thailand (24-26 June 1991). The last two meetings 
were able to break the stalemate, mainly because the parties were willing to make 
concessions. For instance, in Pattaya, Prince Sihanouk had stated that his role as 
Chairman of the SNC would be impartial and neutraI. 193 
However, the change in the attitudes of the Cambodians stemmed from 
developments that had taken place at the regional and international levels, such as 
rapprochement between the US and Vietnam and a shift in Chinese and US policy 
(they had direct contact with the Hun Sen led-government). Normalisation of 
diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China in November 1990 gave 
Indonesia direct access to China, one of the main parties in the Cambodian 
conflict. Moreover, in September 1990, the Cambodian UN seat was left vacant 
because the Cambodians were by then at loggerheads on the composition of the 
SNC. This event was a critical juncture for the Cambodians because the 
international community begun to lose patience. The sign of international fatigue 
was observable on March 1990 when the Thai Prime Minister Chatichai 
Choonhavan asked his cabinet to develop a plan to repatriate around 300,000 
displaced Cambodians living in camps along the Thai-Cambodian border. Patrick 
Raszelenberg and Peter Schier argued that the Thai decision was prompted by 
Thai impatience with the Cambodian resistance due to their lack of flexibility 
during the iMC. 194 Clearly, the resistance forces were disturbed by the Thai 
decision because it had a direct impact on their ability to recruit resistance forces 
from the refugees and to distribute war supplies for sustaining their war efforts. 
By August 1991, the peace process had reached a stage where the international 
efforts under the Paris process and P-5 were complemented by the efforts among 
the Cambodians in the SNC. The synergy between the two processes helped 
further the peace process because the Cambodians were involved in the discussion 
of the substance of the peace framework. Their involvement in the discussion of 
the framework was essential for two reasons. First, the contentious issues, of 
armistice and human rights (especially the issue of genocide) which were 
unresolved in Paris, by then had been included in the framework of a 
comprehensive agreement. Secondly, the Cambodians had agreed earlier in 
Jakarta, on September 1990, to accept the peace framework as a basis for 
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resolving the conflict. A mere acceptance without knowing the substance and 
participation in the discussion would imperil the peace agreement because the 
Cambodians would feel that they had reached an agreement under international 
pressure and terms. In the end, the synergy of all efforts at resolving the 
Cambodian conflict culminated in the signing of Paris Peace Agreement on 23 
October 1991. 
IV .4. Conclusion 
In retrospect, the informal diplomacy through JIM had been successful in 
achieving its limited and modest objectives as follows. First, for the first time ever 
JIM was able to bring all the parties to the Cambodian conflict and concerned 
countries together in one meeting. Secondly, JIM was able to identify some 
elements crucial to a comprehensive political solution. Thirdly, JIM was also able 
to maintain the momentum of the peace process at the regional level. M. Nagendra 
Prasad described the achievement of the JIM as follows: 
[T]here was every reason for Indonesia to be gratified because, 
the limited purpose for which the talks was arranged, was fully 
served as all the Khmer leaders took an active part in the JIM 
proceedings. The two rounds of Jakarta talks, though 
inconclusive, were significant as they offered a useful forum to 
promote constructive dialogue and interaction among the warring 
Khmer parties which had earlier outrightly refused to meet each 
other. 19s 
However, the JIMs were not successful in inducing the factions and the concerned 
countries to move beyond what had been identified. They were reluctant to 
discuss and detail all the agreed aspects of the comprehensive political solution of 
the Cambodian conflict, as well as to ponder on the best way to implement the 
agreed elements. 
The limitation of the JIMs could be discerned from two facts. First, the forum 
itself was informal and was not designed as a negotiating forum, although the 
participants behaved as if they were in formal negotiation. Secondly, the informal 
meetings took place not in an isolation, and, therefore, the attitude of the 
participants were shaped by developments in Cambodia, in the region and 
internationally. It was evident that the participants wished to gain the most from 
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external developments, such flS expecting that the summit between China and the 
Soviet Union could have positive impacts on their respective interests. 196 
The JIM series also revealed that there were limitations in Indonesia's capacity to 
act as a third party in the Cambodian conflict. The limitations concerned with the 
question of neutrality, not having direct access to the protagonists and having a 
limited understanding of their characteristics (especially the Cambodians). 
Although Indonesia treated all the factions equally, sometimes the CGDK 
considered Indonesia sided more with the Vietnam and Hun Sen's position. Prince 
Sihanouk even portrayed JIM as Vietnam's escape route because Vietnam tended 
to highlight the internal aspect of the conflict rather than the cause of the conflict, 
that is, Vietnam's invasion. Indonesia could offer meetings' facilities, ideas and 
the impression of good faith, but was dependent on the willingness of the 
concerned countries to influence some factions to come to Jakarta. 
Indonesia developed its informal diplomacy, including the JIM's strategy and 
tactics, based on information provided by its overseas missions, third countries, 
including the concerned countries, and special representatives of the UN Secretary 
General. All information, especially from non-Indonesians, was treated with extra 
care because of the potential for calculated misinformation to derail Indonesia's 
peace initiatives. The record shows that the activities of information gathering and 
rechecking were extensive prior to JIM and even Minister Alatas himself met 
directly with the factions' leaders to gain their first hand accounts. Although the 
idea of having a support system of liaison involving individuals who were familiar 
with the characteristics of the Cambodians and concerned countries was a worthy 
effort, the reality suggested that after so many years, people had changed and their 
behaviour was less predictable. The Cambodians or Vietnamese that the seasoned 
diplomats had known years before the conflict were often by the time the informal 
meetings took place no longer quite the same. Their basic character might be the 
same, but the war experiences had had some profound impact on their attitudes. 
With regard to the informal format, there were two divergent points of view 
expressed by the Indonesians and JIM's participants. On the one hand, some 
Indonesians expected the informal process would help the protagonists and 
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concerned countries to unravel their differences, step by step in gradual manner. 
Consequently, Indonesia had to position itself mainly as facilitator and meetings' 
moderator, and try to avoid gaining the impression of steering the course of 
discussions. The end objective was to have the agreements reached from this 
process endorsed, at a later stage, by the major powers, interested countries and 
international organisations. Thus, the domain of this point of view was process 
oriented. On the other hand, some Indonesians preferred to have tangible results 
from the informal process and, if necessary, as facilitator Indonesia needed to 
influence the direction of the discussion and if necessary to pressure the 
participants to exchange concessions. Some participants who expected to bring 
home results shared this inclination. However, as a developing country, Indonesia 
had a limited capacity to influence events, and, even during the meetings, 
Indonesia was unable to convince its ASEAN friends to have a single voice. So, 
there was discrepancy between expectation and reality. 
The informal diplomacy broke the psychological barriers of the impossibility of a 
face-to-face meeting between enemies. However, the long years of fighting had 
deepened antagonism among the participants, something that the informal 
meetings (working groups, JIM, social functions between meetings, and some 
informal meeting post-JIM and PICC) failed to curtail. The antagonism and lack 
of trust was observable during all those meetings, including some meetings 
involving major powers and interested countries. 
In the end, the Cambodian conflict was resolved after the international community 
exerted their concerted efforts, combining the efforts of the Co-Chair of the Paris 
Conference, the P-5, and some ASEAN and regional countries. The changing 
regional and international context also influenced the attitudes of the Cambodians 
towards compromise as they were increasingly aware that the international 
community had lost patience with them. 
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Chapter V 
Indonesian Diplomacy in Facilitating the Peace Agreement between 
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and 
The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 
V.1. Introduction 
The involvement of an ASEAN country in the settlement of another member's 
internal conflict is, indeed, a rare case in ASEAN's history. 1 Indonesia was given 
an opportunity to act as a third party in helping to resolve the separatist problem 
in the southernpart of the Philippines, not from an internal arrangement within 
ASEAN, but through its membership in the Organisation of Islamic Conference 
(OIC). From 1991, Indonesia was directly involved in the peace process, when the 
OIC appointed Indonesia as a member of the Ministerial Committee of Six of the 
OIC, which was overseeing the Moro problem. Between 1993 and 1996, 
Indonesia arranged a number of meetings between the Government of the 
Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF) that culminated in the signing of a peace agreement in Manila on 2 
September 1996. Some of the meetings that Indonesia facilitated were informal 
while others were formal negotiations, with the boundary between the formal and 
informal formats overlapping at times as Indonesia used the two formats in 
tandem. 
The intention of this chapter is to analyse the informal diplomatic approach of 
Indonesia, the so-called facilitation function,2 in dealing with the separatist 
problem in the southernpart of the Philippines, and seeing the approach as an 
integral part of Indonesia's diplomatic efforts overall. This chapter will describe 
and analyse the aspects of what constitutes informal diplomacy in the context of 
the Moro problem, why informal diplomacy was required, and how Indonesia 
exercised informal diplomacy. 
The main argument of this chapter is that Indonesia was able to play a critical role 
in the peace process because first, the OIC provided Indonesia with the kind of 
mandate to act on its behalf and secondly, both the GRP and the MNLF accepted 
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Indonesia's role. Initially, Indonesia designed informal diplomacy to assess the 
level of acceptance of the conflicting parties toward its role and to identify 
subjects for discussions during the subsequent meetings. As the meetings 
progressed, Indonesia used the informal approach to help overcome some of the 
obstacles that arose during the peace negotiations. The most pervasive obstacle 
was the low level of trust among the parties to the conflict. The diplomatic 
initiatives had substantial support from bureaucrats within and outside the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and all the activities were co-ordinated by the 
Ministry. 
The chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section provides a 
background to the separatist problem in the southeinpart of the Philippines and 
identifies the parties involved. The second section analyses the Indonesian peace 
initiative to understand the internal dynamics within the Indonesian team; to 
observe the implementation of the informal diplomacy, that is, the techniques 
adopted and the strategy developed, and to observe the outcomes of the peace 
initiative. 
V.2. The background of the separatist problem in the southernpart of the 
Philippines 
In brief, separatism in the southernpart of the Philippines stemmed from the 
Moro's frustration following decades of oppression under the Spaniards and the 
Americans, and a sense of being neglected by successive Philippines 
Governments. In 1968, the Moro declared their independence from the Republic 
of the Philippines and a year later, they established the MNLF as their military 
force. Libya and Saudi Arabia had brought the Moro problem to the attention of 
the OIC during the Third Ministerial Conference in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 
March 1972. From 1972 onward, Libya and Saudi Arabia had always tabled the 
Moro problem in the OIC's agenda and at successive conferences these two 
countries attempted to find a settlement for the Moro problem. 
The term Moro was first introduced by the Spaniards to refer to the Muslim 
inhabitants living around Manila Bay in the 16th Century who had fought them 
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during the colonisation period. Their stronghold was around the southwestern 
shores of the Philippines.3 The earlier Muslim communities in Sulu and,Mindanao 
areas were formed during the 14th Century and within the period of two centuries, 
they had established a sultanate system which had close ties with the sultanate of 
Brunei in Borneo and Ternate in Sulawesi (Celebes).4 According to Rajaretnam, 
when the Spaniards arrived in the 16th Century, a distinct social and political 
organisation based on Isl~mic principles had existed in the southern Philippines.s 
The efforts by the Spanish over many years to control the whole Philippines 
archipelago were not completely successful because they never controlled the 
Luzon area in the southern Philippines.6 
The Americans, who succeeded the Spanish, gave the southern part area of the 
Philippines provincial status. The Americans encouraged Filipinos from the North 
to emigrate to the South, which changed the demographic balance between the 
North and the South as well as the religious composition. Between 1914 and 
1921, the American administration of the Moro Province embarked on a new 
. 
policy of 'Filipinization' which gave Filipinos a greater share in the 
administration of the province. Those who assumed control were mostly from the 
North, educated in Spanish and American institutions, and the majority of them 
were practising Christians.7 The two American policies of encouraging emigration 
and shifting administrative control to Filipinos from the North further ingrained 
the hostility of the Moro people towards foreigners and migrants.8 Successive 
Philippines governments had to deal with hostility which, in 1968, was manifested 
in a demand for independence in the Mindanao and Sulu areas. Fighting was 
localised at first between the C~ristian Filipinos and Muslim Filipinos of Moro 
origin. Then, the central government became involved with the main objective 
being to fight the separatist's demands. However, their 'heavy handed' approach 
in dealing with the rebellion gave the OIC and some of its members a reason to 
support the Moro people. 
Internationalisation of the conflict took place in the early 1970s. In 1971, Libya, 
Malaysia and Kuwait requested the United Nations to intervene. In the following 
year, during their meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, the OIC For~ign Ministers 
discussed the Moro problem for the first time. Some OIC members, deliberately 
182 
or discreetly, supported the MNLF struggle. The Libyan leader, Muammar 
Khaddafi and the Chief Minister of Sabah, Malaysia, Tun Mustapha, gave 
armaments and sanctuary in Sabah. Saudi Arabia also threatened to cut its oil 
supply to the Philippines unless the GRP reversed its policy towards the Moro 
people and showed more leniency towards the MNLF.9 The OIC pre~sures, 
coupled with a concern over oil supplies, forced the GRP to come to Tripoli in 
1976 to a meeting with the MNLF. 
The Tripoli Agreement of 1976 (signed by Deputy Defense Minister Carmelo 
Barbero on behalf of the GRP and Mr. Nur Misuari - the Chairman of the MNLF) 
called for the immediate cessation of all hostilities and stipulated several 
provisions. 10 One provision demands the GRP to give the Moro autonomy over 
thirteen provinces and Article 16 of the Agreement stated that "[t]he Government 
of the Philippines shall take all necessary constitutional processes for the 
implementation of the entire agreement."11 However, after Tripoli, the MNLF 
demanded the 13 provinces be accredited with the status of autonomous region, 
automatically without condition, whereas the GRP insisted that such a status could 
only be accorded after a referendum. The GRP justified their position based on 
Article 16 of the Agreement. Thus the agreement reached in Tripoli was far from 
conclusive and was open to different interpretations between the protagonists. 
These differing interpretations became a bone of contention between the two 
parties. 
At the same time, a rift within the ranks of the MNLF surfaced, between those 
who supported and rejected the proposals for autonomy. Those who rejected the 
proposals formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) under Hashim 
Salamat, and the Moro National Liberation Front Reform under Dimas Pundato. 
Both groups accused Misuari of betraying the Moro people through accepting 
autonomy and not insisting on independence. This sense of insecurity forced Mr. 
Misuari to seek sanctuary in Saudi Arabia. 12 Although this rift had weakened the 
MNLF internally, the international stature of the MNLF and of Mr. Misuari 
remained intact because the OIC maintained a position of recognising only the 
MNLF and its Chairman as the representative of the Moro people. 
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Internal rupture within the MNLF and extensive lobbies to Arab and Islamic 
countries by the Marcos led-Government gave the government until the mid-
l 980s with no sense of urgency to resolve the problem. New impetus for change 
in the GRP' s policy toward the problem took place during President Corazon 
Aquino's administration which came to power in 1986. President Aquino made a 
number of bold initiatives, including her visit to the MNLF stronghold in Sulu. 
Her move, for a while, ~aised hopes for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. 
However, her decision to proceed with the referendum in November 1989 about 
establishing an autonomous region (Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao -
ARMM) - despite strong opposition from the MNLF - weakened her credibility in 
the eyes of the MNLF. The MNLF was also disappointed that the ARMM's 
proposal had split the resistance movement further, between the hard-liners who 
did not want to recognise the ARMM and the moderates who were willing to join 
the ARMM. The split within the MNLF further weakened the resistance 
movement, which following the Tripoli Agreement had already divided into three 
groups. 
Internationally, President Aquino also followed President Marcos's strategy of 
lobbying the Arab and Islamic countries. However, she went further by 
approaching Indonesia and requested assistance to help resolve the Moro problem. 
In May 1987, President Aquino sent Ambassador Emmanuel Palaez to seek the 
possibility of Indonesia: (1) urging the MNLF to look for ways in settling the 
conflict peacefully, but under the terms and conditions of the GRP; (2) persuading 
the MNLF to look on the issue within the overall context of Filipino Muslims, and 
therefore not to further antagonise the Muslim and non-Muslim; and (3) 
supporting the Philippines' position in the OIC. Indonesia did contact the MNLF 
in Kuala Lumpur, in June 1987, but under the guidance of former President 
Soeharto the mission was limited to listening to the position of the MNLF. 13 
Despite Indonesia's apparent hesitation to be involved deeply in the problem, 
Indonesia, together with Malaysia and Brunei, maintained support for the 
Philippines' position on Moro issues in the OIC. 
Hence, during her time in office, President Aquino was unsuccessful in bringing 
the MNLF to the negotiation table. The ARMM was not a solution to the problem, 
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but instead further deepened the MNLF's distrust of the GRP. The election of 
Fidel V. Ramos as the new President of the Republic of the Philippines in 1992 
brought new stimulus for peace initiatives. In his First State of the Nation address 
on 27 July 1992, President Ramos made it clear that his administration would give 
priority to the advancement of peace and reconciliation. 14 Ramos' intention was 
received favourably by Mr. Misuari who in the early 1990s was concerned about 
his decline in popularity a~ong the Moro people, after his long years of self-exile 
in Saudi Arabia. Over those years, the splinter groups had gained more popularity 
among the people. 15 Clearly, mutual interests between President Ramos and Mr. 
Misuari for change in the status quo created a favourable condition for Indonesia 
to act as a third party in the peace process. 
Indonesia's task was to help the conflicting parties find a solution to their 
problem. The task was four fold. The first was to assist the conflicting parties 
rebuild trust after long years of conflict and hostilities. The second was to 
convince the MNLF that autonomy was an end in itself and not a means to 
separate themselves from the Philippines. Thus, autonomy based on the Tripoli 
Agreement of 1976 was the final solution to the Moro problem.16 The third was to 
assist the two parties to reconcile the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, a document that 
had been understood differently by each protagonist. It was important to re-frame 
the Agreement based on the circumstances and political realities of the early 
1990s, two decades after the first conflict erupted in 1968. The last was to balance 
the various interests in the Moro problem: of the protagonists and of the 
stakeholders - the OIC and some of its members (especially Libya and Saudi 
Arabia). 
V.3. Indonesia's peace initiatives in dealing with the Moro problem 
Although the focus of this chapter is on Indonesia's peace efforts between 1993 
and 1996, it is important to examine some of the events prior to 1993 which led to 
Indonesia instigating some meetings between the parties to the conflict. Arguably, 
the years between 1991 and 1993 were the formative years for Indonesian 
diplomatic efforts and, therefore, discussion of some important events during 
these periods is essential. 17 
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3.1. The formative years (1991 to early 1993) 
As previously mentioned, Indonesia was not actively involved in the OIC efforts 
to find a solution to the Moro problem until it was appointed a member of the 
Ministerial Committee of the Six of the OIC in 1991.18 Prior to the appointment, 
Indonesia had distanced itself from the activities of the Quadripartite Ministerial 
Committee of the OIC (t~e OIC conduit for their dealing with the Philippines 
Government) to maintain the solidarity principles of ASEAN. 19 Moreover, 
Indonesia also did not want to break ASEAN's credo of non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of other ASEAN countries. However, by mid-1991, Indonesia 
had learned that the GRP had, in fact, expressed interest in having Indonesia as a 
member of the enlarged Quadripartite Ministerial Committee. 
In his letter to Minister Alatas, dated 20 July 1991, Foreign Secretary Raul 
Manglapus of the Philippines referred to the decision of the 19th Ministerial 
Meeting of the OIC in Cairo, held in August 1990, to expand the membership of 
the Quadripartite Committee from four to six, and to include Asian members. 
Secretary Manglapus stated that "the Philippines Government hopes that 
Indonesia will become a member of the expanded OIC-Quadripartite 
Committee."20 He reasoned that: 
Indonesia's membership would assure the Philippines of an 
understanding friend and ally in its efforts to resolve the Muslim 
secessionist issue within the context of Philippines laws, and 
consistent with the principles of national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. 21 
Two other ASEAN members, Malaysia and Brunei also qualified for a position on 
an enlarged committee, but there is no record of the Philippines making a similar 
request to them. Within ASEAN's tradition, the Philippines would only request 
support from Malaysia and Brunei for Indonesia's nomination at the Istanbul 
meeting. 22 Secretary Manglapus also requested a separate meeting with Minister 
Alatas to discuss the matter during the 241h ASEAN Ministerial Meeting/Post 
Ministerial Conference (AMM/PMC) held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, from 8 to 
25 July 1991.23 
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Indonesia and Bangladesh were appointed, with acclamation, as new members of 
Committee of the Six during the 201h Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 
held in Istanbul, on August 1991. Former Foreign Minister, Mr. Ali Alatas 
reasoned that the appointment was because the OIC finally realised that none of 
the members of the Quadripartite Committee, which dealt with the Moro problem, 
were from Asia. Thus, the selection of a Southeast Asian country was a pragmatic 
decision by the OIC. 24 1:here are reasons for believing that the decision also 
stemmed from the OIC's confidence in Indonesia, knowing that Indonesia was 
actively involved in the peace process in Cambodia and had no history of bilateral 
disputes with the Philippines. In contrast, Malaysia and the Philippines have a 
dispute over ownership of some islands in the Spratlys group in the South China 
Sea and they have a residual dispute over Sabah in Borneo. Brunei had no track 
record of contributing to the settlement of international's conflicts or disputes. 
At the Istanbul meeting, the Indonesian delegation received Mr. Zacariah Candao, 
the Governor of the ARMM and Mr. Nur Misuari, the leader of MNLF. The GRP 
sent Mr. Candao to Istanbul, on a so-called 'goodwill mission,' to lobby OIC 
members on behalf of the Philippines. During the meeting Mr. Candao explained 
some of the progress that had occurred following the implementation of the 
autonomy agreement. 25 In contrast, Mr. Misuari expressed his deep regret at 
President Aquino's decision to proceed with a referendum and create the ARMM, 
which deviated from the Tripoli Agreement. He emphasised that the MNLF would 
not recognise the referendum result as well as the ARMM. 26 Mr. Misuari did 
indicate his willingness to meet with the GRP and, at the same, also requested that 
Indonesia assist with the settlement of the Moro problem based on the Tripoli 
Agreement. 27 
During the ministerial meeting, the Indonesian delegation was responsible for the 
adoption of a resolution which recognised some of the measures taken by the GRP 
to resolve the Moro problem. According to Mr. Sastrohandoyo, the initiative to 
insert a 'mild phrase' that acknowledged the recent efforts of the GRP to resolve 
the problem was an Indonesian one and not at the request of the GRP.28 He 
explained that Indonesia's decision was based on the following reasons.29 First, 
over many years the OIC had always adopted 'accusatory and condemnatory' 
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resolutions toward the GRP and, being a non-member of OIC, the GRP could not 
defend itself. Secondly, Libya and Saudi Arabia's interest in the Moro problem 
had been eroding because there had been no substantial progress since 1976. They 
wanted a solution and Minister Alatas considered this d~velopment provided 
Indonesia with an opportunity to lend some assistance, if requested. 
Mr. Sastrohandoyo recal!ed that Mr. Misuari had been very upset with the 
recognition phrase in the adopted resolution and had requested a private meeting 
with Minister Alatas to complain about Indonesia's action. However, Saudi 
Arabia and Libya supported the resolution and, at the same time, requested that 
Indonesia become a member of the expanded committee, and even chair the 
committee.30 Thus, during the ministerial meeting Indonesia was successful in 
getting the OIC to recognise some positive efforts by the Philippines in the South, 
without being accused by some OIC members of subsuming the interests of the 
MNLF. Interestingly, prior to the Istanbul meeting, Indonesia did not consider its 
membership in the expanded committee as a priority.31 The possible explanations 
for the reversal of this position were twofold. First, Indonesia considered its 
membership would open an opportunity for it to assist the conflicting parties in 
resolving their problem. Secondly, Indonesia sensed sufficient support from the 
OIC's members. 
To acknowledge Indonesia's positive role, Foreign Secretary Manglapus wrote a 
letter to Minister Alatas, dated 21 August 1991, which stated: 
The Philippines delegation, which my government sent to Istanbul 
and which you so kindly received, has reported that, because of the 
firm and well-reasoned position taken by Indonesia on the issue 
affecting the Philippines, the Conference passed a resolution which 
we consider as reflecting a new appreciation of the issue by the 
members of the OIC. I wish to make mention in particular of 
dispositive paragraph no. 2 of the resolution on the question of 
Muslim in the Philippines by which the ICFM, for the first time, 
took note of the steps being taken by my government to solve the 
problem in Southern Philippines. Without doubt, the inclusion of 
such a reference to Philippines government efforts in the resolution 
is a testimony to the influence and prestige which Indonesia enjoys 
in this important international forum. 32 
Secretary Manglapus also expressed his trust that Indonesia would maintain its 
support for his country's position with regard to the Moro problem and mentioned 
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that his country would work hard for the success of the ARMM. 33 Thus, the letter 
not only reflected the GRP's appreciation of Indonesia's help, but also indicated 
their awareness of Indonesia's influence in the OIC. This trust formed the basis 
for the Philippines asking Indonesia to assist them as a third party in the Moro 
problem. The MNLF, for its part, was aware that its main patrons, Libya and 
Saudi, did not object to Indonesia's efforts to insert a statement in the resolution 
' 
taking note of the Philippines' latest policy in the South. Furthermore, the two 
countries' support for Indonesia as a member of the expanded committee meant 
that they did not regard Indonesia as an ally of the Philippines. The two countries 
were, in fact, hopeful that Indonesia could help in settling the Moro problem. 
After the Istanbul conference, the Secretary General of the OIC despatched 
Ambassador Ibrahim Saleh Bakr (Assistant Secretary General for Political, Legal 
and Muslim Minority Affairs) to the Philippines to appraise the situation in 
Mindanao, especially to assess the ARMM within the context of the Tripoli 
Agreement.34 During his visit, from 13 to 16 November 1991, Ambassador Bakr 
also met with President Aquino and Secretary Manglapus to confer on the Moro 
problem. From the visit, both the OIC and the GRP took note of their respective 
. . f 11 35 pos1t1ons as o ows. 
First, the OIC still considered the ARMM not in consonance with the Tripoli 
Agreement because it only included four provinces and did not cover all the 
southern Philippines. In contrast, the GRP was adamant that the establishment of 
the ARMM was in line with the constitutional process of the Philippines which 
the Tripoli Agreement had also agreed to consider. The GRP held a referendum 
on 17 November 1989, based on the Republic Act number 6734. 
Secondly, the GRP was prepared to engage the MNLF in a new dialogue to 
properly address the Muslim Mindanao problem and had agreed to the suggestion 
of holding a peace dialogue under the OIC's framework. However, the GRP 
insisted that the venue for such a meeting should be on Philippines' soil because 
the GRP considered the issue as its own domestic problem. Although the OIC 
proposed Saudi Arabia as the meeting's venue, the OIC reiterated that it would 
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not support any separatist movement that would risk the integrity of the 
Philippines. 
At one level, the understandings were only reiterating their basic disagreement on 
the implementation aspect of the Tripoli Agreement. At another level, the GRP 
was willing to engage the MNLF in a peace dialogue under the OIC,36 although 
the issue of the venue ~or the. meeting remained unresolved. However, they 
reached an important understanding in their recognition of the Philippines' 
territorial integrity. All these issues were the major components that functioned as 
bases for Indonesia to assume its role as a third party in the conflict. More 
importantly, Indonesia was willing to act as a third party only within the 
framework of the OIC and not on a bilateral basis. 
As noted earlier, regime change in the Philippines in 1992 brought new impetus to 
the peace initiative. In September 1992, President Ramos issued Executive Order 
No. 19 for the creation of a National Unification Commission (NUC), an ad hoc 
advisory body, with the task to "formulate and recommend, after consulting with 
concerned sectors of society, to the President a viable general amnesty and peace 
process that will lead to a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the country."37 
The NUC was given the task of conducting consultations with representatives of 
armed rebel groups, but not to negotiate on behalf of the government. 38 
From 3-4 October 1992, Congressmen Eduardo Ermita, a member of the NUC, 
and Congressmen Nur Jaafar, representing the GRP, met with Mr. Misuari, 
representing the MNLF, in Tripoli, Libya. The meeting was intended to explore 
options and to forge better understanding between the two sides. 39 The meeting 
ended on a positive tone and, in particular, Mr. Misuari remarked, "peace was not 
only possible, but achievable."40 Both parties also agreed to pursue formal talks, 
and Mr. Misuari proposed that the formal talks should focus on how to reach "an 
agreement on the modalities for the full implementation of the December 23, 1976 
Tripoli Agreement according to its letter and spirit."41 Misuari also proposed that 
the formal peace talks should be held "in a neutral venue acceptable to the parties 
concerned under the auspices of the OIC."42 For their part, the GRP's 
representatives agreed to convey Misuari' s proposals to their superiors. 
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On 23 October 1992, the NUC issued a statement praising the result of the first 
exploratory talks and suggesting that the second phase of the discussion be held in 
the Philippines. In recognition of the OIC, particularly the efforts of its two 
members, Libya and Saudi Arabia to facilitate the first meeting, the NUC 
"welcomed OIC representatives to observe the next phase of exploratory talks that 
shall hopefully ensue following Mr. Misuari's homecoming."43 Although the tone 
of the statement was positive, the message it contained was not too tactful because 
Misuari would not consider meeting on Philippines soil as a neutral venue. By 
offering the OIC only observer status, the NUC seemed to be wanting to play 
down its role, whereas the OIC and Misuari always insisted on a meeting under 
the framework of the OIC. Furthermore, the NUC also set a condition for the 
meeting to take place, that is, after Misuari had returned to the Philippines. It was 
then evident that the issues of meeting venue and the role of the OIC were two 
hurdles that required careful management before a second exploratory meeting 
could take place. 
Mr. Misuari's rejection of a second meeting in the Philippines put pressure on the 
GRP and the OIC to look for an alternative venue, and not to lose the momentum 
for peace. In December 1992 Indonesia was approached by all the parties to the 
conflict, and the concerned countries (Libya and Saudi Arabia) and the OIC to 
facilitate the Second Exploratory Meeting. During the special ministerial meeting 
of the OIC in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on 2 December 1992, the Head of the Libyan 
delegation, Ali Treiki, informed Minister Alatas about the deadlock in the planned 
meeting between the MNLF and the GRP because none of the proposed meeting 
venues were acceptable to the two parties. He asked if Indonesia could hold the 
meeting and indicated that the two conflicting parties seemed to favour Indonesia 
to other possible venues.44 Indonesia's response to the request was non-committal 
and the Minister mentioned that acceptance would be subject to a request from the 
conflicting parties themselves, particularly the GRP. A few days latter, Mr. 
Misuari contacted Indonesia and expressed his support to have Indonesia as a 
venue for his meeting with the GRP. 
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On 9 December 1992, the Philippines Secretary of Defence, General (Ret.) Renato 
de Villa and Congressmen Eduardo Ermita contacted the Indonesian Ambassador 
in Manila to convey President Ramos's message as follows:45 
1) President Ramos requested Indonesia to host an informal meeting between 
representatives of his government and the MNLF; 
2) The meeting was to follow up the Tripoli meeting of 3-5 October 1992 and 
the nature of the meet~ng would be exploratory; and 
3) Both, the GRP and the MNLF agreed to request Indonesia host the planned 
meeting. 
During his meeting with President Ramos in Malacanang Palace, Mr. Pieter 
Damanik, the former Indonesian Ambassador to Manila, was informed of the 
Philippines' intention to ask for Indonesia's help in facilitating the peace process 
with the MNLF. The President also indicated that he would ask two of his senior 
officials to discuss whether or not Indonesia could offer its good offices on the 
Moro problem.46 Mr. Damanik also mentioned that when he raised the issue with 
Minister Alatas, the Minister queried the position of the MNLF, knowing that the 
MNLF would prefer Malaysia to lndonesia.47 In the end, President Ramos's 
message assured the Minister of the determination of the conflicting parties to ask 
for Indonesia's assistance. Hence, Minister Alatas wrote President Soeharto a 
letter explaining the background of the request and also sought his approval for a 
possible role by Indonesia in facilitating the peace process.48 On 15 December 
1992 President Soeharto, through the Minister for State Secretary, Moerdiono, 
extended his approval and agreement to Minister Alatas' suggestion that a 
meeting be held in mid-January 1993.49 
3.2. The informal meeting in Cipanas Palace, 14-17 April 1993 
3.2.1. The preparations stage 
President Soeharto's approval cleared the way for Indonesia to begin preparations 
for the informal talks. Indonesia planned the meeting to take place in mid-January 
1993. To prepare for the meeting, the Ministry set up a team involving personnel 
from within and outside the Ministry. The tasks of the team were to prepare 
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administrative and protocol aspects of the planned meeting as well as the 
substantive aspects of the Moro problem. Preparation for administrative and 
protocol aspects involved bureaucrats from the Ministry, State Secretariat, 
Ministry for Information, Ministry for Telecommunication, and Intelligence 
Agencies. In terms of substantive aspects, the Ministry gave priority to personnel 
from the Ministry and set a guideline that participation of non-Ministry personnel 
on the substantive's tea~ would be possible when the peace process had 
progressed.so This means that the Ministry had not only anticipated a long 
involvement in the peace process, not limited to facilitating one meeting as 
requested by the GRP, but also noted that the substantive aspects involved were 
beyond the capacity of the Ministry's personnel alone. 
Those involved in the intra-Ministry team were from the Directorate for Asia and 
the Pacific, because the issue concerned a fellow Asian country; the Directorate 
for Africa and the Middle East, because the Moro problem had been dealt with by 
countries in these regions since 1972; and the Directorate for International 
Organisation, which monitored and engaged in annual discussion on the issue in 
the OIC. Thus, from the very beginning, the diplomat in charge of the mission, 
that is, the Director General for Political Affairs, Mr. Sastrohandoyo had to co-
ordinate activities involving bureaucrats from within and outside the Ministry. 
This task proved somewhat difficult since each of the directorates considered 
themselves more appropriate than others to handle the Moro issue. During an 
interview, Mr. Kusnadi, former Director for Asia and the Pacific, stated that he 
was under the impression that his directorate would be the main player on the 
matter and he, therefore, had set up his own team involving some officials who 
were knowledgeable about the Moro issue.st His officials were recruited into the 
Ministry team because of their knowledge on the issue, but in the later stages, Mr. 
Sastrohandoyo worked more closely with officials from the Directorate for 
International Organisation who, in his opinion, were more familiar with the OIC's 
intricacies and had extensive experience in multilateral negotiation.s2 Thus, the 
three directorates were actively engaged in the early stages of the substantive 
preparations, but as the peace process moved on, the roles played by personnel 
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from the Directorate for Asia and the Pacific and the Directorate for Africa and 
the Middle East gradually reduced. 
The possible explanation for this was the personal preferences of Mr. 
Sastrohandoyo, the Indonesian team's Chief negotiator. As the peace process 
progressed, Mr. Sastrohandoyo would need more support from diplomats who 
were exposed to internat_ional negotiations and could help him in facilitating 
discussions at the committee level. In this case, diplomats from the Directorate for 
International Organisations had relatively more experience in chairing 
international negotiations in comparison with diplomats from other directorates.53 
Moreover, their exposure to international conferences provided them with more 
insights about meeting dynamics and interpersonal relationships than those 
officials who were experts in substantive matters. 
However, the substantive aspects of the Moro problem were in fact the most 
delicate aspects that the team in the Ministry had to oversee. Upon receiving 
President Soeharto's approval, Minister Alatas asked Mr. Sastrohandoyo to look 
closely at the substantive aspects of the Moro problem based on the Tripoli 
Agreement. 54 After identifying the issues involved, the team then· compared and 
contrasted the differing positions of the conflicting parties, and tabulated what had 
been done by the GRP on the issues based on the Agreement. They finally 
categorised issues according to the levels of difficulty, that is, what issues might 
be reconciled or which it might be difficult to find a compromise at.55 It turned 
out that in assuming its responsibility as a third party in the negotiation, the 
Indonesian team and its chief negotiators followed this guideline very closely. At 
times, they had to improvise due to the complexity of the issues involved, and 
sometimes they found it difficult to keep the parties committed to agreements 
made in previous meetings.56 
The informal meeting did not take place as scheduled in mid-January 1993. In 
early January, the GRP informed the Indonesians that they could not proceed with 
the planned meeting because the media had learned about it. They did not 
consider it fruitful to meet the MNLF under the media scrutiny. However, the 
delay did not stop Indonesia from continuing its efforts to organise a meeting: 
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they provided the GRP and the MNLF with some alternative dates. The MNLF 
used the delay to demonstrate to OIC members that the Philippines was not 
serious about the peace process.57 Whether or not the MNLF claim had influenced 
the OIC, the organisation did ask Indonesia to postpone the new alternative date 
for the meeting. They argued that the alternative dates, 14-17 April 1993, were not 
suitable for some officials from the OIC to participate. They preferred that 
Indonesia arranged the m~eting after the OIC ministerial meeting, scheduled from 
24 to 29 April 1993 in Karachi. In the end, Indonesia convinced the OIC of the 
merits of proceeding with the meeting on the grounds that: (1) the conflicting 
parties had agreed with the date; 58 (2) the nature of the meeting was exploratory, 
and, therefore, it would not require participation of a large number officials from 
the OIC; and (3) as a chairman of the Committee of Six, Indonesia could act on 
behalf of the OIC.59 Indonesia's argument was well founded noting that in the first 
exploratory meeting in Tripoli in 1992, no officials from the OIC were present. 
3.2.2. The Cipanas informal meeting, 14-17 April 1993 
The informal meeting between the GRP and the MNLF was held from 14 to 17 
April 1993 in the Cipanas Presidential Palace. Although the meeting was a 
continuation of the exploratory talks held a year earlier in Tripoli, the informality 
of the meeting had a special meaning for Indonesia. According to former Foreign 
Minister, Ali Alatas, it was very important for Indonesia: (1) to assess, whether or 
not the conflicting parties really wanted to negotiate, and (2) to measure their 
level of acceptance of Indonesia as the third party.60 Indonesia, as previously 
suggested, had anticipated a possible long-term involvement in the peace process 
and it was, therefore, important to clear any remaining doubts. The informal 
format would give Indonesia a better opportunity to explore the two issues. Mr. 
Alatas also argued that informal diplomacy was not replacing formal diplomacy, 
but was necessary given the nature of the problem.61 Thus, the informal 
diplomacy was a pragmatic approach on the part of the Indonesian diplomatic 
community. 
Indonesia organised the informal meeting somewhat differently to the experience 
in Libya. First, the venue for the meeting was considered important. The Cipanas 
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Palace was conducive for such a meeting because it is serene, and also dignified.62 
During the Tripoli meeting, the venue had been the office of the Libyan Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Presumably, the Philippines delegation would not feel at ease 
meeting with the MNLF in the office of a country which favoured the Philippines' 
opponents. Secondly, to make the meeting more meaningful for the conflicting 
parties and also to testify the seriousness of Indonesia, Minister Alatas himself 
opened the meeting. In ~ontrast, officials at the level of Under-secretary had 
opened the meeting in Tripoli, and officials at the director level witnessed the 
consultation itself, whereas in Indonesia, the Director General for Political Affairs 
was present during the meeting. This scenario was in line with the document 
entitled 'Planned of activities for the meeting between the GRP and the MNLF' 
which was prepared by the Ministry as a guideline in carrying out its task as 
facilitator.63 By opening the meeting himself and assigning a high level official to 
assist the dialogue, Minister Alatas was, in effect, expecting the conflicting parties 
to engage in meaningful discussion. 
In his welcoming remarks, Minister Alatas stated that Indonesia welcomed the 
request to facilitate the meeting because of its natural interest in being the closest 
neighbour, and also its moral responsibility based on the Country's Constitution.64 
The Minister also stated that Indonesia over the past few years had been involved 
in various peace efforts and the practice of preventive diplomacy.65 He further 
stated that Indonesia had experienced similar problems of internal dissension and 
conflict. Based on these experiences, he then outlined the possible steps that the 
conflicting parties might want to consider during their discussion. He made it 
clear that Indonesia did not want to intrude into the substances of the talks.66 His 
message was as follows: 67 
... based on our experience in dealing with certain regional and 
international issues it would be useful for both sides to consider, at 
a first step, agreeing on certain measures that will create the 
necessary and conducive atmosphere of mutual confidence that 
could help ensure the success of further substantive talks. For 
instance you may wish to consider agreeing on a cessation of 
armed hostilities and other appropriate measures. 
The aims of the four day meeting were twofold, first to discuss the contentious 
issues, and secondly to improve relations among the parties to the conflict.68 After 
Minister Alatas had delivered his remarks and speeches were heard from Mr. 
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Ibrahim Bakr, on behalf of the Secretary General of the OIC, the Congressmen 
Eduardo Ermita representing the Philippines Government, and Mr. Misuari of the 
MNLF, the meeting was then adjourned for a welcoming dinner hosted by 
Minister Alatas. The dinner was very informal and was designed to give an 
opportunity for the hosts to meet with representatives of the conflicting parties 
and the OIC. The dinner also functioned as an 'ice-breaker' for the parties to the 
conflict. Indonesia was ~oping that the peace efforts would benefit from an 
improved relationship. 
Despite the fact that the social dinner had been pre-arranged, the program itself 
became more essential because of some statements made by participants on the 
first day were far from conciliatory. For instance, Mr. Ibrahim Bakr who read the 
speech of Dr. Hamid Algabid (the OIC Secretary General), on the one hand 
reiterated that "the problem of the Muslim of Southern Philippines could best be 
resolved by sincere and constructive negotiations between the parties within the 
framework of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of 
Philippines."69 On the other hand, he also stated that the OIC maintained its 
position on the importance of "full realization of the objective, purpose and 
commitment embodied in the Tripoli Agreement of 23 December 1976."70 He had 
also indicated that "the [Moro] problem has been a source of anxiety and concern 
to the OIC Member States."71 Thus, he was suggesting to the Philippines that 
although the OIC supported the integrity of the Philippines, it wished to have the 
problem resolved based on the Tripoli Agreement, so that the issue would no 
longer be of concern to the OIC's members. Mr. Misuari made a harsh statement 
and condemned the various administrations in the Philippines as dishonest and not 
willing to implement the Agreement in letter and spirit. For his part, Congressmen 
Ermita made a plain statement. He explained about President Ramos's policy of 
national reconciliation based on the principle of peaceful resolution of armed 
conflict. He also explained that his mandate during the informal talks was to 
explore possible frameworks for peace with the MNLF and not to negotiate on 
positions.72 
The informal and exploratory nature of the meeting meant that there was no 
concrete agenda. The main objective was to let the parties themselves discuss 
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topics and move at a pace which they felt comfortable with.73 However, all the 
participants in the undertaking were well aware that the most contentious issue 
was the disagreement about the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement. Mr. 
Misuari raised this issue during his opening remarks on the first day and again 
reiterated the matter when he met with representatives of the GRP on the second 
day. Mr. Misuari maintained that the GRP did not respect the Tripoli Agreement 
and that the referendum. was a unilateral action which was boycotted by the 
resistance movement. However, the tone of Mr. Misuari' s statement in the second 
day was not as harsh as on the first day. He also made a positive gesture when he 
said, "I would like to assure you that if the Philippines Government in the same 
spirit that they came here with the honest and sincere attention, the MNLF is 
ready to reciprocate their intention."74 
In the second day of the talks, Congressmen Ermita explained the Philippines 
Government position on the matter of the referendum was based on the 
constitution of his country.75 Thus, on the issue of implementation of the Tripoli 
Agreement the two parties were maintaining their basic positions. However, 
parties to the conflict did agree to move into formal negotiation to discuss the 
Agreement, especially aspects of its implementation. They agreed to discuss 
during the formal meeting aspects of the Tripoli Agreement as follows:76 
1) Those portions of the Agreement left for further (or later) discussion; and 
2) Transitional arrangements implementing a structure and mechanism, that is, 
of the provisional government to supervise the autonomous region. 
The meeting also agreed on three conditions for further meetings. The first 
condition was that a formal meeting should be held with the participation of the 
Secretary General of the OIC and the OIC Ministerial Committee of Six. The 
second condition was that the meeting should be supported by a Joint Secretariat 
to be appointed by both parties. And the third condition was that both parties 
should approve all press releases in relation to the peace talks.77 No agreement 
was reached on the venue for the formal meeting between the two parties. The 
Philippines wanted to have such a meeting in its territory, due to the 'domestic 
nature' of the issue, whereas the MNLF insisted on having such meeting in an 
198 
OIC member country. On this issue of venue, it turned out that Indonesia was 
favoured over other alternative venues. 
3.2.3. Reactions and assessments of the Cipanas informal meeting 
Despite its previous opposition to media releases of its meeting with the MNLF, 
the GRP on 14 April 1993_, released a statement about the activities taking place in 
Indonesia. The reason for such action was unclear because secrecy was one of the 
conditions that the GRP had always emphasised during their consultation with 
Indonesia as meeting facilitator. Arguably, the media release was prompted by the 
GRP's awareness that some of the local media were already aware of the meeting. 
Therefore, the release can be explained for the following reasons. 
First, the GRP wanted to clarify media speculation that they were engaged in 
formal negotiation with the MNLF in Jakarta. On 14 April 1993, the Philippines 
Daily Inquirer wrote an article, based on information from 'unidentified sources', 
that the government was holding a meeting with the MNLF in Jakarta. The Daily 
also mentioned that its 'sources' could not verify whether the meeting was 
informal talks or formal negotiation.78 Secondly, the GRP wished to pre-empt 
possible public and opposition outcry that the government were meeting with a 
separatist group outside the Philippines. Hence, rather than responding to criticism 
at a later stage, it would be better for the government to justify their action at an 
earlier stage. Indeed, in the release, President Ramos mentioned that he concurred 
with the idea of holding exploratory talks in Indonesia based on "the concept of a 
shifting venue, which stipulates that the first stage [of the meeting] shall be held 
in a neighbouring venue outside the country."79 The shifting venue concept was a 
means for justifying the government's decision to meet with the MNLF overseas. 
In fact, in Cipanas, the MNLF had expressed reservations to the Philippines' 
proposal for holding any subsequent meetings in the Philippines. 
Thirdly, the GRP wished to make the public aware that the peace dialogue with 
the MNLF was back on track. Knowing that the Ramos Administration placed 
national reconciliation as one of its priorities, an indication of progress in peace 
talks with the MNLF could help promote President Ramos's image and public 
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confidence. President Ramos made it clear that the economic development 
program could only take place if national security had been established.so Lastly, 
by showing its determination for the talks, the GRP also wanted to impress the 
rogue elements in the Moro groups that their threat to create disturbances in 
Mindanao, in April, had failed to derail the peace dialogue.81 
This release made the Ind?nesian journalists aware of the meeting and they began 
searching for news from officials at the Ministry. Leaming from their experiences 
in dealing with the media during the hosting of the Jakarta Informal Meeting 
(JIM), 82 Indonesia waited until the conflicting parties had finished their talks 
before arranging media interviews in the Foreign Ministry building. During the 
press conference, Mr. Misuari expressed his optimism and stated that peace was 
within reach. Congressmen Ermita also shared this optimism. For his part, 
Minister Alatas reiterated that Indonesia was hosting the meeting at the request of 
the parties to the conflict and that the meeting was being held under the OIC's 
framework. 83 Again, the Minister clearly wanted to emphasise that Indonesia was 
not interfering in the internal affairs of its neighbour, and that the involvement 
stemmed from the parties' acceptability of Indonesia acting as a third party in the 
peace process. 
In reporting the outcomes of the informal meeting to President Soeharto, Minister 
Alatas mentioned that the conflicting parties, especially the MNLF, were still 
reluctant to accept his suggestion of observing a ceasefire as a confidence building 
measure.84 He admitted that the positions of the two parties were difficult to 
reconcile and, therefore, Indonesia offered the parties its long-term commitment 
to facilitate the peace process. However, he considered the informal meeting a 
success because the parties to the conflict had agreed to launch formal peace 
negotiations. The projected meetings would be held on or before 30 June 1993, 
and the agenda for discussion would focus on modalities to fully implement the 
Tripoli Agreement. With such outcomes, the meeting had ended on a positive 
note. He concluded his letter by saying that the achievements had a positive 
impact on Indonesia's profile among the OIC members, on its bilateral relations 
with the Philippines and with the Muslim community in the Philippines.85 
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President Ramos' response to the outcomes of the Cipanas meeting was positive. 
He agreed that the talks in Indonesia had bolstered chances for peace and he was 
prepared to meet with the MNLF's leader in the Philippines to discuss a peaceful 
settlement of the conflict.86 Congressmen Ermita wrote Minister Alatas a letter 
' 
thanking him on behalf ·of the President Ramos for Indonesia's assistance. The 
Congressmen also extended his thanks to President Soeharto for offering the 
Cipanas Palace as a venu~ for the meeting and said that he believed the positive 
outcomes of the talks were influenced by two aspects, that is, a conducive venue 
for dialogues and the assistance provided by the Indonesian staff. 87 In his letter, 
Congressmen Ermita also expressed his hope that Indonesia would continue its 
goodwill towards his government and the people of the Philippines.88 The 
Philippines Ambassador to Jakarta, Ambassador Oscar Velenzuela, also shared a 
similar view on the positive impact of the meeting's venue to the talks. He stated 
"the venue of the talks certainly contributed to the positive and constructive 
outcome of the talks."89 
Giving credit to a venue per se for the positive outcomes of the talks is not 
enough. A venue also implies the notion of a neutral meeting place wherein 
conflicting parties can meet their opponents on an equal footing. In conflict 
resolution, a venue is also an important component of the peace process.90 The 
third party is expected to provide a conducive meeting venue that can stimulate an 
open and frank dialogue among the participants.91 The arrangements also played 
an important role during the talks as all the participants stayed in the Palace and 
were encouraged to interact during the social functions, such as during the dinner 
hosted by Minister Alatas.92 The social functions were a means of smoothing 
interaction among the parties to the conflict, whose history of interaction was 
marked by suspicion and mutual hatred.93 
The informal format also had given the participants the opportunity to come to the 
meeting only to explore options.94 The notion of exploring options, in this case, 
was very much open for interpretation. As previously stated, the Philippines 
wanted "to explore the viable framework for peace with the MNLF and the 
agenda for projected formal negotiations."95 In contrast, the MNLF did not 
indicate which aspects they intended to explore. The speech by Misuari and the 
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subsequent statements he gave mainly elaborated his historical perspective of the 
conflict and his distrust of the GRP during the previous negotiations. In the 
context of conflict resolution enabling the parties to the conflict to express 
grievances and animosities is an important phase of the process. As a third party, 
Indonesia did not prevent Misuari from making such a statement because 
Indonesia regarded openness as an important ingredient for good negotiation.96 
However, as a seasoned ~olitician and a Professor of Political Science himself, 
Mr. Misuari would have wanted to test how the representatives from the GRP 
would react to his statements and accusations. If the reaction from the Philippines 
representatives was also negative, he would have reason to show to the OIC 
representative that the Philippines was not ready for an open and honest dialogue. 
Apparently, the panel delegation from the Philippines was not provoked as they 
did not make a strong statement during the talks. 
In Cipanas, the MNLF would have also wanted to assess the seriousness of the 
GRP for the peace dialogue. Indeed, the Philippines determination was reflected 
in their willingness to come to Indonesia after the MNLF had rejected the GRP's 
proposal to hold the talks in the Philippines. Their agreement to elevate the 
dialogue process into a more formal negotiation was indeed a breakthrough from 
the informal talks. Even Indonesia as the host had not been optimistic of achieving 
this. In fact, Foreign Minster Alatas had anticipated another series of informal 
talks before the conflicting parties could move into a formal negotiation. 97 
3.3. The formal peace talks (1993-1996): informal diplomacy at work 
The series of formal meetings after Cipanas did not render the informal format 
obsolete. Between 1993 and 1996 the peace process took the form of formal 
negotiations at the level of leaders, consultations at the level of senior officials 
and, at some points, seminars to disseminate information to the public. According 
to Dr. Wirajuda, after Cipanas, formal and informal diplomacy were inseparable, 
as both were used in tandem.98 In this case, Dr. Wirajuda was referring to informal 
diplomacy as a negotiation technique to reach an agreement on issues unresolved 
in a formal negotiation setting. Thus, the informal diplomacy did not substitute 
formal diplomacy. 
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As a concept, informal diplomacy during the formal talks was understood in a 
number of ways. Informal diplomacy was interpreted as diplomati~ activities 
behind the scenes, to achieve certain objectives and it relied on good networking. 
Further, informal diplomacy was understood as a diplomatic technique to resolve 
conflict and also as a process to improve relationships. Informal diplomacy was 
also simply a negotiation technique. 
Between 1993 and 1996, the Ministry was preoccupied with the peace process. 
During these years, the aspect of continuity of involvement and familiarity with 
the issues involved were the two most significant aspects of Indonesian diplomacy 
in helping to settle the separatist conflict. To maintain continuity in the Indonesian 
team, Minster Alatas kept the Ministry team intact, in particular the Chief 
facilitators, Mr. Sastrohandoyo99 and Dr. Wirajuda. The Directorate responsible 
for the substantive and administrative aspects of the peace process was the 
Directorate for International Organisations under Dr. Wirajuda. Although the 
composition of the supporting units in this Directorate changed over the period, 
there was always continuity because new personnel were well briefed on the Moro 
problem. These individuals followed the development of the peace process closely 
and acted as a focal point between the Ministry and the national team as well as 
with the Indonesia Embassies in Manila and Jeddah. Individuals could approach 
experts from other Ministries to join the national team based on their expertise on 
some of the issues involved in the Moro problem. Assigning some individuals to 
monitor the issue on a day-to-day basis was an important aspect of the overall 
peace process because of the complex nature of the problem itself and also the 
three years time span of the peace talks. 
In terms of familiarity with the issue, both the members of the Ministry team and 
those who served in the Indonesian Embassy in Manila were well acquainted with 
the Moro problem. For instance, the two Indonesian Ambassadors to Manila who 
dealt with the issue during their tenures had followed the Moro problem quite 
closely. Ambassador Pieter Damanik when serving in the Indonesian Intelligence 
Bureau, prior to his assignment to the Indonesian Foreign Ministry as Director 
General for Social and Cultural Affairs and then as Ambassador to Manila, was 
assigned to monitor the Moro problem. 100 Ambassador Abu Hartono who 
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succeeded Ambassador Damanik was the Deputy Chairmen of the First 
Commission in the Parliament overseeing Foreign Relations. IOI Ambassador 
Hartono served in the Commission as a representative of the Indonesian military 
faction. Needless to say, their previous knowledge coupled with their networking 
with the Philippine military officials during active duty in the Indonesian military 
had given them direct access to the Chief Executive and high ranking officials in 
the GRP. Similarly, all t~e Heads of Political Sections in the Embassy had also 
once served in the Asia and the Pacific Directorate of the Ministry. 
3.3.1. The first formal peace talks in Jakarta, 25 October to 7 November 
1993: setting the direction 
The first formal peace talks did not take place on the schedule agreed to in 
Cipanas, that is, in June 1993. Again, the delay was caused by the MNLF's refusal 
to come to the Philippines for the formal talks and the stakeholders (the OIC, the 
MNLF and the GRP) had to confer again on the most acceptable venue for the 
meeting. The ensuing discussions illustrated the sensitivity of the meeting's venue 
for the conflicting parties. On 18 April 1993, Congressmen Ermita stated that the 
GRP agreed to the involvement of the OIC in the formal peace dialogue with the 
MNLF because the OIC had taken part in the Tripoli negotiation in 1976. He also 
stated that the OIC's involvement did not mean an internationalisation of the 
Moro problem. To affirm the position of the GRP that the issue was domestic, 
Congressmen Ermita emphasised the government's position to have the first 
formal meeting in its territory. 102 President Ramos affirmed this position during 
his speech in Maguindanao Province in 19 April 1993.103 In response to media 
speculation that the venue for the first formal talks would be in Indonesia, Mr. 
Jesus Sison, the Secretary of Information of the GRP, on 20 May 1993, reiterated 
that first formal talks must be held in the Philippines. The following day Haydee 
Y orac, the Chairperson of NUC stated that President Ramos had agreed to let Mr. 
Misuari select any city in Mindanao Province for the venue. 104 
Arguably, by then the GRP had learned about Mr. Misuari's reluctance to come to 
the Philippines and preferred Indonesia instead as the venue of the first formal 
talks. Mr. Misuari was concerned about his safety if he came to the Philippines for 
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the meting, even in the MNLF stronghold in Mindanao. 105 On 25 May 1993, Rep. 
Macabangkit Lant,106 Chairman of the Muslim Affairs in the Philippines' 
Parliament softened the Philippines position and proposed two options for the 
meeting's venue. The meeting could be held at any Philippines' Embassy in one 
of the ASEAN countries or, an opening ceremony could be held in the Philippines 
and the formal talks take place at another venue agreed to by the two parties.107 
The GRP asked Indonesi~ to support the latter proposal, but by mid-June the OIC 
had requested Indonesia to facilitate the formal talks in Indonesia. 108 By mid-June, 
the OIC and the GRP had agreed to postpone the talks. The OIC argued that in 
June 1993, the OIC would be busy preparing for the OIC Summit in Cairo. The 
later date of 25 October 1993 was decided after consultation with Indonesia as the 
host and the meeting facilitator, which meant chairing the meeting. 
The preparatory meeting of the Indonesian team was concerned with substantive 
issues and logistics. On the substantive parts, the Ministry team discussed possible 
scenarios for the meeting's proceedings and their focus of interest was on how to 
direct the discussion based on the Tripoli Agreement of 1976.109 Knowing that the 
Jakarta meeting was the first large-scale formal talks between the two parties 
since 1976, Indonesia was concerned with creating a momentum for dialogue. 
They anticipated a tense atmosphere during the meeting because both parties had 
a history of hostility and had stereotypical opinions of each other. The 
Indonesians also had no knowledge of the MNLF familiarity with negotiation 
settings. It can be argued that the ten days allocated for the meeting was 
intentional, to let the parties discuss the issues exhaustively. 
Minister Alatas officially opened the meeting on 25 October 1993. In his opening 
remarks the Minister expressed his hope that the meeting could create a 
momentum for peace. He also set the direction for the discussion when he pointed 
to the agreement reached in Cipanas in April 1993, in which the parties agreed to 
base their discussion on the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. He also appealed to the 
parties to cease their armed conflicts to indicate good faith in the peace 
dialogue. 110 In somewhat similar tone, the OIC Secretary General, Dr. Hamid Al-
Gabid, also asked the parties to the conflict to concentrate on the formulation of 
modalities to implement the Tripoli Agreement. 111 Mr. Misuari also shared Mr. 
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Al-Gabid's proposal, whereas Ambassador Manuel Yan of the Philippines 
emphasised the importance of observing the territorial integrity of the Philippines 
based on the principle of a single constitution. 112 
The first session of the talks was held on 26 October and successive discussions 
were held until 7 November. Mr. Sastrohandoyo chaired all the meetings. During 
the first session, the parti~s to the conflict debated the agenda for the discussion, 
although both parties agreed to refer to the Cipanas Agreement which stipulated 
the focus of their discussion. The participants wished to proceed with the talks 
from differing standpoints. The MNLF preferred to use the meeting opportunity 
for the establishment of a Mixed Committee, an organ recognised in Tripoli 1976, 
"to study in detail the points left for discussion [after the Tripoli Agreement being 
adopted]."113 By stating that position, Mr. Misuari maintained that the Tripoli 
Agreement was final and the two parties were obliged to implement the agreement 
as it is, such as by granting the Moro people autonomy over 13 provinces with no 
requirement to follow the referendum process. The Philippines was adamant that 
their mandate was only to hold talks on how to implement the Agreement under 
the Philippines Constitution.114 To break the stalemate, Mr. Sastrohandoyo 
suggested the establishment of a Joint Secretariat to detail and categorise the 
meeting's agenda. 115 
Dr. Wirajuda chaired the meeting of the Joint Secretariat. During the discussion, 
the Joint Secretariat agreed to propose eight agenda items based on the Tripoli 
Agreement for discussion at the meeting. The chosen eight items were the least 
difficult items to deal with and most importantly they were "strictly derived from the 
Tripoli Agreement."116 The eight items were: 117 
1. National Defense (para 3, sub-para 2 in Tripoli Agreement) 
2. Education (para 3, sub-para 4) 
3. Administrative system (para 3, sub-para 5) 
4. Economic and financial system (para 3, sub-para 6) 
5. Regional security force (paragraph 3, sub-para 8) 
6. Representation in National Government 
7. Legislative Assembly and Executive Council (paragraph 3, sub-para 9) 
8. Mines and minerals (paragraph 3, sub-para 10) 
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During the plenary meeting's discussion, the participants also agreed that item 
seven should be separated, and that one more item should be added, namely 
Sharia Law. Having agreed with the items, the meeting also agreed to cluster the 
topics and created five support committees, involving experts on the individual 
topics, to examine the issues in depth. 118 The other major achievements of the 
talks were their agreement to observe a ceasefire, to establish an 'Ad-hoc Working 
Group on the Setting ~p of the Transitional Implementing Structure and 
Mechanism', and to reactivate the Mixed Committee in accordance with Article 
III, paragraph 11 of the Tripoli Agreement. 119 As previously indicated, the 
establishment of the Mixed Committee was the most delicate subject during the 
meeting, and even the Philippines Delegation had to contact Manila to ask for 
approval from President Marcos. In reality the Mixed Committee of 1993 was not 
similar to the Mixed Committee of Tripoli 1976 because the tasks for studying in 
detail all aspects agreed in Tripoli was shifted to the support committee. The 
Mixed Committee's function was to approve or disapprove the consensus reached 
at the support committee's level. The Formal Talks was the highest negotiating 
level to make a final agreement on what had been approved during the Mixed 
Committee meetings and to discuss the remaining unresolved issues. The 
agreements set the direction for the subsequent peace talks. 
The three layers of negotiation adopted by Indonesia were both strategic and 
practical. 12° Clearly, the intention was to let the experts or officials from the two 
parties discuss the issues under the cluster exhaustively among themselves, and 
Indonesia chaired the discussion on behalf of the OIC. The technicality of some 
issues indeed required in-depth study, and they needed to consult experts from 
other countries on some of the issues, for example on how to set up an Islamic 
banking system. The essence of this approach was to give the parties to the 
conflict more opportunities to meet one another and, hopefully, they could better 
understand each other and improve their relationship. This approach also 
guaranteed more results, albeit slowly. As had been anticipated, in the 
consultation processes they were able to reach consensus faster on less 
contentious' issues. Psychologically, by having some consensus, the two parties 
could see progress from their efforts and would feel that they were on the right 
track.1 21 Consequently, the momentum for peace was maintained. In theory, the 
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Mixed Committee was to seal the agreements that had been reached by the 
support committees and to negotiate on points of no-consensus. If the Mixed 
Committee still had difficulty in reaching a consensus, the issues would be left for 
the leaders at the Formal Talks. 
The informal diplomacy, in the case of the first peace talks, was concerned more 
with form than with sub~tance. In between meeting sessions and during social 
events, the Indonesians encouraged the participants to mingle and interact. During 
the coffee break or afternoon tea, Minister Alatas joined the social functions. As 
part of the scenario, the Indonesian Secretariat arranged that the Minister would 
sit with the head of the delegations to socialise and to clinch agreements, usually 
on issues unresolved during the plenary meetings. The .Indonesian team had 
always updated the Minister on developments from session to session, and they 
also provided their assessment on issues requiring the Minister's attention. 
Minister Alatas would touch on those issues during his informal talks with the 
leaders, and he put his persuasion and negotiation skills to work. The efforts were 
not always accompanied with success, but it helped the parties in their process of 
improving relationships. In particular, it helped Minister Alatas know better the 
personality of Mr. Misuari, the key player from the MNLF and the Moro people. 
Participants to the first formal talks returned home with a sense of satisfaction that 
each of them had achieved the most from the meeting. Mr. Misuari suggested that 
the decision to reinstate a Mixed Committee was the single most important 
achievement of the talks. 122 The GRP peace panel was satisfied that the MNLF 
had agreed to use the Organic Act, which created the four provinces Autonomous 
Region in Mindanao as the framework of reference during the talks. 123 The 
conflicting parties wished to convince their constituents that they had reached 
their objectives, or at least had achieved common understanding on the positions 
of their opponents. For its part, the OIC expressed its satisfaction that, in the 
aftermath of the formal talks, a "climate of mutual confidence is now prevailing 
N · l L'b t' F t " 124 between the Philippines Government and the Moro at1ona 1 era ion ron, 
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3.3.2. Peace talks in 1994: flurries of diplomatic activities 
Although they returned home with positive impressions, there were still a number 
of issues undecided during the first formal talks, and the Indonesian Embassy in 
Manila was left with responsibility for providing clarification. For instance, the 
MNLF maintained that representatives of the Committee of Six of the OIC should 
be present in any meet~ng involving the two parties, including the support 
committee meetings. The GRP hesitated, at first, to have the OIC's participation 
in all meetings in the Philippines. The MNLF was under the impression that the 
function of the support committee was only to exchange views, whereas the GRP 
wanted to use the forum for negotiating a position. In this case, the Indonesian 
diplomats in Manila had to act as a 'messenger' to convey positions and, at times, 
to provide opinion on behalf of the OIC. 
The first informal meeting after Jakarta was held after the MNLF's delegation had 
visited the Indonesian Embassy, on 15 November 1993, and requested the 
presence of OIC representatives during their meetings with the GRP. Although he 
had not yet received any direction or mandate from Jakarta on the matter, 
Ambassador Damanik relayed the message to the GRP, stressing the MNLF's 
preferences. After securing the Philippines' agreement, the meeting could proceed 
and was witnessed by the Indonesian and the Libyan Ambassadors. 125 The first 
informal meeting, on 17 November, and the subsequent one, on 23 November 
were held mainly to provide common ground on how to implement the agreement 
reached in Jakarta and also to discuss administrative aspects of their meetings. 126 
After their first informal meeting in Manila, the conflicting parties issued a joint 
press statement in which the two parties highlighted the shifting venue concept 
introduced by President Ramos after the informal exploratory talks in Cipanas. 
They emphasised that the peace talks "have now shifted to the Philippines in the 
form of various committee meetings supportive of the plenary sessions that are 
expected to resume in Indonesia in February next year."127 This time, there was no 
hesitation, in particular on the part of the Philippines, to mentioning that Indonesia 
would be the venue for the formal peace talks in 1994. In the press release, they 
also denounced "all form of terrorism, banditry and lawless acts that would go 
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against the spirit of the Interim Ceasefire Agreement."128 During their meeting 
with Indonesian Ambassador on the 15 November 1993, the MNLF complained 
that the GRP had intensified military operations before any meeting of the Joint 
Ceasefire Committee to discuss detailed guidelines and ground rules for a 
ceasefire. In contrast, the Philippines authorities had declared that the agreed 
ceasefire in Jakarta was only between the GRP and the MNLF, and not included 
other resistance movements and their military bands, such as the MILF and the 
lost command (the Abu Sayyat). 129 Arguably, the MNLF had reason to be 
concerned because the Philippines army would have difficulty distinguishing the 
MNLF from other resistance military groups and, therefore, an indiscriminate 
military campaign would pose difficulties to the confidence building effort. 
Nevertheless, the release suggested that they had agreed to condemn terrorism and 
other unlawful acts, and by doing so, the MNLF had given their tacit agreement 
for limited military operations by the GRP to fight terrorism. 130 
Following the first informal meeting in Manila, the Indonesian Embassy hosted 
several consultative meetings at the level of support committees and also sent 
Indonesian diplomats to attend some of the support committee meetings held in 
various cities in the Philippines. Learning that some of the technical issues 
discussed during the support committee meetings were beyond their expertise, the 
Indonesian Ambassador asked Jakarta to intensify inter-departmental meetings 
and, if possible, to send experts on technical issues from Jakarta to attend the 
support committee meetings. 131 At the same time, the Indonesian Embassy was 
designated as a focal point for receiving position papers from the two parties. 
Thus, they would have the opportunity to study the papers earlier before they 
conveyed them to the respective party. 
With the system of communication and contact in place, Indonesia was able to 
maximise its role as a third party. The Indonesian team in Jakarta studied the 
papers (inter-departmentally) and provided their assessment to the Indonesian 
Embassy in Manila. At times, a delegation from Indonesia, including some 
experts on technical issues went to the Philippines to join the support committee 
meetings. The involvement of Indonesian experts was one of the important 
dimensions of the overall peace process. According to Mr. Kusnadi, 132 the 
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Indonesian experts could provide the MNLF with a 'second opinion' on some of 
the papers prepared by the GRP. He explained that some of the Philippines' 
papers were far advanced and thus required extra attention, and the MNLF was 
lacking experts to respond to the ideas, concepts and proposals. 133 Ambassador 
Damanik also mentioned that, at times, he also had to give his counsel and 
opinion to the MNLF delegation. 134 Nevertheless, it took a while before 
Ambassador Damanik could gain trust from the MNLF because he was a 
Christian and, therefore, was suspected of favouring the GRP. 135 Interestingly, his 
personal background as a military officer from Sumatra (known for openness and 
being outspoken) turned out to be a major asset in chairing and participating in 
some of the meetings. He gave little concern about protocol matters and, 
therefore, could direct the discussions more easily on the substantive matters. 136 
At the Mixed Committee level, Indonesians chaired most of the meetings. In these 
meetings the informal approach was sometimes adopted, mainly for the following 
two reasons. First, to break the stalemate during the plenary meetings since the 
plenary setting put extra pressure on some of the participants. They had to appear 
firm and not give in easily to their opponents, especially when their colleagues 
were present. The strategy to deal with the kind of situation was by adjourning the 
meeting, and the Chair consulting with the leader of the two parties separately, or 
arranging a small informal gathering involving leaders, with limited participants. 
Another strategy was by assembling a caucus group, an ad hoc informal gathering, 
to look at the matter closely and to report to the plenary the outcomes of their 
consultations. Those who were involved in the caucus group usually had a similar 
interest on the issues and their discussions were, consequently, more focused. 
More often, those who were involved in the caucus group were the members of 
the support committee, and thus they had known each other from their previous 
meetings. 
The second reason was to let the conflicting parties, especially the MNLF, reach 
out to its constituents. After long years in exile, Mr. Misuari had to regain support 
and sympathy from the Moro people and it was therefore understandable that, at 
· dd h' ' II ' 137 I times, he intentionally used the meetmg forum to a ress ts ga ery . n 
several instances, in the middle of a meeting's proceeding Mr. Misuari would 
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speak, rhetorically, about other issues beyond the topic. The Chair had to adjourn 
the discussion to let Mr. Misuari address his people at length. The Chair also had 
to reach an understanding with the Philippines' panel group that letting Mr. 
Misuari speaking informally between formal negotiations was an important 
component of the peace process. 138 Sometimes, Mr. Misuari also used the 
speaking opportunity to inform the public on some of the issues being discussed. 
Hence, such activities had'. in effect, familiarised the general public with the issues 
and built a sense of being a part of the peace process. 
The Second Formal Talks scheduled for April 1994, in Indonesia, were postponed 
twice. The first postponement stemmed from the disagreement between the GRP 
and the MNLF on the security matters during the Mixed Committee meeting in 
the Philippines. Worrying for his safety, Mr. Misuari had demanded to be able to 
bring a few hundred security staff to accompany him to the Third Mixed 
Committee meeting in Mindanao. The GRP rejected this request because they 
could only accommodate, at the most, 15 personal security staff.139 Mr. Misuari 
then requested Indonesia to host the Mixed Committee meeting or to provide a 
navy ship anchored in the Philippines as a neutral and secure venue for the 
meeting. Indonesia was clearly reluctant to accommodate the latter request. It 
would embarrass the GRP but also could trigger public outcry in the Philippines if 
they learnt that Indonesia was sending a military ship, even for a peaceful 
reason. 140 To break the impasse, the Ministry asked the Indonesian Ambassador in 
Riyadh to approach the Secretary General of the OIC, and also asked the 
Indonesian Ambassador in Manila to consult the Libyan Ambassador in Manila. 
Their mission was to soften Mr. Misuari's position. 141 Nevertheless, Indonesia did 
not pursue other diplomatic initiatives to deal with the stalemate, when Indonesia 
learned that the Secretary General of the OIC had decided to reschedule the 
planned OIC Ministerial meeting from late April to after May 1994. Hence, the 
earlier time pressure to hold the Second Formal Talks, including the Third Mixed 
Committee meeting, before the end of April was no longer a problem. The other 
factor affecting Indonesia's peace efforts with regard to Moro problem was a 
conference on East Timor in Manila. 
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Although Indonesia did not openly admit it, this second postponement of the talks 
was related to the holding of an international conference on East Timor (Asia 
Pacific Conference on East Timor) in Manila, from 31 May to 4 June 1994. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the GRP had risked its reputation as a democratic 
government by prohibitirig several international participants, including Mr. Ramos 
Horta, the East Timor spokesperson, from entering Manila, it could be inferred 
that Indonesia was still upset that the GRP was unwilling to suspend the 
conference. 142 The Ramos Administration's decision to bar the international 
participants received strong criticism from Filipinos. They accused Indonesia of 
bullying its neighbour and interfering in the Philippines' domestic affairs, 
considering that the event organiser was a local Non Governmental 
Organisation. 143 Clearly, Indonesia had expected that the GRP would be more 
appreciative towards Indonesia's concern over the separatist problem in East 
Timor, especially since Indonesia was helping the Philippines deal with a similar 
problem of its own. Indonesia renewed its commitment to facilitating the peace 
process by mid-June 1994 and, in particular, asked the Indonesian Embassy in 
Manila to reactivate meetings at support committee and working group levels.144 
Simultaneously, the national committee in Jakarta also renewed their internal 
preparations. As mentioned earlier, the Indonesian diplomats had a limited 
capacity to handle all the technical aspects of the Moro problem and, therefore, 
had established an inter-departmental team to deal with some of the technical 
issues. The agencies involved were the Department of Religious Affairs, the 
Department of Mines and Energy, and the Indonesian Military Headquarters. Each 
agency was assigned to study and provide counsel on the technical aspects for the 
f h Ph·1· . 145 establishment of an autonomous region in the southempart o t e 1 1ppmes. 
After the First Formal Talks, the inter-departmental team conducted regular 
meetings and was being supervised by Dr. Wirajuda. The Ministry also 
maintained close contact with the Cabinet Secretariat.146 All reports to the 
President concerning the facilitation process and any issues that arose were 
channelled through the Cabinet Secretariat for the President's immediate 
attention. 
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The Second Formal Talks were held from 1 to 5 September 1994, following the 
Third Mixed Committee meeting held on 31 August. Both meetings were held in 
Jakarta. The proceedings of the negotiations indicate that the Indonesians 
maintained a neutral posture when chairing all the meetings. The conference on 
East Timor did not see Iti.donesia backtracking from its position as a neutral third 
party. Indonesia did not appease the MNLF or disfavour the Philippines 
Government, and instead ~alanced the position of the OIC's representative which, 
. . 1 d d "d . h h 147 at times, certam y ten e to s1 e wit t e MNLF. For instance, when discussing 
the agenda item of 'Implementing Structure and Mechanism,' the MNLF insisted 
that the provisional government be established immediately, as constituted in the 
Tripoli Agreement, irrespective of subsequent constitutional processes in the 
Philippines. In contrast, the Philippines' panel argued that the establishment of the 
provisional government had to be facilitated by constitutional processes and the step 
that the GRP had taken was in conformity with the Tripoli Agreement. Ambassador 
Mohsin, representative of the OIC Secretary General, reiterated the position of the 
MNLF when he stated that the head of the government had full power to sign 
international agreements, while the Congress had ratification power. As a 
consequence, the incumbent had to honour all international agreements signed by 
former governments or heads of government. Thus, he considered it imperative for 
the Ramos Administration to fulfil the Tripoli Agreement, that is, to establish a 
provisional government. To break the deadlock Mr. Sastrohandoyo, who chaired 
the meeting, suggested that instead of alluding to history and making rhetorical 
statements, the meeting should consider the modalities in establishing the provisional 
government. The meeting finally agreed to establish a working group (Working 
Group on Implementing Structure and Mechanism) to discuss the matter further. 148 
As a negotiating technique, the establishment of a working group (sometimes on 
an ad hoc basis) was necessary especially when there was a deadlock in 
negotiation. Nevertheless, the technique had disadvantages as well as advantages. 
On the positive side, the working group could focus their discussion and energy 
on the substantive issue, and they could explore options more freely in the 
absence of their superiors. The Chair could share 'alternative views' because the 
forum was designed to brainstorm on the issues and was, therefore, more open to 
inputs. 149 Another advantage of a working group meeting was that some of the 
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representatives had known their counterparts from their previous engagements, 
such as during Mixed Committee meeting, and they had established some working 
relationship. Hence, the Chair could benefit from the working environment in 
which emotional involvement was less prominent. The disadvantages of the 
approach were that the official at the working level sometimes could not decide on 
behalf of his delegation. At times, the open-ended system of the working group 
had posed difficulty to th~ meeting proceedings. The new participants who joined 
the working group between discussions and had not been able to follow the 
previous discussions could derail the discussion, for instance by making a 
statement counterproductive to the meeting objective. 
The roles of the Chair in the working group were also complicated by the 
presence of OIC's representative. According to Mr. Kusnadi, the representative 
from Bangladesh (a member of Committee Six of the OIC) had, on one occasion, 
compared the Moro's struggle for independence with his country's separation 
from Pakistan in 1971. 150 The comparison was counterproductive to the meeting 
because the aim of the peace process was autonomy in Mindanao and not 
separation from the Philippines. Nevertheless, the format of the working group, 
which was most of the time informal, less structured, and problem solving 
orientated, had promised more outcomes rather than a plenary meeting set up. All 
the consensus and points of no consensus were reported by the Chair of the 
working group to the plenary meeting for adoption on the consensus and further 
discussion on the points of no consensus. If the plenary were still unable to reach 
agreement, they would request the working group and the Mixed Committee to 
follow up the matters. This flow of discussions and negotiations, albeit slow, 
helped the parties to the conflict to reach consensus issue by issue. Moreover, 
while the participants of the working group were discussing the issues, Mr. 
Sastrohandoyo would approach Mr. Misuari and Ambassador Manuel Yan, the 
Head of Philippines panel, either separately or collectively to look for possible 
consensus at their level. 
Arguably, the behind-the-scenes meetings involving the leaders of the parties to 
the conflict was designed to improve their personal relationships. Personal rapport 
. . 151 A d' between the two leaders was the key to a successful negotiation. ccor mg to 
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Mr. Sastrohandoyo, Indonesia's role was "to provide a venue, create an 
atmosphere conducive to reconciliation and compromise so that what were left 
unfinished in Tripoli Agreement could be completed."152 The informal get 
together on the side of the formal talks wa~ part of the overall efforts to improve 
the relationship and the exercises certainly helped in the creation of a constructive 
atmosphere. 
Mr. Sastrohandoyo chaired all the sessions during the formal talks and directed 
the participants to concentrate on the recommendations submitted by the Mixed 
Committee meetings. By the end of the talks, the two panels signed an interim 
agreement which highlighted the 42 points of agreement between the two parties 
to the conflict and expounded on the implementation of the ceasefire, along with 
the deployment of an OIC contingent to observe the ceasefire. It turned out that 
the OIC again relied on Indonesia for the deployment of the OIC contingent in 
Mindanao. Indonesia had no difficulty in dispatching some military observers 
while, at the same time, an Indonesian military officer was chairing the 
discussions in the Working Group on the ceasefire agreement. However, 
Indonesia was concerned about possible misunderstanding among the Filipinos on 
the presence of Indonesian military personnel in the Philippines. To deal with the 
dilemma, the Ministry decided to make public announcement of the mission and 
let the Filipinos and Indonesians know that the deployment was legal and not a 
covert operation. 153 The announcement served this purpose. 
3.3.3. Peace talks in 1995: building consensus around contentious issues 
Although, when hosting the second informal talks in 1993, Indonesia had no fixed 
ideas on how long the peace process would last, after facilitating the peace 
process for two years it was confident that the peace process could be completed 
in 1995 and had developed a timetable accordingly. 154 Indonesia had several 
reasons for optimism. 
Although slow, there was progress in the talks and the parties had reached 
agreement on a number of issues stipulated in the Tripoli Agreement. They even 
reached some common understandings on the sensitive issue of provisional 
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government during the Second Formal Peace Talks in 1994 in Jakarta. They 
agreed to form the provisional government in the autonomous region. The 
provisional government would be led by the MNLF and all components in the 
southernpart of the Philippines' society (Muslim, Christian and indigenous tribes) 
would be equally represented in the provisional government. Moreover, the 
President would appoint the executive body of the provisional government after 
he had consulted and asked agre·ement from the MNLF's Chairman.155 At the 
same time both the MNLF and the GRP had agreed to implement a ceasefire 
agreement and to let the OIC monitor it. 
The two parties seemed serious about ending their problem. The Ramos 
Administration had a stake in the success of the peace process because stability 
was the prerequisite condition for their economic development program. 
Similarly, the MNLF, especially Mr. Misuari who had lived in self-exile for 
almost two decades, wished to regain popular support from the Moro people, 
especially the younger generation who were increasingly favouring the other 
resistance movements, including the Abu Sayyaf. The MNLF also sensed 
dwindling support from the Arab countries for their armed struggles because the 
1990s was marked by a number of peaceful settlement of conflicts, including the 
signing of the Oslo peace accords between the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) and Israel in 1993. Thus, by committing the MNLF to the peace talks, Mr. 
Misuari wanted to show his constituents and his international supporters that he 
was serious about finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. 
Another factor that increased such optimism was that the two parties were 
confident that peace was within reach. During the Second Formal Peace Talks in 
1994 in Jakarta, the conflicting parties had agreed that the main task of their next 
peace talks, scheduled for June 1995, would be to formulate the final peace 
agreement, symbolising an end to their conflict. 
However, it turned out that Indonesia's optimism should have been lessened by 
some events in the Philippines, and by the impasse in the negotiations between the 
two conflicting parties. In April 1995, the Abu Sayyaf group had attacked the 
Mindanao-island town of Ipil and created havoc. 156 In their retreat after the attack, 
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some members of the rebel group had escaped through the MNLF's camp, which 
under ceasefire agreement was inviolable for the government troops.1s7 In 
responding to the attack, the GRP had deployed troops in the area and, as a 
consequence, the tension between the Philippines armed forces and the MNLF 
had increased, and was farther complicated by incidents of armed clashes between 
the two. 
Misunderstandings and a lack of trust in the military front line had an impact on 
the peace process. The MNLF hardened its position on a number of critical issues 
because they did not want to lose popular support if it appeared to be yielding to 
the GRP's position. At the same time, the MNLF also wanted to pacify the hard-
liners that they could secure the overall Moro's interests from the peace talks. Mr. 
Misuari must have noted that members of the splinter groups followed closely the 
peace process and its outcomes. If they were not satisfied with the outcomes, they 
have enough basis to take over the leadership from Mr Misuari in the struggle for 
the Moro cause. 158 Mr. Misuari had indicated to the GRP that if the peace talks 
failed, "war could be the only viable option for the MNLF"159 and in response, the 
Philippines armed forces had enhanced their military preparedness in 
Mindanao. 160 Likewise, the GRP also did not want to jeopardise their position, for 
instance, by accepting the MNLF's demand to implement autonomy in 13 areas, 
as stipulated in the Tripoli Agreement, without constitutional process. 
In brief, by the end of 1995 there was stalemate on three main issues. The first one 
was on how to integrate the MNLF forces into the Philippines armed forces. The 
second one was on how to implement the provisional government. The last one 
was on how best to share revenues and the incomes of the Government-Owned 
and Controlled Corporations (GOCCs). The positions of the two parties on these 
issues were difficult to reconcile, even during the Mixed Committee meeting and 
the Third Round of Formal Peace Talks, held from 27 November to 1 December 
1995. Several diplomatic efforts at the highest level, between September and 
October 1995, led by Minister Alatas, also failed to find a breakthrough. 161 
Despite the difficulties, Indonesia appeared to have tried hard to maintain the 
momentum for dialogue and intentionally used the informal diplomacy to 
accumulate more points of consensus between the two parties. The intention was 
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to further narrow the gap, especially on the three most contentious issues. By 
achieving consensus on a number of points outside the three issues, Indonesia 
hoped that the conflicting parties would maintain their commitment to the peace 
process. 
It is important to mention that informal diplomacy in the form of caucus meetings 
was a dominant feature d~ring the Mixed Committee meeting in Davao City, from 
19 to 23 June 1995. It is clear that Indonesia had intentionally limited the plenary 
format. The Chairman, in his report to Minister Alatas, spelled out that the aims of 
the informal set up were to optimise positive result, to ensure efficiency and 
thorough discussions of the various issues, and to find resolution to the 
problems.162 The informal caucus proved effective in accumulating consensus and 
identifying points of no-consensus, and most importantly at the same time the 
parties were willing to explore alternative ways out of their stalemate. Some 
consensus in the informal caucus were reached on matters related to the structure 
of the provisional government, and some general understanding was also reached 
on the modalities to integrate the MNLF into the Philippines armed forces. 163 
Although the agreements on the two issues had not resolved the problem, the 
momentum for peace talks was maintained and the agreements reached were used 
as a basis for their internal discussions, and also in their discussion with their 
respective constituents. 
The informal caucus was also used to urge the participants to look on their 
problems in creative ways. When chairing the caucus meeting, Dr. Wirajuda 
suggested the participants put aside their legal arguments and search for 
innovative solutions to the problems of how to establish the provisional 
government. He emphasised the importance of creativity and pragmatism to find 
new options in settling the issue. 164 In the end, the GRP came with two 
alternatives for resolving the problem of how to establish the provisional 
government. The first alternative was to finalise the negotiation process, no latter 
than September 1995, then to submit an enabling act to Congress on November 
1995. It was expected that the referendum could be held on February 1996, by the 
time the ARMM ended. However, the GRP was not sure if the timetable could be 
carried out as planned because the Congress might not be able to finalise their 
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deliberation on the Act on time. For its part, the MNLF was also not too keen with 
the ideas of constitutional process and referendum. The second alternative was to 
encourage the MNLF to take part in the ARMM's election for Governor and 
legislative positions with the full backing of President Ramos's party thus 
assuring the successful result of the election. From that point, the MNLF could 
initiate change, to reflect the Tripoli Agreement, from within the system. The 
MNLF did not categoric~lly reject this alternative and was willing to study it 
further. However, Mr. Misuari was concerned over the possible opposition from 
the hardliners who would accuse him of selling out to the GRP. 
The two alternatives above were discussed separately in New York, on 24 October 
1995 between Minister Alatas, the OIC Secretary General and Mr. Misuari. 
During the discussion, Minister Alatas sensed that Mr. Misuari appeared more 
flexible. In the meeting, Mr. Misuari acknowledged the necessity to find a creative 
formula to bridge the position of the MNLF and the Philippines Government.165 In 
the previous meeting in New York, on 3 October 1995, between Mr. Misuari, the 
OIC Secretary General and the Foreign Ministers of the OIC Ministerial 
Committee of the Six, Mr. Misuari also had expressed awareness of some 
fundamental changes that had taken place in the southernpart of the Philippines. 
He admitted that the changes, including the new demographic composition of the 
population, had provided an alternative solution to the issue of provisional 
government that was worthy of consideration. To convince Mr. Misuari on the 
merit of considering the two alternatives proposed by President Ramos, Minister 
Alatas indicated his intention to assess the possibility to relieve the referendum 
requirement, at the least during the transitional period. 166 
During the Third Formal Peace Talks, held from 27 November to 1 December 
1995, the mechanism for establishing the provisional government was again 
discussed at length. However, the MNLF did not decide on which of the two 
alternatives and this is probably because the MNLF was still worried about the 
possible backlash from the Moro people. 167 As a facilitator, Indonesia's position 
was consistent with the Tripoli Agreement but Indonesia had encouraged the two 
parties to find a middle ground concerning the provisional government. Indonesia 
tried to persuade the GRP not to insist on the referendum requirement and had 
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asked the MNLF to be more flexible on the ARMM, including giving 
consideration to the possibility of Mr. Misuari running for governor and other 
MNLF people standing for legislative positions.168 In the end, a breakthrough was 
reached after high level diplomacy on Indonesia's part, utilising the available 
networks in the Philippines and the OIC to convince Mr. Misuari to accept the 
latter alternative. At the same time, Indonesia's efforts were made possible by the 
two parties continuous contact in the Philippines and President Ramos's 
courageous move to offer an alternative solution concerning which areas were 
covered by the autonomous region. The following discussion looks at this issue 
more closely. 
3.3.4. Peace talks in 1996: clinching the deal through high level diplomacy 
After the third formal talks, the stalemate in the discussions of some issues had 
put the peace process at stake. The improved relationship between the parties to 
the conflict which had been nurtured during three years interaction, in formal 
negotiations, informal consultation and social activities, were still not enough to 
bridge their differing positions on some critical issues. In this critical stage of the 
peace process, a possible solution to the impasse would be an exchange of 
concessions for a win-win solution or to seek an alternative solution which would 
be acceptable to all. At this point, it would have been difficult for Indonesia to 
move further from the facilitation function, other than hope that some new 
breakthroughs would result from continuing interaction between the parties. 
The role of the Indonesian Embassy in Manila, as a continuation of Indonesia's 
role as facilitator, was critical because they could observe developments on a daily 
basis and provide suggestions on steps that could be taken by the Ministry. Close 
co-operation between Jakarta and the Indonesian Embassy in Manila in the last 
year of the peace process had intensified because of the need for internal co-
ordination between the Ministry and other supporting agencies. The Ministry also 
needed to keep overseas posts, such as the Indonesian Embassy in Riyadh, well 
informed on any developments in the peace process, because these embassies 
were focal points between the Ministry and the OIC, and between Indonesia and 
the members of the Committee of Six of the OIC. The case of close co-ordination 
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between the Embassy in Manila and the Ministry was observable in two cases: the 
'popular consultation' in Mindanao, and a special closed meeting involving the 
foreign ministers of the Committee of Six of the OIC. 
It is important to mention that until after the third formal peace talks, the 
conflicting parties had agreed on almost 90% of the issues covered in the Tripoli 
Agreement. Admittedly, ~he issue left was the most sensitive one, that is, the 
establishment of a provisional government and the enlargement of areas for 
autonomy from the existing area of ARMM. Both the MNLF and the GRP, during 
the third formal talks, had agreed to conduct a 'popular consultation' to assess the 
level of acceptance among the public and local government of the provisional 
government and the enlargement of areas for autonomy. From his consultation 
with the GRP, the Indonesian Ambassador in Manila, Ambassador Abu Hartono 
had secured the GRP's agreement that the 'popular consultation' between Mr. 
Misuari and governors as well as mayors from Mindanao could be held on 29 
February 1996. The GRP had also agreed that the Mixed Committee meeting to 
examine the outcomes of the consultation would be held in Davao City, from 2 to 
4 March 1996.169 However, Mr. Misuari expressed reservations about the 
timetable because the Malaysian Government could not arrange his transport from 
Malaysia to Jolo in Mindanao. He therefore suggested that the consultation be 
held on late May or early April 1996. 
Clearly worried about possible negative consequences from the delay, 
Ambassador Hartono then suggested that the Ministry facilitate Mr. Misuari's 
transport from Malaysia to Mindanao. He also informed the Ministry that he had 
secured the GRP's agreement for the transport arrangement. He had given the 
Ministry two options on how to arrange the transport from Malaysia to Mindanao, 
either using a charter plane or a military aircraft. Concerned about possible 
criticism from Filipino politicians of an Indonesian military aircraft flying to 
· f · h rt plane 170 Mindanao, the Ministry preferred the first option o usmg a c a er · 
Ambassador Hartono also arranged for a crowd to welcome Mr. Misuari in 
Mindanao, and his intention was to give the MNLF's leader a sense of being a 
'real leader.' 171 Ambassador Hartono was convinced that the set up would have a 
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positive psychological impact on Mr. Misuari and increase his determination to 
accept the Philippines Government's offer to run for Governor of ARMM.172 
The close co-operation between Manila and Jakarta was also evident during the 
special meeting involving foreign ministers from the Committee of Six of the 
OIC. The decision to hold a special meeting was caused by President Ramos's 
decision on May 1996 to designate the area covered by Tripoli Agreement as a 
special 'administrative unit' (not political unit). He called the areas a Zone of 
Peace and Development in the Southern Philippines (ZPDSP). The new proposal 
definitely provided a new impetus for the peace dialogue because it touched on 
the three most contentious issues: the area designated within the autonomous 
region, the provisional government and the referendum requirement. Seeing the 
prospect of breakthrough, Ambassador Hartono had sent Minister Alatas a letter 
suggesting the Ministry hold a 'special meeting' with the OIC and the Committee 
of Six of the OIC, to discuss the new proposal. In the letter, he explained that 
Congressman Ermita and Secretary Alexander Aguirre, Chairman GRP Panel, Ad 
hoc Working Group on the Setting Up of the Transitional Implementing Structure 
and Mechanism, had informed him about the new proposal. Based on the 
information, he had met separately with some leaders of the MNLF to discuss the 
proposal and the MNLF, in his observation, had expressed interest. 173 Although 
the Ambassador did not indicate in the letter whether or not the GRP had 
requested him to consult the MNLF, it was obvious that the GRP would have 
expected the Ambassador to do so due to Indonesia's role as facilitator in the 
peace process. However, the decision to call for a· 'special meeting' of the 
Committee of Six, to discuss the proposal, was critical because it brought the 
proposal to the immediate attention of the OIC. 
Arguably, Indonesia's decision to hold a meeting was based on several 
considerations. First, Indonesia had not been successful in convincing the MNLF 
to accept the Philippines's proposal, and, therefore, wished to use the OIC as a 
means to persuade the MNLF. Secondly, Indonesia was concerned about a 
possible deadlock in the peace process because none of the parties seemed willing 
to compromise their position or to find a middle ground on some critical issues. 
Although the parties to the conflict had reached consensus on almost 90% of the 
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problems, their inability to decide on the remaining issues left the peace process 
with no prospect of solution in the immediate future. ThirdlJ, a prolongation of 
the deadlock would jeopardise the peace efforts further, as President Ramos' 
presidency would end in 1998.174 There was no guarantee that President Ramos's 
successor would also give their utmost attention to the peace process with the 
MNLF. Hence, finding a solution to the Moro problem during President Ramos's 
term was most desirable and the concession given by the Ramos Administration 
on some of the contentious issues required immediate attention. 
On 21 May 1996, Indonesia, as the Chair of the Committee of Six of the OIC, 
circulated a diplomatic note to the committee's members inviting them to a 
'special meeting' in Jakarta to discuss President Ramos' proposal. In the letter, 
Indonesia emphasised the value of holding the meeting by mentioning that the 
peace process, after the Mixed Committee meeting on March 1996, had reached a 
deadlock on some substantive issues. In Indonesia's view, the GRP's new 
proposal had some prospects for breaking the stalemate. Understandably, 
Indonesia also wanted the OIC to share this opinion. In fact, the objective of the 
special meeting, as spelled out by Minister Alatas was to develop a common 
position among the committee's members. 175 A common position in the 
Committee of Six of the OIC would help Indonesia in its dealing with the GRP 
and the MNLF. 176 
The 'special meeting' of the OIC combined the formal negotiations and the 
informal consultation process. During the two days' meeting, Indonesia arranged 
four different kinds of meetings: (1) a working session of the OIC to discuss the 
issue in detail; (2) a separate meeting between the OIC and the respective panels 
of the parties to the conflict; (3) an informal working group to look for consensus 
and non-consensus; and (4) a plenary meeting to set the direction for the 
remaining peace talks. The proceedings of the meetings show that in the working 
session of the OIC Minister Alatas who chaired the meeting invited the 
' 
participants to study the Philippines' paper and to identify issues wtiich required 
further explanation. The OIC's positions on the paper were then raised with the 
Philippines panel. The Philippines' explanations were subsequently conveyed to 
the MNLF and, in the separate meeting with the MNLF, the OIC also listened to 
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the MNLF's concerns. Next, the OIC informed the Philippines panel on the result 
of their deliberations with the MNLF. The last meeting on the first day was held 
in plenary and involved the OIC and the two parties to the conflict. During the 
plenary meeting, the Chair had proposed the establishment of an informal working 
group to identify consensus and non-consensus issues. In particular, the 'special 
meeting' had endorsed the establishment of a transitional body, the Southern 
Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), to oversee the 
transitional period before the referendum took place. 
In the end, the 'special meeting' of the OIC had reached a common understanding 
that the Philippines' proposal was the only feasible way to break the stalemate on 
the peace process. 177 Undoubtedly, their agreement put the peace efforts back on 
the right track. At the same time, with their agreement the OIC had given 
Indonesia a sound basis to help resolve the remaining issues based on the 
Philippines proposal. The subsequent meetings at the various levels in the 
Philippines concentrated on the non-consensus issues and adjustments to the 
agreements reached during their previous peace talks with President Ramos's 
proposal. With this clearer direction, Indonesia was able to further the peace 
process more easily. 
During the Mixed Committee meeting, from 20 to 23 June 1996 in Davao City, 
Dr. Wirajuda who chaired it reiterated the specific objective of the meeting. He 
stated that the meeting was to discuss the "understandings and agreements in 
principle"178 on the mechanism to establish the provisional autonomous 
government, reached during the special meeting of the OIC. He also mentioned 
that the peace process had almost reached its conclusion and he, therefore, 
requested both the MNLF and the GRP to act with "goodwill, political vision and 
courage"179 in order to finalise their discussions. 
In his report to Minister Alatas, Dr. Wirajuda explained that the Philippines' 
proposal was helpful in settling the problem of transitional structures and 
mechanism, but had created new problems concerning the MNLF forces. The 
proposal was mainly concerned with the setting up of a transitional administration 
unit and less consideration had been given to the issues of how to integrate the 
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MNLF into the Philippines armed forces and to establish security forces in the 
autonomous region. Moreover, the 'administrative unit' was not a substitute for 
the existing administrative system and its function was limited to co-ordinating 
economic development programs and security maintenance. In the end, the 
meeting was only able to reach some common understanding on how to settle 
these two issues. 180 The settlement of these issues was finally reached during the 
series of working group ~eetings in the Philippines and in the fourth and final 
formal peace talks, held in Jakarta, from 28 to 30 August 1996. 
The Ministry had, at first, planned to hold the fourth formal peace talks in early 
August 1996 and had already circulated invitation letters to members of the 
Committee of Six of the OIC. The planned meeting was postponed until late 
August after the Ministry had learned from its Embassy in Manila that the 
working groups still needed more time to finalise their discussion. In the 
meantime, Mr. Misuari, on 11 July 1996, had decided to run .for the governor's 
position in the ARMM, after he had received assurances from President Ramos 
that the President's party would give him their full support. Also Secretary Ruben 
Torres (Cabinet Secretary of President Ramos Administration) and Mr. Misuari 
engaged in intensive discussions to reach an agreement on how to integrate the 
MNLF into the Philippines armed forces and how to establish security forces in 
the autonomous region. In preparing for the final peace talks, the Ministry held a 
number of mainly internal meetings to co-ordinate their strategy during the last 
talks. 
The Fourth Round of the Peace Talks was held from 28 to 30 August 1996. In this 
meeting, the contentious issues had already been settled and the main task of the 
meeting was to put all the agreements in the peace agreement's document. The 
meeting was opened by Minister Alatas and presided over by Mr. Sastrohandoyo. 
Mr. Sastrohandoyo organised the meeting based on inputs from members of his 
team, that is, to proceed immediately with working group meetings. Apparently, 
prior to the opening of the meeting, members of the Indonesian team had lobbied 
participants separately and they sensed that to proceed with the working group 
1s1 I 
meetings would be far more advantageous rather than a plenary set up. t was 
suggested that the Indonesian Chair form three working groups, each to deal with 
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a special task. The first working group, the Working Group on the Joining of the 
MNLF forces with the AFP, was responsible to discuss the proposal made by 
Defense Secretary Renato De Villa. The second working group, Working 
Committee on Drafting of the Final Agreement, was given the task to finalise the 
Final Agreement's document. The third working group, a loose caucus, was asked 
to consider the ways and means for OIC's participation during the transitional 
periods, that is, from the signing of the peace agreement to its implementation. 
Based on the recommendation, after opening the plenary session Mr. 
Sastrohandoyo asked the participants to break into three working group meetings 
to finalise the outstanding issues left. The day concluded with a plenary session to 
endorse the agreements submitted by the Mixed Committee meeting and the three 
working groups. The smooth processes during the working group meetings 
leading to the plenary meeting can be explained from two perspectives. First, all 
the concerns of the parties had been addressed thoroughly. Secondly, for the 
MNLF, the continuation of OIC's role during the transitional period gave them 
assurances that the GRP would respect the agreement. Similarly, for the GRP, by 
allowing the OIC's continuous involvement post-final agreement, they wanted to 
show good faith on issue that they always consider as internal of the Philippines. 
At the same time, the GRP expected the members of the OIC would contribute 
financially to the development of the southempart of the Philippines.182 
Finally, on 30 August 1996, the parties to the conflict initialled the final peace 
agreement in the Presidential Palace, Merdeka Palace, before President Soeharto. 
Representatives of ASEAN and OIC countries in Jakarta witnessed this ceremony. 
By witnessing the parties to the conflict initial the final peace agreement, 
President Soeharto gave his personal support and 'blessing' to the agreement. 183 
V.4. Conclusion 
In facilitating the peace process between the GRP and the MNLF, Indonesia 
combined informal and formal diplomacy. In the earlier stages, Indonesia used 
informal diplomacy to assess the level of acceptance of the parties to the conflict 
for its role as a third party in facilitating the peace process. After their informal 
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exploratory talks in Cipanas, in April 1993, the participants were willing to 
elevate the peace process from informal consultations to formal negotiations. 
Although there was no clear explanation for this, the parties to the conflict, 
especially the MNLF, had observed the seriousness of the Philippines panel in 
reaching a solution to the problem. The setting of the meeting also had some 
bearing as the informal format gave the participants ample opportunity to interact 
and assess the sincerity of their opponents. 
During the formal peace talks, informal diplomacy was used as a means to 
improve relationships and to discuss contentious issues in greater detail. 
Indonesia intentionally set up a three layers of discussions, from less formal 
(support committees and ad hoc working group) to a formal negotiation setting 
(the mixed committee and the formal talks). The intention was to exhaust 
discussions at the lowest level (support committee) between participants who 
were more concerned with the detailed aspects of the issues. Their frequent 
interactions had made the participants able to develop good personal rapport, and 
gradually trust emerged that both parties really wished to find a solution to their 
problem. 
Informal diplomacy was also used between sessions in the formal meeting to let 
the delegations discuss the contentious issues informally, and sometimes in the 
absence of their superior. At times, the approach was effective but in some cases 
participants who had no clear mandate from their superior were not willing to 
commit themselves to an agreement. In coping with the latter problem, Indonesia 
persuaded the participants to identify points of consensus and non-consensus for 
future deliberation or to be decided by the more senior officials. Although the 
accumulation of the consensus approach was successful in maintaining the peace 
momentum, they could not resolve the most contentious issues. In a deadlock, 
only innovation, creativity and new impetus from their respective leaders could 
bring the conflicting parties into agreement. The latter shows that there was a limit 
to the Indonesian role and the informal format. Indonesia did not want to involve 
itself too deeply in the problem, worrying about possible misunderstandings by 
those involved in the peace process. 
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Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea: 
The series of Indonesia's Informal Diplomacy (1990-1998) 
VI.1. Introduction 
'Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea' was the title 
given by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry to a series of informal meetings it 
sponsored to address the potential conflicts stemming from overlapping territorial 
and jurisdictional claims. From 1990 to 1998, the Ministry, with some financial 
assistance from the Canadian Government, 1 arranged annual workshops involving 
the six claimant states: Brunei Darussalam, People's Republic of China, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan. Some non-claimants (Cambodia, Laos, 
Singapore and Thailand) also participated in the workshops, but these countries 
took part individually and not as a block. 
In the workshops, Indonesia pursued informal diplomacy differently to what had 
been used when dealing with the Cambodian and the Moro problems. In the two 
previous case studies, the involvement of the leaders of the protagonists in the 
meetings was paramount and the approach was top down, but during the series of 
workshops the participants were mainly bureaucrats at the mid-level, scientists 
and political analysts. Some claimant states did assign high-level representatives 
to some of the workshops, but the informality of the workshops meant that they 
all took part as individuals. 
The intention of this chapter is to analyse the informal diplomatic approach used 
during the workshops. In particular, this chapter will describe and analyse the 
aspects of informal diplomacy in the context of the workshops, why informal 
diplomacy was required, and how Indonesia exercised informal diplomacy. The 
main argument of this chapter is that Indonesia was able to organise the informal 
workshop to manage the potential conflicts and play a leading role in the 
diplomatic initiatives because the non-claimant members of ASEAN saw the 
merits of the initiative. At the same time, the claimant countries and Taiwan did 
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not object to Indonesia's role. Informal workshops were not aimed at resolving the 
problem of overlapping claims of territorial jurisdictions over the islands, islets 
and atolls in the South China Sea. The intention was to develop co-operation and 
confidence building measures in order to prevent armed conflict arising from the 
territorial disputes. 
The workshops did produce a number of recommendations and developed habits 
of dialogue among representatives from the littoral states. As convenor of the 
workshops, Indonesia expected that the participants would convey these 
recommendations to their leaders. However, the implementation of the 
recommendations required the co-operation of the claimant states and Indonesia 
lacked the capacity to influence them. Likewise, although the diplomatic 
initiatives co-ordinated by the Ministry at first received substantial support from 
bureaucrats within and outside the Ministry, towards the end of the workshop 
series the support from them gradually declined. The latter factor reduced 
Indonesia's determination and ability to play a leading role.2 
The chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section provides a 
background to the South China Sea issue and highlights: the strategic importance 
of the South China Sea and the major stakeholders, the nature of the claims and 
the reinforcement of the claims, and the military build up and the potential for 
armed conflict. The second section analyses Indonesia's peace initiative to 
understand the development of the idea for the workshops and the internal 
dynamics within the Indonesian team. This section also examines the 
implementation of informal diplomacy through the workshops including the 
techniques adopted and the strategy developed, as well as the outcomes. The final 
part of this section outlines the impact of the competing interests and the differing 
interpretations of the workshops on this exercise of Indonesian informal 
diplomacy. 
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VI.2. The background to the South China Sea issue 
2.1. The strategic importance of the South China Sea: the territorial disputes 
and the stakeholders 
Under article 122 of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) 
1982, the South China Sea is designated as a 'semi-enclosed sea' because the Sea 
is surrounded by a number of littoral states. The littoral states bordering the South 
China Sea include Brunei Barussalam, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam. Taiwan is also adjacent to the 
South China Sea. Based on the UNCLOS, littoral states adjacent to the semi-
enclosed sea are encouraged to co-operate in exercising their rights and in 
performing their duties.3 The South China Sea is very strategic for the littoral 
states and also for maritime states who use it as a 'sea-line of communication' and 
a major route for trade. Although "the waters around the Spratlys are considered 
dangerous to shipping because they are largely uncharted, shallow and contain a 
profusion of moving sandbanks,"4 control of the structures in the South China Sea 
will provide the occupier with immense power over the area.5 James Gregor 
illustrates the strategic nature of the South China Sea as follows: 
Most shipping lanes in the South China Sea pass near the islands, 
atolls, and banks in the region, and occupation and control of such 
territory could influence the flow of traffic from the Strait of 
Malacca to the Taiwan Strait and from Singapore to southern 
China and Taiwan.6 
In fact, during the Second World War, the Japanese used some islands in the 
South China Sea as a stepping-stone to attack the Philippines and to control its 
occupied territories in Southeast Asia.7 After the Second World War, the two 
superpowers asserted the strategic importance of the area from the military 
perspective.8 In the late 1970s, not long after Vietnam invaded Cambodia, the 
Soviet Union gained access to Vietnam's naval and air base in Cam Ranh Bay on 
the South China Sea and then developed intelligence stations which covered the 
whole region.9 At the same time, the US already had established military bases in 
the Philippines. 
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In the early 1990s, the two super powers retreated from their bases for differing 
reasons. The Soviet Union left because of financial difficulties, whereas the US 
left Clark air base and ~ubic Bay naval base in 1992 because the Philippines 
Senate had rejected a new bases treaty. Although it no longer has military bases in 
the South China Sea, the US maintains an interest in the area because of its global 
interests, either for strategic or economic reasons. The US is concerned with peace 
and stability in the area, and the potential for conflict threatens its access and 
freedom of movement. 
Similarly, the economic lifeline of some countries in Southeast and East Asia 
depends on stability in the South China Sea. In Japan's case, for instance, 90% of 
its oil imports from the Middle East pass through this area and the two way trade 
between Japan and the A SEAN countries also flows through this Sea. 10 In the case 
of China, the area has become its "energy arteries - most notably the sea-lines of 
communications (SLOCs) from the Persian Gulf and over the petroleum reserves 
in the South and East China Seas."11 Hence, interest in stability and access for 
sea-lines of communications is not limited to the regional countries only, but also 
to non-regional countries. 
The South China Sea is rich with living resources and, predictably, also has 
immense potential for non-living resources (hydrocarbons). 12 The claimant states' 
interest in living resources and hydrocarbons stems from the fact that their land 
base resources are gradually depleting. The claimant states as well as many other 
countries have gained 'new hope' from the sea's potential and therefore are 
prepared to assert their interests by military means. Kent Calder provides an 
illustration on the inter-linkages between hydrocarbon potential in the South 
China Sea and military assertiveness as follows: "[p]otentially huge amounts of 
subterranean oil and gas compounded their attraction, for both China and others. 
A major oil strike has already been made off the nearby Filipino island of 
Palawan, which prompted a Chinese land grab only 170 kilo-meters away in early 
1995."13 With regard to hydrocarbon potential in the South China Sea, the 
claimant states have adopted a strategy of inviting foreign companies to prospect 
in the area they claim, and of granting concessions for explorations as well as 
exploitation. The strategy was a calculated one. 
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The involvement of foreign companies was necessary because the majority of the 
claimant states had not yet acquired the technological know-how to prospect and 
embark on offshore oil operations. The system normally used in this mode of co-
operation included granting concessions or sharing in production. 14 However, the 
presence of a foreign company could also mean implicit recognition of territorial 
claims and, at the same time, maintain the interest of non-regional countries 
through their nationals' ~ag companies. Concerned about the potential for being 
entangled in such conflicts through private companies owned by their nationals, 
some governments, such as the US, have warned their nationals to consider 
overlapping claims before getting involved in offshore oil operations. 15 
Overall, the stakeholders in the South China Sea disputes include the five 
claimant states as well as several non-claimant states. The South China Sea is 
claimed, partly or as a whole, by five littoral states and Taiwan. Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Brunei claim ownership of some islands, islets and atolls around 
the Spratlys in the South China Sea. China, Vietnam and Taiwan claim ownership 
of the same areas in the South China Sea - including the Paracels islands - and 
there is a reason to believe that China also claims the sea as its inland waters. 16 
The non-claimant stakeholders include some littoral, regional states, such as Japan 
and Australia, and non-regional countries, like the US and Canada. The non-
claimant littoral states include Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and Cambodia. 
The following discussion highlights the nature of non-claimant interests in the 
South China Sea. 
Indonesia's position with regard to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea 
is unique. Although Indonesia has no territorial claim in the South China Sea, its 
territorial jurisdiction around the Natuna Islands is entangled with Vietnam and 
China's disputes over the Spratlys. Indonesia had still not settled its continental 
shelves disputes with Vietnam around the Natunas and was surprised to learn that 
the territorial delimitation of China had incorporated Indonesia's EEZ (Exclusive 
Economic zone) around the Natunas. 17 These circumstances put Indonesia's 
efforts to further exploit the hydrocarbon potential around the Natuna islands in a 
d·1 · · h d t t made clear whether or not its 1 emma, particularly because Chma a no ye 
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claims included "the gas and oil fields less than 225 kilometres from the Natuna 
Islands."18 
Concerning the Natuna Islands, Indonesia has received conflicting signals from 
China. On the one hand, Indonesia has received an assurance from China that 
China has no territorial disputes with Indonesia. In fact, the Deputy Foreign 
Minister of China, Tang Jiaxuan, gave this assurance to the Indonesian 
Ambassador in Beijing, Ambassador Juwana, in a private conversation on 21 June 
1995. Mr. Tang informed him that China had never claimed the Natuna Islands 
and the Chinese Government would not acknowledge any map, that is, China's 
national map which included the Islands. 19 On the other hand, China expressed 
concern when Indonesia in September 1996 embarked on a large-scale military 
exercise around the Natuna Islands.20 Such concerns over Indonesia's military 
exercises is not without precedent. In 1987, Vietnam had expressed concern over 
a planned joint military exercise between Indonesia and Malaysia in Borneo and 
around the Spratlys.21 Indonesia's neutrality as an 'honest broker' in the South 
China Sea is often questioned due to the Natuna issue. 
As an island state with limited national resources, Singapore is concerned with the 
potential for regional instability resulting from armed conflicts in the South China 
Sea. Regional stability is essential for Singapore because it relies on its strategic 
position as a hub for regional commerce, services and maritime sea-lanes.22 As a 
trading nation, Singapore is worried that regional instability, including from 
territorial disputes in the South China Sea, could reduce Singapore's attractiveness 
for investment destination. In fact, since the early 1990s Singapore has been the 
driving force behind the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), a means to increase 
the attractiveness of the region as an investment destination. Singapore was also 
instrumental in the development of ASEAN and European Union economic co-
operation to balance the linkage between ASEAN and the Pacific through Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Hence, regional stability is the only 
foundation that can sustain Singapore's overall designs of regional economic co-
operation. 
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Thailand is also concerned that its economic interests in the South China Sea, 
including harvesting living resources especially fish, could be disrupted by any 
conflict in the area. However, Thailand is also worried that any armed conflicts 
would disturb its "export of agricultural and industrial products to the world 
market which pass through the sea lanes in the South China Sea."23 As a 
landlocked country Laos wished to continue to have easy access to the sea, which 
was guaranteed under _the UNCLOS 1982. Claimant states' assertion of 
sovereignty, including by military means, would restrict Laos's access to the Sea. 
Although there has been little discussion of Cambodia's position on the territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea, Cambodia's interest would probably be based on 
economic considerations. Cambodia is interested in bringing foreign investors to 
Cambodia to help rebuild the country after long years of civil war. All these 
Indochina countries and Thailand have had traditional relationships with China 
and Vietnam and, therefore, they would not want territorial conflicts in the South 
China Sea to antagonise their established relationships. These countries, especially 
Thailand, support a diplomatic solution to the disputes.24 
In general, regional and non-regional countries, including major powers like the 
US, are interested in having safe navigation and freedom of maritime activity in 
the South China Sea. Although countries like Japan, Australia and the US 
maintain their neutral position in the territorial disputes, they are against the 
adoption of unilateral policy by claimant states that might restrict their maritime 
activity and affect sea-lanes. The US Assistant Secretary of State, Winston Lord, 
clearly stated that the US rejected any unilateral action that affected its freedom in 
the South China Sea, and which was implemented in disregard to the UNCLOS 
1982.25 The US position reaffirmed its desire to have freedom of movement in the 
seas, including the South China Sea, especially for US naval fleets. The US had 
even, on several occasions, questioned ASEAN's intent to create a nuclear 
weapon free zone in the ASEAN region. ASEAN's intention, according to the US, 
was incompatible with ASEAN's interest in maintaining US engagement in the 
region and supporting ASEAN's position in the South China Sea.26 
Australia, sensing a growing Chinese presence in Southeast Asia through its 
foothold in the Spratlys, attempted to build a buffer and was successful in enticing 
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fonner Indonesian President Soeharto to sign a security agreement in December 
1995.27 China was obviously alanned about the agreement and inquired of 
Indonesia whether the security agreement was directed against China and its 
interests in the region. Indonesia had to convince China that the agreement was 
not aimed at any particular country in the region.28 Australia shares US concern 
about freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Australia would not want to 
have any claimant states treating the South China Sea as their internal waters. 
Although this has yet to happen in the South China Sea, Australia's freedom of 
navigation in the Taiwan Straits was challenged at one time by China and this 
made Australia upset. The incident took place in April 2001, when China tried to 
exercise its sovereignty around the Taiwan Strait, and claimed the straits as its 
territorial waters.29 
As noted earlier, Japan's economic interests in Southeast and East Asia, and the 
safety of its economic lifelines in the South China Sea depend on peace and 
stability in the region. Philip Bowring notes that "Japan's interest are commercial, 
not territorial. Japan needs to protect its trade and investments in Southeast 
Asia."30 Japan observes developments in the South China Sea very cautiously, and 
tries to avoid antagonising China. Japan wishes to have a peaceful settlement of 
the territorial disputes, and Canada also shares this position. Canada's interest in 
the South China Sea issue also stems from its desire to promote marine 
conservation. As one of the largest coastal states, Canada has consistently adopted 
policies of "promoting conservation and sustainable use, cooperation, and the 
international law of the sea."31 Canada's financial contribution for the workshop 
process was guided by this position. Similarly, Japan, Australia a_nd the US had 
also expressed interest in supporting the workshop process. 32 
2.2. The nature of the claims and the claimants efforts to reinforce their 
claims 
After the Second World War, the ownership of some islands, islets and atolls in 
the South China Sea was not clearly defined and, as a consequence, some 
countries asserted their claim of ownership based on historical considerations or 
international law. For instance, China and Taiwan declared that their ancestors 
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had discovered and occupied some of the islets in the South China Sea since time 
immemorial and named the area Nanyang or the 'Southern Region' .33 In 
particular, the Chinese asserted that the Northern Song Dynasty (AD 960-1127) 
had included the areas as part of China's territory. To substantiate this claim, they 
referred to "historical records, maps, and cultural relics."34 Vietnam also asserted 
sovereignty based on historical argument, but combined its argument with the 
principle of effective occ~pation (a customary international law) and claimed that 
it had effectively occupied the area since 1558.35 Vietnam also argued that as a 
successor state of France, it was entitled to inherit part of the South China Sea's 
archipelago occupied by France during the inter-war period. 36 
The Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei asserted their individual claims based on 
international law. Initially, the Philippines based its claim on its citizen's 
discovery (Thomas Colma) of unoccupied islands or 'terra nullius' ,37 but then 
reinforced its claim through the notion of proximity and indispensable need, that 
is, its security interests.38 The Philippines effective occupation of some of the 
islands it calls 'the Kalayan islands' was one way of justifying its territorial claim. 
Malaysia and Brunei argued that the islands they contested sat on their continental 
.shelf. While Malaysia already occupies some of the islands, Brunei does not 
control any of the islands in the Spratlys. All the claimants, except Brunei, have 
stationed military garrisons to protect their occupied islands. 
The volatility of the disputes was heightened by some claimant states' policy of 
'creeping assertiveness' - that is, "a gradual policy of establishing a greater 
physical presence in the South China Sea, without recourse to military 
confrontation."39 Although China has often been accused of being a proponent of 
this policy, clearly other claimants, such as Malaysia and Vietnam, have also 
adopted a similar strategy of gradually establishing more strongholds in the area. 
However, due to its determination to consolidate its hold in the Spratlys, China's 
actions have always created uproar in the region. In 1995, China constructed 
structures on Mischief Reef within the Philippines-claimed 200 miles EEZ.40 
China halted the development of the structure after the Philippines successfully 
galvanised international support, including ASEAN as a group, for its cause. In 
1998, when some ASEAN countries were plagued with financial crises, China 
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was able to consolidate its position on Mischief Reef, but this time the Philippines 
failed to gain support from its fellow ASEAN members. Part of the reason for this 
was that some ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, were not prepared to 
antagonise China which was providing support during the financial crisis.41 
China adopted a meticulously and well-calculated strategy of establishing a 
stronghold in the South China Sea. In 1974, China took over the Paracels Islands 
from South Vietnam without having to face strong reaction from the US, South 
Vietnam's ally. During that period, China and the US were in the process of 
rapprochement and China had anticipated that the US would not jeopardise its 
renewed relationship with China. At the same time, the Nixon Administration was 
also preoccupied with a pressing domestic issue, the Watergate scandaI.42 In 1988, 
China was able to establish a foothold in six islands in the Spratlys after 
successfully driving out the Vietnamese garrison there. Again, China had assessed 
correctly that its action would not attract external support for Vietnam, even from 
Vietnam's ally the Soviet Union. In the 1980s, the majority of the regional 
countries were less than sympathetic toward Vietnam because of Vietnam's 
military intervention in Cambodia. From the mid- l 980s, the relationship between 
Vietnam and the Soviet Union under President Gorbachev was less close, because 
Gorbachev was more concerned with the Soviet Union's domestic problems and 
at the same time was in the process of improving the Soviet Union's bilateral 
relations with China.43 The Mischief Reef affair showed ASEAN that China was 
willing to postpone its action until regional circumstances suited its objectives. In 
the latter case, the financial crises in 1998 meant that some ASEAN countries 
were unwilling to antagonise China by backing the Philippines. 
The situation was aggravated by some claimant states promulgating national 
legislation for their claims which gave them legal means to assert jurisdictional 
claims. The unilateral promulgation of national legislation of the claim is indeed a 
shrewd tactic to proclaim ownership. If other claimant states or the international 
community left the proclamation unchallenged, this would give an impression of 
recognition of the unilateral legislation. China, for instance, suggested that the 
lack of objection from the international community about the Chinese 
Government's 1947 official atlas of the South China Sea - including the 
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'controversial' nme interrupted lines - was implicit acknowledgement of the 
boundary within which China exercises its sovereignty.44 The 'nine interrupted 
lines' represent a maximal claim put forward by China on the South China Sea, 
because the atlas places the whole sea and the islands, atolls, islets and reefs as 
part of China's territory.45 In reality, the 1992 legislation had reinforced China's 
delimitation issued in the 194 7 official atlas. 
Some littoral states did challenge China's legislation. For instance, in March 
1992, Malaysia sent a diplomatic note rejecting the application of the new law to 
any territory and maritime areas claimed by Malaysia. Malaysia also referred to 
the Malaysian Government Gazette of December 1979 and April 1980 which 
stated the delimitation of its territorial waters, contiguous zones, exclusive 
economic zones and continental shelf.46 In this case, Malaysia contested unilateral 
legislation by referring to its national legislation, which was then also declared 
unilaterally. In September 1994, Indonesia also raised its concern over the 
legislation, and in particular requested clarification on some inconsistency 
between the legislation, the many Chinese writings and various informal 
explanations on the claims. In its diplomatic note, Indonesia sought to clarify the 
basis of China's claim - with reference to the undefined lines of the 1947 - from 
the point of view of the Law of the Sea Convention.47 Although in the diplomatic 
note Indonesia did not explicitly question the status of the Natunas, the question 
about the basis of the claim implicitly reflected its concern about the Natuna area. 
If the 'nine interrupted lines' or undefined lines were being treated as the limit of 
China's territorial sovereignty, China's claim would have included parts of 
Indonesia's 200-mile EEZ.48 
The Philippines had even contested an article in a Chinese newspaper, the 
Guangrning Daily, which was reporting the result of an extensive study in the 
South China Sea conducted by Chinese scientists over a ten year period. The 
article emphasised that the study provided scientific justification for China's 
claim. On 9 December 1994, Foreign Secretary Roberto Romulo released a 
statement which reiterated the Philippines position in the area it called 'the 
Kalayan islands' and stated that "[the Philippines] cannot, as a matter of policy, 
recognize China's claim to all the South China Sea."49 He further stated that "[t]he 
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studies made by China do not change the situation in the South China Sea, [that is, 
the area claimed by the Philippines]."5° China considered the Philippines had 
overreacted to a newspaper article, especially by taking the issue to a higher level 
through the statement made by Minister Romulo.51 Obviously, by expressing its 
strong reaction, the Philippines wished to de-legitimise China's efforts in building 
a case for its claim. In fact, China had adopted a similar strategy when the 
spokesman for China's _Foreign Ministry, Shen Guofang, in January 1995 
protested about an article in Vietnam's newspaper which publicised the results of 
geological research conducted by Vietnamese and Russian scientists around the 
Spratlys in 1993 and 1994. Mr. Shen asked Vietnam not to conduct more research 
in the contested areas in 1995, and asked third parties not to involve themselves in 
similar research with Vietnam.52 
Undoubtedly, overlapping claims, a problem made worse by national legislation 
and parochial reference to the 1982 UNCLOS, were difficult to reconcile because 
the areas claimed involved more than one country and therefore a bilateral 
negotiation would not address the problem adequately. China had announced that 
it would not recognise the result of any bilateral negotiation between other 
claimant states. China was adamant that any negotiation should only be held 
between the claimant states and China on a bilateral basis, and mainly to discuss 
joint development in the areas, without contesting China's claim. China has 
always maintained that its sovereignty over the South China Sea to be 
indisputable and, therefore, considered any claims made by other states as invalid. 
China's resolve about the merit of its claim, including the promulgation of 
national legislation, put the claimant states in a dilemma. Although aware of their 
relative weakness compared to China, some claimant states, such as Malaysia and 
the Philippines, were willing to embark on bilateral negotiation and consultation 
with China to address their differences. However, the Philippines also 
spearheaded the campaign to internationalise the disputes and tried, exhaustively, 
to bring its dispute with China to multilateral forums, such as the ASEAN 
Regional Forum and the ASEAN-China Dialogue. Although China resented the 
Philippines' strategy, it was willing to discuss the peripheral issues of the 
overlapping claims in the multilateral forum, such as the security of the sea-lanes. 
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China was also willing to discuss the South China Sea issues in the fringe of 
multilateral meetings of ASEAN-China Dialogue where such a discussion would 
not necessitate a reflection in the formal record.53 China was only prepared to 
discuss the overlapping claims disputes at multilateral forum on an informal basis. 
2.3. Military build up and the potential for armed conflict in the South China 
Sea 
As outlined earlier, the claimant states over the years increased their presence in 
the South China Sea by occupying more islands, stationing military garrisons, and 
building fortresses and even airstrips. This strategy of unilateral occupation to 
assert claims had led to two military skirmishes involving Vietnam and China (in 
1974 and 1988). The volatility created by the military manoeuvres increased the 
potential for open armed conflict and posed a risk for the whole region. The 
regional countries who felt threatened by an increase of military presence of some 
claimant states, particularly China, lodged diplomatic protests and strengthened 
their military capability, especially their air and naval capabilities. 
The following discussion illustrates the dynamics of the military build up of the 
claimant states and other littoral states bordering the South China Sea. According 
to Anthony Bergin, if China continues to develop its military capability and, in 
particular, its ability over the next 10 years (from 2001) to exploit advanced 
weapons and production technologies acquired from abroad, this would enable 
China to integrate naval and air capabilities against potential adversaries in the 
South China Sea.54 China has also purchased Russian Su-27s which, according to 
Weixing Hu, could satisfy "the immediate needs to extend air coverage to the 
South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits should force be used in these areas."55 
Concerning China's navy, he added that "the goal of naval development is to have 
effective sea control in the areas of Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China 
Sea."56 Tim Huxley argues that the regional countries were naturally alarmed by 
China's military build up because of two aspects: first the modernisation involved 
"often overlooked but increasingly powerful and flexible nuclear and long-range 
missile elements" and secondly, the secrecy that clouded the details of China's 
defence modernisation.57 With this threat looming, the Philippines committed 
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itself in 1985 to a 15-year military modernisation program, amounting to 50 
billion pesos ($1.9 billion).58 The Philippines Congress supported the military's 
modernisation program after they learned that "China was able to build [from late 
1994 to early 1995] installations on the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef with 
apparent impunity."59 
Other claimant states h~ve also embarked on military upgrading programs, 
especially to strengthen their navies. For instance, in April 2001 the United States 
agreed to sell eight conventional submarines to Taiwan. Although the purchase of 
submarines has much to do with Taiwan's threat perception of China, the 
submarines would increase Taiwan's capability to manoeuvre around the 
Spratlys.60 In the late 1990s Vietnam bought two Sango submarines from North 
Korea which had a "range of 2700 nautical miles and can be armed with 4 
torpedoes and up to 16 mines."61 With relatively closer proximity to the contested 
islands in South China Sea, Vietnam's submarines provided a new threat 
dimension that China's navy had to take into consideration.62 Malaysia was also 
considering purchasing submarines and developing a joint venture with the Dutch 
company RDM Submarines to set up a submarine service. In 2000, Malaysia 
obtained two Yarrow-class frigates from the United Kingdom (UK). 
As noted above, non-claimants in the region were also concerned about the threat 
to peace and stability in the South China Sea as a result of the military build up by 
the claimant states. Some littoral states had also embarked on military 
modernisation programs, focusing on their naval forces. In the early 1990s 
Singapore developed a naval dockyard that could accommodate the US military's 
vessels, including aircraft carriers.63 Singapore's strategic interest has necessitated 
the presence of United States' forces in the region to provide the region with 
security insurance. The United States' presence was also aimed at countering any 
potential new hegemonic power, either China or Japan, attempting to dominate the 
region. In particular, some ASEAN countries were concerned about China's 
potential to act as a new hegemonic power in the region, and they were suspicious 
of China's intention in the region through its growing military projection in the 
South China Sea.64 Indonesia supported Singapore's strategy of maintaining the 
U · . · 65 d at the same time developing the mted States' presence m the region an , ' 
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capacity of its own naval forces.66 Undoubtedly, Indonesia's strategic interest in 
the South China Sea, especially around the Natuna Islands, was closely linked 
with the final solution to the South China Sea disputes. 
The overlapping claims pose a risk to stability in the region because the claimant 
states have continuously expressed their preparedness to defend their claim, if 
necessary by military force. Such a statement of intent has increased concerns 
among the regional countries as well as non-regional countries whose strategic, 
political and economic interests are best served by regional stability. 
VI.3. Indonesia's diplomacy to manage potential conflicts in the South China 
Sea: the series of workshops 
The magnitude of the problem and the range of interested parties involved in the 
conflicting territorial and jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea makes the 
issue very complex. Any third party seeking to manage the potential conflicts, or 
to resolve the disputes, should have anticipated a long-term commitment, 
obstacles, and no guarantee of success. The many parties involved in the 
undertakings, the Indonesians, the Canada International Development Agency 
(CIDA) as sponsor, the parties to the disputes themselves and the non-participants 
(that is, the media and think-tanks, like CSIS) would all have realised this 
situation. 
This part of the chapter assesses the dynamics of the informal diplomacy of the 
workshop based on the objectives set by the Indonesians. The following 
discussion outlines the organisational aspects of the diplomatic undertakings in 
order to identify the weak and the strong aspects of the diplomatic process and to 
assess the impact of the organisational aspect on the diplomatic initiatives and 
their implementation. 
3.1. The informal workshop: its inception as a diplomatic means 
The workshop on the South China Sea was the brainchild of Dr. Hasjim Djalal 
(hereinafter referred to as Dr. Ojala)), the then Head of Agency for Research and 
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Development of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry.67 He was responsible for 
stimulating awareness in the Ministry of the South China Sea issue and in 
generating interest in the issue at the national level, through his numerous 
publications and lectures on the subject in military staff training (LEMHANAS) 
and research centres, including CSIS. The workshop series was, therefore, 
coloured by Dr. Djalal's personality, his ideals and determination to give 
substance to the abstrac_t concepts of co-operation and confidence building 
measures, which were the objectives of the workshops. However, apart from Dr. 
Djalal and his son, Dr. Dino Djalal,68 no other officials in the Ministry were 
continuously involved in the undertakings and, therefore, over the period of ten 
years there was a gap in understanding the ideals of the workshops. Moreover, 
those officials did not continuously follow the substantive discussion during the 
long years of the workshop process. To a certain extent, this gap affected the 
interest and commitment of some Ministry personnel in their diplomatic efforts 
and the way the Ministry conducted its diplomatic initiatives. 
According to Mr. Soendaroe Rachmad, in the late 1980s Dr. Djalal had discussed 
the idea for holding a workshop to address the South China Sea issue internally 
among the senior officials in the Research and Development Agency of the 
Ministry.69 The idea was then reported to Minster Alatas and, after receiving the 
Minister's consent, Dr. Djalal travelled to the ASEAN capitals to solicit support 
and, at the same time, to look for funding for the project.70 At the national level, 
the idea for holding a workshop was also discussed with the military 
establishment,71 the concerned ministries, including the Department of 
Communication, the Department of Mines and Energy, the Indonesian State Oil 
Company, the Indonesian Science Institute (LIPI), and the Jakarta based think 
tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). 
The idea received favourable domestic support and after the military skirmish in 
the Spratlys between Vietnam and China in March 1988 Indonesian policy 
makers' interest in the issues increased. For instance, in 1989, the National 
Defense Institute a think tank under the Ministry of Defense, urged Indonesia to 
' 
take initiatives to prevent conflicts erupting from overlapping claims in the sea 
close to Indonesia. They suggested Indonesia hold an informal meeting, like the 
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Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM).72 However, the suggestion did not outline how 
Indonesia should proceed with such a diplomatic initiative. To some extent, the 
paper vocalised Dr. Djalal's concern about the South China Sea problem which he 
had shared with the students during his various lectures in the Institute.73 
In his tour of the ASEAN capitals, Dr. Djalal received a mixed reception. 
According to Dr. Djalal, some ASEAN countries and the national constituents in 
Indonesia were concerned about potential new conflicts in the region after the 
settlement of Cambodia's conflict. He reminded them that it had taken more than 
ten years to settle the Cambodian problem and it was therefore important to find 
ways not to let new conflicts erupt in the region. In his view, the territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea had the potential to embroil the region in conflict. 
Hence, some ASEAN countries were receptive to the idea.74 However, Dr. Marti 
Natalegawa, an Indonesian diplomat who accompanied Dr. Djalal, noted that 
some ASEAN countries expressed scepticism, and were even cynical about the 
Indonesian initiative. He opined that their reaction stemmed from their suspicion 
of Indonesia searching for a new role in ASEAN after the Cambodian problem 
approached its conclusion. Furthermore, he argued that, by then, the idea of 
. d' 1 1 75 preventive 1p omacy was not very popu ar. 
Having domestic support and ASEAN's consent on the proposal, Dr. Djalal 
proceeded with preparation for the workshop, including the development of its 
format. Dr. Djalal based the format on his experiences in facilitating co-operation 
in the Fisheries Task Force of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), 
involving states in Southeast Asia, the Pacific islands, and Pacific Latin America. 
He further developed the format, together with Prof. Ian Townsend-Gault who 
was willing to seek funding from CIDA.76 Canada was included in the project not 
only because of its financial contribution but also because of its "political 
acceptability, being a non-super power but interested in the development of 
cooperative arrangements in the developing world, particularly in the Pacific 
Region."77 Dr. Djalal summarised the involvement of Canada in the workshop 
process as follows: 
The project would be developed by inviting the cooperation of and 
resource persons from Canada Ocean Law and Policy expe~s, w~o 
later founded the SCS Informal Working Group at the Umvers1ty 
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of British Columbia, directed by Prof. Ian Townsend-Gault. The 
SCS-IWG obtained core funding for the project from Canada 
International Development Agency (CIDA), which has supported 
all the ~eetings. SCS-IWG would also collaborate and help in 
developmg the agenda for the meeting, help to prepare background 
papers, and help ~o locate and arrange for participation of resource 
persons as well. 78 
3.2. The organisational aspect of the informal workshop: the problems of co-
ordination and inconsistency of interests among the Indonesians 
3.2.1. Co-ordination as a factor in informal diplomacy 
The financial contribution made by Canada to the diplomatic efforts created a 
triangular relationship between Dr. Djalal, Prof Townsend-Gault and the Ministry, 
in this case the Research and Development Agency, which acted as a focal point 
in the diplomatic initiatives. The triangular format created problems for co-
ordination, especially after Dr. Djalal no longer headed the Research and 
Development Agency. After the first workshop in Bali, in 1990, Dr. Djalal was 
appointed as Indonesian Ambassador to Bonn, but to maintain the continuity of 
the workshops Minister Alatas asked him to continue serving the Ministry in the 
informal workshop. At first, the Minister's request created dualism in the 
diplomatic process with the workshops being directed from Bonn and Jakarta. In 
addition, Minister Alatas' decision to give the Agency the custody of the project 
was not welcomed by some officials from the directorates who considered the 
issue fell under their jurisdiction.79 To complicate the matter further, the new 
Head of the Agency had to seek advice about the substance of the workshops and 
the proceedings from Dr. Djalal. 
The following discussion provides some illustration of the complications 
concerning co-ordination and dualism. Although Dr. Djalal was no longer 
officially in charge of the diplomatic initiatives, his involvement in some meetings 
on the law of the sea put him in contact with some representatives of the claimant 
states, including representatives from China. From the meetings, he sensed that 
China was interested in participating in the workshop and he therefore proposed 
that the Ministry dispatch representatives to Beijing and provide China with 
details of the diplomatic initiative.80 Prof Townsend-Gault supported Dr. Djalal's 
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suggestion of sending a representative to China and even expressed the personal 
view that the presence of Dr. Djalal as Project Director in Beijing was essential.SI 
In reply, Minister Alatas suggested Prof Townsend-Gault should consult with Mr. 
Singgih Hadipranowo, Dr. Djalal's successor, who was responsible for "the 
preparations for the second meeting and the administrative and substantive 
handling of the South China Sea project."s2 The Minister also mentioned that 
although he agreed on the_importance of approaching China, the Ministry was still 
considering the merits of sending a special mission as soon as possible or only 
using the normal diplomatic channels.s3 
There are several reasons to explain the circumstances above. First, there was 
uncertainty on the part of the Canadians as to who was in charge of the project. 
They maintained direct contact with Dr. Djalal, under the impression that Dr. 
Djalal was still in charge of the project. Secondly, they wanted to bring to the 
immediate attention of the Minister the merits of approaching China. They noted 
that Dr. Djalal has sent a cable from New York on August 1990, but that no reply 
had been forthcoming by January 1991 when the Canadians had sent their letter. 
Although there was no clear explanation for the inaction, the delay most likely 
stemmed from the transitional period from Dr. Djalal to his successor, Mr. 
Hadipranowo, who needed more time to fully grasp of the project and the issues 
involved. In the end, the Ministry did not send a special mission but, using normal 
diplomatic channels, sought confirmation of China's participation in the workshop 
during the official visit of China's Deputy Foreign Minister Xu Dunxin to Jakarta 
on 19 April 1991. 
The preparation for the second workshop took place in February 1991 and Mr. 
Hadipranowo consulted Dr. Djalal on a number of substantive issues including 
how to proceed with the meeting. On 30 April 1991, the Ministry circulated a note 
to Indonesian Embassies in Beijing, Vietnam, Laos and in the ASEAN countries, 
detailing the reasons for the planned workshop and asking the Embassies to 
inform their accredited countries about the timetable and the workshop's format. 
In the letter, the Ministry also explained that the initial plan to have a two-stage 
meeting as agreed during the first workshop in Bali (that is, a meeting involving 
ASEAN countries, Vietnam and Laos, followed by a meeting of all participants, 
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including China and Taiwan) was no longer applicable. Indonesia was concerned 
that China would not consider Indonesia was organising the workshop in good 
faith if China was excluded from the first stage of the meeting. 84 
After the second workshop in Bandung, held from the 15 to 18 July 1991, the 
three parties - Dr. Djalal, the Canadians and the Ministry - reached an agreement 
in an apparent effort to cl~fy their individual responsibilities and to smooth co-
ordination. It was agreed that the Canadians, through the University of British 
Columbia (UBC), would be responsible for providing financial support to carry 
out studies, running the workshops, recruiting resource persons from Canada, as 
well as supporting the programs with documentation and library services. The 
Ministry (the Research Agency) would be responsible for technical, 
administrative, as well as political and diplomatic support. The Ministry would 
also be responsible for following up with the participating countries and Taiwan 
on the agreements reached through the workshops and, if necessary, the UBC 
would support any efforts to persuade the participants to commit themselves to the 
program. Funding for the diplomatic mission, including the financial burden for 
organising the workshop in Indonesia, the Ministry should look for support from 
the Ministry of Finance. Dr. Djalal would be responsible for preparing and 
studying the substantive parts of the issues, through Yayasan Pusat Studi 
Kawasan Asia Tenggara (The Centre for Southeast Asian Studies), the research 
centre he had established. The UBC would provide the Centre with financial 
support.85 
3.2.2. Inconsistency of interests among the Indonesians and its impact on 
Indonesian informal diplomacy 
Although the new arrangement clarified the responsibility of each of the parties in 
the project, the Research Agency was somewhat detached from the substantive 
aspects of the project. As a consequence, in the span of eleven years during the 
workshop process, interest among the Agency officials on the substantive aspects 
of the issues varied.86 Despite informal diplomacy being the Ministry's agenda, it 
was natural that each Head of the Agency would wish to bring their own priority 
and programs into consideration during their leadership.87 For instance, Dr. Johan 
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Syahperi88 gave priority to research on international economic issues and 
globalization. Nevertheless, in terms of co-ordination, the Director responsible for 
political research in the Agency was acting as a lynchpin in the diplomatic 
process, with bureaucrats inside and outside the Ministry, and with the 
governments and authorities who sent participants to the workshops. The Director 
was responsible for monitoring the workshop process, and consulting with the 
Head of Agency on issu~s concerned with policies or requiring attention at the 
highest level. 
Another implication of the Agency's detachment from the substantive issues of 
the workshop was the Agency's dependence on direction from Dr. Djalal, 
especially with regard to the steps to be taken and the strategy as well as scenarios 
for the various meetings held within the ambit of the workshops. For instance, Dr. 
Djalal prepared Mr. Hadipranowo's pointers for discussion during the latter's visit 
to ASEAN countries, and China and Vietnam, between March and May 1992, to 
follow up the agreements reached during the second workshop. 89 The technicality 
of the issues, especially after a number of technical working groups and expert 
groups were established, had also restrained the Agency from increasing its role in 
the diplomatic process. Therefore, the Agency functioned more as facilitator of 
the workshop, with the Head of the Agency chairing some of the sessions. 
To optimise discussion at the workshop, the Agency organised preparatory 
meetings involving officials from the Ministry, other ministries, and think tank 
participants. In the pre-workshop meeting, the Agency, together with Dr. Djalal, 
discussed the meeting's agenda and, at times, requested experts from other 
ministries to prepare papers on specific issues, for example, assessing the potential 
for living and non-living resources in the South China Sea. During the meeting the 
Agency also requested inputs from the directorates in the Ministry who followed 
the issues as part of their portfolio on matters such as political and security issues 
in the South China Sea. The workshop's convenor needed to be aware of the 
issues because their political context could affect the dynamics of the informal 
meetings. The informal nature of the workshop did not necessarily isolate the 
participants from the political and security developments in the region and, 
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although they were taking part in the workshops in their personal capacity, they 
had to maintain the official lines of their government at times. 
Some officials in the Agency were dissatisfied because they had only played a 
supporting role. Their displeasure did influence the workshop process. For 
example, some recommendations reached during the workshop or some pending 
matters for consideration ~n participants' respective capitals were not followed up 
thoroughly.90 The informal nature of the workshop made some participants less 
persistent in trying to persuade their leaders to implement the recommendations. 
In such cases, the Ministry sent letters to remind the claimant countries about the 
follow up actions that they had to perform. Except for the Agency, the two other 
parties in the undertaking, Dr. Djalal and the Canadians had no authority to 
remind the participants formally. A timely and persistent follow up was an 
important factor of the workshop process, and any delay in the action was a risk to 
the achievement of the workshop's objectives.91 
The appointment of Dr. Djalal as Ambassador at Large for the Law of the Sea and 
Maritime Affairs in 1994, after he had completed his assignment in Bonn, 
lessened co-ordination problems in the Ministry because he could continuously 
monitor the workshop's preparations from Jakarta. However, his appointment 
renewed the dualism in the process because, from his new position, he could also 
steer the direction of the workshop process through his close contact with Minister 
Alatas. The contact created resentment amongst some Agency officials.92 Initially, 
this was not too problematic because at the time of Dr. Djalal's appointment, the 
new Head of the Agency, Mr. Soendaroe Rachmad, who was at one time Dr. 
Djalal's deputy in the Agency, had been involved in the early process of the 
workshop. Mr. Rachmad served as Head of the Agency from 1994 to 1996, during 
that period, the Agency played a role more as secretariat for the workshop process 
and positioned itself during the workshops as an Organising Committee, 
concerned with procedural and administrative matters.93 However, Mr. Rachmad's 
successors were not impressed with a secretarial role and their reactions swung 
between assertiveness and passivity from lack of interest. They were not very 
eager, for instance, to seek funding for the annual workshop from the Ministry of 
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Finance, and did not consider finalising the minutes of the workshop's proceeding 
on time was necessary. In fact, records of the proceedings have been ~aluable in 
identifying the position of the participants and could function as a basis to set a 
more effective strategy for the subsequent workshops. 
As to assertiveness, some officials from the Agency also wanted to set the 
direction of the workshop from their standpoint, with minimal consultation with 
Dr. Djalal and the UBC.94 This lack of consultation or co-ordination was 
observable in the proceedings of some workshops and in the messages put across 
by the Indonesian Foreign Minister and the Head of Agency in their speeches 
during the workshops. The opening remarks of the Minister, which were prepared 
by the Agency, played an important role during the workshops because they set 
the tone of the discussion, and the participants usually referred to these messages 
during the workshops. Therefore, co-ordination and consultation among the 
Indonesians about the salient points or messages that they wished the Minister to 
emphasise in his speech were essential. Failure or lack of consultation could 
create awkwardness among the Indonesians or increase suspicion among the 
participants about Indonesia's intentions. The following discussion provides two 
examples of the lack of prior consultation among the Indonesians and how it 
impacted on the informal workshop and meeting dynamics. The first one is 
concerned with the notion of formalising the informal workshop and the second 
one with the notion of synergy between the informal and formal tracks. 
Minister Alatas, when delivering an opening remark to the Fourth Workshop in 
1993, expressed his belief that the informal workshop should be formalised. He 
stated that "[g]overnments concerned may soon deem it desirable and timely to 
'upgrade' the present Workshop format and to engage in a more formal 
Government-to-Government dialogue."95 The suggestion prompted debates during 
. 96 ch· . the workshop sessions and, in particular, Chma was upset. ma was not m 
favour of formalising the workshop because of the status of Taiwan, and China's 
policy of discussing overlapping disputes in bilateral and not multilateral 
negotiations. Although there was a precedent for quasi formal co-operation in the 
region (APEC), wherein Taiwan was an active member, it was not clear why the 
Minister took up the issue when the workshop was still in the formative years. 
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The first three workshops produced a joint statement expressing agreement to 
present several recommendations to their governments, including not to use force 
in settling disputes and to explore areas for co-operation. Optimism followed this 
success but subsequent events showed that the participants lacked interest to 
upgrade the workshop format. In fact, when travelling to the capital cities of the 
participants in early 1992, Mr. Hadipranowo had asked the governments and 
authorities' opinion whet~er or not the workshop should be formalised, and most 
of them were against the upgrading of the workshops format. 97 The reason for the 
Agency inserting the idea into the Minister's speech was not clear. One source 
suggested that the Indonesians were interested in testing the reactions of the 
participants toward the idea within the group and they noted that the strongest 
opponents of the idea were Malaysia, Vietnam and China.98 However, the issue 
put Dr. Djalal in a difficult position during the meeting. He had to explain to the 
meeting that the format would remain informal and that formalising the workshop 
actually meant two things "[the] recommendations translated into actual policies 
of the Governments involved, or by devising projects and programs participated in 
and executed by Governments."99 Minister Alatas no longer raised the matter in 
his remarks during the ensuing workshops and when referring to the formalising 
issue, his position was similar to that of Dr. Djalal. 
In 1997, Minister Alatas made a remark about finding a synergy between the "so-
called 'first track diplomacy' within the ARF and ASEAN-China dialogue and 
'the second track diplomacy' through the workshop process."100 He believed that 
the two tracks could "reinforce each other to produce the best result for the 
peoples of the South China Sea area."101 During the meeting's discussion, Dr. 
Syahperi reminded the participants about Minister Alatas's encouragement to find 
synergy between the two tracks. However, Dr. Syahperi was more interested in 
directing the participants to discuss the implementation aspect of the project 
proposal and to focus on aspects that had been agreed upon. He assured the 
participants that the business communities would be interested in translating the 
framework for co-operation identified by the participants into feasible business 
activities. 102 The appeal was in line with his earlier speech when he stated that 
"[the] Agency would undertake any necessary steps, within its competence and 
capacity, to communicate the findings of the Workshop to the interested parties in 
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the region and beyond."103 Clearly, Dr. Syahperi was more interested in finding 
concrete activities from the workshops' process and had hoped that focusing on 
agreed issues could promise tangible results. 
Focusing discussions on concrete activities has positive and negative 
consequences. On the positive side, the workshops could concentrate their energy 
and resources on realisi_ng tangible projects of co-operation to dismiss the 
criticism that the workshops had reached a plateau and become a talk-shop. 104 On 
the negative side, the workshops could become more tedious and too narrow with 
the discussion concentrating mainly on projects rather than on ideas. More 
discussion on projects was welcomed by some participants who were not very 
keen on seeing the workshops discuss political and security issues at length, but 
were prepared to discuss technical issues at length. For instance, in 1997 China 
tried to prevent the workshops from discussing territorial and sovereignty 
issues, 105 or from pondering the sensitive issue of a code of conduct in the South 
China Sea. Prof. Xu Guangjian, Legal Adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of China, maintained that the workshop had no mandate to discuss a code of 
conduct in ~he South China Sea. 106 This position was also asserted in the Ninth 
Workshop in 1998. China wished the workshops to confine their discussions to 
technical aspects of co-operation in the South China Sea. 
China's strategy put the Indonesians in an awkward position because the 
Indonesian team did not voice a coherent perspective during the workshop. Some 
were vocal on the project implementation issue and others took the 'balancing 
position' by preferring the workshop to ponder on the implementation of the 
projects and politico-security issues. For his part, Dr. Djalal was striving to win 
support from the participants to let the workshop discuss the politico-security 
issues, especially the code of conduct in the South China Sea. For Dr. Djalal, the 
concept of synergy - floated by Minister Alatas based on the draft's speech 
prepared by the Agency - meant that the second track was the appropriate forum 
to explore and discuss some sensitive issues which the formal track had been 
unable to do. Obviously, Dr. Djalal was eager to explore the possibility of the 
workshops developing a code of conduct in the South China Sea because he was 
not very optimistic about the implementation of the project in the immediate 
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future. The respective governments' support for implementing projects approved 
at the 1994 and 1995' workshops was not forthcoming. 
Dr. Djalal's persistence on the politico-security issue, and Dr. Syahperi's 
repetitive call to focus on implementing the projects, were not well received by 
some participants, especially those who had misgivings about Indonesia's 
intentions. China percei~ed the discussion on a regional code of conduct as 
Indonesia's effort to restrain China from asserting its claim in the South China 
Sea, whereas in terms of project implementation, some participants, including 
Malaysia, thought that Indonesia wanted to benefit economically from the 
project. 107 Such misgivings about Indonesia's intention in the workshops were 
unavoidable and, as previously noted, were added to by the Indonesian's failure to 
consult among themselves prior to the workshop. 108 
3.3. The dynamics of informal workshop, and ways and means to develop co-
operation and confidence-building measures 
The previous discussion attempted to highlight the internal dynamics of the 
Indonesians and argued that the internal dynamics influenced the way the Ministry 
conducted its diplomatic initiatives. The following discussion addresses the 
dynamics of the workshops from the standpoint of the objectives of informal 
diplomacy, that is, to develop co-operation among the disputants and the littoral 
states without prejudicing the overlapping claims. The other objective of informal 
workshop was to develop confidence-building measures among the disputants so 
that they would hesitate to use military means to settle their differences. Thus, the 
intention was to avoid or prevent military conflicts. 
As mentioned earlier, the idea to hold a workshop stemmed from concern about 
possible open conflicts due to overlapping claims of territorial jurisdiction. By the 
time Indonesia initiated the workshop, there was no other forum in the region 
which addressed the South China Sea issue. Due to its informality, the workshop 
provided a unique opportunity for representatives from all claimant states and 
Taiwan to meet and look for areas of possible co-operation. The objective of 
developing co-operation would only materialise if the participants were 
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committed to the endeavours and were prepared to explore the subject during their 
meetings. 
Indonesia identified some topics of discussions during the workshops with the aim 
of linking the objectives ·of the informal diplomacy and the ideal function of the 
workshops (that is, as a 'policy initiating' forum). The topics, which were 
discussed in separate ~essions, covered a range of issues: (1) resource 
management; (2) shipping, navigation and communication; (3) environment, 
ecology and scientific research, (4) political and security issues; (5) territorial and 
jurisdictional issues; (6) institutional mechanisms for co-operation; and (7) claims 
to the Spratly and Paracel Islands. 109 Discussion on less controversial issues, such 
as navigation and environment, were more intensive because co-operation among 
participants was likely. In contrast the participants also addressed, although en-
passant, politico-security issues and territorial claims. The discussion of 
controversial issues was to develop confidence-building measures among the 
claimant states and concerned countries. At least each of the participants would 
understand what the concerns of the other participants were. 
Over the period of eleven years, the workshop discussions revolved around the 
above seven topics. In that period, the workshops had two distinctive 
characteristics. First, after the setting up of several technical working groups, the 
status of the workshop had been elevated. Workshop participants not only 
received the reports and assessed the recommendations made by the technical 
working groups, but also gave their political considerations. The workshops also 
provided the working groups with mandates on issues that the groups were 
allowed to explore. Second, with the creation of a number of working groups, 
from the Fourth Workshop (in 1993) onward, discussions of political and security 
issues were gradually set aside. Similarly, the topics of Spratly and Paracel issues 
and, at a later stage, confidence-building measures, were taken off the workshop 
agendas. 
Hence, on the one hand, the workshops were characterised by some participants' 
efforts to politicise the technical issues of the project proposals. They prevented 
the implementation of projects in the South China Sea by arguing that the 
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sovereignty status of the territory had not yet been decided. On the other hand, 
some participants de-politicised the workshops by stressing that the workshops 
had no mandate to discuss political issues, including confidence-building 
measures. China, for instance, argued that the workshops themselves were already 
a manifestation of confidence-building measures. The following discussion further 
explores these matters and assesses how Indonesia dealt with the problems, as 
well as what strategies In~onesia used during the workshop process. 
3.3.1. The informal workshop: settings and the strategy Indonesia developed 
Basically, the informal workshop was a kind of multilateral or conference 
diplomacy. The implication of this was that the setting of the workshops, 
including the meeting arrangements, proceedings, and systems governing the 
decision making, followed the normal practice of conference diplomacy. The 
particular distinction of the informal workshop was that no flags were placed on 
the conference table because of the sensitivity concerning Taiwan's status. 
Indonesia pursued informal diplomacy by combining the diplomatic skills of some 
Indonesian diplomats, including persuasion and negotiation skills as well as their 
knowledge of the issues involved. Indonesia also relied on the expertise of some 
resource persons, mostly from Canada, who were familiar with the issues or with 
similar disputes in different regions in the world. To influence the dynamics of the 
workshops, Indonesia gave special attention to several factors such as the 
selection of meeting venues, the arrangement of meeting agenda, and the 
development of strategy during the workshops' process. 
Indonesia paid particular interest to the workshop venues. During the workshops' 
series, meetings were held in places which had significant values, either directly 
or indirectly to the issues involved, and the Indonesian Foreign Minister would 
highlight the significance of the venues during his opening remarks. For instance, 
Bandung, the venue for the Second Workshop, was hailed as the city where the 
Asian-African Conference took place in 1955 (which declared the Ten Principles 
including the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes). With 
other venues, such as Jakarta, Batam and Balikpapan, there was an emphasis on 
their strategic location next to the South China Sea. 
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The opening remarks of the Indonesian Foreign Minister were designed to play an 
important role in the workshop process, and to stimulate discussion during the 
workshops, especially if the speech touched on sensitive issues. In most cases, the 
speech did set the tone of the workshops and was usually referred to by the 
participants during their ·discussions. When submitting the draft to the Minister, 
officials provided an accompanying letter that explained the rationale behind the 
messages and indicated ~ome points that they thought should be emphasised. 
Although in the end it was the Minister who decided on the merit of messages, the 
Minister often included the messages. Another way to stimulate the discussion 
was by developing a strategy of structuring the discussion including assigning 
some participants to lead the discussions and to jointly chair the sessions of the 
meetings. The Canadians and other nationalities who sat as a panel of experts also 
contributed to the discussions by providing an alternative point of view on the 
subjects being discussed or by giving background information on the topic, from 
both theoretical and practical perspectives. Examples of these were the discussion 
on the joint development concept and, at a later stage of the workshop series, on 
the zones of co-operation models involving several countries in different regions. 
The overall workshop setting was also designed to optimise the time available 
during the workshop. When they came to the workshops, the participants were 
already aware of the agenda, and had learned beforehand who would present a 
paper or lead the discussion. In arranging the agenda, Indonesia, if possible, tabled 
the sensitive issues for the later discussions in order to limit controversy and 
debate. It became a convention that the participants discussed the controversial 
issues such as territorial claims, after they had discussed the less contentious 
issues at length. Another approach was to invite the claimant states to outline their 
territorial and jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea but, based on an 
h . 110 F agreement beforehand, no discussion was allowed on t e presentation. or 
instance, during the Second Workshop in Bandung (1991), after the presentation, 
the Chairman, Dr. Djalal, invited views from participants on the "feasible co-
operative arrangements that could be undertaken independently of the resolution 
f · , l d' ,, 111 o temtona 1sputes. 
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During the exchange of views in Bandung (1991), participants identified a number 
of areas for possible co-operation. In particular, they agreed to recommend to their 
respective governments, and to the appropriate institutions in their respective 
countries, three proposals for scientific co-operation proposed by China and one 
proposal made by the Philippines. China suggested conducting scientific studies 
in the following areas: (1) a joint expedition to investigate natural phenomena in 
the South China Sea; (2)_ a joint study on the meteorological conditions in the 
South China Sea; and (3) a joint study on the promotion of the safety of 
navigation in the South China Sea. The Philippines proposed a more ambitious 
proposal in the form of a "joint petroleum evaluation study of an agreed area to 
assist in the assessment of hydrocarbon potential of that area."112 Due to the 
sensitivity of the hydrocarbon issue, discussions on the Philippines' proposal 
(even under the Working Group of Resource Assessment) did not progress well. 
In contrast, China's proposals and proposals from other participants on marine 
scientific research suggested that the issues of scientific studies were less 
contentious, and therefore could generate more ideas. 
Inviting participants to make recommendations was Indonesia's tactic for building 
a consensus for co-operation around the sensitive issues and was one of the main 
features of Indonesian diplomacy throughout the workshops. Indonesia hoped the 
participants and the respective governments would commit themselves to their 
own recommendations. However, the recommendations reached during the 
informal workshops were not always given immediate attention by the respective 
authorities, or some authorities simply did not want to follow up on the 
recommendations. 
After the Bandung workshop in 1991, Indonesia was heartened by the numerous 
proposals of possible co-operation made by the participants, but in all cases there 
was a gap between proposing and implementing the proposal. China's proposal 
was one case. China's proposal for scientific co-operation invited curiosity. By 
making such a proposal, China had impressed other participants that she was 
taking part in the workshop in good faith. However, as evidenced in the following 
years, China's main intention in the workshops was seemingly to prevent co-
operation in the South China Sea from materialising. In fact, China considered the 
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workshop process was moving very fast and in the process had tried to slow it 
down by way of opposing project implementations.113 According to Dino Djalal, 
the designing and the completion of project proposal for co-operation in the South 
China Sea was "by no means an easy process: the drafting process for the 
proposals was marked constantly by foot-dragging, reluctance, indecision, inertia 
and resistance on the part of the claimants."114 
China's tactic did limit Indonesia's ability to manoeuvre during the workshops. 
The consensus ruling of the workshops created difficulty for the workshops 
process to move forward, unless all the participants were agreeable and felt 
comfortable. As workshop convenor, Indonesia had to stick to group consensus 
and could not appear to be imposing its ideas on the participants. Indonesia had 
hoped that the participants would act more reasonably under 'group pressures' 
because it would be awkward to insist on a position when the other members of 
the group were prepared to make concessions. However, the group pressures did 
not influence some participants, for instance from China, who had to maintain 
their government position. To deal with the difficulty, Indonesia had also relied on 
the persuasion skills of the Indonesians involved in the undertakings and the 
approaches made by the Ministry at the governmental level. 
3.3.2. Indonesia's efforts to stimulate progress in the informal workshops: 
the issues of participants lack of commitments and meeting 
procedures 
In the eleven years of conducting the workshops, the various Indonesian 
embassies and some missions that the Ministry had sent to the participating 
countries were part of the overall diplomatic efforts to persuade the respective 
authority to support the project. An example of this occurred in January 1996, 
when Minister Alatas wrote letters to governments and authorities who had sent 
participants to the informal workshops. In the letter, he asked for support and 
contributions, either by providing expertise, technical assistance or financial 
support, to implement the projects agreed by the workshop participants. He asked 
his counterparts, the foreign ministers, "to take an active interest in the realization 
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f th d . t 1 "115 T · . o e agree proJec proposa s. ogive reason for his appeal, Minister Alatas 
highlighted the followings: 
Although the Workshop process is informal in nature and the 
participants, some of whom government officials, attend the 
meetings in thei~ personal capacities, I am of the view that the 
Workshop process has been helpful in managing potential conflict 
in the South China Sea area and in the endeavour to convert it into 
potential for cooperation. Hence it deserves our support, especially 
since it has been ~idely appreciated throughout the world. 116 
To emphasise the significance of his appeal, Minister Alatas sent Dr. Djalal and 
the Director for Political Research of the Agency to the respective capitals to meet 
the foreign ministers and deliver the letter by hand. Dr. Djalal also used the 
opportunity of presenting the letter to explain the progress of the workshop 
process and to indicate on aspects which he believed the authority in each 
participant country might be able to contribute. 117 From their meetings with the 
foreign ministers, the envoys sent by Minister Alatas were able to observe and 
assess reactions from the foreign ministers. In their reports to Minister Alatas, 
they mentioned that with the exception of China and Malaysia, authorities from 
other countries and from Taiwan had indicated their willingness to help 
implement the projects. 118 Overall, the sending of special envoys was a calculated 
move by Indonesia to bring the matter to the highest attention in the respective 
capitals and to bypass the 'bureaucratic red tape'. 
Success in bypassing the bureaucracy did not necessarily guarantee a positive 
response from the claimant states because they looked on the matter from their 
own interests. Not long after the visit, Indonesia received formal replies from 
some authorities of the claimant and littoral states. Except for Brunei and 
Singapore, the other authorities gave no firm commitments and only expressed 
'statements of intent' for supporting project implementation. Foreign Minister 
Domingo Siazon of the Philippines, for instance, stated that "[w]e are now 
evaluating the extent and nature of Philippine contributions to them"119 Similarly, 
Mr. Fredrick Chien of Taiwan stated to Minister Alatas that some authorities were 
discussing how they could participate and contribute to the projects and would 
d . . 120 s· d d contact Dr. Djalal as soon as they had reached a ec1S1on. mgapore respon e 
by mentioning that they would organise and finance the training of seafarers of the 
South China Sea states in Singapore, and also nominated the tide gauge at the 
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Raffles Lighthouse as a tidal monitoring station for project implementation 
121 M s· ' F . M" . purposes. oreover, mgapore s ore1gn mister shared Minister Alatas 
argument on the merit of implementing the projects and stated: 
I agree with the philosophy that we should seek ways to enhance 
cooperation amongst all those concerned with the South China Sea 
dispute, as this would lead to £reater appreciation of the positions 
of each country on the matter. 1 2 
In contrast, Malaysia did not indicate in their letter whether or not they were 
considering the projects, only stating "Malaysian participants look forward to 
discussing the question of implementing the approved projects at the TWG on 
Marine Scientific Research scheduled to be held in Cebu, Philippines, 14-18 July, 
1996."123 In the letter, Malaysia's position was quite clear that they would not 
commit themselves and would rather have further discussion on the matters, that 
is, whether or not it was timely to implement the approved projects. 
The lack of commitments by such governments made Indonesia's efforts to 
develop co-operation through projects implementation difficult. Similarly, in the 
workshops process itself, Indonesia could not adopt a different strategy other than 
to maintain the agreed format of consensus and the ideal of exploration of options. 
Indonesia could only stimulate discussion on possible co-operation in the South 
China Sea, but could not allow discussion on the main issue of overlapping 
territorial and jurisdictional claims. Indonesia did invite discussion on the Spratlys 
and Paracels issues during the Third Workshop in Yogyakarta (1992), and Dr. 
Djalal who chaired the session focused the discussion on three topics, namely: (1) 
clarification and possible definition of the specific area of dispute; (2) co-
operative activities; and (3) dispute settlement. 124 Clearly, the intentions of the 
focused discussion were to set the parameters for possible future co-operation in 
the disputed areas and at the same time to test the preparedness of the claimant 
states to clarify their claims. 
Not all participants were willing to engage in the focused discussion with some of 
the claimant states preferring to make their claim ambiguous. For example, China 
did not make it clear whether they claimed only the Spratly islands or the whole 
territorial waters of the South China Sea. As a consequence, the lack of clarity of 
the claims made it difficult for the workshops to suggest any area in the South 
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China Sea for joint development or joint co-operation. To avoid misapprehension 
about its attention to table the topic, Indonesia had made clear the intention of the 
discussion and had even prepared an annotated agenda for the participants prior to 
the meeting. In its explanation, Indonesia mentioned that the discussions were 
aimed at: 125 
1) defining the Spratly area over which the joint development could be 
undertaken; 
2) defining the notion of 'Joint Development' in the Spratly area, whether this 
should include resources management and exploitation, either living or non 
living; 
3) defining peaceful activities which would be allowed in the Spratly areas, such 
as freedom of navigation and communication, joint conduct of scientific 
research, joint action on search and rescue, and combating pollution and piracy 
as well as eliminating illicit drug traffic; and 
4) defining the possibility of including non-claimant states in the South China Sea 
areas or outside it, and in what fields the non-claimants could participate. 
The discussion on the topics was not very productive because some claimant 
states were not interested in clarifying their claim and were not prepared to talk 
about the issue of disputes settlement. They did exchange views on the topic of 
co-operative activities, but rendered no conclusive agreements on the issue. The 
participants only listed possible areas of co-operation, including environmental 
protection and marine research. 126 Although Indonesia had already anticipated this 
outcome, based on the preliminary visits by the Head of the Agency to the 
claimant states, it still proceeded with the discussions during the workshop. 127 
The decision to proceed did enable Indonesia to observe any shifts in position and 
to test participants' reaction towards divergence of opinions. In the end, Indonesia 
had to accept the reality that the issues surrounding possible co-operation in the 
overlapping areas were very sensitive. However, this did not stop Indonesia from 
looking for possible breakthroughs and had, in fact, come up with two alternative 
solutions. Dr. Djalal, based on his assessment of UNCLOS 1982, developed the 
first option of designating some areas in the South China Sea where no states 
could theoretically assert their claim. The second option was to propose 
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Indonesian territory in the South China Sea as an alternative area for project 
implementation. 
In mid-1994, Dr. Djalal travelled around the capitals of the claimant states to 
discuss a proposal designating some areas in the South China Sea, based on 
UNCLOS 1982, for a joint development zone. He indicated in the proposal that 
within the designated are~s there were a number of possible joint efforts that could 
take place, ranging from less sensitive issues, such as scientific research, search 
and rescue operation and marine parks to the harder subjects of prospecting and 
exploration of sea-bed resources. 128 Some claimant states were not interested in 
the proposal, 129 and China even asked Indonesia not to discuss the idea with other 
claimant states nor to raise it during the workshop. The proposal, known as 'the 
donut formula', reads as follows: 
If the 200 mile economic zone of each littoral country in the SC 
Sea area is measured from their baselines on the mainland or from 
the archipelagic baselines, then it could be visualised that a certain 
portion of the SC Sea (in the middle) would not fall into the 
economic zone of any country. If that is feasible, the 'donut' in the 
middle of the SC Sea could be used as the area for Joint 
Development Zone. 130 
The lack of commitment to the workshop process was one of the major obstacles 
for Indonesia in pursuing its informal diplomacy. Indonesia hoped that, at the 
least, commitment to the workshop process meant developing a sense of 
belonging or making the participants consider themselves as an important part of 
the whole process. To achieve this goal, Indonesia had to develop some tactics 
and, among others, it encouraged the participants to share the chairing of the 
workshops. From the Second Workshop in Bandung (1991) to the Fifth Workshop 
in Bukit Tinggi (1994) Indonesia shared the chairing of different sessions with a 
representative from one of the participating countries. Indonesia changed the 
tactic in 1995. From the Sixth Workshop in Balik Papan (1995) to the Ninth in 
Ancol (1008), the co-chairmen of the session were representatives from two 
participating countries. 
However, Indonesia always chaired the last session in every workshop which 
adopted the workshop's statement. This was the most important session overall 
because it involved the formulation of statements that implied consensus. As a 
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consequence, the participants, at times, became involved in heavy debate about 
the formulation of some paragraphs in the statement and in this case the 
participants' diplomatic and legal backgrounds were their major assets. Their 
experience in diplomacy and familiarity with legal terms were a means to contest 
any draft paragraph in the workshop statement which did not suit their interest. On 
some substantive issues that Indonesia considered important, and which should be 
reflected in the final stat~ment, the Indonesian Chair tried his best to have the 
meeting adopt the statement or at the least to adjust and not to delete the 
statement. This was not an easy task because the consensus ruling meant that all 
participants had to be satisfied with the paragraph's formulation. 
For instance, during the Ninth Workshop in 1998, participants from China argued 
that the word 'develop' in paragraph 14 of the draft statement - which says 'to 
develop a regional code of conduct' - should not be used. Prof. Xu Guangjian, a 
retired Chinese diplomat with a background in law, stated that the word 'develop' 
implied a commitment and only a government can make a commitment. 131 He 
argued that the informal workshop had no authority to make a commitment and 
therefore the word 'develop' should be omitted from the statement. Dr. Djalal and 
Prof. Townsend-Gault, in their capacity as resource persons, as well as an 
Indonesian diplomat who served in the Legal Treaty Directorate provided their 
arguments on the importance of the paragraph. 132 After a lengthy discussion, the 
meeting reached a compromise formulation by replacing the word 'develop' with 
'study and discuss'. The final formulation read as follows: 
Within the context of discussing confidence building measures, 
including guidelines and a code of conduct in the South China Sea, 
the participants agreed that the 4th TWG-LM [Technical Working 
Group on Legal Matters] will continue to study and discuss this 
topic. 133 
In such cases the most that the Indonesian Chairman could do was to find an , 
alternative word or phrase which suited all the participants, but which still carried 
an important message. Hence, the words 'study and discuss' implied that the 
participants remained committed to ponder on the 'code of conduct in the South 
China Sea' in the workshop process. 
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Another tactic used by Indonesia was to create two layers of meetings within the 
workshop process. Noting that participants to the workshop were mostly from the 
foreign ministry who lacked familiarity with the technical issues of the co-
operation projects, Indonesia proposed the establishment of a working group 
meeting and an experts'· group meeting to deal with the technical matters. This 
approach helped the process of producing recommendations as experts in such 
areas as environmental research appeared more concerned with issues of their 
expertise and not about the legal aspects of the overlapping claims. These experts' 
recommendations were later tabled during the workshops for participants to 
consider. Nevertheless, at times, some participants politicised the projects and the 
recommendations which, in effect, made it difficult to have the projects 
implemented. For instance, some participants argued that the recommendations to 
look for funding from non-regional countries and international organisations 
meant internationalisation of the South China Sea issue, and implementation of 
the projects was subject to the willingness of governments concerned. 
The co-operation project thus reached an impasse because at issue was how to 
implement the project if government support was not forthcoming. Workshop 
participants supposedly conveyed all recommendations to their governments as 
policy inputs and Indonesia, from the very outset, had made clear that the 
workshop was not designed as a forum for academic discussion, but as a forum 
where participants in their private capacity could discuss policy inputs for their 
governments. 134 In this case, the policy inputs were the basis for co-operation. 
The notion of policy inputs was shared by Minister Alatas in his opening speeches 
in two workshops in Bali (1990) and in Bandung (1991), but he also expected the 
informal process could "pave the way towards more formal, intergovernmental 
endeavours." 135 The Minister again raised the shift from informal to formal when 
he delivered his keynote addresses at the 41\ ?1h and gth workshops. 136 Although 
Mr. Alatas acknowledged the importance of gradualism in the workshop, he was 
concerned that the workshop might lose its raison d'etre. 137 This concern was 
understandable considering that since the mid-1990s some of the participants had 
used the informality of the process as an excuse for not discussing some issues. 
For instance, as already noted, some participants maintained that the meeting 
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should not discuss the issue of a 'code of conduct in the South China Sea' because 
the topic fell under government jurisdiction. It can be implied that Mr. Alatas was 
concerned that mere discussion without guarantee that the governments would 
commit themselves to implementing the recommendations would be pointless. 
In contrast, the supporters of gradualism maintained that the informal process was 
necessary to increase confidence among the participants and to develop the habit 
for dialogue. Dr. Djalal designed the workshops to move step by step and in the 
discussion gave priority to subjects which fulfilled several points: (a) agreement 
would be relatively easy to achieve; (b) as many states as possible could 
participate in them; (c) as many states as possible have an interest in them; and (d) 
co-operative relations with other governments or international/regional 
organisations could be worked out, particularly with necessary funding. 138 In this 
case, Dr. Djalal's prime concern was to create an inclusive environment through 
the gradual process of developing confidence and the level of comfort among the 
participants through discussing issues of common concern which were relatively 
less risky, such as environmental protection. In Dr. Djalal's view, a frank and 
open discussion would not take place unless the participants were feeling 
sufficiently at ease to express their opinion; informality would help create the 
atmosphere of openness. 139 
3.4. Competing interests and differing interpretations of the workshops: their 
impact on informal diplomacy 
Indonesia's informal workshops invited curiosity not only from the states 
involved in the workshops, but also from non-participating countries and political 
analysts. The curiosity ranged from questioning the motives or suspecting 
Indonesian intentions, to expecting that the diplomatic initiative could contribute 
to a more predictable interrelationship among the claimant states. This range of 
reactions was not surprising because Indonesia was dealing with six claimant 
states and each had a different expectation of the workshop process and a different 
perception of Indonesia as the meeting's initiator. The Philippines and Vietnam, 
for instance, expected that through the workshop the South China Sea issue could 
be internationalised, whereas China and Malaysia did not want this to happen. 
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Both China and Malaysia were proposing that the solution to the territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea issue should be done in bilateral discussions and 
not multilateral discussions. Taiwan had hoped that the workshop could serve its 
interest of recognition, but its bid to host some of the meetings within the ambit of 
the workshop had always been rejected by China. Having claimed the least areas 
in the Spratlys, Brunei took part in the workshop to show solidarity with ASEAN 
and, especially, with Ind?nesia. 140 Hence, the accumulation of expectations and 
perceptions also influenced the participants' eagerness to follow up on agreements 
reached, or recommendations proposed during the workshops to their respective 
governments or authorities. 
Indonesia had to deal with the problem of bridging the outputs of the informal 
workshops with the formal system of governance. Even if the participants were 
willing to follow up the outcomes of the workshops with their government, the 
respective governments had no obligation to implement the recommendations. 
The consequence of the informality of the workshop was that its resolution was 
not binding but Indonesia had hoped that the participating countries would show 
good faith and be willing to co-operate to realise the workshops' outcomes. 
The following discussion considers the issue of differing expectations and also 
attempts to identify the numerous interpretations of the workshop itself, especially 
by examining some analysts' points of view. The differing interpretations reveal 
that the Indonesians were, at times, not sure about their approach and this was 
mainly caused by their desire to appear neutral throughout, to treat all the 
participants equally and to adhere to the principles governing the workshop, 
especially that of decision by consensus. Although neutrality is a matter of 
perception and difficult to judge, Indonesia was very cautious in upholding its 
image as a neutral party, having no claims in the area and, therefore, being a non-
partisan in the territorial disputes. 
Indonesia's diplomatic initiatives were based on its desire to have a peaceful and 
stable regional environment, especially for its economic development program. In 
exercising its diplomatic initiatives, Indonesia was very cautious about how the 
parties in the conflicts or disputes would perceive its neutrality in the issue 
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involved. In dealing with internal conflicts, the Cambodian conflict and the 
separatism problem in the southern-part of the Philippines, Indonesia could 
project an image as a neutral third party. In the South China Sea disputes, 
Indonesia's efforts to appear neutral and disinterested in issues involved in the 
disputes were handicapped by its position in the Natuna Islands. 141 Some claimant 
states questioned Indonesia's neutrality and Indonesia, at times, experienced 
difficulty in projecting ai:i image as an 'honest broker.' Indonesia's major asset 
was that it claimed none of the islands in the South China Sea. 
Both Malaysia and China were suspicious of Indonesia's motives for the 
workshops. Malaysia resented Indonesia for projecting its leadership in the region 
through taking a diplomatic initiative, and China was worried that Indonesia 
wished to internationalise the issue. 142 China was against the internationalisation 
of the disputes. China maintained that the South China Sea was a regional 
problem and non-regional countries as well as international organisations should 
not be involved in the issue. China was very critical of any attempt by Indonesia 
to involve non-regional countries or international organisations in the workshop 
process. China's reluctance to support the possible participation of non-regional 
states and regional as well as international organisations in the workshop process 
was reflected during the discussion of the issue during the Fifth Workshop in 
Bukittinggi, in 1994.143 China's position had backtracked from the workshop's 
earlier consensus in 1993 to invite other regional and global organisations, as 
necessary, to be involved and participate in the realisation of specific projects.144 
In this case, the words 'as necessary' could constrain the possible involvement of 
non-regional countries as well as regional and global organisations because, 
during the workshop process, China maintained that their involvement was not 
necessary. China's position had hardened further by the Ninth Workshop in 1998, 
when it was even critical of the participation of a representative from the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in the workshop as a resource 
person. 145 
Indonesia was aware of China's sensitivity about the internationalisation of the 
South China Sea issue and also that China suspected it of having a grand design to 
internationalise the South China Sea issue. China's suspicions of Indonesia were 
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inevitable because China, apparently, resented the inclusion of the South China 
Sea issue in the final document of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit, in 
Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992, under the chairmanship of Indonesia. 
Although China considered Indonesia accountable for the affair, Indonesia only 
knew about such feeling two years after the NAM Summit. On May 1994, the 
Deputy Head of Indonesian Mission in the UN was informed by his counterpart 
that during the NAM St!mmit, China was actually against the inclusion of a 
paragraph on South China Sea issue in the final document. But China had not 
expressed any reservations then because China's status was as an observer and it 
wished to uphold the renewed bilateral relationship between the two countries. In 
this regard, the Deputy Head of China Mission in the UN asked Indonesia's 
assistant to drop the reference on the issue during the NAM Ministerial Meeting 
in Cairo 1994.146 
As mentioned above, Malaysia was apprehensive about Indonesia playing a 
leading role in regional initiatives. To impress the workshop's participants that 
Indonesia had ulterior motives behind its initiative, Malaysia, at times, questioned 
Indonesia's neutrality by referring to the Natuna issue. Indonesia was perplexed 
by Malaysia's attitude147 and as a consequence Indonesia always repeated its 
objectives at all times during the workshops series. The suspicion also made 
Indonesia very cautious when running the workshop. For instance, Indonesia did 
not want the claimant states to think that Indonesia had a concealed agenda, such 
as securing its position in the Natunas or benefiting from the joint development 
project in the South China Sea. In principle, Malaysia had taken a similar position 
to China, that is, favouring bilateral rather then multilateral negotiations. 
Although not as vocal as China, Malaysia's response to the involvement of non-
regional countries in the workshop process was cautious and it opposed 
internationalising the issues. 148 
Indonesia's interest in involving non-regional countries and other regional and 
international organisations was shared by the Philippines and Vietnam, but for 
differing reasons. To a certain extent, Indonesia believed that the participation of 
non-regional countries in the projects was essential because the realisation of the 
agreed projects, on bio-diversity and sea level and tide monitoring as well as co-
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operation on information exchange, were subject to the availability of funds. The 
failure of the workshop to generate funds from the participating countries could be 
seen as demonstrating either a lack of interest from some participating countries to 
implement the agreed projects or simply that they did not yet consider the projects 
as a national priority. bther than Brunei, Indonesia and Vietnam, no other 
participating countries were offering to contribute more funds. For Indonesia, the 
implementation of the projects was important because it indicated that the 
workshop had moved forward into concrete activities. This is why Indonesia was 
willing to search for alternative sources of funding. 
Indonesia looked to non-regional countries and international organisations for 
funding for two reasons. First, Indonesia had anticipated difficulty in raising funds 
from the participating countries because the workshop decisions and suggestions 
were not binding, and it was up to the discretion of each individual participant to 
recommend to their respective authorities to consider the workshop's 
recommendations seriously. During the Fourth Workshop, in 1993, Indonesia 
appealed to the participants to display more confidence in the process so that their 
respective authorities would be willing to finance the projects and to consider 
possible funding from interested parties from outside the region. 149 The belief that 
the participating countries would not give immediate attention to the workshop's 
recommendations, or show a willingness to finance the project, was proven during 
the Sixth Workshop in Balikpapan, in 1995. During that workshop, except for 
Vietnam and the Philippines no other participants were prepared to commit their 
authorities to funding the bio-diversity project. •so 
. Secondly, by securing funding from a third party, Indonesia had hoped that the 
workshops' participants would have no reason to block the project's 
implementation. Unfortunately, Indonesia soon learned of the difficulty in finding 
a third party willing to finance the overall budget of the project. For instance, 
during the Sixth Workshop in Balikpapan, in 1995, Dr. Hasjim Djalal informed 
the meeting that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was 
willing to finance the project as long as the respective governments approved the 
project. The UNDP also requested that respective government should also indicate 
how they would contribute to the project.1s1 The condition set by UNDP posed a 
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difficulty for the realisation of the workshop because the participating countries 
failed to follow up the UNDP' s requests, despite being aware of them· before the 
workshop in Balikpapan. Ironically, Dr. Hasjim Djalal did not unilaterally 
approach the UNDP. He approached the UNDP with the mandate from the Fifth 
Workshop in Bukittinggi in 1994 to seek support and funding, especially for the 
bio-diversity project. 152 
The participating countries' lack of enthusiasm in following up their agreement 
reached in 1994 provided the Indonesians with another lesson of internal 
communication failure. The Research and Development Agency of the Ministry 
was not aware until late April 1995 that the participants had not yet followed up 
their agreements, such as (1) providing Dr. Djalal with names of focal points with 
whom the co-ordinators on fisheries (Thailand), hydrocarbon resources 
(Indonesia) and non-hydrocarbon non-living resources (Vietnam) should co-
operate; and (2) nominating a marine science expert who could be called upon to 
redraft the project proposal based on inputs from potential donors. On the latter, 
the workshop participants had also agreed in Bukittinggi to submit names of their 
nominating marine science experts to Dr. Djalal no later than 31 January 1995.153 
Any delay would affect the chain of activities because, in some cases, a prompt 
reply to a potential donor's query should be taken up before the following 
workshop. Indonesia would have difficulty proposing an expert meeting to 
respond to queries if the participating countries had not given Indonesia the names 
of their contact person. 
In Bukittinggi the participants had implicitly assigned Dr. Djalal and his research 
centre (the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies) to act as an anchor in the 
implementation stage of the workshop process. On the one hand, the assignment 
of Dr. Djalal could solve the problem surrounding the issue of establishing a kind 
of mechanism to supervise the project's implementation. Undoubtedly, some 
participants were not willing to support the creation of a new structure or 
mechanism because they were afraid that a structure would lead to the formalising 
of the workshop process, an idea that had been floated by Minister Alatas in his 
154 I d . h 
opening remarks in Surabaya, during the Fourth Workshop. n onesia wast en 
narrowing the issue by emphasising that it was not the workshop process which 
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was being formalised, but the agreed projects. Hence, formalisation in this case 
was defined "by either having the Workshop's recommendations translated into 
actual policies of the Governments involved, or by devising projects and programs 
participated and executed by Governments."155 
On the other hand, it turned out that Dr. Djalal and the Centre for Southeast Asian 
Studies he led had dif~iculty acting as an anchor when dealing with the 
participating countries. Dr. Djalal found himself in the awkward position of 
having to send a letter to the governments requesting them to follow up the 
agreement reached by their representatives during the informal workshop. Dr. 
Djalal, in his capacity as Ambassador at Large for the Law of the Sea and 
Maritime Affairs, faced no such dilemma when he sent letters to some non-
regional countries and international organisations to request their assistance for 
the project. In fact, he had referred in his letter of the mandate given by the 
workshop to him to look for potential sources of funding. 156 However, this was 
not the case when dealing with the participating countries who seemingly 
preferred the formal channel of communication through the Foreign Ministry, and 
in the case of the Indonesian workshop, the Research Agency of the Ministry. To 
cope with this difficulty, Dr. Djalal wrote to the Head of the Agency, Mr. 
Rachmad, in April 1995 to request the Head urgently follow up the matter with 
the respective authorities of the participating countries.157 
This indicated a communication failure among the Indonesians. Apparently, the 
Agency was of the opinion that Dr. Djalal would act as the focal point in the 
implementation stage and was fully in charge of following up all the agreements 
reached in Bukittinggi. However, it was unclear why they did not bother to check 
with Dr. Djalal on the progress of the projects after Bukittinggi. Likewise, it was 
also unclear why Dr. Djalal did not notify the Agency earlier if respective 
governments and authorities had not contacted him on time. This communication 
problem somewhat influenced the discussion during the Sixth Workshop in 
Balikpapan, in 1995, because almost all the participants were not prepared to 
discuss their governments' latest position on the project proposals in depth. In that 
· · It w1'th the appropriate authorities in meetmg, they requested more time to consu 
their respective countries. 
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Although Indonesia was seeking assistance from international organisations and 
non-regional countries for funding, Indonesia was also not too narve to realise that 
the involvement of these actors implied internationalisation of the workshop and 
the issue involved. These actors were interested in supporting the projects not 
mainly for altruistic reasons, but because they had interests in the region, such as 
f d b.1. 1ss D . or peace an sta 11ty. r. DJalal did not object to this aspect of the 
internationalisation of the. South China Sea issue, but maintained that that was not 
the intention of the workshop. However, the workshop process had helped 
generate international interests on the issue and increased their concern of the 
danger posed by the overlapping claims. 159 Thus, internationalisation was the 
implication or logical consequence of the workshop process. 160 In contrast, both 
the Philippines and Vietnam favoured internationalising the issue and wished to 
steer the workshop process toward that direction. 
Due to the relative weakness of its military, the Philippines had relied on 
diplomacy to secure its claim in the South China Sea. The Indonesian workshop 
was one of the arenas where the Philippines was striving to win its case. The early 
indication of its attempt to generate international interest on the issue through the 
workshop process became clear when the Philippines hosted the scientific meeting 
on marine research in Manila, in 1993. During the Third Workshop in 
Yogyakarta, in 1992, the participants had agreed "to establish two working groups 
consisting of experts, to prepare and, after approval by governments, organise 
joint activities [on resource assessment and ways of development and marine 
scientific research]." 161 Seeing an opportunity to further highlight the South China 
Sea issue - after being successful in convincing the ASEAN countries to proclaim 
the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, during the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting on July 1992 in Manila - the Philippines decided to host the Working 
Group meeting in Manila. 
However the decision was made unilateraUy without consulting Indonesia, who , 
had initiated the workshop process, or the UBC who was responsible for 
funnelling the funds from CIDA. The Indonesians and the Canadians learned 
about the Philippines' intention through the Canadian Embassy in Manila which 
had received a request from the Philippines Government for funding from CIDA 
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for the planned working group meeting in Manila in late 1992.162 Dr. Djalal who 
was in Manila in mid-October 1992 had to clarify the procedure in organising any 
meeting within the ambit of the workshop process to the Philippines Government. 
He emphasised that the Indonesian Foreign Ministry should first seek agreement 
from the participants that the Philippines organise the meeting. 163 Dr. Djalal raised 
the issue of participants' consent with the Philippines because he had learned that 
some participating countries had indicated reservations about Manila as the venue 
for the meeting. 
The consultation process between Indonesia and the participants took some time, 
and the Philippines initial plan to have the meeting in late 1992 had to be 
postponed until May 1993. To avoid further complication, in March 1993, the 
Philippines assigned a senior diplomat to Jakarta to consult with Mr. 
Hadipranowo, the Head of the Agency, about the substantive and technical aspects 
of the meeting. During their discussion, Ambassador J.A. Zaide Jr. (Acting 
Assistant Secretary for Asia and Pacific) mentioned that in financing the meeting, 
the Philippines planned to ask for third party funding, including from Japan. In 
response, Mr. Hadipranowo suggested the Philippines consult with other 
participants about the plan, because the general understanding was that the host 
and CIDA would be responsible for the cost of the meeting. 164 In the end, the 
Philippines did not pursue its plan, but they intentionally organised the technical 
meeting, from 30 May to 3 June 1993, in a high profile manner, to the fullest 
media exposure. 165 Clearly, the media coverage of the meeting was a means for 
the Philippines to generate international interest in the South China Sea issue. 
The international interest in the South China Sea issue and the workshop process 
were important for the Philippines as internationalisation was a means to ensure 
the continuation of the interests and the workshop. The expectation was implied in 
Foreign Minister Romulo's opening remark to the meeting in Manila, when he 
mentioned "[t]the multilateral process [that is, the workshop] is very fragile, and 
significant unilateral actions by claimant states may terminate it before it has a 
chance to succeed." 166 In fact, internationalisation became a major tool for the 
Philippines in dealing with the potential threat from China in the South China Sea, 
especially during the Mischief Reef incidents. In 1995, as already noted, the 
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Philippines had tried to galvanise ASEAN's support and in particular through 
ASEAN Ambassadors in Manila who were briefed and continuously informed 
about developments. 167 
During the ASEAN Senior officials meeting in Singapore, in March 1995, based 
on the initiatives of the Philippines, ASEAN officials supported the issuing of the 
'Statement of the ASEA~ Foreign Ministers on the Recent Developments in the 
South China Sea.' The tone of the Statement was in favour of the Philippines, 
such as calling the disputants to refrain from taking actions that could destabilise 
the region. This statement was, obviously, directed against China. In Singapore, 
the Philippines had anticipated ASEAN's support from two factors. First the 
media campaign had successfully cornered China as the main culprit in the affair, 
and had raised international concern about a possible armed clash in the region as 
a result of China's assertive policy. Secondly, the Philippines had activated high 
level diplomacy in ASEAN capitals, through sending a special representative. 
An example of this was the visit by a high level Philippines' diplomat to Jakarta 
in February 1995. On 14 February, Ambassador Lauro L. Baja, Jr. (Assistant 
Secretary for Asian and Pacific Affairs) arrived in Jakarta to consult the 
Ministry's Director General for Political Affairs about the incident. Indonesia was 
informed that the decision to send Ambassador Baja to Indonesia was because 
Indonesia was taking the lead in discussing the territorial disputes through the 
workshop. 168 During the discussion, Ambassador lzhar Ibrahim, the Director 
General for Political Affairs, expressed support for the Philippines' efforts to find 
a peaceful solution to its bilateral dispute with China. He asked the Philippines to 
consider their decision very carefully, based on the available options, and also to 
consider the likely impact of such a decision among others to the workshop 
process. 169 During the Second Mischief Reef incident in 1998, the Philippines 
failed to win support from the ASEAN countries. This time, the Philippines did 
N . l 110 not send any representative to ASEA capita s. 
Vietnam also shared the Philippines' desire to maintain international interest in 
the region. As a victim of China's military assertiveness in the South China Sea in 
1974 and in 1988, Vietnam had no other option than to raise its cause at the 
284 
· . l l l 171 R 1· . h mternattona eve. ea 1smg t e strength of China's military power, Vietnam 
was not willing to engage in another military confrontation in the South China Sea 
and thus face the prospect of losing another stronghold in the area. Hence, 
Vietnam preferred to use diplomacy as a means to assert its claim and the 
workshop was one diplomatic forum in which it could do this. The workshops 
also provided Vietnam with an opportunity to internationalise its disputes over the 
Paracels with China and, _according to Dino Djalal, Vietnam wished "to keep the 
issue alive in international scene."172 
The informal workshops were successful in generating international interest in the 
South China Sea issue and raised international awareness of the potential for 
armed conflict in the Southeast Asian region due to overlapping claims. The 
workshops had also invited curiosity from a number of analysts who attempted to 
make sense of Indonesian informal diplomacy. Some analysts argued that the 
workshops were a kind of regime creation,173 or an effort to develop functional 
co-operation.174 Others suggested that the informal workshops were aimed at 
containing China or, in a rather modest interpretation, the intention of the 
workshops was actually to embrace China into ASEAN's way of interaction. 175 
The numerous interpretations implied two things: (1) the workshops aims were 
rather vague and therefore subject to different interpretations, and (2) the analysts 
were suspicious of Indonesia and therefore they attempted to construct the motive 
behind the informal diplomacy. 
The differing interpretations of the workshops gave Indonesia no alternative other 
than to argue at all times that the main objective of the workshops was not to 
solve the territorial disputes but to "transform potential sources of conflict into 
· 1 b f't "176 I d . l constructive forms of co-operation for mutua ene 1 . n onesia a so 
emphasised that in the workshops the participants had to identify areas of possible 
co-operation and produce policy inputs for their respective authorities. 
Interactions among the participants of the workshops would, hopefully, increase 
confidence and create an atmosphere conducive "for peaceful cooperation and 
· fl' · t' "177 Thus the Indonesian negotiation in addressing potential con 1ct-s1tua 10ns. , 
workshops had, in fact, a three-pronged objective: to promote co-operation, to 
d l f.d b 'ld' measures and to develop networking among the eve op con 1 ence- m mg , 
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littoral states and the regional countries. The networking was the logical 
consequence of the participants' interactions over the eleven years of the 
workshops process. 
VI.4. Conclusion 
The triangular relationsh~p, between the Research Agency of the Ministry, Dr. 
Djalal and the research centre he established (the Centre of Southeast Asian 
Studies) and CIDA was indeed a unique case in Indonesian diplomacy in which 
Canada had continuously supported Indonesian diplomatic activities, albeit 
indirectly through one of its universities (the UBC). In theory, the arrangement 
made by Indonesia of the three major players in the process was an ideal one 
because it combined the aspects of formal institution, expertise, and financial back 
up. In practice, the diplomatic initiatives encountered problems of dualism and co-
ordination as well as, at times, a lack of interest in the workshop process. The 
latter was the result of the Agency's detachment from the substantive aspects of 
the workshops. 
Nevertheless, the political dimension of the issue also put constraints on an open 
and frank discussion among the participants, especially because some of the 
participants were diplomats representing their country. Indonesia did tailor the 
workshop to meet the differing interests of the parties to the disputes in order to 
get the process moving and to maintain the commitment of the parties. Indonesia 
tried also to be more creative in designing the workshops, such as in the setting of 
the workshops' agenda and in conducting the meetings. At the same time, 
Indonesia also accommodated some of the demands made by the participants in 
order to assure their participation, and followed the ground rules set up by the 
workshop's participants, such as making decision by consensus. Although the 
workshops did benefit from these approaches, progress stalled if the participants 
disagreed with the proposals or even some of the topics for discussion, such as 
joint development in the South China Sea. 
From their engagement in the workshop process from 1990 to 1998, the 
participants had got to know their counterparts in the undertakings, and were 
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aware of which issues were acceptable or unacceptable to various participants. 
This acquaintance and knowledge at interpersonal level was an asset as well as a 
liability. On the one hand, at the least, in the region there was a group of 
individuals who were attached to the workshop process and had extensive 
knowledge of the issues based on their participation in the workshops or the 
experts meetings. Some countries, such as China and Malaysia, often sent the 
same person every year. On the other hand, the participants became reluctant to 
raise issues that they knew would be vetoed by some claimant states, and records 
show that China tended to veto more often than other participants. 
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Indonesian Diplomacy in Dealing with Regional Conflicts and Disputes 
(1985-1998): Evaluation of Informal Diplomacy 
VII.I. Introduction 
This chapter evaluates the implementation of informal diplomacy by comparing 
the way Indonesia exercised informal diplomacy in the three case studies. The 
chapter's discussion is organised into three main themes based on the common 
threads of the Indonesian informal diplomacy discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
The first discussion focuses on the organisational aspects of co-ordination, 
building the team and bureaucratic politics. This section also addresses the aspects 
of the originator of the informal diplomacy approach adopted by the Indonesian 
camp. 
The second discussion examines the processes that took place during the meetings 
because the processes provided this thesis with insights into the meetings' 
dynamics. Attention is given to the strategies and tactics developed by the 
Indonesians in dealing with the meetings' dynamics, particularly those which 
went against informal diplomacy's objectives of, for instance, exploring options. 
The analysis of the process during the meetings will also look at the interplay 
between the core participants, that is, representatives from the parties involved in 
conflicts and disputes, and the facilitators: the Indonesians and others, such as the 
Canadians in the South China Sea workshops and the French in Cambodia. The 
role of the media who were not taking part in the meetings but were able to 
influence the meetings' dynamics will also be observed. 
The third discussion looks at the objectives of Indonesian informal diplomacy in 
conjunction with Indonesia's strategic interests in the region. This chapter will 
assess what was achieved through informal diplomacy in the three case studies, 
based on the characteristics of Indonesia's informal diplomacy, and in the light of 
conceptions derived from Track Two diplomacy and the problem solving 
workshop. It will be argued that the achievement of informal diplomacy's 
296 
objectives was influenced by several factors: first, the participants' motives, 
whether or not they were willing to seek a solution to their problems; second, the 
nature and the context of the problems, and to a certain extent of non core 
participants' involvement in the problems; third, the way Indonesia pursued 
informal diplomacy; and fourth, the interrelationship between the timing of 
Indonesia's involvement as a third party and the participants' interests in seeking 
a solution to their problem~. 
VII.2. Assessment of the Indonesian organisational aspect: the domestic 
context of the third party 
The organisational aspect of the third party played an important role in the 
informal diplomacy process. Good co-ordination and teamwork among the 
Indonesians involved in the informal diplomacy and their clear understandings 
about the mission, as well as the underlying principles governing the informal 
approach were factors which contributed positively to the process. The domestic 
context was also affected by the level of support the Ministry received from other 
ministries, and from the military establishment, in pursuing and co-ordinating the 
peace initiatives. 
2.1 The originators of informal diplomacy's conception in the Ministry 
In the three case studies, the proponents of informal diplomacy in the Ministry 
were diplomats with extensive experience in negotiations, some of them with a 
background in international law. They were knowledgeable about the issues 
involved in the conflicts and disputes, interested in finding a breakthrough in the 
stalemate, such as in Cambodia and the Philippines, and in defusing potential 
conflicts in the South China Sea. Those diplomats considered a new impetus to 
influence the relationship among the protagonists was essential because of the 
lack of trust and confidence among them. Hence, the informal formats proposed 
were based on an assessment of the nature of the conflicts and the disputes, as 
well as the level of relationship among the disputants and the conflicting parties. 
The informal diplomacy approach was also developed based on their experiences 
in negotiations and on theoretical knowledge obtained from academic institutions. 
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In Cambodia's case, the former Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Mochtar 
Kusumaatmadja, developed the informal format based on his assessment of 
factors that prevented the Cambodian factions from meeting face to face. In 
particular, the competing factions - with the full backing of the regional countries 
who were involved in Cambodia's imbroglio - did not want to recognise, let alone 
accept, the legitimacy of their opponents. Moreover, the long years of conflict and 
antagonism created a psyc~ological barrier to the competing factions sitting down 
together and engaging in frank discussions. Therefore, an informal format - held 
on a basis of equal footing, without preconditions and with no political label - was 
the only option that could bring the conflicting parties together in one meeting. 
To accommodate Vietnam's interests the informal meeting was held in two stages 
to reflect the internal and external dimensions of the Cambodian conflict. In this 
way, Indonesia accommodated Vietnam's concern at being identified as the main 
culprit in the conflict. This concern is understandable considering that the 
coalition forces (the CGDK), and some ASEAN countries had long insisted on a 
direct meeting with Vietnam because they did not recognise Vietnam's 'puppet 
government' in Phnom Penh. The Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIMs) were 
developed on the basis of equality, and on the premise of accommodating the 
concerns of the many parties to the conflicts. 
The successor to Minister Kusumaatmadja, Minister Alatas, had no difficulty in 
continuing the peace initiative developed by his predecessor. Minister Alatas had 
followed the developments from his previous position as Indonesian Ambassador 
to the UN where part of his responsibility was to promote the proposal during his 
interaction in New York with the various parties to the Cambodian conflict. The 
transitional period from Minister Kusumaatmadja to Minister Alatas did not 
jeopardise Indonesia's peace initiative. On the contrary, the new minister gave 
'new blood' to the initiative. 
The informal meeting on Cambodia followed the original design put forward by 
former Foreign Minister Kusumaatmadja. No modification to the proposal -
except for a change in nomenclature from 'cocktail party' into 'Jakarta Informal 
Meeting (JIM)' - meant that Minister Alatas agreed with the principle governing 
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the informal diplomacy. The informal diplomacy through the first JIM gave the 
various parties in the Cambodian conflict an opportunity to meet face to face for 
the first time, and by doing so, the meeting broke the psychological barrier that in 
the past had prevented a fully inclusive meeting. 
In the Philippines case, the informal exploratory talks held in Cipanas in 1993 
were a continuation of the_ first exploratory talks sponsored by Libya in Tripoli in 
1992. The difference between the exploratory talks sponsored by Libya and those 
sponsored by Indonesia was in the way Indonesia arranged the setting for the 
meetings (this will be elaborated on when discussing the process of informal 
diplomacy) and on the kind of facilitation function that Indonesia upheld during 
the informal diplomacy process. The exploratory talks under the aegis of 
Indonesia met the principle governing Track Two diplomacy, that is, to facilitate 
the conflicting parties in the process of addressing their problem, improving their 
relationship and solving their problems amicably. 
Informal diplomacy remained essential, even when the process had been elevated 
to formal negotiations. Informal diplomacy was being used more as a diplomatic 
tool to create a conducive environment for negotiation and to increase the level of 
comfort among the participants for open communication. To reinforce this, as 
suggested by Dr. Hassan Wirajuda, Indonesia intentionally followed a gradual 
approach in order to develop a habit of communication among the disputants.1 
Gradualism in this case referred to an approach of discussing less contentious 
issues in the earlier phase, to discussing more sensitive issues later on. Years of 
hostility prevented the Moro and the Government of the Republic the Philippines 
(GRP) from meeting face to face and discussing their problem openly. Arguably, 
maintaining a habit of communication and momentum for dialogue between the 
parties was one of the characteristics of Indonesian informal diplomacy in dealing 
with regional conflicts and disputes. At the same time, another intention of this 
gradual process was to increase the level of comfort among the participants 
enabling them to sit together and discuss their problems openly. 
This gradual approach for the sake of maintaining communication and increasing 
the level of comfort among the participants raises the question as to whether or 
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not Indonesia adopted control communication techniques of problem solving in 
the informal diplomacy. 2 Although this matter will. be discussed in following 
sections, it is worth noting here that in the case of the Moro issue, the main feature 
of Indonesia's facilitation function was to let the parties engage in consultation 
and discussion rather than in political bargaining. Indonesia clearly did not adopt 
the control communication technique fully because in some sessions the 
discussion was based on. proposals tabled by either of the parties. What the 
Indonesian facilitators cautiously 'controlled' during the process was the 
momentum of discussion which included shelving discussion on sensitive issues 
until a later stage so that the process of improving the relationship among the 
participants would not be disturbed. 
The proponent of the South China Sea workshop in the Ministry was Dr. Hasjim 
Djalal, trained in international law and with extensive experiences in UNCLOS 
(UN Convention of the Law of the Sea) negotiation as well as in the development 
of a regime to manage fisheries in the Pacific under the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council (PECC). Dr. Djalal envisaged that the informal workshop 
could help the disputants shelve their territorial claims and embark on co-
operative efforts. He also believed that a regular informal consultation could 
induce better understanding of the differing claims, such as the area and the basis 
of the claim, and the concerns of the claimant and non-claimants.3 Clearly the 
intention of the informal workshop was to reduce regional tension through 
confidence building measures. 
2.2. The building of the team and teamwork 
Who initiated and led the peace initiatives and at what level the initiatives were 
formulated influenced the dynamic within the Indonesian team. These factors also 
had an impact on the aspects of team building, involving personnel from inside 
and outside the Ministry, and of the administrative support to each of the peace 
initiatives. The direct involvement of the Indonesian Foreign Minister in the 
informal diplomacy process reduced intra-ministry competition and guaranteed 
smoother teamwork. At the same time, President Soeharto's interest in the peace 
initiatives assured the Ministry that the informal diplomacy process would receive 
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equal support from other ministries and bureaucracies in Indonesia. Moreover, at 
times, the President himself was involved during the process and this, gave more 
weight to the Ministry's profile and to the diplomats who were responsible for 
informal diplomacy. 
As outlined in Chapters 4 and 5, the informal diplomacy process to solve the 
Cambodian and Moro pro?lems was developed at the highest level. Both Foreign 
Minister Kusumaatmadja and Ali Alatas were involved directly in the shaping of 
the informal diplomacy and in directing the process. President Soeharto also gave 
his fullest support to both peace initiatives. In contrast, the idea of an informal 
workshop to manage potential conflict in the South China Sea was shaped by 
bureaucrats at the Director General level. After receiving consent from Foreign 
Minister Alatas, Dr. Djalal promoted the proposal domestically and regionally. 
Although the level of President Soeharto's support for the informal workshop on 
the South China Sea was unclear, some Indonesian scholars like Rizal Sukma and 
Ben Drajat believed that the informal workshop was an indication of assertiveness 
in Indonesian foreign policy under Soeharto since the late-1980s.4 However, 'a 
tacit support' from the President presented the Ministry with some difficulties in 
organising the informal workshops, such as obtaining a yearly budget from the 
Ministry of Finance to underwrite the expenses for the workshop which were not 
covered by the Canadians. 
In both the Cambodia and Moro cases, Minister Alatas had no difficulty in 
pooling the cream of the Ministry's human resources. In dealing with the 
Cambodian problem, Minister Alatas recruited senior diplomats who, as a result 
of their earlier postings in Indochina and in the ASEAN countries, were familiar 
with the cultural particularities of the Cambodians, the Vietnamese and the 
concerned countries. Their knowledge of the local languages - some of them 
spoke French and one diplomat spoke Chinese (Mandarin) - as well as their 
acquaintance with some members of the representatives of the factions were an 
asset to the Indonesian team. Minister Alatas assigned these diplomats as his 
liaison with the participants of the JIM. They functioned in the team as the 
Minister's confidants to listen to any concerns of the participants, on either 
substantive or non-substantive matters and, if necessary, to convey any message 
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from the Minister to the participants. Overall, the main responsibility of the 
liaisons was to make the participants feel comfortable during the informal 
meetings. 
Minister Alatas was in charge of the substantive aspects of the problem, assisted 
by diplomats responsible for regional issues under the Directorate General for 
Political Affairs. The dir~ct involvement of Minister Alatas in the substantive 
aspect centralised the decision-making. On the one hand, this gave the Minister a 
firm grip over the process and an opportunity to follow developments closely. The 
complexity surrounding the Cambodian conflict made it imperative for Minister 
Alatas to be aware of any developments, such as whether or not there was any 
shift in participants' positions during the informal meeting. On the other hand, this 
centralisation meant that some team members were unwilling to risk making 
decisions on substantive matters without Minister Alatas's approval. For instance, 
they were reluctant to provide information to the media without the Minister's 
consent. The problem with this dependency was that the media were searching for 
information from the participants and, as a result, occasionally the media 
highlighted contradicting viewpoints. The antagonism created by this was not in 
line with Indonesia's interests in improving relationships among the parties. 
Indonesia's efforts to deal with the Moro problem received a high level of 
attention from its inception. Minister Alatas was personally involved in the 
formative year of the peace process. after Indonesia was asked to become a 
member of Committee of the Six of the OIC tasked with helping resolve the Moro 
problem. After receiving the mandate from the OIC, Minister Alatas gave the 
Director General for Political Affairs, Mr. Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, full 
responsibility for setting up and recruiting the members of the Indonesian team. In 
selecting members of the team, Mr. Sastrohandoyo recruited diplomats who were 
familiar with the issues from the regional and international organisation 
directorates of the Ministry. These diplomats represented the Asia and Pacific 
Directorate who dealt with the Philippines issue, the Africa and Middle East 
Directorate who dealt with the Moro problem due to the involvement of Libya and 
other Middle Eastern countries, and the International Organisation Directorate 
who followed the discussion of the problem in the OIC. 
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The selection of members of the team was based on their knowledge of the issue 
as well as their understanding of the standpoint and interests of the parties 
involved in the conflict. Hence they were able to provide Mr. Sastrohandoyo with 
a comprehensive understanding of the problem. As the informal diplomacy 
process moved on, Mr. Sastrohandoyo scaled down the members of the team. He 
gave diplomats from the International Organisation Directorate, under the 
supervision of Dr. Wiraj~da, more responsibility in the daily operation of the 
Ministry's secretariat to deal with Moro problem because they were more familiar 
with the intricacies of the OIC. Clearly the intention was to streamline the team 
and increase efficiency. Moreover, the diplomats from the International 
Organisation Directorate had been exposed to multilateral international 
negotiation settings and knew how to deal with participants from the OIC 
countries. However, Mr. Sastrohandoyo maintained the involvement of diplomats 
from other Directorates who were skilful in negotiation and were known for their 
patience.5 
Although Mr. Sastrohandoyo acted as an anchor in the peace process, Minister 
Alatas remained fully appraised of the process and, at times, acted as a trouble-
shooter. Mr. Sastrohandoyo always briefed Minister Alatas about developments 
during the meeting so that the Minister was well advised on matters that required 
his early attention or involvement. For instance, he took part in some chief 
delegations' meeting to break some stalemates. The nature of the Moro conflict, 
the deep-seated frustration among the Moro and the idiosyncrasy of Mr. Misuari, 
the MNLF leader, made it necessary for the Indonesians to approach the MNLF 
with extra caution. Minister Alatas' continuous contact with the participants, 
especially with Mr. Misuari, was a means to develop personal rapport and to win 
trust and confidence. Hence, Minister Alatas was, at times, involved in the 
facilitation activities, but most of the time he provided his support based on his 
capacity as Foreign Minister through his close contact with the Philippines leaders 
at the highest level. 
The Indonesian team in Jakarta co-ordinated their work closely with the 
Indonesian diplomats in Manila who were also knowledgeable on the Moro issue 
from their previous portfolio in the Ministry prior to their assignment. At the same 
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time, the two Indonesian Ambassadors in Manila (retired military generals) 
enjoyed a personal rapport with President Ramos and the Philippines military 
establishment throughout. This contact gave them relatively easy access to the 
Philippines leaders and helped Indonesia bypass the bureaucratic lines on issues 
that required the Philippines leaders' immediate attention. Thus, in dealing with 
the Moro issue Indonesia had the benefit of a solid team who were familiar with 
the issue. Further, the Chief negotiator, Mr. Sastrohandoyo, gained the most from 
the strength of his team members he had appointed. Furthermore, Mr. 
Sastrohandoyo and his team were able to concentrate on the day to day operation 
of the conflict resolution process and as a consequence, they had the privilege of 
overseeing the internal dynamic within the Ministry on the Moro issue. Such a 
privilege, however, did not transpire within the Indonesian team which was 
responsible for the South China Sea informal workshop. 
Indonesia's informal workshop to deal with South China Sea disputes was 
masterminded and organised by officials at the Director General level. The 
diplomatic initiative based on policy initiation by bureaucrats at first echelon level 
was prone to inter-elite rivalry, especially when high-level officials from other 
Directorate Generals considered the issue fell under their jurisdiction. The 
implication of this was that the support for Dr. Djalal and the Research Agency of 
the Ministry from other directorates was not optimal. Although the informal 
diplomacy initiative received the full blessing of Foreign Minister Alatas and the 
Minister had given Dr. Djalal as well as the Head of Research Agency of the 
Ministry authority in shaping and directing the peace process, they largely worked 
on their own. Ideally, the Directorate General for Political Affairs and the ASEAN 
National Secretariat of the Ministry who dealt with some of the South China Sea 
issues in their portfolio should have had more involvement in the shaping and 
directing of the informal workshops.6 Closer co-operation between the Research 
Agency and the operational unit in the Ministry would have increased the synergy 
between the informal workshop and the policy discussion in formal fora, such as 
in ASEAN. 
Arguably, the less than forthcoming support from other directorates within the 
Ministry was, partly caused by the active involvement of non-Indonesians, as a 
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third pillar in the informal workshop process. Through their financial 
contributions in the workshop process and close working relationship with Dr. 
Djalal, the Canadians had more leverage in the informal workshops than the 
Ministry's bureaucrats outside the Research Agency. Moreover, on issues of 
substance, Dr. Djalal consulted the Canadians more than the Ministry's officials. 
Needless to say, the active role of the Canadians in the informal workshop created 
resentment among some ~inistry officials and led to their lack of interest in 
contributing substantive ideas to workshop discussions.7 
Another factor that further distanced some Ministry diplomats from the informal 
workshop concerned the recruitment of resource persons during the process. As 
noted in Chapter 6, part of the Canadian responsibility was to recruit resource 
persons for the workshops. The Canadians recruited resource persons based on 
their expertise, and in line with the topic of the workshop discussion. For instance 
in discussing proposals for environment protection in the South China Sea, the 
resource person who was invited came from the United Nations Environment 
Protection Agency (UNEP). Indeed, the nature of some discussions during the 
workshop did not necessitate the involvement of diplomats from the Ministry. 
However, on issues where the Ministry had a numbers of experts, such as on the 
law of the sea, the Ministry's personnel were seldom recruited as resource 
persons. On the one hand the limited involvement of Indonesian diplomats as 
resource persons in the informal workshops actually benefited Indonesia because 
it balanced the impression of Indonesia wanting to dominate the informal 
workshop process (see more discussion under 3.1.3. The South China Sea 
disputes). On the other hand, the non-involvement of Ministry diplomats as 
resource persons further distanced them from the workshop process. Hence, the 
inter-elite rivalry in the Ministry, coupled with Dr. Djalal's close working 
relationship with the Canadians accounted for the Agency's difficulty in 
assembling an inter-directorates team to run the informal workshop. 
The Indonesian team dealing with the South China Sea issue consisted mainly of 
officials from the Research Agency of the Ministry. Personnel from other 
directorates usually took part only during the workshop and the preparatory 
meetings prior to the workshop. At times, representatives sent by some 
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directorates to the preparatory meetings differed from those who took part in the 
actual workshops. This discontinuity affected their involvement in the workshop 
because they were not fully briefed on the context of some workshop issues 
discussed during the preparatory meetings. In theory, those who were involved in 
the actual workshops should have been aware of the results of the preparatory 
meetings. This was not always the case because, at times, their preoccupation with 
their main portfolios gave ~hem little time to ponder on the workshop substance. 8 
2.3. Co-ordination as a factor in the informal diplomacy 
Internal and external co-ordination influenced the outcomes of Indonesia's 
informal diplomacy. In the domestic context, internal co-ordination involved the 
team inside the Ministry, and between the Ministry and other ministries. External 
co-ordination implied a working relationship between Indonesians and non-
Indonesians who were involved at a certain stage or in the overall process. For 
instance, in the case of Cambodia, the Indonesian diplomats needed to co-ordinate 
their work with diplomats from ASEAN countries, France and Australia. In the 
Philippines case, Indonesia worked closely with the OIC and in the South China 
Sea workshop, Indonesia's counterpart was Canada. 
In the domestic context, to a certain extent, the Ministry could benefit in co-
ordination efforts when the President himself showed an interest in the process. In 
particular, former President Soeharto was interested in having Indonesia assist the 
Cambodians and the GRP in resolving their problems. As a result, the Foreign 
Ministry had no difficulty obtaining financial and administrative support from 
other ministries, especially once the other ministries learned about the President's 
support for the informal diplomacy initiative.9 What was important in this case, 
was keeping the President aware of developments at all times and, therefore, the 
Ministry had to keep their communication channel with the President open by 
maintaining good rapport with the State Secretariat. 
The Ministry' secretariat under the Director General of Political Affairs handled 
internal co-ordination in the cases of Cambodia and the Philippines. The Ministry 
· • 'b'l't to ~ollow up the substantive and administrative secretanat s respons1 1 1 y was 1' 
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aspects of the peace process on a daily basis. They served this function at the 
point of contact, inside the Ministry and between the Ministry and other 
ministries. The secretariat also arranged preparatory and follow up meetings 
involving members of the Indonesian team. The follow up meetings usually took 
place after the actual events, such as after JIM for example. The composition of 
the secretariat remained intact and even if some members took up new positions, 
their successors were well_exposed to the substantive and non-substantive aspects 
of the peace process. 10 Clearly, the series of internal meetings coupled with a solid 
secretariat mechanism guaranteed continuity and kept the team's members abreast 
of every development and the issues involved. 
The strength of the internal co-ordination mechanism for Cambodia and the 
Philippines was not evident when Indonesia launched the series of informal 
workshops to deal with the South China Sea disputes. The difference was the 
question of who was responsible for supervising the informal diplomacy process 
on a daily basis, and for acting as a point of convergence at the national level. In 
theory, the Research Agency played a secretarial role and was responsible for 
providing diplomatic support. In reality, the secretarial function of the Research 
Agency was constrained by their detachment from the substantive aspects of the 
informal workshops. After the first workshop in 1990, the two main players at 
national level, the Research Agency of the Ministry and Dr. Djalal, reached an 
agreement that the substantive aspect of the informal workshop would be dealt by 
Dr. Djalal and his research centre (the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies). 
Consequently, the Research Agency's role was mainly administrative, and before 
arranging internal meetings prior to or after the workshops - involving members 
of the Indonesian team from inside and outside the Ministry - it had first to co-
ordinate the substance of the discussion with Dr. Djalal. The scope of the 
secretarial function of the Research Agency was more limited compared to that of 
the secretariat which dealt with the Cambodia and the Moro issues. 
In some cases, Foreign Minister Alatas intentionally did not inform the secretariat 
on some substantive issues on Cambodia.11 His decision, however, did not create 
· · b because the peace process was under 
displeasure among the secretanat mem ers 
M. · Al • h ·t I the case of the informal workshops, the Research mister atas s aut on y. n 
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Agency's lack of grasp on the substantive aspects of the informal diplomacy 
initiative limited their ability to optimise their secretarial function. For instance, 
the Agency was unable to take a proactive role in co-ordinating their position and 
responsibilities among the Indonesians who took part in the informal workshop. 
As a consequence, some ·Indonesian participants faced the dilemma of a lack of 
clarity about their role in the informal workshop and they lacked an awareness of 
the direction of the info~al diplomacy process itself. The situation was rather 
awkward considering that it was the Agency which had been given the custody of 
the peace process by Minister Alatas and, therefore, had to report to him the 
progress of the process, both on substantive and non-substantive issues. As 
mentioned in Chapter 6, this dilemma was worsened by the efforts of the 
workshop's participants, at certain stages, to further limit the involvement of 
government in the process. 
During the Fifth Workshop in Bukittinggi, in 1994, the participants agreed to 
appoint Dr. Djalal and his research centre as their contact on issues relating to 
hydrocarbon resources and non-hydrocarbon non-living resources projects. This, 
in essence, gave Dr. Djalal and his research centre a secretarial function to co-
ordinate activities relevant with the projects. This arrangement proved ineffective 
because the participants failed to contact him. For his part Dr. Djalal, a retired 
Ambassador, was reluctant to contact authorities of the participating countries to 
follow up the matters. In the end, the Agency took over the function and the 
contacting of the authorities of the participants. Interestingly, some participants 
during the Fifth Workshop argued that the appointment of Dr. Djalal as point of 
contact was to ensure that the project proposals would be followed up. It could be 
argued, however, that the main motive was actually to delay the process by 
distancing the Research Agency from the responsibility of following up the 
project proposals through formal channels. 
External co-ordination was another aspect of the informal diplomacy process in 
the three cases. The task of co-ordinating positions with non-Indonesians was not 
easy because they brought their own interests and agenda. The least the 
Indonesians could do was to maintain dialogue with the parties involved to limit 
misunderstandings during the process. This approach was not always effective, 
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especially if the parties had their own agenda. To illustrate, during the 1989 
meeting in Paris, France submitted a proposal without the consent of Indonesia as 
one of the Co-chairs. The most Indonesia could do was to clarify that the proposal 
was made by France and that Indonesia not been consulted in its preparation. 12 
In the Cambodian case, Indonesia had no capacity to co-ordinate an ASEAN 
position in dealing with !he conflict, even though Indonesia was, supposedly, 
acting as ASEAN interlocutor with Vietnam. What really mattered was that 
ASEAN countries gave Indonesia a partial mandate to communicate with 
Vietnam, but not a mandate to make any decision on behalf of ASEAN. This 
ambiguity in mandate limited Indonesia's ability to set the direction of the JIMs 
and during the actual informal meetings, ASEAN did not speak with one voice 
because each member country was promoting its own position and agenda. 
When the French Government entered in the scene and Indonesia had to work as 
Co-chair with them, co-ordination efforts between the two governments centred 
on open communication. The two countries always advised each other on the 
planned programs and the substance of the issues. This task experienced some 
difficulties in the beginning because during the first Paris International 
Conference on Cambodia (PICC) in 1989, the Co-chairs were not always 
successful in synchronising their positions.13 Similarly, the ASEAN countries also 
took part in the Paris talks on their own, and the only co-ordination activity that 
Indonesia could arrange by then was a caucus meeting among the ASEAN 
countries to listen to each ASEAN countries' position and to share information. 
However, Indonesia's efforts to promote openness among the ASEAN members 
remained unsuccessful because some of them were reluctant to disclose their 
position during the caucus meetings. 
After the Paris meeting, co-ordination between Indonesia and France was more 
effective, especially after Indonesia gained the trust of the French Government 
that the following meetings after Paris were under the framework of PICC. 
I d · 1 · 1 d the French in the post-Paris meetings in Jakarta and, n onesta a ways mvo ve 
l.k · F 1 k t Indonesia abreast about discussions among the 1 ew1se, ranee a so ep 
P F. Th h Co chai·r did not leave their counterpart out of the ermanent 1ve. us, eac -
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loop on the development of the discussion after Paris and the two tracks of 
discussions, in the UN and in Southeast Asia, cross-fertilised each other.' 
The co-ordination function between Indonesia and Australia was relatively easier. 
Australia entered the picture after offering a new proposal to break the stalemate 
in the discussions on the merit of diluting the Hun Sen led-Government, and the 
kind of role for the UN . before the election. Australia proposed that the UN 
function as an interim government in Cambodia. The Australians consulted 
Indonesia and France about the idea, and then the Australians consulted the 
Cambodian factions, the Vietnamese and the PRK of Hun Sen. At the same time, 
Minister Alatas conducted a regional tour to seek responses from the factions, the 
Vietnamese, the PRK and the concerned countries about the Australian proposal. 
After gaining some knowledge about the respective parties' positions, Indonesia 
arranged an Informal Meeting on Cambodia (IMC) in Jakarta in February 1990, 
and Indonesia invited the Australians to act as resource persons during the 
meeting. Later still, the Permanent Five refined the Australian proposal for UN 
involvement in Cambodia. 
The OIC mandate regarding the Moro issue presented Indonesia with a unique 
opportunity to assist the conflicting parties in resolving their problem. Basically, 
the mandate provided Indonesia with more leverage to facilitate the informal 
diplomacy. This leverage was more observable on non-substantive issues with, for 
instance, Indonesia having no difficulty in proceeding with the talks even though 
the schedule for the meeting that Indonesia set, did not suit some members of the 
Committee of the Six, or even the OIC secretariat. Indonesia was able to set the 
tone and the direction of the informal diplomacy process more easily. In terms of 
substantive issues, Indonesia's ability to co-ordinate a common position with the 
OIC and members of Committee of the Six was subject to the interest of the OIC 
and Committee of the Six members. 
Toward the end of the process, Indonesia had co-ordinated a common position 
among the OIC and Committee of the Six's members that helped persuade the 
MNLF to accept the final solution of the Moro's problem. This event took place 
in late August 1996, when the conflicting parties were still undecided about the 
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few remaining obstacles for an agreed solution, including the integration of the 
MNLF forces into the Philippines Armed Forces. Indonesia was able to co-
ordinate common positions among members of the Committee of Six and the OIC 
Secretariat, after convincing them that the GRP had given Mr. Misuari more 
concessions. The criticai concessions in this case included President Ramos' 
support for Mr. Misuari's bid as Governor of the ARMM, and the President's 
agreement to absorb som~ MNLF members in the Philippines Armed Forces. In 
the end, the positions of all parties in the peace process had converged or reached 
a consensus, based on pragmatism that a conclusion of the Moro's conflict was 
within reach. 
In the case of the informal workshops, the Indonesians needed to co-ordinate with 
the Canadians. Mostly, Dr. Djalal supervised co-ordination on the substantive 
aspects of the informal workshops between Indonesia and the Canadians, whereas 
the Research Agency dealt with the Canadians prior to and during the informal 
workshops. The Agency co-ordinated with the Canadians on the administrative 
aspects, but not so much on the substantive aspects of the informal workshops. 
The secretarial role of the Agency was confined to non-substantive aspects of the 
workshops which prevented the Agency from co-ordinating substantive aspects, 
either with Dr. Djalal or with the Canadians. However, the Agency was 
responsible for preparing the opening remarks of the Foreign Minister in every 
workshop. This arrangement was not without flaws. At times the lack of co-
ordination among the Indonesian team on the content of the speech, and on the 
message that they wished the Foreign Minister to put across, created confusion 
among the Indonesian team. 
VII.3. Assessment of process during informal diplomacy 
Process in informal diplomacy refers to the interactions between the Indonesians 
as the facilitators and the participants, and between the participants themselves. A 
solid team and sound teamwork among the Indonesians, and between the 
Indonesians and their counterparts, did not guarantee successful outcomes. 
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However, a solid team, combined with a well de 1 d t t d · ve ope s ra egy an tactics 
during the peace process did increase the effectiveness of informal diplomacy. 
The following discussion evaluates the informal diplomacy process by looking at 
the activities that took· place during and between the meetings, involving 
Indonesia as facilitator, the core participants and individuals who acted as 
resource persons, such as _the Canadians in the South China Sea workshops. The 
role of non-participants, that is, the media and the think tanks will also be 
evaluated. The overall intention is to gain a bigger picture of the process by 
looking at the interplay between the core participants and non-participants, as well 
as at the interrelationship between the actual meeting facilitated by Indonesia and 
the wider contexts of regional and international environments. 
3.1 The dynamics of informal meetings 
The notion of dynamics implies a lively interaction involving the participants in 
the informal diplomacy process. The lively interaction during the various 
meetings was of two types: positive and negative. Positive interaction meant that 
the participants were willing to share ideas and exchange points of view for the 
sake of gaining mutual understanding and resolving conflict. In contrast, 
participants engaged in negative interaction if they were not willing to move from 
their 'square,' and maintained defensive attitudes. The third party's responsibility 
during the meeting was to stimulate positive interaction and to facilitate or 
encourage a smooth transition from negative to positive interactions. 
In situations, involving deep-rooted conflicts and disputes, negative interactions 
are unavoidable. Any kind of meeting, either formal or informal, results in 
participants expressing their feelings of anger, frustration and dissatisfaction 
directly in front of their opponents. As noted in Chapter 2, Christopher Mitchell 
and Michael Banks argue that an outpouring of emotions during the first stage of 
most workshops is normal and the third party should not stop the process. 14 
Likewise, the proponents of psychoanalytical techniques in problem solving 
workshops consider expressing a feeling openly as the strength of the informal 
approach and a way of reducing stereotypes. 15 Informal meetings are seen as a 
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more suitable forum for the negative interactions because the participants take part 
in the meeting in their private capacity, thus distanced from their primordial 
elements of identity group or affiliation, and they are treated equally. Moreover, in 
theory, an infonnal setting could filter dissatisfaction from aggressive exchanges 
of views because a stress free environment would help the participants feel 
comfortable. Therefore, the facilitator should select a venue and arrange a meeting 
setting where the participa!lts feel comfortable during and between the meetings. 16 
An infonnal meeting would not jeopardise the official lines of the factions or 
countries, especially if the participants are aware that the objective of the 
endeavour is to explore options. However, during the Indonesian led infonnal 
meetings, some participants had difficulty in accepting strong statements from 
their opponents. Some participants also had difficulty in dissociating themselves 
from the official lines of their governments and the interests of their supporters. 
This problem was heightened by the reports made by media on the meetings 
because of the high profile nature of the issues. The following discussion looks 
closely at these issues and, in particular, at the issues of participants' sensitivity 
and inflexibility in their position. The discussion also highlights some strategies 
developed by Indonesia to deal with the problem. 
3.1.1. The Cambodian conflict 
Sensitivity toward other participants' comments was observable in the JIM 
process. The Khmer Rouge faction did not accept any mention of 'the genocidal 
policies and practices of the Pol Pot regime' in the meeting discussion of the first 
JIM and in the Chainnan's Statement. As a facilitator in the JIM meeting, 
Indonesia tried to balance the Chainnan' s Statement of the first JIM by also 
stressing the aspect of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. Still, 
the Indonesian efforts did not satisfy the Khmer Rouge and they expressed their 
dissatisfaction by boycotting the First Working Group meeting of JIM in Jakarta, 
from 17 to 19 October 1988. 
The JIM process provided Indonesia with a lesson that the deep-seated animosity 
among the Cambodian factions would be difficult to reconcile. Indonesia also 
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learned that the plenary format of the first JIM was prone to confrontational 
interactions. The unstructured discussion in the morning meeting of the first JIM, 
which was designed to give the factions more freedom to look at their problems 
and explore possible solutions, failed to meet these objectives. Initially, Indonesia 
had hoped that the factions could come up with some topics for discussion in the 
afternoon session. By encouraging the Cambodian participants to assume 
responsibility for deciding the agenda, Indonesia had hoped that the factions 
would feel that the JIM process was their own. As argued by John Burton, 
"problem solving means leaving decision making in the hands of the parties until 
an agreement is reached which satisfies the needs of all concerned."17 Knowing 
the level of distrust among the Cambodian factions, the least that Indonesia 
expected from the Cambodians in the morning session was to have them generate 
a list of issues to be discussed in the afternoon session involving non-
Cambodians. 
However, the Cambodians who participated in the morning session did not 
produce any topics for discussion and, therefore, Minister Alatas, who chaired the 
afternoon session, had to set a discussion agenda. The afternoon session was also 
clouded by the reality that participants from the ASEAN countries, Vietnam and 
Laos, were more concerned with their own interests than with finding a solution to 
the Cambodian problem. Hence, a deep-seated animosity coupled with the 
participants' competing interest constrained progress during the first JIM. 
The first JIM was a learning exercise for Indonesia. The least that Indonesia had 
hoped to achieve through the informal meetings and the social functions organised 
on the fringe of the meetings was an improvement in relationships among the 
Cambodians. However, this did not happen. There was some mingling and 
interaction during the meeting and the social functions (members of Hun Sen 
delegation mingled with delegations from FUNCINPEC and KPNLF), but this did 
not make them more conciliatory when discussing the substantive issues of their 
conflict. 
Having no leverage over the participants and the concerned countries, the success 
of the Indonesia led JIM depended on whether the participants were seriously 
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looking for a solution to the Cambodian problem. Indonesia could not even 
develop a common position with the ASEAN members because each of the 
members had their own agenda. Therefore, it was simply impossible to dislodge 
the participants from their official positions. To deal with this problem and also to 
avoid negative interactions, Indonesia modified the format of the second JIM by 
limiting the plenary meetings and, instead, encouraging more informal 
consultations among the ~actions and the concerned countries. The aim of the 
strategy of limiting plenary meetings was to give the participants sufficient time to 
study and respond to a discussion document prepared by Indonesia. Minister 
Alatas who chaired the meeting moved from participant group to participant group 
to learn about their latest position on the document and identify areas of possible 
consensus. 
This strategy also failed to bridge the gaps among the differing positions because 
the participants were unwilling to compromise their own _interest. The participants 
were trapped in the realist paradigm of a zero sum game and did not want to seek 
a co-operative solution of win-win. Indonesia had hoped that the second JIM 
would be more progressive than the first one, especially as the document 
discussed by the participants during the second JIM had been discussed earlier by 
participants - composing representatives at senior level - during the working group 
meeting prior to the Second JIM. The main task of the participants to the Second 
JIM was to discuss issues left undecided during the working group meeting. 
Other factors that impeded some participants from making any shift in their 
positions were, first, their expectation that they would gain the most from a peace 
process under the aegis of the French Government. By the time of the second JIM, 
some of the Cambodians had already requested the French Government to take a 
role as a third party. Hence, the second JIM had to face the issue of lessened 
interest from some participants who did not wish to yield their positions because 
they hoped to have a more favourable outcome from the Paris peace process. The 
second factor that influenced the JIM process was the media. 
The mere presence of the media put the JIM process in limbo. The high profile 
nature of the Cambodian conflict and the fact that JIM was the first ever meeting 
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among the Cambodians and the regional countries brought a throng of journalists 
to Jakarta. Indonesia had no authority to seclude the participants from ,the media 
because the two had mutual interests. The journalists were searching for news and 
the participants benefited from the media interest for news by sharing their 
interests and positions. The factions and the concerned countries also used the 
media as a means to send signals to other parties, even before the second JIM took 
place. For instance, Vietn~m Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach declared that if 
the second JIM failed to reach an agreement, Vietnam would not abide by the 
timetable for its military pull out from Cambodia. 18 Another example was Prince 
Ranariddh' s statement before the journalists during the JIM that the dilution of 
power of both the CGDK and the PRK was a prerequisite for a free election.19 
This position was contrary to the interests of the PRK and Vietnam who were 
against the idea of diluting the power of the PRK. 
When the Cambodian peace process was elevated into formal negotiation under 
the Co-chairman, Indonesia and France, the difficulty of reconciling this differing 
position remained. The level of animosity among the Cambodians was very high 
and they were not willing to compromise their interests and position. Likewise, 
the concerned countries also impeded the meeting by raising issues of their own 
concern and by making statement critical to particular participants. For instance, 
Singapore always expressed strong and negative statements toward Vietnam and 
Hun Sen.20 Arguably the intention was to draw a clear line that Singapore strongly 
opposed any military intervention by a stronger country on a weaker country. In a 
way, the assertion was a reflection of Singapore's vulnerability as a small island 
country, bordering a bigger country, such as Indonesia, which in the past had 
adopted a hostile policy toward its smaller neighbour. 
The Paris peace process did not start from scratch because some of the peace 
elements that had been identified earlier in the JIM process and reflected in the 
Consensus Statement of the second JIM were used as the basis for the Paris 
discussion. After the JIM process, the peace process shifted from formal 
negotiation in Paris to informal consultation in Jakarta as well as a number of 
related meetings in some Asian cities. Clearly, the informal consultation was the 
strategy for building consensus gradually. The format was preferable and less 
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risky for both the third party and the participants because the expectation was that 
those involved were more concerned with process rather than the end result. In 
contrast, a formal negotiation, at times, had to face time constraints, more pressure 
and high expectations. A failure of a formal negotiation has a potential to 
backtrack the overall process because the participants might harden their position, 
and even not willing to meet again, face to face. After the two Chairs were 
convinced that a compr~hensive solution to the Cambodian problem was 
achievable, they organised a formal Paris Peace Conference in October 1991 to 
finally seal the peace process. 
Overall, Indonesia's expectation of having the Cambodians reach a resolution by 
themselves was difficult to realise. The solution to the Cambodian conflict was 
reached first among the concerned countries, then endorsed by the Permanent Five 
and later on the Cambodians accepted the agreement. Other factors that made the 
resolution of the Cambodian conflict possible included the improvement of 
bilateral relations between China and the Soviet Union, Vietnam's efforts to break 
the isolation, and the betterment of relations between Thailand under Prime 
Minister Chatichai Choonhavan and Vietnam, as well as with the PRK. The 
improvement of the external environment left the Cambodians with no other 
option than to accept the peace framework because, in particular, their external 
patrons had accepted the content of the agreement in total. The peace framework 
also dealt with the internal aspects of the Cambodian problem. However, this 
reality suggests that, in the end, the Cambodians had to face realism that they 
were lacking incentive to prolong their conflicts, especially with the dwindling 
supports from their respective patrons. When the external parties left the 
battlefield, the Cambodians were left with the only alternative, that is, to co-
operate among themselves to rebuild their country. At the least, the JIM forum 
provided the Cambodians with a first ever opportunity to communicate among 
themselves, during which they had a chance to judge from the meetings whether 
or not they would be able, in the end, to work together as fellow countrymen. 
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J.t.2. The Moro problem 
In contrast to the factions in the Cambodian conflict, the parties in the Moro 
problem did not take negative statements and criticism from their opponents as an 
offence and a stumbling· block to the informal diplomacy process. This self-
restraint was observable especially among the representatives from the GRP, and, 
the conciliatory attitude made Indonesia's role as a facilitator less troublesome. 
Clearly, the representatives from the GRP and the MNLF came to the Cipanas 
informal exploratory talks for the sake of exploring options and assessing whether 
or not their opponents were serious about finding a solution to the Moro problem. 
The interests of all parties to explore options, during the informal talks and the 
subsequent peace talks, gave Indonesia more flexibility in facilitating the informal 
diplomacy process. Hence, the process moved on with the participants' 
willingness to look for innovative ways in resolving the problem. 
However, the positive attitudes described above did not necessarily mean that the 
participants trusted each other. After more than two decades of arms conflicts, the 
level of trust among the parties was very low. The MNLF considered the various 
GRP deceitful because they did not want to implement the Tripoli Agreement pf 
1976. This lack of trust was a problem that Indonesia encountered as facilitator 
during the informal diplomacy process. As the third party facilitating the process, 
Indonesia did not have a remedy to deal with this problem. They tried hard to 
encourage more communication and interactions among the protagonists, during 
and in the fringe of the meetings through social functions and group activities. 
During the informal diplomacy process social activities became part and parcel of 
the process, and the activities were designed as a means to develop confidence 
among the participants. Indonesia facilitated the participants, as a group, to visit 
some scenic places in Indonesia or arrange opportunities for shopping together in 
local shopping mall. 
Other critical problems that the Indonesians encountered were the lack of 
experience of formal negotiation among some MNLF representatives and their 
distrust of GRP. Dealing with this problem required patience not only from the 
Indonesians, but also from the GRP's representatives. Indonesia's main tasks were 
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to develop an environment conducive to discussions among the participants, and 
to implement a strategy for developing consensus on the lesser and gradually on 
the more contentious issues. In pursuing this strategy, Indonesia developed a 
tactic of limiting plenary meetings and encouraging more informal consultations 
to reach consensus. Hence, the formal plenary meetings were held after Indonesia 
was confident that the participants had reached a consensus on some issues, a 
tactic Indonesia also adop!ed during the second JIM. However, the consultation 
process during the JIM proved more difficult because more than two actors were 
involved in the process, with the four Cambodian parties and the eight concerned 
countries. In the case of Moro, there were usually only two parties: the 
representatives from the GRP and the MNLF. The representative from the OIC in 
general followed the leadership of Indonesia.21 Clearly, the number of parties is a 
factor that influenced the efficacy of the Indonesian informal diplomacy. 
To tackle the issue of inexperience among the MNLF on the negotiation format 
and their lack of experts who could comprehend the substantive as well as 
technical aspects of the issues being discussed, Indonesia provided some experts 
to assist the MNLF indirectly. For instance, an expert from the Indonesian 
Ministry of Religious Affairs gave their account of the GRP's proposal of Sharia 
Law, and an expert from the Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mining looked at 
the issue of resource sharing based on the GRP's proposal. At times, the 
Indonesian experts gave their assessment of the GRP's proposal to the Indonesian 
diplomats. Then during the interaction with the MNLF, the Indonesians used this 
input as a means to convince the MNLF, particularly in stressing the merits of 
various proposals of the GRP. However, this did not preclude the MNLF from 
asking for inputs from the OIC Secretariat. Hence, the Indonesian experts were 
acting more as a second or alternative opinion for the MNLF. 
The informal diplomacy process was also characterised by Indonesia's efforts to 
win the support of Mr. Misuari. Arguably, Mr. Misuari was the personification of 
the MNLF. He had pioneered the MNLF, lobbied for Moro's cause in the OIC, 
and was very instrumental in the informal diplomacy process as Chief Negotiator. 
As mentioned earlier, during the informal diplomacy process in Jakarta, Indonesia 
always arranged a private meeting between Minister Alatas and the leaders of the 
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conflicting parties. Such a meeting not only helped the Minister to become aware 
of and understand at first hand information on the process, but it also helped him 
understand the personality of Mr. Misuari better. A better understanding of Mr. 
Misuari's personality in~uenced the way Indonesia conducted the informal 
diplomacy process. For instance he was not prevented from making a statement, 
in the middle of the meeting, that was outside the scope of the topic under 
discussion. Indonesia was .aware that Mr. Misuari wished to address 'his gallery', 
that is, his sympathisers who always gathered when the meetings were held in the 
Philippines.22 Although this distracted the concentration of the meeting's 
participants, Indonesia did not stop Mr. Misuari from speaking to his 'gallery'. 
In comparison with the Cambodian conflict, an approach at the personal level in 
the Moro case was relatively easier. At the governmental level, the two 
Indonesian Ambassadors in Manila were old acquaintances of President Ramos. 
Further, their military background helped them gain access to the Philippines 
military establishment. Moreover, the relations between officials from the 
Indonesian Foreign Ministry and the Philippines Ministry of Foreign Affairs were 
also in a good accord. Thus, the Indonesians who facilitated the informal 
diplomacy process were able to concentrate more on persuading Mr. Misuari who 
stated that he felt he was the target of OIC persuasive diplomacy.23 Mr. Misuari's 
statement should be understood in the context of, first, Indonesia representing the 
OIC as Chairman of the Committee of Six, and second, when making this 
statement, Mr. Misuari had been approached by other members of the OIC 
Committee of Six after Indonesia had called for a special meeting. In that meeting 
of June 1996, Minister Alatas briefed the OIC Ministerial Committee of Six about 
the latest development of the informal diplomacy process and explained about the 
concessions that the GRP had offered. Thus, Indonesia did ask the committee 
members to help in persuading Mr. Misuari to accept the concession. 
A similar personal approach was difficult to achieve in the Cambodia case. 
Indonesia faced the problems of the many parties in the Cambodian conflict, and 
not having direct access to some of the key players in the conflict. For instance, 
Indonesia had to rely on Thailand in dealing with the Khmer Rouge and its 
contact with the PRK was through Vietnam. By then, Indonesia also had not yet 
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normalised its diplomatic relations with China, although the two countries' 
diplomats maintained contacts in the UN forum. Consequently, this handicap of 
direct access prevented Indonesia from pursuing the informal diplomacy to the 
utmost. 
Overall, the role of non-participants in the Moro informal diplomacy process, 
particularly the Philippin~s journalists, was relatively balanced. At first, the 
Philippines' media was very critical about the planned meeting between their 
government and the MNLF about internal issue was being hold overseas. In order 
to clarify speculation in the media about the nature of the meeting in Indonesia, 
the GRP released a statement explaining the rationale for the meeting and asserted 
that the following meeting would be held in the Philippines. The media interest on 
the informal meeting, held on April 1993, did not disturb the process because the 
press were not admitted to the meeting's venue. Press briefings and interviews 
were held after the conflicting parties had completed their deliberations in 
Cipanas. The isolation from the media gave the participants in the informal talks 
an opportunity to concentrate on their deliberations. 
The subsequent formal talks, between 1993 to 1996, were held under the close 
coverage of the Philippines media. At times, both the GRP and the MNLF used 
the media to assert their positions and justify their actions. The Ramos 
Administration wished to convince the public that the government national 
reconciliation program was on the right track. In the case of Mr. Misuari, 
obviously, he benefited from the media coverage. He had become less popular 
among the Moro in Mindanao due to his long period of self-exile in Saudi Arabia. 
The media coverage reasserted his position as a central figure in the MNLF, and 
his prominent position among other known separatist groups, the MILF and Abu 
Sayyaf. 
The fact that it was only the MNLF which was recognised by the OIC as the 
representative of the Moro people gave no basis to include the splinters groups, 
the MILF and Abu Sayyaf, into the informal diplomacy process. Thus, they were 
not bound by the agreement reached at the end of the process which meant that 
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Indonesia's intention to assist the Filipinos in finding a comprehensive solution to 
the Moro problems was not fully attained. 
In the end, Indonesia's effort to facilitate the resolution of the separatism conflict 
in Mindanao was enhanced by three factors to emerge inside and outside the 
Philippines. First, President Ramos committed his administration in a campaign to 
end the domestic insurge!lcies, including the Moro problem, so that he could 
concentrate on an economic development program. Secondly, Mr. Misuari 
realised that his popularity in Mindanao had declined due to his long period of 
self-exile in Saudi Arabia. In his absence, the other rebellious group, the MILF 
and Abu Sayyaf, had gained more popularity among the Moro people. Thirdly, the 
interests of both Libya and Saudi Arabia on the Moro problem had also declined. 
In particular, Libya wanted to improve its image from a country that sponsored 
armed rebellion to a country which supporting peaceful settlement of conflict. 
3.1.3. The South China Sea disputes 
The South China Sea informal workshops (1990-1998) presented Indonesia with a 
unique experience in terms of interpersonal relationships among the participants 
and with regard to their position toward the official line of their government. The 
informal workshops provided participants with an opportunity to meet in their 
individual capacity and develop personal relationships. This relationship helped 
them to better understand the concerns of their counterparts on issues sensitive to 
their country, but this did not limit the efforts of some participants and Indonesia 
to raise those issues during the informal workshop. Most of the time, participants 
from China vetoed discussion on issues sensitive for their government, such as on 
a regional code of conduct and the involvement of non-regional countries and 
international organisations in the workshop process. 
The difficulty some participants had in distancing themselves from the official 
line of their governments during the workshop limited Indonesia's ability to 
explore options during the process and encourage the participants to look outside 
of their 'square'. Indonesia's efforts to innovate, such as by proposing a 
'doughnut formula' as areas for possible co-operation, were rejected by some 
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claimant states. Therefore, the workshops between 1997 and 1998 were marked 
by a lack of new ideas and the participants tended to concentrate their discussions 
more on the technical aspects of the co-operation. This tendency turned the 
informal workshops into more routine meetings with the function of endorsing or 
revising the various proposals made by the informal meetings at the working 
groups and experts level. Despite the difficulty, the informal workshop was 
marked by an increase. of personal understanding and bonds among the 
participants. They did not take strong language and statements from other 
participants personally. Their interaction in the workshop and during the social 
functions and activities organised by Indonesia between the workshop' sessions 
gave the participants opportunity to develop a personal rapport. 
Indonesia's role during the South China Sea workshops was not confined to the 
three roles suggested by Herbert Kelman, that is, providing theoretical inputs, 
content observations and process observations. 24 Indonesia had engaged in the 
substantive discussion of the issues during the process, through the role of Dr. 
Djalal as resource person, and through the Indonesians who took part as 
participants during the meeting process. At times, Dr. Djalal was involved in 
intellectual debate with participants from China, to defend the merit of discussing 
particular topic during the workshop, such as the regional code of conduct.25 Dr. 
Jiwandono of CSIS stated that even during the First Workshop in 1990, the 
Indonesians who took part in the workshops as participants or resource persons 
engaged in substantive discussion. In his opinion not all participants from the 
ASEAN countries were happy about this 'know better attitude', and he was under 
the impression that the Indonesians dominated the First Workshop.26 The question 
is whether his observation confirms Herbert Kelman' argument that the third party 
in a conflict resolution should not take part in the substantive discussion nor give 
advice or offer its own proposals?27 
There is no affirmative answer to this matter because the informal workshop was a 
rather unique diplomatic effort involving not only participants with territorial 
disputes, but also those who have no territorial claims whatsoever. Arguably, 
those who have no direct stake on the issue would be less reserved in presenting 
their opinion, including the Indonesians who took part in the informal forum as 
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participants or resource persons. Another explanation for active third party 
involvement in the process was that they had a stake in a successful or tangible 
outcome of the process and, therefore, were willing to transgress the ideal 
boundary of informal diplomacy set by some scholars. In fact, the Indonesian 
diplomats who were in charge in the process had to report to their superiors about 
the outcomes of the process, and their concerns were ultimately about achieving 
tangible results. However! the implication of much involvement in the process 
was resentment from some participants to the role of the third party. 
Another question arises whether the Indonesians engagement in the substantive 
discussion mean that as facilitator in the problem solving exercise Indonesia 
wished to steer the discussion. Although none of the interviewees were willing to 
support such a scenario, at a certain stage during the workshop process, the 
Indonesians must have become nervous at the slow pace of the workshops' 
achievements. Minister Alatas' suggestion to formalise some of the agreements 
reached during the workshops could be seen as a hint that he was not very pleased 
with the slow progress of the informal workshop. The Minister's assertion put 
extra pressure on the Indonesian team and they wished to gain concrete results. 
Another way to explain the active involvement of the Indonesian team in the 
workshop discussion could also be that on the one hand, the Indonesians wished 
to stimulate the substantive discussions during the workshop in the expectation 
that this would induce other participants, especially the claimant states, to be more 
forthcoming. Therefore, their active involvement was a calculated tactic on the 
part of Indonesia as facilitator of the informal workshops. On the other hand, 
some members of the Indonesian team lacked understanding or direction on the 
kind of role that they had to perform during the informal workshops. This was 
mostly caused by a lack of clarity of the assignment they received before the 
informal workshop. Consequently, they actively engaged in the discussion based 
on their 'gut feeling' and background knowledge on the topics under discussion. 
Arguably the second explanation is more desirable because, as admitted by Dr. 
Djalal, some participants from the claimant states, at times, suspected Indonesia of 
having an undisclosed agenda, such as to benefit economically from the co-
operation projects. 28 Such suspicion was unavoidable knowing that some 
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members of the Indonesian team included officials from the military, mostly the 
navy, and from technical ministries such as the Ministry of Mining and Energy. 
Other participants could interpret any comments made by Indonesian participants 
from these branches of government during the substantive discussion as an 
implicit interest. 
The lack of clarity of thei~ role among the Indonesians during the workshop was 
further impaired by insufficient co-ordination among members of the Indonesian 
team between the sessions of the workshop. Although the Indonesian team 
engaged in preparatory meetings prior to the workshop, internal co-ordination in 
the intervals between the workshop sessions was limited. Seemingly, as long as 
those who acted as facilitators, participants or observers understood their role and 
function, they were left to perform it. Some co-ordination activities were held by 
each group, but the groups did not meet as a whole team. Dr. Djalal co-ordinated 
the substance with resource persons from Canada, while the Indonesian team from 
the Research Agency conducted a separate meeting. Meanwhile, those involved as 
participants as well as observers seldom sat together to discuss the process or the 
dynamics of the earlier sessions.29 This reality could also stem from the fact that a 
number of Indonesians had long involvement in the yearly workshops and, 
therefore, to some members of the team, at least, the informal diplomacy had 
become a routine exercise. They simply did not find internal co-ordination during 
the workshop urgent because they assumed that the rest of the team members were 
also aware of their role and function. Hence, the active participation of the 
Indonesians during the substantive discussions was the result of internal pressure 
and different understanding among members of the team of their role in the 
informal process. 
This finding raises a question as to the extent of Indonesia's involvement during 
the substantive discussions on Cambodia and the Moro problems. The discussion 
in Chapter 4 suggested that during the Cambodia peace process the Indonesians, at 
first, tried to avoid involvement in the substantive discussion by letting the 
Cambodians hold their internal discussions. However, the paucity of results from 
this session put pressure on Minister Alatas, in his capacity as a chairman of the 
JIM, to direct the discussion in the afternoon session. Indonesia even prepared a 
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document for the second JIM and Minister Alatas consulted the content of the 
document with the head of each delegation. Therefore, Indonesia was also 
involved in the substantive discussion during the informal meetings of the 
Cambodians, and was even more active in terms of providing the participants with 
a consolidated text as a basis for their discussion. 
In the Moro case, Indonesia distanced itself from the substantive discussion 
during the informal exploratory talks and took a facilitative role. When the 
informal talks moved into formal talks, Indonesia set the direction of the 
substantive discussion by identifying the issues or topics of discussion based on 
the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. However, in the overall informal diplomacy 
process, the Indonesian team also tried to limit their involvement in the 
substantive discussion. In the process, they mostly facilitated the discussion 
among the participants, by chairing the various meetings. They did give 
alternative opinions based on the request, mostly of the MNLF, and mainly on 
issues where the MNLF lacked expertise. Thus, the involvement of the 
Indonesians in the substantive discussion in dealing with the Moro case was more 
moderate compared to the other two cases, Cambodian and the South China Sea. 
The above evaluations reveal that the involvement of Indonesia in the substantive 
discussions during the informal diplomacy process in certain circumstances was 
unavoidable. However, what made a difference in these cases was the level of 
understanding among the Indonesians on the extent of their role in the informal 
diplomacy process. Furthermore, their understanding was influenced by the 
considerable extent of co-ordination within the team. Clearly, members of 
Indonesian teams dealing with the Cambodian and Moro problems were engaged 
in intensive co-ordination in comparison with the Indonesian team for the South 
China Sea informal workshop. 
3.2. The meeting setting and its impact on the informal diplomacy process 
Track Two scholars have long drawn attention to the setting as one of the most 
important aspects in the problem solving exercise.30 The impact of the meeting 
setting on the informal diplomacy conducted by Indonesia and meeting dynamics 
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is difficult to evaluate. At question is how influential the setting was to the 
meetings' dynamic and the outcomes of the meetings themselves. During the 
infonnal diplomacy process, Indonesia tried to create a setting which was 
supportive to the dynamics during the actual meeting and between the sessions. 
The setting in this case ·involved the selection of the meeting's venue and the 
seating arrangement during the meeting itself. Indonesia also gave extra attention 
to other factors that coul~ influence the settings and meeting dynamics, such as 
the arrangement of participants' accommodation and the organisation of social 
activities in between the meetings, to effect improvement in interpersonal 
relationships among the participants. The following discussion evaluates these 
efforts in the three case studies. 
The first JIM on the Cambodian issue and the informal exploratory talks of the 
Moro were held in the Presidential Palace. The venues were selected at the 
discretion of President Soeharto, reflecting his personal interest in the informal 
diplomacy process. By selecting the palaces as the venue, Indonesia clearly 
wished to demonstrate to the participants that it took its role as facilitator 
seriously and wished to treat the participants with the utmost respect. Moreover, 
the palace has an aura of dignity and Indonesia wished to share this with the 
participants. Seemingly the element of symbolism was an important factor for 
Indonesia in performing the role as facilitator and, arguably, Asian culture takes 
symbolism very seriously. For instance, Hun Sen was upset that as Prime 
Minister he was not being treated equally by the French Government because the 
host did not reserve him a room in the same hotel where Prince Sihanouk was 
staying. Also in the case of Cambodia, in Jakarta in 1989, Prince Sihanouk had 
insisted Hun Sen visit him in the hotel he stayed for their bilateral talks. Hence, 
the mere visit of Hun Sen to his hotel symbolised obedience. In the case of the 
Moro, arguably an opportunity for the MNLF to share a stay in a palace with 
representatives from the GRP gave them a sense of equal status. Likewise, for the 
GRP's representatives, the palace would be less intimidating for a meeting than 
the office of Libya's Foreign Ministry in Tripoli where they held their first 
informal exploratory talks with the MNLF in1992. 
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The selection of a palace also stemmed from practical reasons. It was easier for 
Indonesia to provide the participants with security and to isolate ·them, for 
instance, from media interference. Both palaces were located on the outskirts of 
Jakarta. However, Indonesia did face some difficulties in meeting the demand of 
the Cambodian participants during the first JIM in Bogor, as each group insisted 
on having sleeping quarters at the same level; no one wanted to be placed in the 
room at a lower level. tha~ other participants.31 Similarly, the parties were highly 
sensitive over the meeting setting and, at one point, their officials even measured 
the size of the table in the meeting room that Indonesia provided for their head of 
delegation.32 Indonesia also faced difficulty in providing the media with a holding 
room and telecommunication facilities in Bogor Palace. Clearly, some of the 
technical problems of the antique Bogor Palace caused difficulties for Indonesia in 
fulfilling the various demands of the participants. Indonesia was able to meet the 
participants' demands, but the complexity surrounding the process could have 
influenced the positive atmosphere of friendship that Indonesia had wished to 
nurture. The limitations of the palace venue were the reason why the second JIM 
was held in a modem hotel in Jakarta. 
The informal exploratory talks involving the Filipinos held in the Cipanas Palace 
did not face the same sort of technical problems. Despite the antiquity of Cipanas 
Palace, the Indonesian team had earlier requested the Ministry of 
Communication's assistance to upgrade the telephone facility and guarantee easy 
access to Manila and Riyadh. With the communication system in place, the 
participants faced no difficulty in consulting with their superiors or advisers in the 
two cities. This easy access to communication proved valuable for the informal 
talks and the subsequent meetings in Jakarta, and Indonesia took special care of 
this matter. Therefore, in Cipanas, Indonesia was relatively less troubled by the 
participants' demands. Their numbers were also smaller. Indonesia had to deal 
mainly with Mr. Misuari and his entourage. The participants from the GRP were 
easier to deal with because understandably they were in need of Indonesia's 
assistance. 
In the subsequent meetings after Cipanas, Indonesia had to deal with the 
increasing number of representatives from the MNLF. Indonesia had to 
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accommodate their large numbers - even at its own expense _ for the sake of 
providing Mr. Misuari and the MNLF with peace of mind. Indonesia tried to 
empathise with Mr. Misuari's interest in bringing the various interest groups of 
the MNLF to Jakarta so that he could convince them that he was discussing the 
interests of all the Moro elements. At the same time, the informal diplomacy 
process itself benefited from the involvement of the various sections and interest 
groups in the MNLF. Th~ dissemination of the meetings results was enhanced 
because more Moro people were exposed to the process. Therefore, Indonesia 
would not have been reluctant to accommodate the large number of MNLF 
representative during the peace process in Indonesia. 
In the case of South China Sea workshop, the activities were held in different 
cities in Indonesia. The selection of the city and venue was based on the 
consideration of symbolism and practicality. A city with a symbolic meaning was 
selected in order to relate the participants with what had been achieved in the city 
in the past; for instance Bandung because of the Afro-Asian Conference, and the 
ancient city of Jogyakarta because of the peace tradition among the Javanese 
society. Some cities were selected because of their proximity to the South China 
Sea, and in the past those cities functioned as a hub that connected the Asian 
people from different race groups for trades and communications. The 
significance of every city was explicitly stated by Minister Alatas in his opening 
remarks in every workshop. Hence, the aspect of symbolism remains essential for 
the venues of the informal workshops. However, there is no clear explanation 
whether or not such symbolism had any influence on the participants. 
Indonesia also gave careful attention to the seating arrangements during the 
informal meetings. Although the informal setting supposedly gave the facilitator 
less headache over the protocols, in reality during the Indonesian informal 
diplomacy some participants remained critical about protocol matters. As 
mentioned earlier, some Cambodian participants were very sensitive to the 
treatment their leaders received from the host. To avoid apprehension during JIM, 
the participants were seated based on alphabetical order and this arrangement was 
also introduced during the informal workshop. However, in the case of the South 
China Sea informal workshop, no flags or country designation were placed on the 
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table. Each participant received a map of the seating arrangement, so they would 
know where to sit. In the case of JIM, the Cambodian participants sat with the 
only identification: a plate which said 'Cambodia'. Therefore, arguably the 
intention of Indonesia was twofold: first to avoid disputes on who was the 
legitimate representative of the Cambodians, and second to emphasise 
togetherness, that all the participants were Cambodian by origin. 
Indonesia was also concerned about the shape of the table for the informal 
meetings. The shapes of the table for the informal meetings were either round or 
oval. However, in the case of the informal workshop, this was not always the case 
because some venues had difficulty in accommodating a round or oval shaped 
table. A square table was all Indonesia could arrange in some of the workshops. In 
general, participants to the informal workshop seldom complained about the 
seating arrangements. What really mattered for China was to prevent Taiwan 
using the workshop forum to assert its claim as a sovereign entity. 
China was very critical if the notion of the Republic of China was mentioned 
during the meeting or in workshop documents. On some occasions, Taiwan did 
circulate a document bearing the name Republic of China which dragged some 
meeting sessions into a long debate between participants from China and Taiwan 
on the legality of the name. According to Dino Djalal, at times China used this 
issue to delay discussion on substantive issues.33 Clearly, Indonesia took care of 
the Taiwan issue very carefully because Indonesia did not want to embarrass 
China and did not want the peace process troubled with China's domestic interest. 
For its part, Taiwan did benefit from its participation in the informal workshop. 
The forum provided Taiwan with an opportunity to follow discussions not only on 
technical issues but, at times, also on political and security issues. 
Indonesia gave special attention to social activities involving the participants 
during the informal meetings. Indonesia organised social events between 
meeting's sessions and at the end or the final day of the meetings. The aims of the 
activities were to relieve their tensions and stress during their interactions in the 
meeting, as well as to socialise the participants one with another. The varieties of 
activities included attending traditional dances performance (in the case of JIM), 
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taking tum in presenting national songs (in the informal workshop on the South 
China Sea) and visiting scenic places. During the Moro meetings, Indonesia 
organised a number of group field trip to various tourism sites or simply to visit 
local markets together. The social activities were aimed at increasing interpersonal 
relationships among the participants, better understanding and also to relieve some 
tensions during the meetings. 
Arguably, such social activities did influence participants' relationships in the 
three case studies, although their impact in each case was different. At the least, 
the MNLF admitted that they had learned more about their opponent during the 
various social activities organised by lndonesia.34 Similarly, some Cambodians 
who took part in JIM stated to the Indonesian Ambassador in Phnom Penh that 
they were touched by the message delivered by President Soeharto during their 
courtesy visit.35 In that meeting the President appealed to the Cambodians to fulfil 
their common goal together, of holding an election, and to leave their antagonism 
behind. During the second JIM, one of the social activities that Indonesia 
organised was a courtesy visit to President Soeharto's house. 
VII.4. Assessment of the objectives of informal diplomacy and the outcomes 
The efficacy of informal diplomacy in dealing with regional conflicts and disputes 
is subject to various interrelated factors, such as whether or not the conflicting 
parties were interested in the informal diplomacy process, and whether or not the 
participants in the process shared similar objectives of resolving their problem. As 
noted earlier, developments at the domestic, regional and also international 
environments also had some influence in the process. 
Indeed, Indonesian informal diplomacy was only one of many peace efforts 
involving different actors and countries, and took place in other forums. The 
informal diplomacy contributed to the peace efforts in different forums and, at the 
same time, it was influenced by the interrelationships between the core 
participants in the informal meetings and those outside the meeting forums or the 
non-participants. For instance, the Khmer Rouge dependence on China set the 
limits on the JIMs because China did not take part in the meetings. Indonesian 
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informal diplomacy also influenced the peace efforts in other forums, such as the 
inter-linkages between the JIMs process and the UN discussion on Cambodia. 
Similarly, the informal workshop on the South China Sea actually provided the 
regional countries with some proposals of possible regional co-operation in the 
South China Sea. 
The following discussion. evaluates the objectives of the Indonesian informal 
diplomacy and whether it has furthered Indonesia's strategic interests in the 
region. The participants' interest in the process also influenced the attainments of 
the objectives. However, their interest in taking part in the informal diplomacy 
process can be difficult to discern. Their interests and objectives can really only 
be ascertained from the various statements the participants made inside and 
outside the meetings, and through observing their behaviour during the process. In 
determining whether the participants were interested in the informal diplomacy, 
the thesis has to rely on the impressions the Indonesians had about the many 
participants. Similarly, the objectives or the motives of the third party in 
sponsoring the informal diplomacy process are also difficult to identify at times. 
The techniques to identify Indonesia's objectives and motives as a third party in 
resolving the conflicts are similar to the ones used in assessing the participants' 
objectives, that is, through observing the various statements made by Indonesians, 
and through the interviews with some Indonesians involved in the undertakings. 
4.1. Shared objectives: between ideals and reality 
Shared objectives is an ideal in informal diplomacy. If all parties in the conflicts 
and disputes shared the desire to resolve their problems, then the role of the third 
party is relatively easy. What the third party needs to do is assist those in conflicts 
to find the most acceptable solution to their problems and ensure that all 
participants are satisfied with the outcomes of the peace efforts. As noted in 
Chapter 3, Indonesian informal diplomacy was also inspired with the ideal of 'just 
peace', that is, to resolve the problems of conflicts and disputes comprehensively 
to the satisfaction of all the participants and the parties concerned. 
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As also noted in Chapter 3, this ideal of a lasting peace; stemming from the 
balance between freedom and responsibility; 36 was also shared by many officials 
of the Ministry. They believed that conflict resolution would last longer if the 
parties to the conflicts or disputes were satisfied with the outcomes of the informal 
diplomacy process. For instance, Mr. Yusbar Djamil mentioned that Indonesia's 
peace initiatives to deal with the three regional issues were based on the interest of 
finding a comprehensive ~olution to the problem.37 A comprehensive solution in 
this case meant that Indonesia looked at issues involved in the conflicts and the 
disputes comprehensively, and not mainly on issues related to the conflict. 
Arguably, informal diplomacy was Indonesia's main tool to address issues which 
were not immediately obvious. The informality of the forum (it is not official) 
which is exploratory in nature, with outcomes which are non-binding, is suitable 
for efforts to explore problems, positions, and options exhaustively. However, the 
effectiveness of an informal forum and the role of the third party can only be 
enhanced if the participants also shared similar objectives of resolving their 
problems. 
The third party's role is far more difficult where the participants do not share 
similar objectives of conflict resolution and come to the forum with a differing 
interpretation of the Indonesian peace initiative, or seek to achieve particular 
interests. For example, some participants came to meetings mainly to block the 
discussion because of their national interest, such as the case of China and 
Malaysia's participation in the South China Sea workshop.38 Therefore, the main 
challenge for any third party in the informal diplomacy process is how to 
encourage the participants to share the objective of resolving their conflict and 
disputes. It is important for the third party to make participants understand that the 
foundation of informal diplomacy is process, and in some cases it takes time for 
the process to achieve the objective of solving the conflict. Likewise, the third 
party needs to enlighten the participants that the process itself does not guarantee 
a solution to the problems, but could help parties become more aware of and 
understand the positions, concerns and interests of other parties. 
Both attitudes among the participants toward the informal diplomacy, either of 
having or lacking interest, were observable during the informal diplomacy process 
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sponsored by Indonesia. Cases where the participants showed a lack of 
understanding of the objectives of the informal diplomacy were observ~ble during 
JIM and the informal workshop on the South China Sea. In fact, in the case of 
JIM, the forum itself was marred by participants' insistence on maintaining their 
parochial interests. This· stance was a clear reflection of their objectives and 
motives in participating in the informal forum. For instance, during JIM, 
participants representing ~he CGDK wished to put Vietnam on the spot as the 
main culprit for Cambodia's fiasco. Singapore and Thailand also shared this 
intention. In contrast, Vietnam and Hun Sen wanted to put all the blame for the 
Cambodian debacle on the Khmer Rouge, implicating that the Khmer Rouge 
policy of genocide was the main factor of the Cambodian conflict. Thus, Vietnam 
invaded Cambodia not as an oppressor but as a liberator. 
Vietnam's objective in participating in the JIM was to break the international 
isolation imposed by some countries and international organisations. At the same 
time, Vietnam was also interested in relieving itself of the economic burden of its 
occupation in Cambodia. Hence, Vietnam had a stake in a successful outcome 
from the JIM and, therefore, played a constructive role during the informal 
diplomacy process. However, Vietnam's desire not to be blamed as the instigator 
of the conflict made this country very averse to any discussions on the topic of 
military pullout. Vietnam's tactic to avoid discussion was to link the issue of a 
military pullout with the discontinuation of all military assistance to all the 
Cambodian factions and to declare the non-recurrence of the genocide policy of 
the Khmer Rouge. 
Similarly, the Cambodian participants did not share the objectives of resolving 
their conflicts in a most acceptable way, where all parties involved in the informal 
diplomacy were satisfied with the outcomes. Clearly, they came to Jakarta to gain 
the most vis-a-vis the other parties and, as a consequence, they were unwilling to 
listen to other parties' points of view. The informality of the forum was not able to 
move the participants forward to look at issues beyond their parochial interests. 
As explained in Chapter 4, Indonesia designed the first stage of the First JIM as an 
avenue for the Cambodian participants to discuss among themselves issues that 
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required attention during the second stage of the JIM, involving participants from 
concerned countries. Minister Alatas spelled out this objective as follows: 
Herein lies th~ signifi_cance of this stage of our Meeting [the first 
stage or mornmg session], for it is our considered view that it will 
provide all of you.representatives of all Kampuchean factions with 
~ first a~d unique opportunity to discuss, in an atmosphere of 
mformahty, those aspects of the problem that should appropriately 
be taken up by the Kampuchean people themselves, e.g. such 
aspects as national reconciliation, self-determination, the formation 
of a provisional government to arrange for general elections and the 
building of a new, peaceful, independent, Non-aligned and neutral 
Kampuchea. 39 
By giving the Cambodian participants the opportunity to set the direction of the 
afternoon discussion, Indonesia had hoped that they would have considered the 
JIM as their own. With a sense of belonging, Indonesia expected that Cambodians 
would have respected any outcomes of the JIM process, thus guaranteeing the 
sustenance of the outcomes of the informal diplomacy process. However, the 
Cambodian participants did not seize the opportunity and, in the end, Indonesia 
had to set the agenda for the afternoon discussion. By setting a meeting agenda, 
Indonesia deviated from the principles governing the conflict resolution exercise, 
especially of the Track Two diplomacy. John Burton, for instance, maintained that 
in an informal forum for conflict resolution "there should be no fixed agenda of 
either specific items or timing".40 The difficulty of observing this principle in the 
actual exercise of conflict resolution, such as in Cambodia, is that the core 
participants were not willing to engage themselves in a kind of exploratory 
discussion. Hence, as a third party, Indonesia felt obliged to stimulate the 
discussion during JIM by setting the agenda and items for discussions, otherwise 
the momentum of the first ever meeting among the parties in the Cambodian 
conflict would be meaningless. 
Similarly, by letting the Cambodian participants discuss some issues of their 
conflict among themselves, without the presence of the third party, Indonesia also 
did not observe the requirements of controlled communication, another cardinal 
principle of the Track Two diplomacy.41 For scholars of Track Two diplomacy 
and problem solving workshops, controlled communication is the main 
characteristic of their conflict resolution approach because the participants were 
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expected to move from one discussion to another after completing their analysis 
of their problem in the earlier discussion. In this case the third party should ensure 
that the participants observed this procedure and prevented the participants from 
suggesting any proposal before the analysis of the situation was complete.42 
Given the discrepancies between the ideal of conflict resolution as outlined by 
some scholars and the implementation of informal diplomacy by Indonesia, the 
question arises of why the Indonesians did not observe the principles behind 
conflict resolution, particularly of the problem solving workshop? Furthermore, is 
there any similarity between what Indonesia called a 'just peace' or a 
comprehensive resolution and conflict resolution? On the second question, 
arguably in principle what Indonesia called 'just peace' and 'comprehensive 
resolution' share the central tenet of conflict resolution through a problem solving 
workshop. According to Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks a successful 
workshop is when the parties emerge from the meeting with "an outcome that 
satisfies their underlying interests and their goals."43 The so-called 
comprehensive resolution is also based on the interest of addressing all aspects of 
the conflict so that the parties are satisfied with the outcomes and their sense of 
justice is served. 
Although sharing the basic tenet with some variants of conflict resolution 
techniques, in pursuing its informal diplomacy, Indonesia did not follow the ideal 
forms of the problem solving approach as suggested by the Track Two diplomacy 
scholars. This action stemmed from the fact that JIM was Indonesia's first ever 
exercise of informal diplomacy in dealing with regional conflict, and therefore, it 
was open for experimentation. Arguably, Indonesia had learned some lessons 
from the difficulty it encountered in the first JIM and in the subsequent informal 
diplomacy meetings; Indonesia no longer left the parties in a meeting setting on 
their own, without the presence of Indonesia as the third party. Similarly, in both 
the Cambodia and Moro cases Indonesia also reduced the frequency of plenary 
meetings when it found that the participants tended to engage in confrontational 
interactions during the plenary setting. To deal with the problem, Indonesia 
intensified informal caucus meetings wherein the third party and the parties in the 
conflicts met in private to discuss the contentious issues. 
336 
The caucus meeting is a informal meeting with a limited number of participants. 
Some scholars of problem solving techniques consider a caucus meeting not 
suitable for conflict resolution because the exercise is depicted as non-analytical 
and concerned with bargaining an outcome. Scholars are concerned that in a 
caucus meeting the interactions among the parties are influenced more with power 
politics and, therefore, the weaker party would not find the outcomes acceptable. 
However, during the In~onesian caucus meetings all the participants were 
involved and the interactions were not guided by power politics but more by 
exploring the underlying reasons behind some participants' positions on some 
issues of their conflict. For instance, representatives from the MNLF did not feel 
comfortable discussing the issue of their irregular forces' integration into the 
Philippines Army openly in the plenary settings. Thus, a caucus meeting during 
the informal diplomacy process to deal with Moro problem provided the parties 
with the opportunity to discuss all their concerns on some sensitive issues 
exhaustively. 
At the same time a caucus meeting helped the participants know each other better, 
and from the interactions they gradually developed a personal rapport. Arguably, 
personal rapport among the participants was one of the main objectives of the 
Indonesian informal diplomacy because with good rapport the participants could 
understand more of the perspectives of their opponents and, at the same time, see 
them as fellow humans and not simply as an enemy sitting on the other side of the 
table. Clearly good personal rapport among the participants and between the 
Indonesians and the participants was an important feature in Indonesian informal 
diplomacy. To reinforce this objective, Indonesia kept intact the composition of 
the teams who were assigned to deal with the informal diplomacy, and in 
particular maintaining the head of the team at all time. In the case of Moro the 
Foreign Minister assigned Mr. Sastrohandoyo as head of the team continuously, 
even after he was appointed as ambassador in France, and in the case of the South 
China Sea informal workshop, the Foreign Minister trusted Dr. Djalal. 
However, good personal rapport, especially among the participants, also has a 
negative side. Good relations at the interpersonal level among the participants 
Carries the risk of frustrating the informal diplomacy process because the 
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participants' integrity could be questioned by colleagues back home who were not 
involved in the informal diplomacy process. In order to deal with the problem 
emanating from the perception of 'selling out' to the enemy, Indonesia 
encouraged the participants to maintain close contact with their colleagues back 
home by installing communication facilities in the meeting venue. In the case of 
the Moro, another option chosen by Indonesia was to let the MNLF bring into the 
informal diplomacy proce~s more participants who were representing the different 
interests among the Moro. Their exposure to the discussion helped the Moro 
people's acceptance of the meetings outcomes. However, this option of bringing 
more participants was costly for Indonesia, financially. 
The role of the third party in conflict resolution is less complicated where 
participants share the objectives of the informal diplomacy. In the Moro case, the 
participants did share similar objectives when they came to Jakarta to participate 
in the informal exploratory talks. All the participants came to the forum to explore 
options and to look at their problems afresh. In particular, they were willing to re-
look at the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 and to find ways and means to improve the 
Agreement. Indeed, the parties had different understandings and interpretations of 
the Agreement because, after almost two decades, the Agreement had been taken 
over by events and developments in the Philippines. As facilitator, Indonesia 
assisted the participants in their discussion on the issues involved by identifying 
the points of contention in the Agreement and let the parties discuss each point, 
step by step. 
In the case of the workshop on the South China Sea, Indonesia had difficulty in 
convincing the participants of the merits of informal diplomacy's objectives. 
Indonesia had hoped that the informal diplomacy would build confidence among 
the participants and, at the same time, contribute to the development of alternative 
policies to deal with the issues relating with the territorial disputes. Although in 
the informal diplomacy process, the participants were able to develop a cordial 
working relationship among themselves, the better understanding did not occur at 
the governmental level. There was a gap between the improvement of 
relationships at an interpersonal level, better understanding of the participants' 
position and concerns during the workshop and the attitude of their authority in 
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the region. This occurred, despite the fact that the majority of the participants to 
the informal workshop dealt with the South China Sea issues in their daily 
responsibility or portfolio in their government. Hence, this reality can be 
explained in two ways: first, the participants failed to influence the policy of their 
respective authorities and; second, they came to the informal workshop simply to 
secure the official lines or the interests of their government. 
In the workshop, the participants were also reluctant to discuss the so-called 
policy inputs issues. They did discuss some topics that were aimed at exploring 
policy options for their respective governments, but in the process some 
participants vetoed the discussion giving the reason that the workshops had no 
mandate to discuss such issues. Hence the ideal nature of informal diplomacy to 
explore issues comprehensively was handicapped by some participants' 
determination to prevent such discussions taking place. In this case, clearly some 
participants to the informal workshop were taking part in the informal diplomacy 
process for the sake of securing their government's interest. 
The difficulty in encouraging participants to share the objectives of the informal 
diplomacy was one of many problems Indonesia experienced during the informal 
diplomacy. At times, the participants also questioned Indonesia's motives in 
sponsoring the informal diplomacy and, as discussed in Chapter 6, such 
scepticism was observable in the South China Sea workshop. Some participants to 
the JIMs also questioned Indonesia's motives. They did not believe that Indonesia 
was sponsoring the informal diplomacy initiatives mainly for altruism. The 
following discussion evaluates the issue of motive in the context of informal 
diplomacy. 
4.2. Third party motives in facilitating informal diplomacy 
The motives of any third party willing to facilitate resolution of a conflict or 
dispute is always questioned, not only by those directly involved in the endeavour 
(the core participants), but also by the non participants, such as the media and 
independent analysts. Usually they are suspicious that the third party might have 
undeclared motives behind the peace initiatives. For instance, Indonesia was often 
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alleged to have ulterior motives in playing a leadership role - at times pejoratively 
called the 'big brother role' - in ASEAN and the region. Any indication of 
Indonesia increasing its diplomatic profile in the region was at times received as a 
conflicting signal by the neighbouring countries. However, in the end, some 
regional countries including Singapore were able to appreciate Indonesia's 
diplomatic initiatives because their strategic interests were also linked to the 
resolution of the problems. 
Indonesia's interest in regional stability when translated into diplomatic initiatives 
was not always easily expressed. For instance, Indonesia would be hesitant to 
mention that the South China dispute jeopardised its territorial integrity around 
the Natuna islands. Any new configuration of boundary delimitation as a result of 
the dispute would have a direct impact on Indonesia's territorial boundary. Hence, 
Indonesia only stated the motives of the informal diplomacy in general terms, 
such as to bring peace and stability, and avoided any impression of self-benefit 
from the diplomatic efforts. Nevertheless, Indonesia benefited from any solution 
to the problems, from the perspective of security and in terms of an increase of 
diplomatic profiles, regionally and internationally, as did the regional countries 
andASEAN. 
In some instances there were discrepancies between the statements made by some 
Indonesians when organising the informal diplomacy to deal with the regional 
conflicts and disputes. In the case of Cambodia, the stated interest of the 
Ministry's officials to help solve the Cambodian problem was at times 
contradicted by the position of officials from the Defence Ministry, implying an 
unstated interest in strengthening the capacity of Vietnam to act as a buffer against 
potential threat from China. This lack of internal cohesion was inevitable because 
foreign policy making in Indonesia involved a number of actors, including the 
military, each with their own vision on how best to deal with particular problems. 
However, the military no longer contradicted the motive after it received a signal 
of the President's interest in having Indonesia help resolve the Cambodian 
problem.44 In the late 1980s President Soeharto's attitude toward China was more 
progressive compared to the hard-line views of in the military. 
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The misrepresentation of motives had to a certain extent constrained Indonesia's 
efforts in dealing with the Cambodian problem because some participants were 
sceptical about Indonesia's impartiality. Despite Indonesia stating that the 
intention of the JIM was to allow the Cambodian factions and the regional 
countries to deal with the Cambodian problems, the non-participation of China in 
the JIMs limited Indonesia's ability to optimise the forum. Some participants also 
suggested that the prior ~greement between Indonesia and Vietnam about the 
format of the JIM reflected Indonesia's favouring of Vietnam's interest. Indonesia 
decided to make all the participants feel that there was no discrimination during 
the South China Sea informal workshop. For instance, Indonesia did not follow 
the recommendation of the first workshop in 1990 to include China at a later stage 
after Vietnam had been included. China and Vietnam as well as Taiwan were 
admitted in the process at the same time, during the Second Workshop in 1991. 
Indonesia also decided not to organise a separate meeting to include all members 
of ASEAN during the second Workshop which was recommended during the first 
Workshop. Thus, all participants took part in all sessions during the second 
Workshop in 1991. 
In the Moro case, misunderstanding about Indonesia's motives did not carry such 
concerns. At one point of the informal diplomacy process, the Philippines public 
was critical of Indonesia seemingly using its facilitation role to pressure the GRP 
on issues relating to the East Timor. In 1994, Indonesia delayed the planned 
meeting between the Moro and the GRP when it learned about an international 
conference on East Timor in Manila. In fact, the diplomatic pressure that 
Indonesia put on the Philippines included the delaying of a business visit to the 
Philippines by some Indonesian businessmen in the context of regional co-
operation.45 Some Philippines' media accused Indonesia of bullying its neighbour 
and interfering in the domestic affairs of the Philippines. Nevertheless, this affair 
did not affect Indonesia's conflict resolution efforts overall. 
The Indonesian motive behind the South China Sea informal workshops was quite 
obvious, to prevent the disputes becoming armed conflicts. However, some 
participants suspected Indonesia of wanting to internationalise the issue and to 
gain economic benefit from the co-operation (see discussion in Chapter 6). The 
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main proponent of the informal workshop, Dr. Djalal, admitted to such suspicions, 
but argued that internationalisation of the issue was not Indonesia's motive, and 
was a logical consequence of the informal workshop process.46 Hence, although 
there was no conclusive evidence whether internationalisation was Indonesia's 
main motive, Indonesia did benefit diplomatically from international interest in 
the issue and the informal workshop process. For instance, despite the East Timor 
debacle in late 1990s - especially following the mayhem after the UN supervised 
referendum in August 1999 - Indonesia was still noted as a country which was 
actively contributing to regional peace, including its role in sponsoring the South 
China Sea informal workshop.47 
4.3. The outcomes of the informal diplomacy 
The following discussion evaluates the outcomes of the Indonesian informal 
diplomacy by looking at the objectives and motives of the Indonesian peace 
initiatives through informal diplomacy. 
In pursuing informal diplomacy, Indonesia wished to have 'a just or 
comprehensive peace', where all the parties in the conflicts and disputes were 
satisfied with the outcomes of the informal diplomacy process. Indonesia believed 
that satisfaction among the parties would guarantee a durable peace and the 
parties' observance of the peace agreement reached from the informal diplomacy 
process. However, on the one hand, this expectation was not sustained by the fact 
that the Khmer Rouge boycotted the UN supervised election, one of the main 
elements of the Paris Peace Agreement of 1991. Similarly, the MNLF in 2001 
abrogated the Peace Agreement of 1996, accusing the GRP of not adhering to the 
Agreement. Do these realities mean that the informal diplomacy process failed? 
On the other hand, the failure to observe these details of the two Agreements also 
could not omit the fact that the informal diplomacy process had contributed to the 
signing of those Agreements. In the case of the informal workshop process in the 
South China Sea disputes, the workshops also produced a number of project 
proposals and discussed some possible policy options for the regional countries. 
However, some regional countries were reluctant to implement the proposals and 
consider policy options. 
342 
In the end, the only viable means to assess the outcomes of the informal 
diplomacy process is by looking at the Indonesian objectives and motives in 
pursuing its diplomatic initiative. This reasoning also took into consideration that 
the process did contribute to the signing of the peace agreement, such as the cases 
of Cambodian and Moro conflicts. The difficulty in this approach is that, at times, 
Indonesia did not make clear its objectives and motives from the informal 
diplomacy process. How~ver, four of the objectives the Indonesians always 
mentioned during the process included: a) to explore options for the solution of 
the conflicts and disputes, b) to improve the relationship among the participants, 
c) to develop confidence among the participants, and d) to let the regional 
countries deal with their own problem.48 
In term of exploring options, clearly Indonesia used informal diplomacy as a 
means to achieve this objective. Exploring options in this case involved efforts to 
search for alternative resolution to the conflicts and innovation in developing 
policy options. In the informal diplomacy process, Indonesia encouraged the 
participants to re-look at their problems, let them define and share their own 
perspectives on the problem within the informal forum, helped to map the issues 
involved and facilitated the discussion to move gradually from the less to more 
contentious issues. Thus, as a third party, Indonesia at times played a more active 
role in the informal diplomacy process and did not simply rely on participants' 
initiatives. It was almost impossible to expect the participants, such as the 
Cambodian participants in JIM, to come up with alternative ideas for resolving 
their conflict because they all had their own preconceptions on how to end their 
conflict. However, their approach was zero-sum and they were not willing to look 
for alternative solutions that would benefit all the parties involved. Indonesia had 
to map the issues and alternative solutions to the conflict and, later, approach the 
participants separately to consult its content. 
In the case of Moro's problem, the process of exploring options was helped by the 
participants' interest in finding solutions to their problem. The early efforts of re-
framing the problem reached a conclusion that the basis of the discussion was the 
Tripoli Agreement of 1976 of which the parties interpreted the Agreement 
differently. Indonesia helped map the issues involved in the problems, with 
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reference to the content of the Tripoli Agreement and to the developments 
between 1976 to early 1990s, which were taking place in the Philippines and 
within the Moro as earlier discussed in Chapter 5. In the informal diplomacy 
process, the GRP was willing to make some innovation regarding the transitional 
structure and mechanism (see Chapter 5) which enabled the conclusion of the 
process in 1996. 
The informal South China Sea workshop was the best example of the informal 
diplomacy ideal of exploring options in the Indonesian informal diplomacy 
overall. As an informal meeting convenor, Indonesia encouraged the participants 
to explore options of possible co-operation to avoid conflict from territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea. Arguably, in the process Indonesia helped to map 
the issues involved in the disputes and began the discussions on issues less 
contentious where co-operation involving regional countries was more possible. 
Participants who contested some or all areas in the South China Sea were given 
the opportunity - during several sessions in the early years of the informal 
workshop - to define their perspectives on the disputes. At the same time, the 
informal workshop provided participants from non-claimant states with an 
opportunity to share their concerns about possible regional instability emanating 
from armed conflict between the disputants. Exploring options, in this case, 
involved efforts to explore possible co-operation and alternative policy options 
that the regional countries might take during the formal interaction. 
In terms of improving relationships and developing confidence among the 
participants, the informal diplomacy process did gain this objective in two of the 
three cases. Improvements in relations and confidence occurred among the 
participants in the forum dealing with Moro and the South China Sea's problems. 
In the Moro's case, the improvement of relationships was characterised, at the 
least, by the willingness of the participants, albeit gradually, to face each other 
during the meetings and, in some instances, to communicate during the meetings 
in their own dialect (Tagalog). In the South China Sea workshop, the participants 
mingled freely and were not offended when other participants made strong 
remarks and, at times, personal comments during the meeting sessions. However, 
the degree of improvement in relationships and confidence in the Cambodian case 
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was difficult to judge. The most that Indonesia can claim was that the JIM 
provided the Cambodian participants with, for the first time, inclusive meetings 
among the Cambodian factions. The extent that the meeting had been able to 
reduce the stereotypical behaviour among the Cambodians was difficult to assess 
because even after the meeting had moved into Paris peace process, some 
Cambodian participants were still reluctant to speak one to another, especially 
participants representing the Khmer Rouge and Hun Sen's led-Government. 
Nevertheless, during the JIM some participants representing Hun Sen's led-
Government did mingle with participants from the Sihanouk and Son Sann camps. 
Although Indonesia attempted to limit the involvement of non-regional countries 
in the informal diplomacy process, the involvement of the non-regional countries 
was inevitable in the process. In dealing with the Cambodian problem, Indonesia 
initially wished to have the regional countries dealing with their own problems 
first, and later to have the non-regional countries endorse the result. The 
expectation was not achieved because some participants were not able to make 
any decision without the approval of their patron, for example, China in the case 
of the Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk. Moreover, some Cambodian participants 
wanted the direct involvement of non-regional countries, such as the Soviet 
Union, China and France in the process. After the Paris meeting in 1988, the 
involvement of the non-regional countries in the process had increased. However, 
learning from the failure of the Paris meeting in 1989, Indonesia was able to 
persuade its partner (Co-chair), France, not to rush into an international 
conference on Cambodia unless the parties had reached some agreement on the 
most contentious issues. To facilitate this gradual process of reaching agreements, 
Indonesia organised a number of informal consultations and meetings involving 
Cambodians and non-Cambodians. 
In the informal diplomacy process dealing with the Moro problem, Indonesia had 
to accept the participation of members of the OIC (Committee of Six) and the OIC 
Secretariat in the process. However, Indonesia maintained control of the process 
and, therefore, the participation of non-regional countries and the OIC did not 
really affect the process. In dealing with the South China Sea disputes, Indonesia 
was not able to implement the objective of limiting the participation of non-
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regional countries on issues of regional characters for two reasons. First, 
Indonesia needed the financial assistance of Canada in the process. Canada was 
selected because of its remoteness from the areas under the disputes and because 
the country had a record of promoting peace efforts in many regions. Countries 
who sent their representatives to the informal workshop did not feel threatened by 
Canada, a middle power country remote from the region. 
Second, as the discussion in the informal workshop expanded, the participation of 
non-regional countries and international organisations was also inevitable. 
Indonesia wished to tap their financial resources for implementing some of the 
project proposals and to avoid overlapping between the projects under the 
informal workshop and projects under some international organisations, such as 
UNEP. Other than breaching the ideal of having the regional countries dealing 
with the regional countries at first, Indonesia's efforts to involve the non-regional 
countries and international organisations were perceived by some countries as an 
implied effort to internationalise the issue. Hence, some participating countries 
questioned Indonesia's motive, that is, whether Indonesia was acting for the 
region or mainly to secure its own national interest of regional peace and stability 
by way of internationalising the issue, and thus, keeping the parties in check under 
international surveillance. Indeed, the South China Sea informal workshop was 
successful in maintaining international interest on the issue, especially on the 
concern of negative consequences of any armed conflicts due to territorial 
disputes. 
Overall, the successful achievements of each one of the four objectives of 
informal diplomacy, from the three case studies were varied. The outcomes were 
influenced by (1) the participants' motives, whether or not they were willing to 
seek a solution to their problems; (2) the nature and the context of the problems, 
especially the extent of non core-participants' involvement in the problems; and 
(3) the way Indonesia pursued the informal diplomacy. Furthermore, (4) the 
interrelationship between the timing of involvement as a third party and also 
participants' interests in seeking a solution to the problem were also factors that 
influenced the successful outcomes of the informal diplomacy. Discussion in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 revealed that the timing of Indonesia's involvement in the 
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three cases studies differed. In Cambodia, although Indonesia had propagated the 
idea of informal meeting among the core-parties in the conflict since 1985, the 
actual meeting did not take place until 1988. By then, the regional contexts were 
characterised by the rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union, and 
Vietnam was having difficulty in maintaining its presence in Cambodia. Although 
the timing was supportive of Indonesia's efforts, some Cambodian participants 
were not prepared to impr9ve their relationship. Clearly, their long years of armed 
conflict and deep-seated animosities set a limit for possible improvement of their 
relationship from the JIM process. 
In the Moro case, the timing of Indonesia's involvement was suitable. On the one 
hand, the Ramos Government wished to end all the internal problems of rebellion 
and separatism so that the Government would be able to concentrate on economic 
development. On the other hand, the MNLF was also interested in finding a 
solution to their problems because of the declining support from Libya and Saudi 
Arabia, and also due to Mr. Misuari' s intention to regain the support of the Moro 
people. What prevented the two parties having a bilateral meeting of their own 
was their lack of trust. Thus, the involvement of a reliable third party was 
necessary. 
Indonesia designed the South China Sea informal workshop conception and the 
concept was then offered to the regional countries. The participants came to the 
informal workshop with differing expectations and motives. The fact that the issue 
was not looming high in the regional security agenda in early 1990s made some 
participants feel that they had less stake on the issue and on the process. In fact, 
before 1990 the armed clash over the territorial disputes involved only China and 
Vietnam, and thus other countries felt less threatened by China, the major power 
in the region. The regional countries' interest of the informal workshop had 
increased over the years, especially after they noted China's persistence in 
asserting its claim. However, what transpired in the process after its fourth year 
was Indonesia's effort in maintaining the momentum of informal dialogues to 
prevent conflicts and participants from China's efforts to 'tame' the process, that 
is, for not letting the informal workshop discuss the security-politico issues. 
347 
In terms of motive, Indonesia wished to have peace and stability in the region, and 
translated the motive into a role as third party, but with various names. In the 
Cambodian conflict, Indonesia called itself 'honest broker' and later was 
addressed as a Co-chair in the Paris International Conference on Cambodia. In the 
Moro case, Indonesia named itself 'facilitator', whereas in the informal South 
China Sea workshop, Indonesia was known as 'workshop convenor'. Although, in 
theory each designation ~arried different responsibilities and functions, in the 
process Indonesia did not see the nomenclature set a limit to its role. Based on the 
priority of achieving peace and stability in the region, Indonesia used the 
opportunity to assist the parties in the disputes and conflicts by all means and, at 
times, as discussed in earlier discussion went outside the ideal role of third party 
in conflict resolution theory. 
VII.5. Summary and Conclusion 
The assessment of Indonesian informal diplomacy based on its organisational 
aspect, its process and its objectives shows that these three aspects were 
interrelated and that they all influenced the achievement of the informal 
diplomacy objectives. 
The organisational aspect was important overall because good co-ordination and 
teamwork among the Indonesians involved in the informal diplomacy and their 
clear understandings about the mission had some impacts on the informal 
diplomacy process. A clear understanding about informal diplomacy principles 
also influenced the way the team members conducted their role during the 
process. The organisational aspect also involved co-ordination with other 
ministries and the military establishment. Good co-ordination coupled with a clear 
signal from the President of his interest in the informal diplomacy helped the 
Ministry in its co-ordination of the diplomatic initiatives. 
The assessment of the process shows that the dynamics during the informal 
diplomacy were shaped not only by the process during the informal meetings, but 
also by the interaction within the wider contexts of regional and international 
environments. However, the ability of the Indonesian teams to develop a well 
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designed strategy and tactics during the peace process did increase the 
effectiveness of the informal diplomacy process. 
The assessment of the objectives shows that the efficacy of informal diplomacy in 
dealing with regional conflicts and disputes is subject to various interrelated 
factors. The differing understanding of informal diplomacy objectives between 
Indonesia as facilitators and those of the participants were detrimental to the 
process. At the same time, the participants' interest and their motivation in taking 
part in the process influenced the overall process in some cases positively and 
other cases negatively. 
In conclusion, the Indonesian diplomats developed informal diplomacy as a 
concept and approach to deal with conflicts and disputes in the region. They 
developed the approach, and implemented it as a diplomatic technique, based on 
their experiences as negotiators and with reference to their academic background. 
When performing their role as a third party in informal diplomacy, the 
Indonesians often adapted the approaches and techniques developed by the Track 
Two practitioners and scholars. At times, the circumstances necessitated this, but 
in a number of instances adaptation was a response to pressures from colleagues 
and superiors who wished to see tangible results from the informal diplomacy 
process. 
Finally, from the discussion it is not conclusive whether the informal diplomacy 
was intentionally developed to increase the Ministry's profile domestically vis-a-
vis the other ministries and military establishment. What is clear is that the 
outcomes of the Ministry's diplomatic initiatives were influenced by the support 
the Ministry gained from other ministries and from the military establishment. 
Such support was enhanced after the other ministries learned of President 
Soeharto's interest in the approach. However, support from the Ministry's 
bureaucracy on the informal diplomacy initiative was less forthcoming if there 
were conflicting interests. This reality was observable during the informal 
workshop on the South China Sea disputes. 
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The main purpose of this thesis has been to assess Indonesia's use of informal 
diplomacy as it sought to further its interests in the peace and stability of its 
immediate region, Southeast Asia. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 presenting the case studies 
and the summary analysis in Chapter 7 set out how Indonesia pursed informal 
diplomacy in dealing with three regional problems: the Cambodian conflict, the 
separatism problem in the Philippines (the Moro problem), and territorial disputes 
in the South China Sea. The case studies also showed that informal diplomacy 
was adopted because the nature of the conflicts and the disputes suggested a 
different approach from traditional diplomacy. 
Informal diplomacy as outlined in Chapter 2 is derived largely from Track Two 
diplomacy. At the same time, as discussed in Chapter 3, informal diplomacy was 
introduced as a result of internal dynamics at the institutional level of the 
Indonesian Foreign Ministry (the Ministry). The adoption of informal diplomacy 
was also a manifestation of bureaucratic politics within the Indonesian political 
system. The Ministry had to compete with other bureaucracies and the military 
establishment for the President's favour, and informal diplomacy was the 
Ministry's preferred means of gaining its President's support. In their efforts to 
gain the confidence of the President, the professional diplomats from the Ministry 
searched for avenues to perform their professionalism. Chapter 3 also showed that 
the Soeharto Government was concerned about the potential of regional conflicts 
and disputes for disturbing Indonesia's development program. Under all these 
circumstances, the diplomats proposed informal diplomacy as an alternative 
means to deal with these regional problems comprehensively and informal 
diplomacy assimilated some principles closely associated with Track Two 
diplomacy. Hence, this study has argued that Track Two diplomacy and 
bureaucratic politics were the two most important conceptions to better 
understand the Indonesian's adoption of informal diplomacy in addressing the 
three problems of conflicts and disputes outlined in the case studies. 
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The first section of this chapter assesses hypotheses derived from propositions of 
Track Two diplomacy and bureaucratic politics discussed in Chapter 2. The 
second section draws further lessons from the informal diplomacy based on the 
case study materials. 
VIII.1. The linkage between the analytical framework of informal diplomacy 
and the empiric~I findings from case study materials 
The analytical framework for this study (Chapter 2) consisted of three main parts. 
The first part explored the notion of order in the regional context to show that a 
country's interest in regional order could be obtained through a number of ways. 
Diplomacy is one of the primary instruments available to the state in seeking to 
achieve that interest, but the traditional practice or form of diplomacy is inherently 
limited when dealing with some conflicts and disputes. Innovation in diplomacy 
was, therefore, necessary to address the problems in a non-conventional way. The 
second part of the analytical framework outlined the non-conventional mode of 
addressing conflicts and disputes based on the perspectives of Track Two 
diplomacy. The third section explored the aspect of bureaucratic politics in 
Indonesian Foreign Policy, proposing that the informal diplomacy was the 
outcome of bureaucratic politics. Chapter 3 discussed the evidence for this 
proposal. Bureaucratic politics and the Ministry internal dynamics, as outlined in 
the three case studies chapters, also influenced the way in which informal 
diplomacy was implemented. 
In a number of contexts, as shown in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, Indonesian informal 
diplomacy displayed principles closely associated with Track Two diplomacy. 
Overall, as a chain of peace process informal diplomacy moved from informal to 
formal processes. However, as a diplomatic technique informal diplomacy was 
used interchangeably, both within formal and informal settings. These facts gave 
rise a number of questions, such as whether or not the informal diplomacy was 
guided by principles grounded in Track Two diplomacy, and what aspects of the 
Track Two diplomacy were utilised and what aspects were not observed by the 
Indonesians and why. This section of the conclusion summarises the linkage 
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between the Track Two diplomacy and informal diplomacy, and discusses some 
hypotheses which were set out in Chapter 2. 
1.1. Hypothesis no 1: 
A third party's adherence to principles, assumptions and techniques derived from 
Track Two diplomacy will _ensure positive results. 
This hypothesis was derived from proponents of Track Two diplomacy on the 
efficacy of informal workshops to deal with conflicts. 1 The main principles of 
Track Two diplomacy revolve around the notion of unofficial, informal and non-
structured interaction and the overall exercise is designed to establish the pre-
negotiation stage. At the same time, the Track Two diplomacy's process works 
with the assumptions that it is preferable that the third party has no special 
knowledge of the area or of the parties involved.2 Regarding the process, the 
assumption is that parties should analyse their problems exhaustively before 
moving to a discussion of possible solutions to the problems. However, equally 
important, Track Two diplomacy was developed mainly to deal with conflicts and 
not disputes.3 The case study materials show that while, on some occasions, 
Indonesia adhered to Track Two principles, assumptions and techniques, this was 
not always the case. Dynamics surrounding bureaucratic politics forced the 
Indonesians who oversaw the informal diplomacy process to focus more on 
achieving results and, therefore, their adherence to Track Two principles, 
assumptions and techniques was influenced by such motives and also by their 
assessment of the circumstances during the informal diplomacy. Hence, they did 
not follow the ideals of Track Two diplomacy when they thought their informal 
diplomacy would not profit from adopting Track Two ideals. Thus, adherence to 
principles, assumptions and techniques derived from Track Two diplomacy does 
not necessarily guarantee positive results. 
From the very outset, it is important to highlight that a major contrast between 
Indonesian informal diplomacy and the pure model of the Track Two diplomacy 
is the notion of the status of those who lead the informal process. While the Track 
Two scholars urge strongly that the third party should be unofficial and have no 
354 
prior knowledge of the parties, the Indonesian case shows the opposite. The ideal 
of the Track Two scholars of impartial non-state actors acting as a third party in 
informal diplomacy has its own merit, particularly because the scholars and also 
the conflicting parties and disputants used to question the neutrality of a state 
who, in their eyes, mainly served its national interests rather than the interests of 
the conflicting parties or the disputants. 
Indonesian informal diplomacy took the form of informal and non-structured 
interaction, but the notion of 'unofficial' was ambiguous. The informal diplomacy 
was sponsored by a state and therefore, it would be difficult to de-link the 
informal exercises with the aspect of formality and status, which were accredited 
to a state. In fact, although the meeting setting itself was informal and the rules of 
recognition as well as protocols were very flexible, some participants insisted on 
having their status and credentials recognised. This was observable during JIM of 
Cambodia and to a certain extent in the Moro case. 
This reality suggests that status is an important factor, certainly within the Asian 
tradition. The conflicting parties and the disputants were willing to take part in the 
informal diplomacy because they knew that their status and credentials were 
upheld. Even in the South China Sea, the informal workshop put Taiwan on an 
equal basis with other participants. Hence, the notion of status and symbolism 
attached to it remain essential in the Asian tradition and in the contexts of the 
regional conflicts and disputes. 
In general, Paul Salem's proposition - in the third world context an increase in the 
level of formality is desirable4 - is helpful in understanding Indonesian informal 
diplomacy. However, his suggestion was not applicable in the case of informal 
South China Sea workshop, simply because China and other participants did not 
recognise the status of Taiwan. Therefore, there were conditions where increasing 
the level of formality is not always desirable, especially when the nature of the 
problems necessitate unqualified observance of informality. Formalising the 
informal workshop meant excluding Taiwan from the process, a step contrary to 
the inclusiveness of informal diplomacy. 
355 
The Indonesians were also familiar with the issues and the main parties or actors 
in the conflicts and disputes. The Indonesians had known some individuals who 
took part in the informal diplomacy processes from their previous encounters in 
different settings. Again, Salem's opinion on the importance, in the third world 
context, of having a third party whom the conflicting parties and the disputants 
had recognised5 is proved useful in Indonesia's case. Arguably, the notion of 
knowing those who assis_t the informal diplomacy process is a critical factor 
within the Asian tradition. Generally, the participants would have felt more at ease 
speaking about their problems in the presence of somebody they knew and not 'a 
total stranger.' There is also a notion of understanding about culture specifics that 
is not always obvious to those unfamiliar with local customs. For instance, Mr. 
Misuari often spoke out of context to address his gallery during the informal 
diplomacy process to deal with the Moro problem. To follow the procedures of 
Track two diplomacy, the third party should have redirected Mr. Misuari to the 
topic of discussion. However, allowing Mr. Misuari to speak at length and not 
interrupt him - despite the distraction he made to the overall discussions -
sustained his standing and status before his local people. 
However, despite the fact that the Indonesian practice was in line with Salem's 
proposition, the end result of their knowledge of the people and local cultures was 
not always desirable. As shown in Chapter 4, some Indonesians responsible for 
JIM knew some of the participants from their previous diplomatic assignments in 
Cambodia and Vietnam. The case study of Moro in Chapter 5 showed that 
familiarity with the issues and acquaintances with influential leaders from the 
parties turned out to be one of the assets of the third party in informal diplomacy. 
The Indonesians were able to follow up the results of the discussion during the 
informal diplomacy process directly with the respective authorities through the 
formal track. Hence, the informal diplomacy process to deal with the Moro 
problem benefited from the direct channel the Indonesians had with leaders of the 
parties in the conflict, especially with the Philippines Government. 
In contrast, JIM provided the Indonesians with a different lesson where their 
personal knowledge of the Cambodian participants in JIM did not guarantee a 
smooth process during the informal diplomacy. This reality bemused the 
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Indonesians because they thought that they knew the Cambodians quite well, in 
terms of the culture and their ways of thinking. Yet, as long as the Cambodians 
were not prepared to reconcile their deep-seated distrust and hatred of each other 
any diplomatic initiative aimed to improve their relationship was bound to fail. In 
the end, the Cambodians· were prepared to reconcile their differences only after 
they realised that the international community had lost patience with them and the 
new regional configurati<?n, including the rapprochement between China and 
Vietnam, left them with no other option other than to settle their differences. 
The notion of analysing the problems thoroughly before discussing a possible 
solution is proposed by a number of Track Two scholars6 which was not always 
practical during the informal diplomacy process. The factors responsible for this 
were participants' lack interest and some participants' efforts to avoid analysing 
their problems. This lack of interest constrained the dynamics of the analytical 
process in JIM. In the case of the informal workshop, some participants tried to 
avoid discussing the main problems of their disputes. Track Two diplomacy 
scholars have yet to give any solution on how best to deal with the problems of 
participants' lack of interest and participants' efforts to avoid analysing the 
problems. If a state sponsored informal diplomacy faced difficulty in dealing with 
these problems, the non-state actors with lesser authority would have been more 
difficult. 
Overall, it was only in the Moro case where the analytical process helped the 
parties move forward and deduce options to resolve their problems. Essentially 
the parties had long agreed that they interpreted the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 
differently. Indonesia facilitated a process whereby the parties reconsidered the 
Agreement and from that stage onward, all discussions were centred on their 
common understanding of issues that they still did not agree upon. The Indonesian 
Chair facilitated the discussion process by clustering the problems into 
manageable components and left discussion on the most difficult subject toward 
the end of the informal diplomacy process, when the relationship among the 
parties had improved. In the case of Cambodia, the analytical process of the 
problem was not achieved because the participants were not willing to move from 
their positions and, therefore, were not prepared to analyse their problem 
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thoroughly or from a different perspective. In the end, during participants' 
discussions (the analytical stage) the Indonesians led the discussion process, 
summarising what they perceived as the definition of the problems. 
The analytical process in· the informal workshops was rather different in essence 
because the participants avoided discussion of the main issues of the overlapping 
territorial claims. The process consisted of the participants merely outlining their 
positions on the disputes with no further discussion permitted. What participants 
analysed was possible functional co-operation in the areas under dispute. 
Indonesia considered the informal workshop process more as confidence-building 
measures and a forum for developing policy options for authorities in the South 
China Sea areas. The Indonesians hoped that in the long run the process would 
help the parties better understand the concerns of the regional countries and 
therefore, would help reduce the tensions. Hence the informal workshop limited 
discussion on the main issues, but discussed issues 'outside the square' of the 
problems. 
Achieving peace through co-operative processes outside the negotiation 
frameworks of formal diplomacy and mediation is one of the main principles of 
Track Two diplomacy. Obviously, the informal diplomacy as practised by 
Indonesia subscribed to this ideal because the approaches were co-operative, 
rather than those of formal diplomacy and mediation. The approach was of 
gaining better understanding and reaching consensus through discussion. In 
particular, informal diplomacy was concerned with process. In this case the 
process was to develop the level of comfort among the participants so that they 
would be prepared to elevate their level of interaction into a formal negotiating 
framework. However, there was a discrepancy among the Indonesians between 
allowing the exploratory and consultation process run its own course and taking 
an active role to set the direction of the discussion. Bureaucratic politics was a 
factor that challenged the consistency of the Indonesians in adopting the principles 
of Track Two diplomacy. Those who lead the informal diplomacy process faced 
the dilemma between being process oriented or result oriented. They knew that 
concentrating on process or making gradual progress would tend to sustain a 
peace agreement, but they needed results in order to maintain the support of other 
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bureaucratic institutions, such as securing continued finance. This kind of 
dilemma was observable during JIM and the informal workshop dealing with the 
South China Sea disputes. This reality suggests two facts: first it did not negate 
the essential nature of the co-operative process derived from Track Two 
diplomacy and second, the adoption of Track Two principle took place in a 
bureaucratic politics setting. 
The strength of pre-negotiation stage from Track Two diplomacy7 can be subdued 
by participants' interests to secure their position and, therefore, hindered the 
chance for exploring the issues and options exhaustively. The informal workshop 
showed a case where the notion of pre-negotiation was rather blurred because 
during the process the participants, some times, were engaged in negotiating a 
position. The participants were worried that the workshop statements would be 
treated as if they were an indication of intent because some authorities, at times, 
referred to the workshop statements in a formal forum, such as in ASEAN 
meetings. Hence, the informal workshop played down the idea of workshops as a 
forum for exploration and not for bargaining.8 However, from a different 
perspective, the bargaining took place because the participants felt comfortable 
with the informal workshop and interacting with other participants and facilitators, 
some of them for more than a decade. 
Overall, the structure of informal diplomacy proposed by Harold Saunders, that is, 
building strategy from a combination of options and from the broadest possible 
choice among instruments proved helpful to understand the Indonesian informal 
diplomacy.9 However, Saunders argument also suggested an element of trial and 
error, contrary to the ideals of Nadim Rouhana who prefers a well-structured 
approach. 10 An example of a trial and error exercise occurred during the JIM 
when Indonesia encouraged interactions among the participants inside and outside 
the meeting forums. On some occasions, Indonesia let the Cambodians meet 
among themselves, a strategy not recommended by Track Two diplomacy's 
scholars who maintain that the third party should be present in every meeting, at 
all times. However, this effort to allow an inclusive meeting among Cambodians 
did not achieve the objective of gaining the commitment of the Cambodians to the 
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informal process. During the informal diplomacy process of Moro, Indonesia 
always took part in the various meetings, at all levels. 
In the end, the informal diplomacy did help the participants, especially the Moro 
and informal workshops, overcome the problem of stereotyping each other. 
However, in these two cases, the key factor that helped change such perceptions 
was regular and continuous meetings, inside and outside the meeting forums. 
Hence, it was the sustained processes of interactions that altered participants' 
perceptions, and not a specific technique or a well-designed structure. 
One of the Track Two diplomacy principles that Indonesia did not adhere to was 
using informal diplomacy to deal with conflicts and disputes. Although not all 
scholars of Track Two diplomacy rigidly separate disputes and conflicts, such as 
Hugo van der Merwe and Scimecca, 11 scholars like John Burton disagree with 
using the techniques interchangeably. 12 This reality suggests that state sponsored 
informal diplomacy was more concerned about ways and means to address the 
problems. They gave little consideration to the ontological classification between 
disputes and conflicts made by Track Two diplomacy scholars. On the one hand, 
this reality could mean that the Indonesians lacked understanding of the 
underlying principles separating disputes and conflicts. On the other hand, the 
Indonesians could have been aware of the principles, but been more interested in 
using the Track Two diplomacy as a diplomatic technique. 
Finally, it is not a third party's adherence to principles, assumptions and 
techniques derived from Track Two diplomacy which guarantee positive results of 
informal diplomacy, but a combination of factors. One of the factors was 
pragmatism, that is, adopting the Track Two diplomacy's principles, assumptions 
and techniques according to the circumstances during the diplomatic exercises 
while, at the same time, carefully observing developments at regional and 
international levels which have a direct bearing on the problems. 
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1.2. Hypothesis no 2: 
The non-binding character of inf annal diplomacy and a third party's discipline in 
upholding its facilitation fanction are positively correlated with the participants' 
willingness to explore options. 
Although claiming that . they were performing a facilitation function, the 
Indonesians responsible for informal diplomacy did not confine their role to that 
of a facilitator. The case studies showed that the Indonesians considered playing 
an active role was necessary to stimulate both discussion and the dynamics during 
the informal meetings and, therefore, they made the most of their role when the 
opportunities arose. The non-binding character of the process was not enough to 
make the participants more willing to explore options, which prompted the 
Indonesians to play a more active role. 
During the informal discussions, the Indonesians on a number of occasions 
intervened, not to provide theoretical inputs as suggested by Herbert Kelman, 13 
but to direct the discussion. On the one hand, taking an active role was a 
consequence of Indonesia's interest in having tangible results from the informal 
process. In this case, the notion of bureaucratic politics played some role because 
the diplomats wished to impress other bureaucracies of the efficacy of the 
informal diplomacy. On the other hand, the dynamics during the informal process 
required a third party to drive the discussion. An example of this was during JIM 
where the Cambodian participants were reluctant to embark on substantive 
discussion and explore options among themselves. The failure of the Cambodians 
to move beyond their mutual hatred forced the Indonesians to set the directions for 
the discussion during the two JIM. In fact, during the Second JIM the plenary 
format of the meeting was not considered suitable because the participants tended 
to embark on negative interactions. Although such negative interactions were 
inevitable - in fact were acceptable as a learning process from Track Two 
diplomacy process - the Indonesians did not want to further imperil the 
momentum of a first ever meeting among the Cambodians. The plenary meeting 
was only assembled after the contentious issues had been discussed in separate 
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discussion, on a one to one basis, and after the Indonesian Chair had met with 
leaders from each group of participants in JIM separately. 
This practice of separate meetings between the Indonesian Chair and the 
participants contravened the ideal of Track Two diplomacy. Kelman, for instance, 
asserts that any ideas to resolve the problems must emerge from the interactions 
between the parties themselves. 14 All inclusiveness is important to maintaining the 
participants' trust of third party impartiality. However, in the case of JIM the 
ability of the third party to bring all parties to the conflict together was already an 
achievement considering that the parties had never wanted to meet together 
inclusively in the past. For the sake of maintaining the momentum of their 
willingness to meet, the Indonesians were prepared to compromise some of the 
ideals of Track Two diplomacy. Hence, it was the symbolism of the all 
inclusiveness of the meetings and not the principles of Track Two diplomacy that 
the Indonesians prioritised during JIM. 
However, as showed in the other two case studies, Indonesia avoided separate 
meetings with the parties to the conflict. The meetings to discuss substantive 
matters between the Philippines Government and the Moro were held in the 
presence of Indonesians. The Indonesians always took part in (in fact encouraged) 
caucus meetings between the parties to the conflict to discuss contentious issues 
thoroughly. In the case of the informal workshops to deal with the South China 
Sea disputes, all meetings were held in plenary and the participants had the 
freedom to explore various issues of possible co-operation in the South China Sea. 
However, from 1994 onward, the informal workshop was restrained from 
discussing politico-security issues because of China's insistence that the informal 
workshops were not mandated to discuss such issues as they fell under 
government jurisdiction. Clearly, restricting discussion under the notion of 
mandate hampered the opportunity for exploratory interaction as suggested by 
Kelman and for looking unconventionally at old problems as suggested by John 
McDonald. 15 Therefore, there are cases where the ideal of open discussions, 
which is supposedly not to be troubled by formal procedures such as mandate, are 
not possible in a real situation of conflicts and disputes. 
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This issue of participants' insistence on rules of procedures to avoid discussing 
substantive issues during informal diplomacy has yet to achieve much attention 
from scholars of Track Two diplomacy. This fact suggests that scholars look on 
their approach from idealism and hope that the participants will set aside formal 
attributes for the sake of ·achieving solutions to their problems. In the real world, 
as demonstrated in this study, it is difficult for participants to dissociate 
themselves from the posit!ons and interests of their government or groups, even 
when they take part in the informal diplomacy process as individuals. 
Altogether, the non-binding characters of informal diplomacy did not necessarily 
influence the participants to embark on exploring options. From the case studies, 
it is clear that there were conditions where the third party must assume a 
responsibility more than as a facilitator in order to instigate interactions among the 
participants, leading to exploring options. 
1.3. Hypothesis no 3: 
The participants' commitment to the informal diplomacy process is positively 
correlated with their preparedness for, and interests in, change. 
The willingness of the respective authority and organisation or parties to the 
conflict and disputes to participate fully in the informal diplomacy was a factor 
that determined the outcomes of informal diplomacy. From the three case studies, 
only in the Moro case did the Indonesians encounter a willingness among the 
parties to participate positively in the informal diplomacy process. The kind of 
willingness was not shared equally among parties to the Cambodian conflict and 
the South China Sea disputes. In the Cambodian conflict, Vietnam and the Hun 
Sen led-government responded positively to the informal diplomacy because they 
really wanted to break the international isolation, whereas the rest of the 
Cambodian parties were not committed to this. Some participants in the informal 
workshop were clearly not prepared to reverse the status quo in their disputes. As 
explained in Chapter 6, although willing to partake in the informal workshop, 
China's aim was to stall the process because China was comfortable with the 
status quo of the territorial disputes. Hence, the willingness to participate in 
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informal diplomacy was one factor that influenced the informal diplomacy, as was 
the parties' motivation. 
The aspects of parties' motivation were beyond Indonesia's capacity to influence. 
The ability of informal ·diplomacy to affect the dynamics within the external 
factor, including the aspect of motivation, only happened when informal 
diplomacy was being con~ucted at the right time. When Indonesia hosted JIM, the 
timing was relatively prudent because, as noted in Chapter 4, Vietnam and the 
Hun Sen led-government wanted to break their international isolation. At the same 
time, Vietnam's statement in 1988 to immediately pull its troops from Cambodia 
increased the urgency of informal diplomacy because the regional countries were 
worried about the prospect of a new civil war in Cambodia. However, China - the 
main party in the conflict - preferred the status quo and maintained its support of 
the hard-liners in the Cambodians so they could continue their war efforts. 
Therefore, although the timing was right, the incompatibility of interests among 
the parties hampered the informal diplomacy during JIM. In the case of Moro, the 
timing of informal diplomacy was right. At one level, the new government in the 
Philippines under President Ramos had expressed its interest in ending all internal 
hostilities and considered internal stability as a prerequisite for the Philippines 
national development. At another level, Misuari of the MNLF noted the declining 
support from Libya as well as Saudi Arabia and the decline in his popularity 
among the Moro in the Philippines. Thus, the informal diplomacy took place at 
the right time when the parties to the Moro conflict were desperately wanting to 
end their problem, albeit for differing reasons. 
In the case of informal workshops, the timing for the informal diplomacy was also 
prudent. On the one hand, countries in the region were concerned with the armed 
skirmish in 1988 between two claimants, China and Vietnam. The regional 
countries were also alarmed that some claimants had raced to secure more islets as 
a means to establish more strongholds in the South China Sea. On the other hand, 
some claimants were not very enthusiastic about reversing the status quo in the 
disputes. China and Malaysia also were not very supportive about multilateral 
efforts through informal diplomacy and preferred instead a bilateral· approach. 
Therefore, the timing for informal workshop needs to consider the interplay 
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between the interests for such a meeting and th_e reluctance of the participants. 
However, at times, the timing of the informal workshop was also influenced by 
the element of context. There were moments during the annual informal workshop 
when the profile of the exercise had increased, such as in 1993 when China 
developed fortifications structures in islets close to the Philippines' territory. 
International concerns about China's unilateral action did increase international 
interest and hope for the ~nformal workshop, but to no avail. The failure of the 
informal diplomacy to address the affair was mainly because some participants 
insisted that the informal workshop was not a suitable forum for discussing 
politico-security matters. 
Overall, the participants' preparedness and interests for change was a factor that 
induced them to contribute positively to the informal diplomacy process. Hence, 
the scholars' notions of conflict ripeness, leadership changes and asymmetry 
proved essential to understand the dynamics during the overall diplomacy 
process. 16 These are factors that had influenced the informal diplomacy for 
positive or negative results. 
1.4. Hypothesis no 4: 
A third party's creativity and innovation is derived from their scholarship and 
stature as private citizens, not from their official status or authority. 
The Indonesians responsible for informal diplomacy were competent in their field 
of diplomacy, but none of them had any formal training in human behaviour. The 
case study materials showed that the skills of the Indonesian diplomats were not 
always in conformity with the notion of third party skills that scholars and 
practitioners of Track Two diplomacy emphasise. However, the criteria of 
creativity and innovation, such as approaching the issues unconventionally, were 
observable in the three case studies (especially during the informal workshop). 
Overall, the make up of the Indonesian teams responsible for informal diplomacy 
combined skilful diplomats and some members familiar with the issues mostly 
because of their portfolios in the Ministry. 
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The case studies also showed that the Indonesians performed their role as third 
party based on their long experiences in diplomacy and in dealing with 
negotiations. Hence, they took their individual skills from formal diplomacy into 
the informal diplomacy settings. However, at times the 'old habit' as negotiator 
saw the Indonesians cross the boundary between performing a role mainly as 
facilitator and, instead, they became active participants. Although, to a certain 
extent this change of role was observable in the three case studies, the most 
obvious one was in the informal workshops where, on several occasions, the 
Indonesians engaged in discussion. 
In general, with reference to Jacob Bercovitch's proposition,17 the Indonesians 
had utilised their competence, credibility and experience to create contexts and 
occasions in which communication may be facilitated, and a better understanding 
of a conflict gained. However, the Indonesians did not approach the disputes and 
the conflicts as private citizens as suggested by Bercovitch. The informal 
diplomacy was a state sponsored exercise and, therefore, the Indonesians who 
acted as third party performed their role as governmental officials. Only in the 
informal workshop was the notion of acting in private capacity dominant. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 6, some participants to the informal workshop 
always maintained their official positions and, as a consequence, clouded the 
notion of private capacity. 
Overall, creativity and innovation are important attributes for those practising 
Track Two diplomacy. An official status or authority is not a handicap for a third 
party in performing a role in informal diplomacy. In fact, in the Asian context the 
notion of official status elevates the importance of informal diplomacy in the eyes 
of the participants. It is evident from this study that participants were able to send 
a message to their respective constituents back home that they were involved in an 
important and prestigious exercise. At the same time, the apparent support from 
the Indonesian President had assured the participants and the Indonesians who 
lead the informal diplomacy process that the process carried a similar authority as 
those of formal diplomacy. These notions of prestige and authority are important 
in the context of Asian traditions. 
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1.5. Hypothesis no 5: 
Those practising informal diplomacy should set altrnistic objectives and strive for 
the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organising 
human and material resources, as well as their interests. 
In general, the Indonesian informal diplomacy was far from altruistic and this was 
a logical consequence of having a state sponsoring informal diplomacy. Indonesia 
pursued informal diplomacy to serve its interests of having peace and stability in 
its immediate region, Southeast Asia. This objective was more observable during 
the informal workshop because Indonesia tried to achieve its undisclosed interests 
of generating international interest on the South China Sea disputes and in this 
Indonesia was successful. Hence, the element of influencing public opinion, at 
regional and international levels, was one of the objectives of the informal 
workshop. 
However, in dealing with the Cambodian and the Moro problems Indonesia 
attempted to develop strategies and organise human and material resources to help 
resolve the conflict. The efforts also contributed to Indonesia's interest because 
the issues were dealt with comprehensively, reducing the potential for further 
conflict after the problems had been resolved. Indonesia's strategy with regard to 
Cambodia was to have the issues dealt with, firstly, at the regional level and to 
have the non-regional countries endorse the outcomes at a later stage in 
international conferences or forums, such as the UN. In the case of Moro, the 
strategy was to have the party re-look at the Tripoli agreement of 1976. By 
approaching the Cambodian and the Moro problems comprehensively, Indonesia 
promoted discussion on how to generate resources when the conflict had been 
resolved. 
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1.6. Hypotheses no 6: 
The level of support from bureaucratic and military institutions for informal 
diplomacy depends on the interest of the President in informal diplomatic 
initiatives. The more these institutions are aware of the President's support, the 
more forthcoming is their support for informal diplomacy. 
From the domestic perspective of Indonesia's political system, bureaucratic 
politics was dynamic behind the adoption of informal diplomacy. Having to 
compete with other bureaucracies and the military establishment on international 
relations issues of the Ministry's domain, the Ministry proposed informal 
diplomacy as an alternative to the diplomatic approach for some regional conflicts 
and disputes. Informal diplomacy gave the Ministry an advantage over other 
bureaucracies and the military establishment because of the Ministry's familiarity 
with the approach. At the same time, the Ministry also had the human resources 
capable of implementing informal diplomacy. Hence, new ideas were the only 
relative power that the Ministry had in their competition with other institutions. 
Although President Soeharto intentionally let his subordinates compete in order to 
protect his own personal power, the informal diplomacy showed a case where the 
foreign policy elite became involved in some kind of co-operation for the sake of 
supporting Soeharto's interest. Hence, Harold Crouch's argument of a weak 
internal coherence18 did not fully materialise in cases where the bureaucracies 
found that the President has shown interest to some diplomatic initiatives at a 
regional level. The President was able to give more attention to foreign related 
affairs because he was confident that his supremacy at domestic level was 
unchallenged. At the same time, he was confident that the economic and 
development programs that he had pursued were already in place and, therefore, 
he could tum his attention to regional issues. 
Overall, the notion of inter-elite competition from bureaucratic politics was a 
critical factor that supported or impeded the implementation of informal 
diplomacy. Inter bureaucracy co-operation was optimal in the case of JIM and 
Moro because the bureaucracy were aware that the Ministry had gained the 
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confidence of the President, and they also wanted to gain credit for their informal 
diplomacy activities. In contrast, support for the informal workshop from other 
bureaucracies and the military was moderate because the President did not express 
his interest in the informal workshop openly. Hence, these variations in degree of 
support are a logical consequence of bureaucratic politics. Therefore, for the sake 
of maintaining the President's support, those who pursued the diplomatic 
initiatives were very concerned with tangible results from the informal diplomacy 
process. 
Bureaucratic politics explains not only the reason behind the adoption of informal 
diplomacy but also the degree of support from the domestic institutions on 
diplomatic initiatives. Hence, the Indonesian informal diplomacy was a case 
where a state adopted Track Two diplomacy principles, assumptions and 
techniques within the setting of bureaucratic politics. 
VIII.2. Further lessons from informal diplomacy 
The case study materials show that the informal diplomacy paved the way for the 
resolution of the Cambodian and the Moro conflicts, but the informal workshops 
on the South China Sea disputes have yet to achieve any concrete results. 
Nevertheless, for the latter, the informal workshop was able to produce a number 
of project proposals and generate international community interest in the 
territorial dispute. The contribution of informal diplomacy to the overall peace 
process - combining formal and informal diplomacy as well as involving countries 
other than Indonesia - was moderate in the case of Cambodia, high in the case of 
Moro, but low in the case of the informal workshop. Nevertheless, informal 
diplomacy helped achieve Indonesia's interest to have peace and stability in the 
region because the Cambodian and Moro problems were resolved. In the case of 
the South China Sea disputes, the informal workshop helped increase the 
international community's interest in and concern about the issue and Indonesia 
hoped that this would prevent the disputants from destabilising the region in their 
efforts to assert their territorial claim. 
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Overall, as outlined in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, the success of informal diplomacy 
was subject to a number of factors, internal and external to Indonesia. The internal 
factors that contributed to the effectiveness of informal diplomacy revolved 
around the way in which the Indonesians conducted the informal diplomacy. The 
discussions in the three case studies highlighted that the effectiveness of informal 
diplomacy was enhanced by the skills of the Indonesians leading the process, the 
cohesiveness of the Indonesian team, and the co-ordination between the work of 
the team in Jakarta and the Indonesian Missions overseas. The informal 
diplomacy was also dependent on the ability of the Ministry to win support from 
other bureaucracies within Indonesia and from the military establishment. The 
confidence of President Soeharto also played an important role in the 
implementation of informal diplomacy because his explicit support guaranteed 
continuous flows of budget for informal diplomacy. In contrast, the lack of the 
President's clear support for the informal workshop of South China Sea limited 
the flexibility of the Ministry's officials in pursuing the informal diplomacy 
objectives. There is no clear evidence to substantiate the reasons behind 
Soeharto's unexpressed support for the informal workshop. The most logical 
explanation was that the President was aware of the complexity of the issues and 
China's strong stand on the matter and therefore, he had already anticipated the 
process would be difficult. Hence, the best option for the President was to 
maintain a low profile stand in the overall workshop process. Moreover, the 
workshops were dependent on the financial support of Canada. 
The study shows that in term of skills, all those responsible for informal 
diplomacy had extensive experience in international negotiations. The majority of 
then had a background in international law,19 but none of the team's members 
were experts in behavioural studies. The study also shows that the Ministry's team 
dealing with the Cambodia and the Moro problems were cohesive, whereas the 
team responsible with the informal workshop lacked cohesiveness. The 
cohesiveness of the team was influenced by the degree of the Foreign Minister's 
involvement in the informal diplomacy process. Hence, the direct involvement of 
the Foreign Minister in the informal diplomacy processes resulted in the 
cohesiveness within the team. The cohesiveness of the team was also reflected in 
the aspect of co-ordination. Again, the internal and external co-ordination of the 
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teams responsible for Cambodian and Moro were strong, whereas in the case of 
informal workshop they were weak. 
The aspects of skills, cohesiveness and co-ordination influenced the dynamics 
during the informal diplomacy. Arguably, skilful facilitators who gained 
maximum support from a cohesive team would perform their role more 
effectively. They were fully briefed on issues affecting the informal diplomacy, 
either substantive or non-substantive matters, and therefore were able to 
concentrate on their role in the process. In contrast, a lack of cohesiveness 
hampered the role of the facilitator at times because however skilful the person 
was he/she could not be sure about the level of support that he/she would receive 
from members of the team. Similarly, co-ordination affected the dynamics during 
the informal diplomacy. Good co-ordination meant that members of the team were 
fully abreast of the context of the discussion and the kind of role that they should 
perform during the informal diplomacy. Clarity of responsibility prevented the 
member from presenting contradictory statements during the informal diplomacy, 
as was the case during the South China Sea informal workshop. As shown in 
Chapter 6, the opening remarks of Minister Alatas for making synergy between 
informal and formal tracks was understood differently among the Indonesian 
teams. 
Good co-ordination also means that the outcomes of the informal diplomacy were 
followed thoroughly by the Indonesian Missions overseas. The three case studies 
showed that those from overseas posts had responded to all queries and tasks from 
the Indonesian team in Jakarta. However, the Missions that supported the informal 
diplomacy of Cambodia, at times, had difficulty following up some issues because 
they had no direct access to some parties to the conflict. This difficulty of access 
did not occur in the case of Moro. In the informal workshop, although the 
Missions faced no difficulty with access to their respective authority, the 
preparedness of the respective authority to follow up the matters was beyond the 
capacity of the Mission to pursue. Hence, direct access to the main parties in 
conflicts and disputes was a factor in informal diplomacy. Direct access coupled 
with the willingness of the respective authority to follow up the matters 
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guaranteed successful outcomes of informal diplomacy, as was the case in the 
Moro case. 
The external factors that influenced the outcomes of informal diplomacy are 
outlined in the discussion of Hypothesis number 3. Furthermore, Chapters 4, 5 
and 6 showed that the element of context was significant in the three case studies. 
The informal diplomacy process post-JIM under the Co-Chair (Indonesia and 
France) was enhanced after the rapprochement between China and Vietnam and 
after the Permanent Five put their 'muscle' in the overall peace process. In the 
case of Moro, the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) set a context at the 
international level, where the OIC gave Indonesia fullest support in its dealings 
with the Moro problem. In the case of informal workshop on the South China Sea 
disputes, the participants were hardly able to dissociate the exploratory nature of 
the workshops with the position of their respective governments. 
Participants' links to their respective decision-makers did not always guarantee 
successful outcomes for the informal process. What really mattered was the 
parties' willingness to seriously move beyond their differences. The case studies 
show that those who took part in the informal diplomacy had significant links 
with the decision-makers in their respective organisations and, indeed some of 
them were themselves decision-makers. However, of all the three case studies, 
only participants to the informal diplomacy process on Moro confirmed the ideal 
of Track Two diplomacy by having participants' objectives of reducing or de-
escalating their conflict. The significant link between parties to the Moro conflict 
and decision-makers in their respective organisations enhanced the process of 
transferring the new knowledge or agreement reached during the informal 
diplomacy to their constituents. As a third party, Indonesia reinforced the process 
by accommodating as many participants as possible from the MNLF side. This 
strategy stemmed from an assumption that the more exposure the factions within 
the MNLF had to the informal diplomacy process, the greater the likelihood they 
would accept an agreement.20 
Participants to JIM were mostly decision-makers within the Cambodian parties, 
but they came to Jakarta without clear objectives to de-escalate their conflict. In 
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the case of the infonnal workshop, as shown in Chapter 6, although almost all 
participants had access to decision makers in their respective authorities', they took 
part in the informal meetings with differing objectives. Some participants were 
willing to ponder on alternative co-operation, but some other participants were 
reluctant to let the process move forward. For instance, China always vetoed 
proposals that had implications for joint co-operation in the disputes' areas. Some 
participants of the infonnal workshops derailed discussion on issues not to their 
liking based on the consensus ruling of the proceedings being observed by the 
informal workshop. Similarly, some parties to the Cambodian conflict used the 
unanimity ruling of the meetings as a means to block the progress of discussion on 
issues of their own concerns. For instance, the lnfonnal Meeting on Cambodia in 
Jakarta, 26-28 February 1990, failed to reach broad based agreements, because of 
the Khmer Rouge's insistence on omitting the word genocide from the meeting's 
document. Hence, a ground rule agreed upon by all parties can tum out to be a 
barrier to the informal diplomacy process. As the Chair, Indonesia had no option 
but to adhere to the ground rules of unanimity in Cambodia and consensus ruling 
in the informal workshops. In the case of Moro, the consensus ruling did not pose 
a problem because the parties were motivated by common desire to resolve their 
problems. However, their long years of hostility and distrust at times prevented 
the participants to reach a smooth consensus during the Moro's peace process. 
Another major finding of this study is that Indonesia had to accommodate the 
social particularities of the participants in its informal diplomacy process. 
Although, the infonnal diplomacy observed the Track Two diplomacy principle of 
maintaining very flexible rules of recognition and protocol, the notion of 
flexibility did not mean that the aspect of participants' status became secondary. 
This aspect of status was difficult to put aside during the informal diplomacy 
process because the participants were very sensitive about their status. This was 
very obvious in the case of JIM where some participants were members of Royal 
families. In the case of Moro, Misuari was very conscious about his status because 
he was representing the MNLF, an organisation recognised by the OIC but not 
recognised by the Philippines Government. To deal with this issue of status, the 
Indonesians intentionally arranged the two meetings on Cambodia and Moro in 
the Presidential Palace. The selection of a palace was tactful because all the 
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parties to the conflict felt that they were being treated equally and their status was 
being recognised. 
In final analysis the case studies show that: 
1. The effectiveness of informal diplomacy was dependent on how the 
Indonesians conducted informal diplomacy of which the issues of skills, 
teamwork and co-ordination were essential to the successful outcomes of 
informal diplomacy. However, the effectiveness of informal diplomacy was 
also subject to the willingness or motivation to resolve their problems on the 
part of the parties to the conflicts and disputes, and whether or not they 
seriously wanted to resolve their problems. The aspect of timing of the 
informal diplomacy and the context surrounding the problems were also 
essential to the successful outcomes of informal diplomacy. 
2. In Indonesia's case, informal diplomacy should also be seen within the context 
of bureaucratic politics. A convergence of interest between the President and 
the Ministry helped increase the profile of informal diplomacy at domestic and 
regional levels. Internally, bureaucracies within Indonesia and the military 
establishment supported the diplomatic initiatives because they wanted to 
share the credit should informal diplomacy be successful. Externally, the 
interest of the President increased the confidence of the participants in 
informal diplomacy and brought status to the endeavours, an important value 
in the Asian context. 
3. The informal meetings influenced the overall informal diplomacy processes in 
four main ways. First, the informal meetings were able to improve 
relationships between the participants. Minimally, the informal forum 
provided the parties with the opportunity to meet face to face and break the 
psychological barrier that had prevented them in the past from sitting together 
around the table. Second, the informal forum provided the parties with the 
opportunity to listen to the point of view of other participants. Third, the 
informality of the process gave the participants the opportunity to explore 
options, exchange ideas, and better understand the position of other parties and 
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their concerns. Fourth, the informal diplomacy process gave the participants 
the opportunity to develop personal rapport and establish networks. 
Nevertheless, not all the case studies subscribed to all of these characteristics. 
4. Indonesia used Track Two diplomacy to complement the diplomatic efforts 
held in formal diplomatic spheres. Hence, the Track Two diplomacy was used 
within the bigger picture of diplomacy and therefore, in the three case studies 
there was a linkage or synergy between informal and formal diplomatic 
processes. JIM was linked with the Paris Peace process and the Permanent 
Five of the UN Security Council. The informal diplomacy process of the Moro 
was linked with the OIC. The informal workshop on the South China Sea 
received acknowledgment in some ASEAN meetings and in the UN. It was 
therefore desirable to those exercising informal diplomacy or pure model of 
Track Two diplomacy to look for such a linkage between their works and the 
bigger framework of diplomacy, to ensure continuation and success or at the 
least, a receptive audience. 
5. In conducting informal diplomacy government officials should be aware and 
have cognisance of some principles derived from the Track Two diplomacy, 
but at the same time, they should be prepared to adapt the principles to the 
circumstances that they encounter during the process. Principles from Track 
Two diplomacy provided the government officials with more insights on how 
to deal with protracted conflicts and on how to innovate and develop co-
operation among the disputants. However, to be effective, Track Two 
diplomacy needs the support or political commitment from those involved. 
This study shows that although the non-binding character of the informal 
diplomacy gave the participants much more leeway in their discussions, the 
participants were easily able to backtrack from what they had agreed in the 
informal diplomacy whenever they moved to formal negotiations. Ideally, 
despite of the non-binding character of their discussions under informal 
diplomacy, the parties should consider any agreement reached from the 
discussion during the informal process as carrying a moral obligation. 
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6. This study has confirmed the usefulness and relevance of Track two 
diplomacy in understanding Indonesian informal diplomacy. However the case 
studies have revealed some weaknesses in the propositions derived from Track 
Two diplomacy in the real life situation. This study shows that there were 
context factors that have influenced the overall informal diplomacy processes. 
The implication of this is that in adopting principles from Track Two 
diplomacy, the third party should give more consideration to the domestic 
contexts of the third party: in Indonesia's experience, these include the 
dynamics internal of the Ministry, the notion of bureaucratic politics and the 
extent of the President's interests in the diplomatic initiatives. Attention 
should also be given to the dynamics in the context where the informal 
diplomacy will be operating, that is, the contexts of the conflicts or the 
disputes, the parties involved, and the political settings where the problems 
take place, including developments at regional and international levels. In any 
case, more case studies are needed in different political and cultural settings to 
confirm these findings. 
7. Overall some propositions derived from Track two diplomacy are relevant 
tools for states conducting informal diplomacy. However, the real life 
situation, culture specifics and problems particularities prevented the third 
party in this study from implementing the Track Two propositions in the 
manner suggested by the scholars and practitioners. Therefore, in the process 
of applying the propositions derived from Track Two diplomacy, the third 
party should also take into consideration th_e dynamics of the situation at that 
point. Hence the third party should maintain flexibility and prepare to adjust or 
modify the format of Track Two diplomacy in response to the dynamics, 
internal or external of the informal diplomacy processes. In Indonesia's 
experience, adjustments were required at each stage of the processes. The 
diplomatic, negotiation and mediation experiences of those involved in 
implementing informal diplomacy were the assets of those Indonesians in 
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Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Ali Alatas; the Foreign Minister at the time of the writing of this 
thesis, Minister Hassan Wirajuda; and the proponent of the informal workshop, Dr. Hasjim Ojala!. 
20 See Chapter 6, discussion under the heading of ''The first formal peace talks in Jakarta, 25 
October to 7 November 1993: setting the direction." 
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Postscript 
Between 1998 to 2003, the Indonesian political system went through political 
turmoil and, in the span of these five years, Indonesia experienced three 
successive administrations. These administrations prioritised economic recovery 
programs and, at the same time, tried to deal with the pressing issues of 
separatism and interethnic conflicts. However, the slow progress of Indonesia's 
economic recovery was shaken by the terrorism act in Bali in 2002 allegedly 
linked to international terrorism groups. Hence, from 2002 onward Indonesia's 
domestic problem included the issue of international terrorism. 
With the acuteness of the domestic problems, the aims of Indonesian foreign 
policy and diplomacy were focused on helping to achieve Indonesia's interests at 
the domestic level. As a consequence, Indonesia's attention to issues affecting 
peace and stability at the regional level was relatively modest. The degree of 
attention was also dependent on the particular interests of the government in 
power. For instance, President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) expressed a 
desire to assist the Government of the Philippines (GRP) in its dealing with the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) under Hashim Salamat. Apparently, 
Indonesia's domestic constituents and perhaps the GRP itself did not see the offer 
as feasible because at the time of the offer Indonesia still was struggling with its 
own problem of separatism. Between 1998 and 2003, the only contribution 
Indonesia made towards regional peace efforts was through the informal 
workshop dealing with the South China Sea disputes. 
Similar to other bureaucratic institutions in Indonesia, the Indonesian Foreign 
Ministry (the Ministry) also had to adjust its position and role in the post-Soeharto 
political environment. Democratisation processes in Indonesia, including the re-
emergence of political parties and the rise of civil society in domestic politics, had 
direct repercussions on foreign policy. The conduct of diplomacy came under 
close scrutiny of the domestic constituents and any diplomatic mishap was prone 
to domestic backlash to discredit the government in power. For example, 
President Abdurrahman Wahid was criticised for his frequent official visits 
overseas and was accused of neglecting the pressing domestic issues. Moreover, 
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the opposition and political analysts made a case that there was no clear evidence 
that Indonesia had gained economic or political advantages from those visits. 1 The 
controversy surrounding his travels was one of the factors that led to his removal 
from office in 2001. A similar allegation was directed against President Megawati 
who made a number of official visits overseas in 2002. Hence, the various 
administrations and the Ministry were very cautious about their performance 
within the realm of foreign_ policy. 
To adjust to the new political environment, the Ministry introduced a new 
structure in 2002. Although the restructuring of the Ministry had been discussed 
since the mid-1990s, more serious discussion took place only in the late 1990s. 
The new structure reflected the Ministry's interest in developing a channel of 
communication with the legislative branch of government and the domestic 
constituents. A special liaison position at the level of Director General was 
established for consulting with the legislative branch on a regular basis.2 A special 
Directorate to deal with the domestic constituents was established (Directorate for 
Public Diplomacy) and the position of Ministry's spokesperson was reintroduced. 
Clearly the intention was to keep the domestic public informed about foreign 
policy and diplomatic matters. 
The focus on performance made the Ministry's personnel appear very cautious in 
proposing policy options. This could have been the result of the transitional 
process within the new structure, which integrated the previously divided 
political, economic and social branches of the Ministry. The Ministry is, therefore, 
still undergoing the transitional stage of its internal consolidation. However, such 
caution could also be the result of the greatly tightened budget of the Ministry. 
Hence, the Ministry has pursued diplomatic initiatives according to the priority 
and availability of funds. However, besides addressing the pressing domestic 
issues, under Minister Hasan Wirajuda,3 Indonesia has again given particular 
attention to basic issues, such as ASEAN and maintaining good bilateral 
relationships with Indonesia's close neighbours. For the first time, the Ministry 
became involved directly in the domestic issue of separatism. In the past, the 
Ministry of Home Affairs and the military establishment had handled this issue. 
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The Ministry's experience in pursuing informal diplomacy to deal with regional 
conflicts and disputes between 1985 to 1998 was noted by the two successive 
governments of President Wahid and President Megawati. President Wahid took a 
bold decision by permitting the Indonesian Mission in Geneva to open contact 
with the Aceh separatist ·group, the GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or the Free 
Aceh Movement). The person responsible for the contact was Dr. Hasan Wirajuda 
who was involved in the ~1oro peace process between 1993 to 1996 and at the 
time of that contact was Indonesian Ambassador for the UN Mission in Geneva. 
With the help of conflict resolution experts from the Henry Dunant Centre (HOC), 
Indonesia and the GAM were able to reach a peace agreement in late 2002. 
During the political negotiation in 2002, the Indonesian team was led by another 
veteran of the informal diplomacy process to deal with the Moro problem, Mr. 
Wiryono Sastrohandoyo. 
The involvement of Dr. Hasan Wirajuda and Mr. Wiryono Sastrohandoyo in the 
Aceh peace process can be explained in two ways. First, it was recognition of 
their individual performance in the Moro case and of the Ministry's capacity as an 
institution. In Dr. Hasan Wirajuda's opinion there was no alternative institution in 
Indonesia that could engage in constructive dialogue with the separatist groups, 
including GAM.4 Indeed, the Soeharto Government's legacy had been a political 
system where the use of force to settle domestic problems had been more common 
than the use of constructive dialogue. Hence, Indonesia still lacked negotiators 
who could deal effectively with domestic issues, from labour disputes to 
separatism issues. Second, from a wider perspective, both the Wahid and 
Megawati governments would have hoped that the Ministry team would have 
brought their experience in facilitating the informal diplomacy process into the 
context of the separatism issue in Indonesia. In this case the HOC played a role as 
neutral third party which facilitated the peace process. The Aceh peace process 
modelled the informal diplomacy process of Cambodia and Moro. It evolved from 
informal contacts, followed by a confidence building process among the 
participants and the two conflicting parties. At a latter stage the participants were 
engaged in substantive discussion. 
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Another case where Indonesia used informal diplomacy in dealing with conflict 
was in the post referendum East Timor. According to Dr. Marti Natalegawa, 
informal diplomacy was used to solve residual issues, including the reconciliation 
process among the East Timorese. The informal approach allowed for a 'low 
profile' contact necessary because of the sensitivity of some East Timorese and 
some factions within the Indonesian society, especially the military, to any notion 
of direct contact. lndones~a facilitated contacts and dialogues between the pro-
Indonesian East Timorese and the new East Timor govemment.5 Clearly, this was 
not an easy diplomatic exercise because Indonesia would have had difficulty in 
appearing neutral due to Indonesia's complicity in the East Timor issue in the 
past. However, Indonesia was interested in finding a solution because there were 
many other domestic problems requiring the Indonesian Government's close 
attention. 
The above cases show that informal diplomacy has been an essential and effective 
diplomatic approach for Indonesia. However, in these cases Indonesia was 
involved as a participant on the peace process. In the case of Aceh, Indonesia was 
a party to the conflict and in the case of East Timor, Indonesia's role as facilitator 
was clouded by the history of East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia by force. 
Hence, it would not have been easy for Indonesia to disentangle its past history 
and assume a third party role. Indonesia was indeed an interested third party in the 
East Timor case. The only case where Indonesia was able to maintain a role as a 
disinterested third party was in the informal workshops dealing with the South 
China Sea disputes. 
The termination of Canada's funding officially ended the South China Sea 
informal workshop in 2001 (the 11th workshop). However, the termination did not 
stop Indonesia from approaching regional countries to continue the informal 
diplomacy process. The continuation of the workshop series in 2002 suggests that 
the regional countries found the exercise worthwhile, although the process was 
not as comprehensive as that funded by Canada. The regional countries' 
participation in the 12th informal workshop was not simply a token gesture. Not 
only were they prepared to cover the cost of their representative participation in 
the workshops, but also during the informal meeting the participants were willing 
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to ponder on how to establish a regional fund to sustain the informal workshop 
process. As well, the participants' enthusiasm to discuss special funding for the 
workshop suggests that they valued the informal workshop and wish to maintain 
the process. It may be the case that after their long years of involvement in the 
workshop, they have developed a sense of belonging to the informal diplomacy 
process and consider themselves as an integral part of the peace endeavours. 
The regional countries' positive response has convinced Indonesia of the efficacy 
of the informal workshop as a forum to address issues of mutual interest in the 
South China Sea. However, the success of the forum to address issues of mutual 
interest does not necessarily mean that the present workshop format is adequate. 
The eleven years of annual workshops show that the process was handicapped by 
the regional countries' disinterest in implementing the workshops' 
recommendations and project proposals. It is also yet to be proven whether or not 
the Indonesian team can co-operate closely without the Canadian's involvement in 
the process. In any case, Indonesia was pleased with the positive response toward 
the workshop because it was the only forum where Indonesia could show the 
international community that, despite all its domestic difficulties, it was still a 
responsible country. The informal workshop was Indonesia's avenue to engage 
the regional countries in discussion to prevent the region from being engulfed in 
armed conflicts. 
However, the efficacy of the informal diplomacy to deal with conflict 
comprehensively was challenged by the deterioration of the peace agreement 
between the GRP and MNLF in late 2001. Both Mr. Nur Misuari and the new 
GRP administration under President Joseph Estrada, and later on President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo, blamed the other party for the deterioration. Mr. Nur Misuari 
accused the GRP of not acting in good faith, whereas the GRP accused Mr. Nur 
Misuari of mismanagement in running the autonomous region during the 
transitional administration prior to the vote in 2000 to decide on the expansion of 
the region. This episode involving MNLF was also clouded by the MILF's earlier 
declaration in 1999 to annul the peace agreement of 1998. At the same time, 
another Moro splinter group, the Abu Sayyaf, was involved in a series of hostage 
taking for ransom. This reality suggests a fragility in the informal diplomacy 
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process when the parties involved were frustrated because they were unable to 
fulfill the earlier expectation during the dialogue process. The informal diplomacy 
was easily shaken by the denial of its existence by the splinter groups who were 
not involved in the peace process and wished to benefit from its failure. For 
example, groups like MILF and Abu Sayyaf wished to benefit from the decline of 
MNLF popularity among the Moro people. 
In retrospect, the breakdown of the agreement was a result of a combination of 
factors. The MNLF failed to manage the autonomous region properly because the 
GRP was not able to supply the region with sufficient funding. The GRP, by then, 
was experiencing a financial crisis that had depleted their reserves and economic 
capability. At the same time, Mr. Misuari was also unable to attract OIC countries 
to invest in the region, contrary to his promises to the Moro people in the past. As 
a third party assisting the peace process, Indonesia was no longer able to assist the 
parties because the implementation process was essentially a domestic affair of 
the Philippines. Although Indonesia was trusted with the responsibility of leading 
the OIC monitoring team during the implementation stage, Indonesia was not 
interested in involving itself deeply in the internal matters of the Philippines. 
Indonesia was also not able to sustain the agreement financially, such as by 
investing in the Mindanao, because of its own financial crisis in the late 1990s. 
The Moro case serves as a lesson that what is achieved during the informal 
diplomacy process can only be sustained if all parties are committed to the 
agreement's success. There were factors behind expectations such as financial 
crises that impeded the implementation of the agreement thoroughly. Another 
influential factor that impeded the implementation stage was the regime change 
from President Ramos to President Estrada. In this case, the new administration 
did not sustain their predecessor's special interest in the issue. 
Notes 
1 "Politik Luar Negeri No Profile," Kompas, 30 Juni 2001. 
2 Former Foreign Minister Dr. Alwi Shihab, under President Wahid (1999-2001) initiated this new 
post and appointed Mr. Abdul Naser to act as the Ministry liaison. As a political appointee and 
party member, Minister Shihab was clearly aware on the importance of maintaining close contact 
with the parliamentarians. 
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3 President Megawati appointed Dr. Hasan Wirajuda as Foreign Minister in August 2001. 
4 Interview, 3 November 2001. 
5 Interview, 5 December 2001. 
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Appendix No. 1 
List of Interviewees and Date of Interview 
1. Mr. Sunu Mahadi (Deputy Director overseeing Indochina Affairs, Directorate 
for Asia and the Pacific Affairs of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved 
in JIM and in informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 24 and 26 
September 2001. 
2. Mr. Andreas Sitepu (Deputy Director, Directorate for Policy Analysis, 
Directorate General for ASEAN Affairs of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. 
Former Head of Information Section, Indonesian Embassy in Manila. 
Involved in Moro peace process), 2 October 2001. 
3. Mr. Budiman Darmosutanto (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Ottawa and 
former Director for International Treaty of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. 
Involved in JIM), 3 October 2001. 
4. Mr. Kusnadi (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Bandar Seri Begawan and 
former Director for Asia and the Pacific of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. 
Involved in post-JIM and Moro peace process), 3 and 9 October 2001. 
5. Mr. Rahardjo Mustajab (Director for Functional Co-operation of the 
Directorate General for ASEAN of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Former 
Head of Political Section, Indonesian Embassy in Manila. Involved in Moro 
peace process), 4 October and 30 November 2001. 
6. Mr. John P. Louhanapessy (Former Director General for Political Affairs of 
the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in JIM), 16 October 2001. 
7. Mr. Juwana (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Hanoi and Beijing. Involved 
in JIM and informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 19 October 
2001. 
8. Mr. Wiryono Sastrohandoyo (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Paris and 
Canberra, and also former Director General for Political Affairs of the 
Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in post-JIM and in Moro peace 
process), 22 October 2001. 
9. Maj. Gen (ret.) Pieter Damanik (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Manila 
and former Director General for Social, Cultural, and Information Affairs of 
the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in JIM and in Moro peace process), 
23 October 2001. 
10. Dr. Ben Perkasa Drajat (Desk officer for APEC of the Indonesian Foreign 
Ministry), 24 October 2001. 
11. Mr. Ahmad Jatmiko (Staff at the Foreign Minister Office of the Indonesian 
Foreign Ministry. Involved in informal workshop on the South China Sea 
disputes), 30 October 2001. 
12. Mr. Wahid Suprijadi (Acting Director for Information of the Indonesian 
Foreign Ministry until early 2002), informal consultation, 30 October 2001. 
13. Rear Admiral (ret.) R. M. Sunardi (Involved in informal workshop on the 
South China Sea disputes), 31 October 2001. 
14. Mr. Soendaroe Rachmad (Former Head, Research and Development Agency 
of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in pre-JIM and in informal 
workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 1 November 2001. 
15. Dr. Hasan Wirajuda (Indonesia's Foreign Minister - appointed in 2001. 
Involved in Moro peace process), 3 November 2001. 
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16. Mr. Ali Alatas (Former Indonesia's Foreign Minister, from 1988 to 1999. 
Personally involved in JIM and post-JIM as well as in Moro peace process), 
14 November 2001. 
17. Mr. Rizali (Deputy Director, Protocol Affairs of the Indonesian Foreign 
Ministry. Involved in JIM), 15 November 2001. 
18. Dr. Boer Mauna (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Cairo and former 
Director for Political Research, Research and Development Agency of the 
Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in JIM), 15 November 2001. 
19. Mr. Dian Triansyah Djanie (Deputy Director, Directorate for Economic 
Relations among Developing Countries of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. 
Involved in JIM), 16 November 2001. 
20. Mr. Bantarto Bandoro, CSIS, 21 November 2001. 
21. Dr. Soejatmiko (Deputy Director, Directorate for Policy Analysis, Directorate 
General for ASEAN Affairs of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in 
informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 22 November 2001. 
22. Dr. Rizal Sukma, CSIS, 22 November 2001. 
23. Dr. Soedjati Djiwandono, CSIS, 22 November 2001. 
24. Mr. Mangantar Hutagalung (Desk officer for Southeast Asian Countries of the 
Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in informal workshop on the South 
China Sea disputes), 23 November 2001. 
25. Dr. Hasjim Djalal (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Ottawa and Head, 
Research and Development Agency of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. 
Involved in JIM and informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 23 
November and 7 December 2001. 
26. Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, LIPI, 28 November 2001. 
27. Mr. Abu Hartono (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Manila. Involved in 
Moro peace process), 28 November 2001. 
28. Mr. Abdul Naser (Special Advisor to the Indonesian Foreign Minister. 
Involved in informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 29 
November 2001. 
29. Dr. C. F. Luhulima, CSIS, 4 December 2001. 
30. Dr. Marti Natalegawa (Director for International Organization of the 
Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in JIM, Moro peace process and 
informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 5 December 2001. 
31. Mr. Darmawan Ronodipuro (Former Director for Information, State 
Secretariat, during President Abdurrahman Wahid. Involved in JIM), 12 
December 2001. 
32. Mr. Supamo (Prof. Fuad Hassan's personal secretary in the Research and 
Development Agency of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry in mid-1980s), 12 
December 2001. 
33. Prof. Fuad Hassan (Former Head, Research and Development Agency of the 
Indonesian Foreign Ministry), informal consultation, 21 December 2001. 
34. Mr. Ridwan Wahab (Director for Political Research, Research and 
Development Agency of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in 
informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 26 December 2001. 
35. Mr. Mohammad Jusuf (Head, Research and Development Agency of the 
Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in post-JIM and informal workshop on 
the South China Sea disputes), informal consultation, 26 December 2001. 
36. Mr. Teuku Rezasyah, University of Padjadjaran in Bandung, 28 December 
2001. 
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37. Mr. Fikri Cassidy (Desk officer for Disarmament of the Indonesian Foreign 
Ministry), 31 December 2001. 
38. Mr. Chalief Akbar (Head of Political Section, Indonesian Embassy in Dili -
East Timor. Involved in Moro peace process), 31 December 2001 and several 
informal consultation thorough e-mail. 
39. Mr. Yusbar Jamil (Director for Asia and the Pacific of the Indonesian Foreign 
Ministry. Involved in informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 10 
January 2002. 
40. Mr. Taufik Soedarpo (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Phnom Penh. 
Involved in post-JIM), 13 January 2002. 
41. Mr. Abdurahman Gunadirdja (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Beijing. 
Involved in JIM), 14 January 2002. 
42. Mr. Asep Setiawan (Former journalist from the daily Kompas - Indonesia. 
Reporter for the BBC London. He covered the Moro peace process and 
informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 15 August 2002. 
• Mr. Ali Alatas was interviewed by reporter from Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 
Tokyo, from 24 to 28 January 2000. 
• Ambassador Oscar Valenzuela, the Philippines' Ambassador to Jakarta, was 
interviewed by a reporter from The Jakarta Post, 26 April 1993. 
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Appendix No. 2 
THE 1945 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
(As amended by the First Amendment of 1999, the Second Amendment of 
2000, the Third Amendment of 2001 and the Fourth Amendment of 2002) 
Unofficial translation 
THE PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION 
Whereas independence is the inalienable right of all nations, therefore, all 
colonialism must be abolished in this world as it is not in conformity with 
humanity and justice; 
And the moment of rejoicing has arrived in the struggle of the Indonesian 
independence movement to guide the people safely and well to the gate of the 
independence of the state of Indonesia which shall be independent, united, 
sovereign, just and prosperous; 
By the grace of God Almighty and motivated by the noble desire to live a free 
national life, the people of Indonesia hereby declare their independence. 
Subsequent thereto, to form a government of the state of Indonesia which shall 
protect all the people of Indonesia and all the independence and the land that has 
been struggled for, and to improve public welfare, to educate the life of the people 
and to participate toward the establishment of a world order based on freedom, 
perpetual peace and social justice, therefore the independence of Indonesia shall 
be formulated into a constitution of the Republic of Indonesia which shall be built 
into a sovereign state based on a belief in the One and Only God, just and 
civilised humanity, the unity of Indonesia, and democratic life led by wisdom of 
thoughts in deliberation amongst representatives of the people, and achieving 
social justice for all the people of Indonesia. 
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STATEMENT BY THE CHi,IRMAN OF THE 
JAKARTA INFORMAL MEHTINGl 
Appendix No. 3 
With the concurrence of the participants of the Meeting 
I have the pleasure to make the following statement: 
1. The Jakarta Informal Heeting (JIM) was held in the 
City of Bogor from 25 - 28 July 1988. The Meeting 
compriaed two stages. At the first stage the 
participants were the four factions of Kampuchea. 
While at the second stage the four Kampuchean 
factions were joined by Brunei Darussalam, the Lao 
People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Repub-
lic of the Philippines, Singapore, the Kingdom of 
Thailand, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and 
the Republic of Indonesia. 
2. The purpose of JIM was to provide a framework for 
informal discussions among the parties directly 
involved and other concerned countries in the 
search for a comprehensive, just and durable 
solution of the Kampuchean problem, taking into 
account the legitimate interests of all concerned. 
The Meeting was organized and conducted in accord-
ance with the Ho Chi Minh City Understanding, 
concluded between the Foreign Ministers of Indone-
sia and Vietnam on July 29, 1987. 
3. The discussions throughout the meetin• were marked 
by a friendly and constructive atmosphere and 
covered a wide range of issues and aspects 
relevant to the Kampuchean problem. There was 
·-------------------
1. Two participants, H.E. Mr. Son Sann and H.B. Mr. Khieu 
Samphan have expressed their reservations. 
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sincere Willingness on all sides to exert efforts 
to identify areas of common ground and 
convergencies of view on the issues discussed. 
4. All the participants agreed on the need to solve 
the Kampuchean problem through political means and 
thereby contribute to the establishment of peace 
and stability in Southeast Asia. 
5. During the discussions there was a common under-
standing on the urgent need to end the sufferings 
of the Kampuchean people and to work towards the 
establishment of an independent, sovereign, 
peaceful, neutral and non-~ligned Kampuchea on the 
basis of self-c.l.?tqrmination and national 
reconciliation. 
6. All participants shared the view that the two k~y 
issu~s of the Kampuchean problem which are inter-
linked are the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces 
from Kampuchea, to be carried out within 
context of an overall political solution and 
the 
the 
prevention of the recu~rence of genocidal pol~cies 
and practices of the Pol Pot regime and to ensure 
the cessation of all foreign interference and 
external arms supplies to the opposing Kampuchean 
forces. They also saw the need to set definite 
time-tables and to provide an effective 
international presence to supervise • these 
processes. 
7. The participants recognized the complexities of 
the Kampuchean problem in its many dimensions and 
aspects and in its ramifications which are both 
regional and international in scope. They, there-
fore, concurred on the need to have further dis-
cussions on issues on which there were still 
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divergencies of view and those which still require 
further detailed consideration. In this connection 
I refer to a decision taken by the Meeting to 
establish a Working Group to examine specific 
aspects of a political solution. 
The City of Bogar, 28 July 1988. 
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Appendix No. 4 
CONSENSUS STATEMENT OF TIIE CHAIRMAN OF 
THE JAKARTA INFORMAL MEETING 1 
1. The second Jakarta Informal Meeting was held from 19-21 
February, 1989, preceded by the second rr.eeting of the Work-
ing Group of the J.I.M which convened from 16-18 February 
1989. Both meetings were attended by Delegations from Brunei 
Darussalam, the four parties of Kampuchea, the Lao People's 
Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philip-
pines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and the Republic of 
Indonesia. 
2. As during the first J.I.M., the second Jakarta Informal 
Meeting was organized and conducted in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the Ho Chi Minh City Understanding, 
concluded between the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and 
Vietnam on 29 July 1987. 
3. The proceedings throughout tWe\Meeting were characterized by 
a frank and constructive atmosphere, with all sides showing 
seriousness of pu~pose and effort to identify areas of 
common ground and to promote convergencies of view on the 
issues discussed. 
4. All participants agreed to puild upon the progress already 
achieved at the first Jakarta Informal Meeting in terms of 
agreed understandings and approaches towards solution and, 
hence, to direct their further efforts towards addressing 
and resolving those substantive issues and aspects on which 
there were still divergencies of view among them. 
- ·---------.- ... ---------
l.Three participants, HRH Prince Ranariddh, H.E. Mr, Son Sann and 




they reiterated their common understandings 
a) the Ka~puchea questior~ \hould be resolved through 
political means, thereby contributing to the establish-
ment of peace and stability in Southeast Asia; 
b) the ultimate objective to strive for is the establish-
ment of an independent, sovereign, peaceful, neutral 
nnd non-aligned Kampuchea on the basis of self-
determination and national reconciliation; this would 
c) 
ensure a Kampuchea at peace within itself, free from 
foreign interference by any quarter and posing no 
threat to any of its neighbours; 
there should be a comprehensive, just and durable 
solution, encompassing all aspects of the question and 
taking into account the legitimate concerns of all 
parties involved. 
6. Participants also reiterated the view that the two key 
issues of the Kampuchea question which are inter-linked are 
the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea, , to be 
carried out within the context of an overall political 
solution and the prevention of the recurrence of ienocidal 
policies and practices of the Pol Pot regime and to ensure 
the cessation of all foreign interference and external arms 
supplies to the opposing Kampuchean forces. They also saw 
the need to set definite time-tables and to provide an 
effective international presence to supervise these process-
es. 
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Withdrawal of Vietnam~se forces within the co~text of an 
overall solution, 
On this issue, participants concurred on the followin: 
general understandin~e: 
a, a cease-fire throughout Kam~uchea would take effect on 
the date of entry into force of an agreement on the 
solution of the Kampuchea question. Its modalities and 
detailed aspects would be further worked out; 
b. immediately following cease-fire, the withdrawal from 
Kampuchea of all Vietnamese troops, military advisors 
and personnel, armaments and other war materials would 
begin, with the entire process of withdrawal being 
completed no later than 30 September 1989; 
c. the manner of withdrawal, whether nL'lnerically or 
territorially based and whether phased or not, as well 
as all other practical modalities would be the subject 
of further negotiations; 
d. The process of withdrawal and all other aupects related 
to it as referred to in paragraph 6 above, would be 
under the adequate and effective supervision of an 
International Control Mechanism, which would be in-
place and deployed prior to the start of withdrawal; 
Prevention of the recurrence of genocidal policies and 
practices of the Pol Pot regime 
Participants shared the view that concrete measures will 
have to be taken to prevent the recurrence of genocidal 
policies and practices of the Pol Pot regime and the resump-
tion of armed hostilities, Such concrete measures needed to 
be further discussed. 
394 
Cessation of all foreign i~tetference and external armg 
~uQpl i es to th_g_ oppoH i ng l{umpuchean fore~§. 
9, To ceu~e ul.l. fol'eign interference and external arms supplies 
:o the opposing Kampuchean forces, the participants con-
curred that concrete m~asures should be taken, the details 
of which required further discussions. 
10, The time-table of withdrawal of Vietnamese forces in the 
context of a comprehensive solution of the Kampuchean ques-
tion and the time-table for cessation of all foreign inter-
ference and external arms supplies to all Kampuchean parties 
would be synchronized. The modalities of the synchronization 
will be further discussed and worked out. 
international Control Mechanism 
11. On this issue, participants concurred on the following 
general understandings: 
a) an International Control Mechanism (I.C.M) would be 
established, having the required components so as to 
ensure its operational effectiveness, and equipped with 
necessary arms for self-defen~e and for the discharge of 
its duties; 
b) with due respect to the sovereignty of Kampuchea, the 
mandate/scope of functions of the I.C.M would be, inter 
alia, to monitor, supervise and verify the processes of 
~ithdrawal of Vietnamese forces and all other aspects 
related to it as referred to in paragraph 6 above, the 
prevention of a resumption of armed hostilities and the 
conduct of the general elections; 
c) the nature (civilian, military or both), composition, 
size, operational principles and time-frame of operation 
of the I.C.M., as well as auspices under which the I.C.M. 
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12. 
woulJ uperate (whether under tlie UN or othE:r auspices), 
wuulJ be Lhe subject of further negotiations. 
Intt=::1·.na)_as~,:::c_ts of_ the Kampucht=::a q_ut=::stion 
«.,> \ 
Participants supported the p~inciple agreed by the 
chean parties that in the exercise of the right of 
Kampu-
self-
determination of the people of Kampuchea, general elections 
woulJ be held in a free and democratic fashion under the 
supervision of an International Control Mechanism. The 
electoral provisions and other organizational modalities for 
the i~neral elections would be the subject of further dis-
cussions among the four Kampuchean parties. 
13. Noting that there are disagreements in the positions of the 
Kampucl\ean parties on the internal aspects of the Kampuchea 
question, notably on the establishment of an interim quadri-
partite authority of national reconciliation under the 
leadership of H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, the partici-
pants reaffirmed the universally recognized principle of 
people's right of self-determination and that the internal 
affairs of Kampuchea must be settled by the Kampuchean 
people themselves. They welcomed the continuation of talks 
between the four Kampuchean parties to settle the internal 
aspects. The participants proposed that within fou~ months 
or aooner, the four Kampuchean parties will inform the JIM 
Chairman of the results of·the talks. 
Tl,e establishment of peace and stability in Southeast Asia 
1.;. All participants shared the view that a comprehensive solu-
tion of the Kampuchea question should contribute to the 
establishment of durable peace, stability and mutual cooper-
ation in Southeast Asia. Having studied the provisions 
contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-
east Asia, concluded at Bali on 24 February 197G and open 
for acces$iOn by all States in Southeast Asia, participants 
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agreed that ail undertaking by all Southeast Asian countries 
t . ., IJ~•:<J111t~ r•>.11·1.y t.o thiH Trt::1\l.y, would sct·vt:, t.o 111tl11ift:,st in a 
conc1-etc::: way Lheir common <l1::sirt: to &chieve that goal. 
f5. Pat·ticip&.nts also shared the view that a ·comprehensi·:e 
pol it i cnl solution ;Jf the Kampuchea q11est ion would a.cceler-
a tt': the realization of ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia. 
The International Conference 
JG. Participants agreed that after achieving broad consensus on 
the various elements and aspects of·a. comprehensive solution 
to the Kampuchea. question within the J.I.M. process, there 
would be a need to convene an International Conference. 
17. There was a common understanding that the main purpose of 
such an International Conference would be, inter alia, to 
obtai11: 
1a) gua1·1-a1,teet; by ull pa1·ticipant of the Confe1·e11cc of full 
compliance with all agreements on the solution of the 
Kampuchea question; 
b) international endorsement of the declared status of 
Kampuchea as a sovereign, independent, peacefui, neutral 
and non-aligned State within its territorial integrity; 
c) the adoption and initiation of an international programme 
of economic reconstruction and development for Kampuchea 
and other countries of the region; 
d) the necessary funding for the implementation of the 
Kampuchean peace process. 
18. Questions with regard to date, venue an.d participants of the 
International Conference, as well as under who~e auspices 
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such a Conference is to be convened, would be the subject o 
furth~P consultations. 
t9. Participants agreed to await the results of the talk~ amon 
the fou1· Kampuchean parties. as referred to in paragraph 13 
in the ligl,t of those results, the JIM Chairman will consul 
with all participants with a view to deciding what fu~the 
ai.:.:tion to take. 
Jakarta, 21 February 1989. 
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Appendix No. 5 
TI-IE TRIPOLI AGREEMENT 
In the Name of God, tire Omnipotent, the Merciful. 
AGREEivfENT BETWEEN TI-IE GOVERNMENT OF TI-IE .·. 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES· AND MORO 
NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT WITi-I IBE PARTICI-
PATION OF TI-IE QUADRIPARTITE MINISTERIAL COM-
MISSION l\1EMBERS OF TI-IE ISLAL\1IC CONFERENCE 
AND TI-IE SECRETARY GENERAL OF TI-IE ORGANIZA-
TION OF ISLA.tv!IC C01\1FERENCE 
In accordance with the Resolution No. IV Para. V adopt-
ed by the Council of Ministers· of the Islamic Conference in 
its 'Fourth Session held in Benghazi, Libyan Arab Republic 
during the month of Safar 1393 H. co~esponding to March 
1973, calling for the formation of Quadripartite Ministerial 
Commission representing the Libyan Arab Republic~ the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Senegal and the 
Republic of Somalia, to enter into discussions with the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of the Philippines concerning the 
situation of L~e 1'1uslims in the South of.the Philippines. 
And in accordance with the Resolution No. (18) adopted 
by the Islamic Conference held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
in Jumada Alakhir 1393 H. corresponding· to June 1974 A.D. 
which recommends the searching for a just and peaceful 
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political solution to the problem of the Muslims in the South 
of the Philippines through the negotiations. 
And in accordance with the Resolution No. 12/7/S 
adopted by ·the Islamic Conference held in Istanbul in 
Jumada El-Ula 1396 H. corresponding to May 1976 A.D. 
empowering the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission and 
the Secretary_ General of the Islamic Conference to take the 
necessary steps for the resumption of negotiations. 
And following the task undertaken by the Quadripartite 
Ministerial Commission and the Secretary General of the 
Islamic Conference and the discussions held with H.E. Pres-
ident Marcos, President of the Republic of the Philippines. 
And in realization of the contents of Para. (VI) of the 
Joint Communique issued in Tripoli on the 25th Zulgeda · 
1396 H. corresponding to 17th November 1976 A.D. follow-
ing the official visit paid by the delegation of the Govern-
ment of the Philippines headed by the First Lady of the 
Philippines, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, to the Libyan 
Arab Republic and which calls for the resumption of negotia-
tions be~ween the hvo parties concerned in Tripoli on the 
15~h of December 1976 A.D. 
Negotiations were held in the City of Tripoli during the 
period beh,veen 24th Zulhijja 1396 H. to Second to Moharram 
1397 H. corresponding to the period from 15th to 23rd 
December 1976 A.D. at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pre-
sided over by Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki, Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Libyan Arab Republic, and comprising 
of the Delegations of: · 
1. Government of the Republic of the Philippines, led 
by Honorable Carmelo Z. Barbero, Undersecretary of 
National Defense for Civilian Relatio;1s. 
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2. Moro National Liberation Front, led by Mr. Nur 1viis-
uari, Chief of the Front. 
And with the participation of the representatives of the 
Quadripartite Ministerial Commission: 
The Libyan Arab Republic-represented by Dr. Ali 
Abdussalam Treki, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia-H.E. Salah Abdalla 
El-Fadl, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
Libyan Arab Republic. 
The Republic of Senegal-Mr. Abubakar Othman Si, 
Representative of the Republic of Senegal and Charge 
d' Affaires of Senegal in Cairo. 
Democratic Republic of Somalia-H.E. Bazi Mohamed 
Sufi, Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Somalia, 
Libyan Arab Republic. 
\i\7i th the aid of H.E. Dr. Ahmed Karim Gaye, Secretary 
General of the Organization of Islamic Conference, and a 
delegation from the Secretariat General of trye Conference 
composed of Mr. Qasim Zuheri, Assistant Secretary Gener-
al and lvfr. Aref Ben Musa, Director of Political Department. 
During these negotiations which were marked by a 
spirit of conciliation and understanding, it has been agreed 
on the follov..ring: 
First: The establishment of Autonomy in the Southern 
Philippines ,.,•ithin the realm of the sovereignty and territo-
rial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. 
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Second: The areas of the autonomy for the Muslims in 




4. Zamboanga del Sur 
5. Zamboanga del Norte 
6. North Cotabato 
7. lvfaguindanao 
8. Sultan K udara t 
Third: 
9. Lanao del Norte 
10. Lanao del Sur 
11. Davao del Sur 
12. South Cotabato 
13. Palawan 
14. All the cities and villages 
situated in the above-
mentioned areas. 
1. Foreign Policy shall be of the competence of the Cen-
tral Government of the Philippines. 
2 The National Defense Affairs shall be the· concern of 
the Central Authority provided that ~he arrangements for 
the jou:ung- oR µie·.forces-:·of the Moro National Liberation 
_~ront ,;.rith the Philippi~-.A.rmed Forces be discussed later. 
3 In the areas of the autonomy, the_Muslirns shall have 
the right to set up t.lieir own Courts which implement the 
Islamic Shari'a laws. The lvfuslims shall be repres·ented in 
all Courts including the Supreme Court. The representation 
of the Muslims in the Supreme Court shall be upon the 
recommendation from the authorities of th_e Autonomy and 
the Supreme Court. Decrees will be issued by the President 
of the Republic of their appointments taking into considera-
tion all necessary qualifications of the candidates. 
4 Authorities of the autonomy in the South of the 
Philippines shall have. the right to set up schools, colleges 
and t::niversities, provided that mutters pertaining to the 
relc:tionship between these educational and scientific organs 
and the general education system in the State shall be sub-
ject of disc..!ssioi.'1 1<1 ter on. 
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5 The Muslims shall have their own administr.1tive sys-
tem in compliance with the o~jectives of th~ auto~o.my a.nd 
its institutions. The relationship between this admm1stralwe 
system and the Central c1dministrative system to be discus;-_ 
sed later. 
6 The authorities of the autonomy in the South of the 
Philippines shall have their own economic and financial sys-
tem. The relationship between this system and the Central 
economic and finc1ncial system of the State shall be discussed 
later. 
7 The authorities of the autonomy in the South of the 
Philippines shall enjoy the right of representation and par-
ticipation in the Central Government and in all other organs 
of the State. The number of representatives and ways of 
participation shall be fixed later. 
8 :·~~ReJ?)Jifgi_o_ii.al Security Forces are to be set up in the 
>-. - ~,-....... _ ····- .... , .. ·. . 
area of the AutonOmy for the Muslims in the South of the 
Philippines. The relationship between these forces and the 
Central security forces shall be fixed later. 
9 A Legislative Assembly and an Exe~tive Council 
shall be formed in the areas of the Autonomy for the Mus-
lims. The setting up of the Legisla live Assembly shall be 
constituted through a direct election, and the formation of · 
the Executive Council shall take place thru_1:.1gh appointments 
by the Legis!;ative Assembly. A decree for their formation 
shall be enacted by the President of the Republic respective-
ly. The number of members of eac;h assembly shall be deter-
mined later on. 
10 lviines and mineral resources fall vvithin the compe-
tence of the Central Government, and a reasonable percen-
tage deriving from the revenues of the mines c1nd minerc1Is 
be fixed for the benefit of the ~re.ls o( the autonomy. 
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11 A mixed Committee shall be composed of representa-
tives of the Central Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines and representatives of the Moro National Libera-
tion Front. The mixed Committee shall meet in Tripoli dur-. 
ing the period from the Fifth of February to a date not later 
than the Third of March 1977. The task of the said.Committee 
shall be charged to study in detail the points left for discus-
sion in order to reach a solution thereof in conformity with 
the provisions of this agreement. 
12 Cease-fire shall be declared immediately after the 
signature of this agreement, provided that its coming into 
effect should not exceed the 20th January 1977. A Joint 
Com~tte~ shall be composed of the two parties vvith the 
help of the Organization of the Islamic Conference rep-
resented by the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission to 
supervise the implementation of the cease-fire. · 
The said Joint Committee shall also be charged with 
supervising the follmving: 
a A complete amnesty in the areas of the autonomy 
and the renunciation of all legal claims and codes result-
ing from events which took place in the South of the 
Philippines. 
b The release of all the political prisoners who had 
relations with the events in the South of the P~ilippines. 
c The return of all refugees \i.,,•ho have abandoned 
their areas in the South of the Philippine~. 
d To guarantee the freedom of movements and 
meetings. 
13 A joint meeting be he1d in Jeddah during the first 
week of the month of :tvforch 1977 to initial what has been 
concluded by the Cammi ttee referred to in Para. 11. 
14 Thc finnl agreement concerning the setting up of the 
cJLi tonomy referred to in the first and second pclragraphs 
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shall be signed in the City of Manilc:i, Republic of the Philip-
pines, between the Government of the Philippines and Moro 
National Liberation Front, and the Islamic Conference rep-
resented by the Quadripartite Ministerial Commissior:i.-,md 
the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Confer-
ence. 
15 Immediately after the signature of the Agreement in 
Manila, a Provisional Government shall be established in the 
areas of the autonomy to be appointed by ~he President of 
the Philippines; and be charged with the task of preparing 
for the elections of the Legislative Assembly in the territories 
of the Autonomy; ~nd adriunhter the areas in accordance 
with the provisions of this agreement until a Government is 
formed by the elected Legislative Assembly. 
16 The Government of the Philippines shall take all 
necessary constitutional processes for the implementation of 
the entire Agreement. 
Fourth: This Agreement shap come into force with effect 
from the date of its signatur·e. 
Done in the City of Tripoli on 2nd Muharram 1397 H. 
corresponding to 23rd December 1976 A.D. in three original 
copies irt Arabic, English, Frcnd1 languages, all equal in legal 
power. 
FOR TrlE GOVERNMENT OF 
"CT-IE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: 
HON. CARMELO. Z. BARBERO 
Undersecretary of National Defense 
for Civilian Rcl.iltions 
OR. ALI ABDUSSALAM TREK! 
Minister of State for Foreign 
Affair.;, Libyan Arab Republic and 
Chcinnan of the Negotiations 
FOR THE MORO NATIONAL 
LIBERA TIOi.J FRONT: 
lvffi .. NUR MISUARJ 
Chainnan_ of tlze Front 
DR. AHMED KARIM GAYE 
Secretan; General of the 
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